Starbucks Corporation

373 NLRB No. 53 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Starbucks Corporation and Chicago & Midwest Re- gional Joint Board, Workers United/SEIU. Case 18–CA–293653 May 7, 2024 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS KAPLAN, PROUTY, AND WILCOX On March 3, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Geof- frey Carter issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief. The General Counsel also filed excep- tions with supporting argument, the Respondent filed an answering brief, and the General Counsel filed a reply brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.1 The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,2 findings,3 and conclusions4 as 1 The Respondent asserts that Members Prouty and Wilcox should recuse themselves based on their “past, present, and perceived relation- ships with the Service Employees International Union (‘SEIU’) Interna- tional Union, SEIU Local Unions, and their affiliates, including Work- ers United.” Members Prouty and Wilcox have determined, in consul- tation with the Board’s Designated Agency Ethics Official, that there is no basis to recuse themselves from the adjudication of this case. 2 We find no merit in the Respondent’s exception to the judge’s rul- ing at the hearing granting the General Counsel’s petition to revoke the Respondent’s subpoena duces tecum issued to employee Hannah Fogarty. 3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder- ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 4 For the reasons stated by the judge, we affirm his conclusions that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1), in about late February 2022 or early March 2022, by threatening employee Fogarty that the Respond- ent would enforce work rules more strictly because of employees’ union activities and that employees could be terminated because of that stricter enforcement and, on a date between about February 11, 2022, and April 4, 2022, threatening employee Fogarty with unspecified reprisals against employees if they unionized. In affirming these con- clusions, Member Kaplan observes that, although the judge did not explicitly rely on demeanor when he credited Fogarty’s account over that of store manager Nick Reid, he did rely on that the fact that Fogarty provided a more detailed account of their conversation. Mem- ber Kaplan does not find that a clear preponderance of the evidence warrants overturning this credibility resolution. Accordingly, Member Kaplan finds it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s inaccurate statement that Reid did not directly refute Fogarty’s more detailed testimony. In further discussed below and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.5 I. BACKGROUND FACTS On February 11, 2022,6 the employees of a Starbucks store in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, went public with their union organizing campaign urging the Respondent to voluntarily recognize Chicago & Midwest Regional Joint Board, Workers United/SEIU (the Union) as their collec- tive-bargaining representative. That same day, employ- ees Sydney Lebarron-Fahl, Aleja Norton-Abad, and Syd Nelson met with Respondent Store Manager Nick Reid in the store’s back room away from the sales floor and delivered to him a letter that their coworker Hannah Fogarty had emailed that morning to the Respondent’s President and CEO Kevin Johnson. Surprised by the organizing campaign, Reid asked the employees individually why they sought to unionize. Each employee provided their personal reasons, which included concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic, staff- ing levels, wages, and the lack of transparent communi- cation. Reid responded that he felt like he had failed as a store manager. Lebarron-Fahl told Reid that the organiz- ing campaign was not about him but involved corporate- level issues that Reid could not fix. After Reid asked why they had not raised their concerns with him first, Lebarron-Fahl explained that other employees had told them of having felt dissatisfied after speaking with him. The very next day, on February 12, Reid told Norton- Abad that he wanted to speak with her after her break. Norton-Abad again met with Reid in the store’s back room. As he did the day before, Reid asked Norton- affirming these conclusions, Member Kaplan also does not rely on the judge’s statement that “[t]he problem in this conversation began when Reid stated that his back was on the line.” We also affirm the judge’s conclusion that, based on current Board law, the Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) by holding mandatory captive audience meetings with employees during worktime to express to them its views about their organizing campaign. Members Prouty and Wilcox are open to reconsidering Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 NLRB 577 (1948), and the legality of mandatory captive audience meetings in a future appropriate case. No exceptions were filed to the judge’s dismissal of the allegations that the Respondent, on February 11, 2022, unlawfully interrogated employees by repeatedly asking them why they felt they needed a un- ion and, in about late March 2022, unlawfully threatened employees with stricter enforcement of the Respondent’s dress code because of their union activities. 5 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order in accordance with our decision in Paragon Systems, Inc., 371 NLRB No. 104 (2022). Member Kaplan acknowledges and applies Paragon Systems as Board precedent, although he expressed disagreement there with the Board's approach and would have adhered to the position the Board adopted in Danbury Ambulance Service, Inc., 369 NLRB No. 68 (2020). We shall substitute a new notice to conform with the Board’s stand- ard remedial language. 6 All dates hereinafter are in 2022 unless otherwise indicated. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 Abad why she wanted to unionize and why she had never approached him to discuss her concerns. Norton-Abad told him that she had heard from others that bringing concerns to him had not been productive. Reid scoffed when Norton-Abad mentioned that she knew that the Respondent’s corporate policies limited what he could do. When Norton-Abad gave, as an example of her con- cerns, Reid telling a coworker to just take some vacation time if the coworker was concerned about COVID-19 exposure at work, Reid started to raise his voice and again mentioned that Norton-Abad had never brought that issue to him and told her that she does not know what he told that coworker. After a few moments of silence, Norton-Abad pivoted the focus of the meeting away from her union support by asking Reid why exactly he was against the employees’ organizing campaign. Reid responded that he was afraid of losing his job based on research he had done the night before and texts he had received from friends. Reid also explained that he was worried that unionizing would in- hibit his close relationship with employees and might create hostility between employees. Reid questioned Norton-Abad as to whether unionizing was “worth the risk” and if employees “knew what they were signing up for.” Norton-Abad countered that unionizing was worth the risk and, while agreeing that employees should be well-informed about the Union, noted that a lot of em- ployees feared being terminated if they showed support for the Union. The meeting concluded with Norton- Abad telling Reid that she hoped the two of them could continue working well together. II. DISCUSSION For the reasons stated by the judge, we affirm his find- ings that Reid’s February 12 meeting with Norton-Abad violated Section 8(a)(1) by unlawfully threatening un- specified reprisals against her and her coworkers if em- ployees unionized and by unlawfully interrogating her as to her support for the Union.7 We also affirm the judge’s 7 On exceptions, the Respondent argues that the complaint incor- rectly specified that Reid’s unlawful conduct occurred on the “work floor” because Reid’s February 12 meeting with Norton-Abad indisput- ably occurred in the store’s back room, not the “work floor” that the Respondent claims is only in the front of the store. Regardless of whether the “work floor” of the store includes the back room where Reid’s February 12 meeting with Norton-Abad took place, minor factu- al discrepancies from what was alleged in the complaint as to the loca- tion of where a violation occurred do not create a due-process issue. In this case, the Respondent was not prevented from mounting its defense to the allegations because there was never any dispute as to which of Reid’s statements the General Counsel was alleging were unlawful. In the alternative, we find the judge’s violation findings are permissible because they are “closely connected to the subject matter of the com- plaint and ha[ve] been fully litigated.” See Pergament United Sales, 296 NLRB 333, 334 (1989) (finding that the Board may find a violation dismissal of the allegation, for the reasons he stated, that Reid did not unlawfully threaten Norton-Abad with job loss during this same meeting. A. Threat of Unspecified Reprisals In considering the entirety of Reid’s remarks at the February 12 meeting, we agree with the judge that Nor- ton-Abad would have reasonably understood them as threatening unspecified reprisals against employees be- cause of their organizing campaign. Just the day earlier, Reid had already asked Norton-Abad about and heard her reasons for supporting the Union. Nonetheless, Reid followed up with Norton-Abad the very next day by tell- ing her to meet with him again privately to discuss em- ployees’ unionization bid. This time, Reid pointedly expressed to Norton-Abad his frustration and concerns about employees’ union activity, including his perception that it posed a risk to his own job. When Norton-Abad tried to impress upon Reid that he was not at fault for employees seeking to unionize, Reid scoffed at Norton-Abad. Reid explained to Norton-Abad that he was worried that unionizing would inhibit his close relationship with employees and conveyed to Nor- ton-Abad that, in addition to the risk to his own job, she and her coworkers may face negative consequences by asking if organizing was “worth the risk” and if employ- ees “knew what they were signing up for.” Based on the context in which the remarks were made and the overall tenor of the meeting, including Reid scoffing at Norton-Abad and raising his voice while speaking with her at one point, Reid’s remarks to Nor- ton-Abad about fearing that the organizing campaign would hurt his close relationship with employees and asking if organizing was “worth the risk” and if employ- ees “knew what they were signing up for,” when taken together, would reasonably be understood as a threat intended to dissuade Norton-Abad from continuing her union activity. An employee whose manager expresses such disdain towards her actions and questions the soundness of her engaging in those actions would reasonably be concerned that her manager, or someone else acting on behalf of her employer, might discipline or take some other form of adverse action against her. Reid baselessly prognosticat- ed to Norton-Abad about the negative repercussions that even in the absence of a specified complaint allegation if the issue has been fully litigated), enfd. 920 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Wayne J. Griffin Electric, Inc., 335 NLRB 1362, 1362 fn. 2 (2001) (finding violation even though complaint misidentified unlawful statements as being made at a job site instead of on a telephone call because “the violations found by the judge are sufficiently related to the [complaint] allegations” and “the violations were fully and fairly litigated”), enfd. 36 Fed. Appx. 138 (4th Cir. 2002). STARBUCKS CORP. 3 could come about by unionizing. Moreover, Reid’s vague statement about unionization damaging his close relationship with employees is distinguishable from the lawful statements in Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377 (1985). Reid’s comment was much more ominous be- cause it did not give any indication that this potential harm to employees would only occur as an outcome of the collective-bargaining process. In addition, we disa- gree with our dissenting colleague’s claims regarding how an employee would reasonably understand Reid’s statements. Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s asser- tion about what Norton-Abad “clearly understood,” we do not think that a reasonable employee would have a tendency to understand Reid’s comments, in the context of Reid’s expression of frustration with employees’ un- ionization effort, as referring only to employee knowledge of unionization in general, and without threatening unlawful action. We similarly disagree with our colleague that Reid’s dismissive reactions to Norton- Abad’s explanations for employees’ union activity would not cause an employee to reasonably believe that she may face reprisals for engaging in that activity. Consid- ering the entire context of Reid’s statements to Norton- Abad, we find that they constituted an unlawful threat.8 8 Because it would not affect the remedy, we find it unnecessary to pass on the General Counsel’s exception to the judge not specifically finding that Reid’s questions to Norton-Abad about whether unionizing was “worth the risk” and if employees “knew what they were signing up for” were also independently unlawful threats of unspecified repris- als. Similarly, although the judge dismissed the allegation that Reid committed an additional 8(a)(1) violation by threatening Norton-Abad that unionization would inhibit his close working relationship with employees, we find it unnecessary to pass on whether that comment independently constituted an additional threat of unspecified reprisals. Lastly, because the statements here are distinguishable, we find it un- necessary to pass on the General Counsel’s exception urging the Board to overrule Tri-Cast, Inc., above. Member Kaplan would reverse the judge and dismiss this allegation. First, there is no threat in Reid expressing his concern that unionization would inhibit his close relationship with employees. See Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377, 377 (1985) (“There is no threat, either explicit or im- plicit, in a statement which explains to employees that, when they se- lect a union to represent them, the relationship that existed between the employees and the employer will not be as before.”). The catalyst for the change in the employer-employee relationship—employees’ selec- tion of the Union as their bargaining representative—is self-evident, it would therefore have been clear that any change “would only occur as an outcome of the collective-bargaining process.” Second, as explained below, Reid’s concerns about his own job security would not be rea- sonably understood as threatening that employees might also lose their jobs if they unionized. In this context, an employee would not reasona- bly view Reid’s questions about employees being aware of and ready for the risks of unionization to suggest that their actions would result in the Respondent making negative changes to their terms and conditions of employment. In fact, although Reid asked Norton-Abad whether unionizing was “worth the risk," the risks he referred to in their conver- sation were that he was fearful that unionizing would affect the close relationship he had with employees and that he feared conflicts between B. Interrogation We agree with the judge that, under the totality of the circumstances, Reid’s interrogation of Norton-Abad about her union sympathies, just a day after Reid had already asked Norton-Abad the exact same questions, would reasonably tend to interfere with, restrain, or co- erce an employee’s union activity. See Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1178 & fn. 20 (1984), affd. sub nom. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). Reid, the Respondent’s high- est-ranking official at the store, directly questioned Nor- ton-Abad about her support for the Union during a one- on-one meeting initiated by Reid solely to discuss the employees’ organizing campaign and during which Reid expressed his personal concerns about employees’ union organizing. Reid engaged in this questioning while openly expressing his hostility towards Norton-Abad’s responses during the meeting, including scoffing at her when she suggested there were limits on his authority and raising his voice when Norton-Abad mentioned a coworker who had told her that Reid had dismissed that employee’s concerns about COVID-19 exposure. Instructively, the questioning occurred in the same meeting where Reid unlawfully threatened Norton-Abad with unspecified reprisals. See Parts Depot, Inc., 332 NLRB 670, 673 (2000) (“Where the interrogation is ac- companied by threats or other violations of Section 8(a)(1), as this one was, there can be no question as to the coercive effect of the inquiry.”), enfd. 24 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Norton-Abad’s truthful response to Reid does not negate the coerciveness of the interroga- tion. Unlike the February 11 discussion when Reid asked employees about their union support, in a moment of surprise immediately after employees informed him of their demand for voluntary recognition of the Union, Reid’s deliberative questioning of Norton-Abad about employees with different views of the Union. When Reid asked wheth- er employees knew what they were signing up for, Norton-Abad an- swered that "we wanted to make sure they understood, you know, what a union was and understood what they were signing up for," and Reid responded "okay." As would any reasonable employee, she clearly understood that Reid was referring to employee knowledge of unioniza- tion in general and was not threatening unlawful action by the Re- spondent. Third, an employee would not reasonably view Reid’s “scoffs” or raised voice as hostility toward employees’ decision to unionize. Rather, Reid’s reactions came in direct response to Norton- Abad’s statements about Reid’s job position—specifically that Reid had limited authority to address employee complaints in relation to corpo- rate management and the perception that employees had not been satis- fied when raising concerns with him. The exchange had nothing to do with the Respondent’s views about the Union, and Reid’s purely per- sonal reactions did not in any way hint at “reprisals” by the Respond- ent. For these reasons, Member Kaplan finds that Reid’s remarks, questions, and actions, as individual statements and when taken togeth- er, did not convey a threat of unspecified reprisals. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 her union sympathies after having already done so the day before, and without Reid providing Norton-Abad with any explanation for doing so again, would have rea- sonably discouraged her from engaging in further union activity. Our dissenting colleague would find Reid’s interrogation of Norton-Abad lawful because he de- scribes Reid as having only followed up with Norton- Abad over their conversation from the previous day. However, there was nothing for Reid to follow up about regarding the employees’ unionization efforts, as Reid had already heard from employees about why they had sought to unionize and he did not seek any new or addi- tional information that would warrant his further ques- tioning of Norton-Abad. In light of the context in which Reid’s interrogation of Norton-Abad occurred, we find that it was unlawfully coercive.9 C. Threat of Job Loss Irrespective of the legality of Reid’s remarks at the February 12 meeting, discussed above, we agree with the judge that Reid did not unlawfully threaten Norton-Abad with job loss. Reid’s speculation to Norton-Abad about the risks that employee organizing posed to his own job reasonably conveyed nothing more than an honest as- sessment of his own subjective concerns. Reid’s specu- 9 Member Kaplan would reverse the judge and dismiss the interro- gation allegation. The day before the conversation at issue, employees met Reid in the back of the store to inform him of their decision to seek union representation, and Reid asked them about their reasons for or- ganizing. Reid followed up with Norton-Abad the next day and, in a one-on-one conversation in the back of the store, asked Norton-Abad the same question about employees’ reasons for seeking union repre- sentation. Reid did not seek new or additional information that could be used against Norton-Abad or other employees, and she freely an- swered his questions and queried him about why he opposed unioniza- tion. The conversation occurred in the same part of the store where employees apparently felt comfortable discussing unionization with Reid only a day earlier. Norton-Abad answered Reid’s question honest- ly and indicated that she and Reid had a good working relationship by stating at the end of their conversation that she hoped they could con- tinue working well together. Further, as explained above, Member Kaplan does not find that Reid threatened Norton-Abad with unspeci- fied reprisals during this conversation as in, e.g., Parts Depot, supra. Therefore, the background, nature of the information sought, location of the inquiry, and Norton-Abad’s truthful response weigh against finding that Reid’s limited questioning was coercive under Rossmore House, supra. Reid’s status as the highest-ranking in-store official does not change the balance in favor of finding the questioning coercive because the record shows that he was a low-ranking member of the Respondent’s management hierarchy and that he and Norton-Abad, whom he directly supervised, had an amicable relationship. See gener- ally Toma Metals, Inc., 342 NLRB 787, 789 (2004) (dismissing interro- gation allegation where employee’s question about union activity prompted low-level supervisor to ask another employee about union rumors, supervisor and employee had a friendly relationship, conversa- tion was informal and not in the boss’s office, and employee answered truthfully). For these reasons, Member Kaplan would find that Reid’s questioning of Norton-Abad did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. lation about his own circumstances does not reasonably convey a threat of Norton-Abad’s job loss because, as the judge pointed out, the two were not similarly situated. Reid is the store manager. Given the significant differ- ences in their job positions, an employee on the receiving end of such speculation would reasonably understand that the personal concerns of a store manager are not necessarily applicable to the store’s employees. Moreo- ver, in the midst of an organizing campaign, an employee such as Norton-Abad would also likely understand that, as a store manager, Reid is not covered by the Act and does not enjoy the same job security protections as Nor- ton-Abad and other employees. Accordingly, and con- trary to our dissenting colleague, we affirm the judge’s dismissal of this allegation.10 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Respondent, Star- bucks Corporation, Oak Creek, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a). “(a) Post at its Howell and Puetz store in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, copies of the attached notice marked “Ap- pendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by 10 Member Prouty would reverse the judge on this issue and find that Reid unlawfully threatened Norton-Abad with job loss by stating to her that he feared losing his job because of employees’ organizing cam- paign. Despite the differences in their positions, an employee in Nor- ton-Abad’s position would reasonably fear that her job was at risk by hearing her manager tell her directly that even he feared for his job because of employees’ protected activity. Reid’s expression of fear for his job reinforced his underlying message conveyed to her during the February 12 meeting that employees’ union activity could have nega- tive ramifications for everyone, including a well-regarded manager like himself, and would reasonably suggest to Norton-Abad that she (and/or other co-workers) could be next. Notably, Reid never explained to Norton-Abad that his fear of job loss was limited to only his position as store manager, even after Norton-Abad noted that a lot of employees feared being terminated if they showed support for the Union. Member Prouty does not agree that a reasonable employee would be reassured by the knowledge—if she knew it—that the Act protects employees but not managers from retaliatory job loss. 11 If the store involved in these proceedings is open and staffed by a substantial complement of employees, the notice must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the store involved in these pro- ceedings is closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of em- ployees due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the notice must be posted within 14 days after the store reopens and a substantial complement of employees have returned to work. If, while closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees due to the pandemic, the Respondent is communicating with its employees by electronic means, the notice must also be posted by such electronic means within 14 days after service by the Region. If the notice to be physically posted was posted electronically more than 60 days before physical posting of the notice, the notice shall state at the bottom that STARBUCKS CORP. 5 the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consec- utive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, post- ing on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other elec- tronic means, if the Respondent customarily communi- cates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the store involved in these proceedings, the Re- spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at that store at any time since February 12, 2022.” 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin- istrative law judge. Dated, Washington, D.C. May 7, 2024 ______________________________________ Marvin E. Kaplan, Member ________________________________________ David M. Prouty, Member ________________________________________ Gwynne A. Wilcox, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. “This notice is the same notice previously [sent or posted] electronical- ly on [date].” If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities. WE WILL NOT interrogate you about why you wish to unionize. WE WILL NOT threaten you with unspecified reprisals if you choose to unionize. WE WILL NOT threaten to enforce work rules more strictly because you engage in union activities, and WE WILL NOT threaten you that you could be terminated be- cause of that stricter enforcement. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. STARBUCKS CORPORATION The Board’s decision can be found at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/18-CA-293653 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National La- bor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940. Renee Medved, Esq., for the General Counsel. Michael Yellin, Michael Gotzler, and Nina Neff, Esqs., for the Respondent. Robert Cervone, Esq., for the Charging Party. DECISION GEOFFREY CARTER, Administrative Law Judge. The Gen- eral Counsel contends that Starbucks Corporation (Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by conducting captive audience meetings at which employees on paid time were required to listen to Respondent’s views about union activity, and by making various statements to employees that had a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act. Relying on current Board precedent, I recom- mend dismissal of the complaint allegations that captive audi- ence meetings are, per se, unlawful. I have found, however, that Respondent did run afoul of the Act by unlawfully interro- DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 gating employees about their union activities and by threaten- ing employees that their union activities and/or unionization could lead to various adverse consequences such as stricter enforcement of work rules and unspecified reprisals. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case was tried in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on January 11, 2023. The Chicago & Midwest Regional Joint Board, Workers United/SEIU (Charging Party or Union) filed the charge on April 6, 2022, and filed amended charges on April 14, May 12, and July 18, 2022.1 The General Counsel issued the complaint on August 19, 2022, and amended the complaint during trial on January 11, 2023. (Tr. 10–12.) In the complaint, the General Counsel alleged that Respond- ent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by: (a) since February 2022, implicitly, if not explicitly, forcing employees to convene on paid time to listen to Respondent’s position regarding union activity; (b) on about February 11, 2022, interrogating employ- ees in the store manager’s office by repeatedly asking them why they felt they needed a union; (c) in early February 2022, interrogating employees about their union activities, impliedly threatening unspecified reprisals of employees organized, threatening employees with job loss because of their union activities, and threatening that unionization would inhibit the relationship between the store manager and employees; (d) in about February or March 2022, threatening to enforce work rules more strictly because of employees’ union activities, and threatening to terminate employees because of their union ac- tivities; and (e) in about March or April 2022, threatening em- ployees that the store manager would more strictly enforce the dress code because of employees’ union activities. Respondent filed a timely answer denying the alleged violations in the complaint. On the entire record,2 including my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT3 I. JURISDICTION Respondent, a Washington corporation with headquarters in Seattle, Washington, operates coffee shops on a retail basis throughout the United States, including a coffee shop located in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.4 In the 12 months before the complaint 1 All dates are in 2022, unless otherwise indicated. 2 The transcripts in this case generally are accurate, but I note the following transcript corrections: p. 8, l. 2: Mr. Gotzler was the speaker; p. 9, l. 12: “by” should be “about”; p. 9, l. 13: “advance” should be “events”; p. 125, l. 23: “meaning” should be “meeting”; p. 170, l. 20: “banning” should be “banding”; and p. 200, l. 23: “I’ll be” should be “by”. I also note that the exhibit file erroneously includes Respondent Exhibit 7, which was withdrawn and is not part of the evidentiary rec- ord. (See Tr. 198–199.) 3 Although I have included several citations in this decision to high- light particular testimony or exhibits in the evidentiary record, I empha- size that my findings and conclusions are not based solely on those specific citations, but rather are based on my review and consideration of the entire record for this case. 4 Employees also referred to this store as the “Howell and Peutz” location in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. The Howell and Peutz store is lo- was filed, Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received goods at its store in Oak Creek, Wisconsin that are valued in excess of $5000 and came directly from points outside the State of Wisconsin. Respond- ent admits, and I find, that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent also admits, and I find, that the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES5 A. Background 1. Respondent’s employees and managers Employees, also called “partners,” at Respondent’s stores work in the following roles (among others): Barista: A barista is responsible for preparation of hot and cold beverages, cash register transactions, store cleanliness, product merchandising and excellent customer service. A barista generally works fewer than 40 hours per week. Shift supervisor: A shift supervisor performs all the duties of a barista, as well as helping guide the work of others and assist- ing with ordering and accounting. . . . A shift supervisor gen- erally works fewer than 40 hours per week. Store manager: The store manager is ultimately in charge of all store operations and directs the work of . . . shift supervi- sors and baristas. The store manager is responsible for per- sonnel decisions, scheduling, payroll and fiscal decisions. A store manager is considered full-time and is generally sched- uled to work at least 40 hours each week. (Jt. Exh. 6 at 13; Tr. 17, 38–39, 58–59, 107, 161–162, 181– 182.) Since about May 2021, Nick Reid has served as the store manager at Respondent’s Oak Creek location and is the highest level of manager who works in that store on a daily basis. Reid reported to district manager Meg Ryan throughout the relevant time period. In connection with his role as store manager, Reid regularly checked in with employees to ask how they were doing and to make sure that employees were “in the right space” for work. (Tr. 17, 49–50, 58, 107–108, 159, 161, 172, 182–183.) 2. Dress code policy and practices Respondent uses a color palette for employee clothing “to cated at 8880 South Howell Ave., Oak Creek, Wisconsin. (Tr. 17, 58, 107, 159, 181; Jt. Exh. 4 at 5; GC Exh. 1(a).) 5 As indicated above, this case involves allegations that Respondent, through store manager Nick Reid, made various statements that violate Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. When Reid testified, he denied making various unlawful statements such as threatening partners that they would lose their jobs if they voted to unionize or engaged in union activities, or threatening to enforce work rules more strictly because the Union filed a petition for an election. (See Tr. 173–174.) I give little weight to these general denials as, at most, they reflect Reid’s subjective view about whether his remarks to employees ran afoul of the Act. That is a matter that I will decide based on the evidentiary record and the appli- cable legal standards. STARBUCKS CORP. 7 ensure that our green apron is the focal point. A small amount of accent color on ties, scarves, tops, socks and shoes is al- lowed.” The permissible colors for employee clothing are black, gray, navy, brown, khaki, or white (with the color white permissible for tops only). (Jt. Exh. 7; see also Jt. Exh. 6 at 28– 31 (describing Respondent’s “Dress Code and Personal Ap- pearance” policy); Tr. 32, 62–63, 73, 116–117, 134–135, 162– 163.) In practice, Respondent did not enforce the dress code con- sistently before February 2022. For example, employees some- times wore white shoes to work without objection from man- agement even though the dress code did not permit that shoe color. (Tr. 32–33, 36–38, 55, 63–64, 96; see also Tr. 117, 135– 136 (same, when an employee wore red boots on her first day working on the floor, and when an employee wore a navy shirt with a cherry pattern).) When Reid did raise dress code com- pliance issues with employees he typically had a conversation with the employee about the policy and gave the employee an opportunity to correct the problem. (Tr. 163–164.) 3. Drink-making policies and practices To ensure consistency across its various stores, Respondent’s baristas complete training (usually with a barista trainer or an- other experienced coworker) on how to make various drinks available on the menu. When questions arise after the training period about how to make a drink, baristas may refer to printed cards (usually kept by the cash register) that provide recipes for drinks, or may ask a coworker for assistance. If a barista is making drinks incorrectly, either the shift supervisor or store manager may coach the barista on how to make the drink properly. There is no dispute that making drinks correctly is an important aspect of working as a barista. (Tr. 39–40, 74–76, 79–80, 136–138, 165–166.) B. The Union Organizing Campaign Begins 1. January 2022 – preliminary discussions about union organizing In January 2022, employee Hannah Fogarty spoke with other employees about the possibility of union organizing at the Oak Creek store. After other employees showed interest, Fogarty emailed the Union. (Tr. 108.) 2. February 11, 2022—employees send letter to Starbucks President and CEO Kevin Johnson On February 11, 2022, Fogarty emailed Starbucks President and CEO Kevin Johnson a letter signed by 16 employees at the Oak Creek store. The employees stated as follows in the letter, in pertinent part: As “essential” workers during an ongoing pandemic we go to work in a high risk environment every day. To not give us a say in the policies that directly impact our safety is nothing short of disrespectful. Not to mention the complete lack of guaranteed paid sick time, for any illness other than Covid, that makes it both physically and financially dangerous for us to get sick. At $12.60 per hour it’s impossible for any barista with bills and rent to pay to also develop a savings account to fall back on in the event they do fall ill. . . . We are proudly standing together . . . both as Starbucks part- ners and Wisconsinites to speak up for what we believe in as a store and as a state. . . . It is in this spirit that we, the under- signed partners of Starbucks at Howell & Peutz, respectfully and formally demand that Starbucks recognize our union, CMRJB Workers United (SEIU), as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all permanent hourly full-time and part-time employees, including Baristas and Shift Super- visors, and excluding Store Managers, Assistant Store Man- agers and supervisors as defined by the NLRA. You can see from the signatures below that our union clear- ly has majority status. It is time to abandon the union bust- ing and stall tactics, Kevin. It is time to sit-down at the bar- gaining table, and negotiate a fair contract with us, your part- ners. Please respond to our demand for union recognition and bar- gaining by Thursday, February 17th, at 3pm Eastern time. (Jt. Exh. 1 (emphasis in original); see also Tr. 18, 45–46, 108– 110.) 3. February 11, 2022 – employees deliver letter to Store Man- ager Reid Also on February 11, employee Sydney Lebarron-Fahl asked Reid if she and coworkers Aleja Norton-Abad and S.N. 6 could speak with Reid in the back of the store (away from the sales floor). Reid agreed. Once they reached the back room, Lebar- ron-Fahl gave Reid a copy of the letter seeking union recogni- tion and briefly explained why employees were hoping to un- ionize. (Jt. Exh. 2 (the same letter as Jt. Exh. 1, but showing employee signatures instead of typed employee names); Tr. 18– 21, 40–43, 59–61, 80–81, 85, 166–169).) Reid, who was surprised to learn about the union organizing campaign, asked each of the three employees why they were unionizing. Lebarron-Fahl explained that she had concerns about how Respondent had been handling the COVID–19 pan- demic, particularly regarding inadequate staffing and Respond- ent’s decision to shorten the quarantine period after a COVID– 19 infection from 10 to 5 days. When Reid asserted that Re- spondent was following CDC guidelines when it shortened the quarantine period, Lebarron-Fahl added that the shorter quaran- tine period made her and other employees feel uncomfortable and that Respondent should hear employees’ perspective about the issue. (Tr. 20–21, 41, 81–82, 168–169, 187; see also Tr. 168–169 (noting that Reid did not have a chance to read the letter before the discussion began).) Reid then turned to S.N. and Norton-Abad and asked why they wanted to unionize. Norton-Abad responded that she was concerned about wages and why Respondent could not act more quickly to fulfill its promise to raise its minimum wage to $15 per hour (Respondent proposed making the increase by summer 2022). Reid stated that Respondent probably had a plan for wages and that it probably was not easy for Respond- ent to raise wages immediately. Norton-Abad replied that she 6 As per my usual practice, I use initials when referring to non- supervisory employees who did not testify during the trial. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8 and other employees were looking for more transparent com- munication from Respondent about wages. When Reid asked why S.N. wanted to unionize, S.N. described hearing other employees talk about struggling to pay rent and bills and ex- plained that S.N. wanted to do something to help other employ- ees and wanted to have a say in what happened at the store. (Tr. 21–22, 61–62, 83, 170.) At some point during the discussion, Reid said he felt like he failed employees as a store manager. Lebarron-Fahl explained that the union organizing campaign was not about Reid, but rather was about Respondent as a whole and involved corpo- rate-level issues that Reid could not solve. Reid also asserted that Lebarron-Fahl, Norton-Abad, and S.N. had never previous- ly spoken to him about their concerns. Lebarron-Fahl respond- ed that other employees had shared similar concerns to her and reported feeling dissatisfied after they spoke directly with Reid about their concerns. After about 15 minutes,7 the discussion concluded with Reid planning to contact Ryan about the organ- izing campaign and the employees returning to the front of the store to continue working. (Tr. 22–23, 46, 62, 83, 169–170; see also Tr. 41–42, 82–83, 168 (noting that nothing prevented the employees from leaving the back of the store at any time to end the conversation with Reid), 43, 81–82, 88 and R. Exhs. 8–13 (noting that employees planned to publicize their letter to Re- spondent’s CEO and subsequently gave media interviews about the union organizing campaign).) 4. February 12, 2022 – Reid talks to Norton-Abad On February 12, 2022, Reid told Norton-Abad that he would like to speak with her after she finished her break. When Nor- ton-Abad met with Reid in the back of the store, Reid again asked her why she wanted to unionize. Norton-Abad explained that she supported unions in general and that in addition to her concern about wages she also had concerns about Respondent’s COVID–19 practices. Regarding COVID–19, Norton-Abad noted that the beginning of the year was hard because employee absences made it difficult for employees who had to come in to work, and because there was uncertainty about who had been exposed to COVID–19. When Reid stated that Norton-Abad had never approached him to talk about her concerns, she re- sponded that based on what she heard from other employees she did not think much could come from talking to Reid. As an example, Norton-Abad described hearing that Reid told a coworker to just take some vacation time when the coworker told Reid about concerns related to COVID–19. Reid said, “how do you know that’s exactly what [I] said,” and reiterated that Norton-Abad never spoke to him directly about her con- cerns. (Tr. 23–25.) After a few moments of silence, Norton-Abad asked Reid why he was against unionizing. Reid stated that, based on some research he had done the night before, he feared losing his job. Norton-Abad responded that it would be wrong for Respondent to fire him, and that in any event the organizing campaign wasn’t about Reid but rather was about employees 7 I do not credit Reid’s testimony that the conversation only lasted 3–5 minutes. (See Tr. 171.) Both Norton-Abad and Lebarron-Fahl demonstrated through their detailed testimony that they remembered the discussion better than Reid. trying to have a better voice with Respondent as a whole. (Tr. 26, 50.) Next, Reid said he feared that unionizing would inhibit the close relationship between Reid and store employees, and also worried that there might be hostility between pro-union and anti-union employees. Reid asked if Norton-Abad thought unionizing was worth the risk, to which Norton-Abad answered “yes,” explaining that she supported unions and thought they could do good things. (Tr. 26–27; see also Tr. 173, 187 (Reid acknowledged that he spoke to employees about being con- cerned/nervous that having a union could change the way things were done at the store and affect communication be- tween him and employees).) At some point during the conversation Reid asked Norton- Abad if employees knew what they were signing up for. Nor- ton-Abad agreed that it was important for employees to know what they were signing up for and described efforts to ensure that employees: knew what a union was; understood what they were signing up for when signing union cards; and understood that the letter to Respondent’s CEO would be a public letter. Norton-Abad also noted that a lot of employees feared being terminated if they showed support for the union and that some employees did not sign the letter for that reason. Norton-Abad observed that things were a little awkward in her and Reid’s discussion, stated that she hoped that she and Reid could con- tinue working well together, and then returned to the front of the store to work. (Tr. 27–28; see also Tr. 50 (noting that Nor- ton-Abad could have left the conversation at any time).)8 C. February 14, 2022: The Union Files an Election Petition On February 14, 2022, the Union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board to assert that a substantial number of Respondent’s employees at the Oak Creek store wished to be represented by the Union for purposes of collec- tive bargaining. The proposed bargaining unit included all full- time and regular part-time baristas and shift supervisors. (Jt. Exh. 3.) D. February/March 2022: Additional Communication Between Reid and Employees 1. Late February/Early March 2022—Reid talks to Hannah Fogarty In about late February or early March 2022, employee Han- nah Fogarty finished her shift and went to the back of the store to get her jacket and purse. Reid was working in the back of the store at the time. Reid and Fogarty said good-bye to each other, and then Reid stated that he thought they each had some- thing more to say. Fogarty agreed. Reid then asked how Fogarty was feeling about it (the union organizing campaign), and Fogarty said she felt good and excited but also nervous that she might lose her job for organizing. Reid replied that Fogarty would never be fired for organizing but now his back was on the line and if Fogarty needed to be coached multiple times on one issue in the same day then she could be fired. As an exam- ple, Reid said that if Fogarty had to be coached multiple times 8 Norton-Abad’s testimony about this conversation was unrebutted. STARBUCKS CORP. 9 in one shift for making refreshers the wrong way9 then she would be fired, and that Reid would have to be more vigilant from now on.10 (Tr. 111–113, 139; see also Tr. 138 (noting that on an unspecified earlier date Reid coached Fogarty about not making refreshers properly), 145–147 (explaining that Fogarty agreed to speak with Reid because she hoped the conversation would help Reid understand where she stood regarding the union).)11 2. Fogarty’s performance review On an unspecified date between February 11 and April 4, 2022, Reid met with Fogarty to conduct Fogarty’s performance review (a meeting that Fogarty was required to attend). Initial- ly, Fogarty and Reid discussed how Fogarty was feeling about the job and other work-related matters. Fogarty mentioned that she was experiencing financial stress because of reduced work hours and asked about getting a raise and/or becoming a shift supervisor. Reid responded that he would look into getting Fogarty a raise. (Tr. 113–114.) The conversation then shifted to a discussion about why Fogarty felt strongly that employees should have a union and 9 Fogarty described refreshers as a beverage made from half juice concentrate and half water. To make a refresher, employees should place the juice concentrate and water in a shaker with ice, shake the mixture up, and then pour it into a cup to serve. An incorrect shortcut for making a refresher would be to put the juice concentrate, water, and ice directly into the cup and serve it to the customer. (Tr. 113.) 10 Reid did not directly refute Fogarty’s testimony about this conver- sation but did describe a conversation (in February or March 2022) with an unidentified employee who was concerned about their union affiliation and what would happen if they did not follow drink making procedures. Reid testified that he assured the employee that their union affiliation would having nothing to do with it, but emphasized that employees need to follow procedures and he would remind the employ- ee about them and hold the employee accountable if they chose to not follow procedures over and over after being reminded. (Tr. 174–175.) I do not credit Reid’s testimony on this point. As a preliminary matter, it is not clear whether Reid was describing the conversation with Fogarty or instead describing a conversation with another employee altogether. But even assuming that Reid was referring to a talk with Fogarty, his description lacked detail, omitting information such as where the conversation occurred and the context in which it arose. 11 Respondent maintains that I should not credit Fogarty’s testimony because she now works for the Union as a paid organizer, she admitted that she did not remember the entire late February/early March conver- sation with Reid clearly, and she dissembled about whether her journal included entries related to her work experiences with Respondent and the union organizing campaign. (R. Posttrial Br. at 35.) I disagree. Fogarty’s employment with the Union is not a basis, in and of itself, for discounting her testimony. Indeed, the same point applies to Reid, whose employment as one of Respondent’s supervisors is not a basis, standing alone, for discounting his testimony. As for the journal, Fogarty testified that she did not recall journaling about any of the events that she described in her testimony but “was not a firm re- reader” of her journal. (Tr. 134.) I give little weight to the Twitter post that Respondent produced in which Fogarty stated that she was “jour- naling about the unionization process” because that broad statement does not undermine Fogarty’s credibility. (See R. Exh. 17.) Most important, I found that Fogarty demonstrated good recall of her con- versations with Reid, as (among other things) she provided clear de- scriptions about what she and Reid said to each other and the contexts in which the conversations occurred. Reid’s rationale for why employees should not unionize. Reid stated that he was concerned that he would not be able to be able to help Fogarty out or be flexible on the schedule as he had been in the past. Reid added that a union contract starts from zero and that employees risked losing benefits, including the ability for Reid to assist them on the floor (the front of the café) during busy times by taking orders, making drinks, or stocking supplies. Fogarty said she had no intention of negotiating away Reid’s ability to be flexible with the schedule or help out on the floor, and that employees would not vote for a contract that did not serve their best interests.12 (Tr. 114–116, 143–144; see also Tr. 143–144 (Reid did not say that the changes at the store would actually happen if the union prevailed in the election), 187 (Reid testimony that he was concerned that having a union could change the way that things were done in the Oak Creek store and shared that concern with employees).) 3. Respondent’s dress code enforcement In about late March 2022, Reid told Lebarron-Fahl that he was going to start enforcing Respondent’s dress code, particu- larly regarding shoes. Lebarron-Fahl subsequently notified employees about the change to dress code enforcement.13 (Tr. 66–68 (noting that this conversation occurred when Reid and Lebarron-Fahl were in the back of the store), 93–94 (Reid did not ask Lebarron-Fahl to notify employees or start documenting dress code violations).) Later in March 2022, Lebarron-Fahl and Reid were working in the front of the store when Lebarron-Fahl noticed that Reid was wearing white shoes. Lebarron-Fahl told Reid that his shoes did not comply with the dress code, and Reid acknowl- edged that he was out of dress code. (Tr. 68–69, 92, 96–97, 164.)14 E. March 14, 2022: Election Agreement On March 14, 2022, the General Counsel sent a notice of election and election agreement to Respondent. Under the agreement, the parties agreed to conduct the election by mail ballots, with ballots to be sent on April 6, 2022, returned on or before April 26, 2022, and counted on April 27, 2022. (Jt. Exh. 4.) 12 Fogarty’s testimony about what she and Reid said during her per- formance review was unrebutted. 13 Reid did not testify about this conversation with Lebarron-Fahl. Instead, Reid only offered the following general denial: Q: Specifically did you ever threaten to enforce the dress code more strictly because the store had filed a petition for an election? A: Did not. (Tr. 174; see also Tr. 165–166 (Reid testimony that he never threatened to change his policy of talking to employees about being out of dress code and giving them a chance to correct the problem).) I give little weight to Reid’s testimony on this point because it does not rebut Leb- arron-Fahl’s testimony and at most communicates Reid’s subjective view that he did not “threaten” anyone about enforcing the dress code. 14 To the extent that Fogarty, Lebarron-Fahl, and Norton-Abad testi- fied that other employees spoke to them about more strict dress code enforcement after the union organizing campaign began (see, e.g., Tr. 33–34, 64–65, 117–118), I have not given weight to that testimony because it is hearsay and does not serve any identified non-hearsay purpose. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10 F. April 4, 2022: Respondent Conducts Captive Audience Meeting On April 4, 2022, Respondent held a scheduled staff meeting in the back of the store with a group of employees (including Fogarty, who used her cellphone to record the meeting, Lebar- ron-Fahl, and Norton-Abad). Reid and district manager Meg Ryan led the meeting. After discussing a sample espresso drink and asking each person at the meeting to talk about what brought them to Starbucks, Reid and Ryan pivoted to discuss- ing the union organizing campaign. Specifically, Reid and Ryan: (a) discussed the mail ballot election schedule; (b) briefly explained the collective bargaining process if the union was voted in, noting that bargaining could take a while; (c) showed a short video about the mail ballot election pro- cess; and (d) described the example of one store in Canada that union- ized and bargained a contract that, among other things, did not include the wage increase that Starbucks recently announced and did not allow employees to work at other store locations. Reid also expressed the view that he did not think voting “yes” (to unionize) would be the right decision. At various points during the meeting employees shared their views about why they thought unionizing might be beneficial. The meeting ran for about 60–80 minutes and employees were on the clock and paid for their time during the meeting. Respondent held similar meetings with additional groups of employees. (GC Exhs. 4–6; Tr. 30–32, 51–52, 69–70, 90–91, 118–123, 126–127, 143, 171– 172, 184; see also GC Exh. 3 (transcript provided as an aid to be used when listening to the audio recording of the meeting); Tr. 194 (noting that employees are expected to attend staff meetings if they are on the clock).)15 G. May 4, 2022: Union Certified as Collective-Bargaining Representative On May 4, 2022, the Regional Director for Region 18 issued a Certification of Representative to state that based on the mail ballot election, the Union was selected as the exclusive collec- tive-bargaining representative of employees in the bargaining unit at the Oak Creek store. (Jt. Exh. 5.) DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS A. Credibility Findings A credibility determination may rely on a variety of factors, including the context of the witness’ testimony, the witness’ demeanor, the weight of the respective evidence, established or admitted facts, inherent probabilities, and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole. Credibility findings need not be all-or-nothing propositions—indeed, noth- ing is more common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some, but not all, of a witness’ testimony. Farm Fresh Co., Target One, LLC, 361 NLRB 848, 860 (2014) (noting that an administrative law judge may draw an adverse inference 15 As I mentioned during the trial, the audio recording controls as ev- idence of what was said in the meeting to the extent that any questions arise about the written transcription. (Tr. 126.) from a party’s failure to call a witness who may reasonably be assumed to be favorably disposed to a party, and who could reasonably be expected to corroborate its version of events, particularly when the witness is the party’s agent). To the ex- tent that credibility issues arose in this case, I have stated my credibility findings in the Findings of Fact above. B. Did Respondent Make any Statements or Engage in Conduct that Violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act? 1. Complaint allegations The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(1) of the Act by making the following statements and/or engaging in the following conduct: (a) since about February 2022, threatening employees implic- itly, if not explicitly, by forcing employees to convene on paid time to listen to Respondent’s position regarding union activi- ty; (b) on about February 11, 2022, interrogating employees by repeatedly asking them why they felt they needed a union; (c) in about early February 2022, interrogating employees about their union activities by repeatedly asking why they wanted to unionize; impliedly threatening unspecified repris- als if employees organized, threatening employees with job loss because of their union activities; and threatening that un- ionization would inhibit the relationship between store man- ager Reid and employees; (d) in about February or March 2022, threatening to enforce work rules more strictly because of employees union activi- ties, and threatening to terminate employees because of their union activities; and (e) in about March or April 2022, threatening employees that Reid would more strictly enforce the dress code because of employees’ union activities. (GC Exh. 1(i) (pars. 5–10).) 2. Applicable legal standard Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer (via statements, conduct, or adverse employment action such as discipline or discharge) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7. The test for evaluating whether an employer’s conduct or statements violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act is whether the statements or conduct have a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain or coerce union or protected activities. Farm Fresh Company, Target One, LLC, 361 NLRB at 860 (noting that the employer’s subjective motive for its action is irrele- vant); see also NCRNC, LLC d/b/a Northeast Center for Reha- bilitation, 372 NLRB No. 35, slip op. at 10 (2022) (explaining that when analyzing alleged threats, the Board asks whether the threat would reasonably tend to interfere with, restrain, or co- erce an employee in the exercise of the employee’s Section 7 rights, and noting that the test is an objective one, not based on subjective coerciveness) The Board has provided additional guidance for specific types of statements and conduct that can arise in connection STARBUCKS CORP. 11 with an ongoing union organizing campaign. As a general matter, employers may permissibly engage in legitimate cam- paign propaganda about the merits of union membership, as long as the campaign propaganda is not linked to comments that cross the line set by Section 8(a)(1) and become coercive (from the objective standpoint of the employees, over whom the employer has a measure of economic power). See Mesker Door, Inc., 357 NLRB 591, 595 (2011); Section 8(c) of the Act (stating that the “expressing of any views, argument, or opin- ion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act . . . , if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit”). 3. Analysis—Respondent’s general arguments As a preliminary matter, I address four general arguments that Respondent set forth in its posttrial brief about the com- plaint allegations. I do not find any of the arguments to be persuasive. First, I am not persuaded by Respondent’s argument Reid’s remarks to employees were protected under the Act as general statements about the potential change in the employ- ee/employer relationship that can result from unionization. (R. Posttrial Br. at 32.) I recognize that the Board has held that an employer does not violate the Act by informing employees that when they select a union to represent them the relationship that existed between the employees and the employer will not be the same as before. Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377, 377 (1985); see also International Baking Co. & Earthgrains, 348 NLRB 1133, 1135 (2006). The Board has also explained, however, that employer statements that threaten adverse changes to specific terms and conditions of employment may violate the Act. Holy Cross Health d/b/a Holy Cross Hospital, 370 NLRB No. 16, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2020) (finding that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by stating that if employees union- ized the employer’s leave policies might become less generous and its shift scheduling might become less flexible, without clarifying that any such changes would be collectively bar- gained). That is what is alleged here concerning the remarks that Reid made to employees. Second, I reject the argument that Reid’s remarks to employ- ees were not coercive because they contained tentative lan- guage (i.e., a statement that something adverse “could,” as op- posed to “would,” happen if employees unionized). (See R. Posttrial Br. at 32–33.) The Board has held that tentative lan- guage about adverse consequences can nonetheless be coercive, particularly where the employer’s prediction is not based on objective facts or the nature of the collective-bargaining pro- cess. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 623–624 (2001) (holding that it was not a defense that the employer phrased its predic- tion that the plant could close if employees unionized “as a possibility rather than a certainty”), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Holy Cross Health d/b/a Holy Cross Hospital, 370 NLRB No. 16, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (employer un- lawfully threatened that if employees unionized the employer’s leave policies might become less generous and its shift schedul- ing might become less flexible); Metro One Loss Prevention Services Group, 356 NLRB 89, 89 (2010) (employer unlawful- ly threatened that an employee’s pay rate could get worse if the union came in); compare Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 325 NLRB 280, 280 fn. 3 (1998) (employer’s statement that benefits “could go either way as a result of collective bargaining” was lawful). An employer may lawfully communicate to its em- ployees carefully phrased predictions about “demonstrably probable consequences beyond [the employer’s] control” that unionization will have on the company, provided that the pre- dictions are based on objective facts. However, if the employer predicts, without any supporting objective facts, that it may or may not take action solely on its own initiative for reasons un- related to economic necessities and known only by the employ- er, then the employer’s prediction is a threat of retaliation that violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 623–624. Many of Reid’s statements to employees about the risks of unionization were not based on objective facts or the nature of the collective-bargaining process, and thus ran afoul of the Act.16 Third, I do not find any merit to Respondent’s argument that the allegations in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint should be dismissed because the General Counsel did not show that the interrogation and threats occurred “on the work floor” (as op- posed to in the back room of the store). (See R. Posttrial Br. at 21–23 (contending that the “work floor” only includes the front café of the store); see also Findings of Fact (FOF), Sec. II(B)(4), (D)(1) (noting that Reid’s February 12 comments to Norton-Abad and late February/early March comments to Fogarty occurred in the back of the store).) Under Board Rule 102.15, the complaint shall contain: (a) a clear and concise statement of the facts upon which the Board asserts jurisdiction; and (b) a clear and concise description of the acts which are claimed to constitute unfair labor practices, including, where known, the approximate dates and places of such acts and the names of respondent’s agents or other representatives who committed the acts. The complaint allegations in paragraphs 7 and 8 satisfy the requirements of the Board Rule 102.15, in- cluding the specification that the alleged unfair labor practices occurred at the Oak Creek, Wisconsin store where Reid works as store manager.17 For purposes of pleading complaint allega- 16 Depending on the context, it may be lawful for an employer to comment that the collective-bargaining process may lead to some nega- tive outcomes for employees. See, e.g., Wild Oats Market, Inc., 344 NLRB 717, 717–718 (2005) (finding that the employer did not violate the Act by stating, in a flyer to employees, that “in collective bargain- ing you could lose what you have now” because the statement was an accurate observation regarding a possible negative outcome of collec- tive bargaining). Reid did not link any of the remarks at issue here to the collective-bargaining process. 17 Pars. 7 and 8 of the complaint specifically state as follows: 7. In early February 2022, Respondent, by Store Manager Reid, on the work floor: (a) Interrogated employees about their union activities by repeatedly asking why they wanted to unionize; (b) Impliedly threatened unspecified reprisals if employees organized; (c) Threatened employees with job loss because of their union activities; (d) Threat- ened that unionization would inhibit the relationship between himself and employees. 8. In about February or March 2022, the exact date being unknown, Respondent, by Store Manager Reid, on the work floor: (a) Threatened DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 12 tions and for my rulings on the merits of those allegations, it is not material where exactly in the store the alleged unlawful acts occurred. Fourth, I do not find merit to Respondent’s argument that any unlawful statements that it made in this case were de mini- mis (i.e., inconsequential) and thus should not lead to a finding that Respondent violated the Act. Specifically, Respondent contends that the General Counsel did not show that employees were influenced by any unlawful threats or interrogation, or that the unlawful statements had more than a de minimis impact on the election (in which employees voted in favor of unioniz- ing). (R. Posttrial Br. at 48.) Respondent relies on the Board’s decision in American Federation of Musicians, Local 76, in which the Board determined that a single incident qualified as a technical violation of the Act but nonetheless dismissed the complaint because the conduct was too insignificant to warrant a finding of a violation or a remedial order. 202 NLRB 620, 622 (1973). Since that decision, however, the Board has lim- ited the scope of the de minimis defense by noting (among other things) that an unlawful statement cannot be deemed de minimis simply because the respondent may not have engaged in other unlawful acts, or because the union found some success with bargaining after the violation occurred. Holladay Park Hospital, 262 NLRB 278, 279 (1982); Regency at the Rodeway Inn, 255 NLRB 961, 961–962 & fn. 5 (1981).18 In any event, I cannot accept Respondent’s version of the de minimis defense because it conflicts with the legal standard for Section 8(a)(1) violations, which makes it clear that the subjective effect of a statement on an employee is irrelevant to the question of whether the statement was unlawful. (See Discussion and Analysis, Sec. B(2), supra.) 4. Analysis—forcing employees to convene on paid time to listen to Respondent’s position regarding union activity (cap- tive audience meetings) The evidentiary record shows that on about April 4, 2022, Respondent required employees to attend meetings during work hours in which Respondent expressed the view that unionizing would not be the right decision for employees. During at least one of the meetings, employees spoke up to express the contra- ry view that unionizing could be beneficial. (FOF, Sec. II(F).) Respondent, through Reid, also met one-on-one with employ- ees while they were on duty on various dates between February and April 2022. In those one-on-one meetings, Reid expressed his views about unionization. (FOF, Sec. II(B)(4), D(1)–(2).) During trial, the General Counsel stated that it does not con- to enforce work rules more strictly because of employees’ union activi- ties; (b) Threatened to terminate employees because of their union activities. (GC Exh. 1(i) (pars. 7–8).) 18 The de minimis defense may come into play when the Board is evaluating whether conduct that violates Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act war- rants setting aside the results of an election. See, e.g., Bon Appetit Mgmt. Co., 334 NLRB 1042, 1044–1045 (2001) (finding that an 8(a)(1) violation during the critical period before the election did not warrant setting aside the election because it was virtually impossible to con- clude that the conduct affected the results of the election). That ques- tion is not at issue in this case. tend that Respondent made any unlawful statements during the April 4 meeting that witnesses described. Instead, the General Counsel contends Respondent violated the Act by requiring employees to attend the meetings while on paid time and hear its views about whether employees should unionize. (Tr. 125– 126.) Along the same lines, the General Counsel also contends that Respondent violated the Act by expressing its views about unionization in one-on-one meetings that occurred while em- ployees were “cornered while performing their job duties.” (GC Posttrial Br. at 21, 27.) In arguing that these captive audience meetings were per se unlawful insofar as Respondent required employees to listen to its views about unionization, the General Counsel seeks a change in the law from the Board’s decision in Babcock & Wilcox Co., in which the Board held that the Act permits an employer to compel its employees during working hours to attend and listen to speeches that express the employer’s oppo- sition towards unionization. 77 NLRB 577, 578 (1948) (citing Section 8(c) of the Act). Based on the current law (Babcock & Wilcox), which I am bound to follow, I find that Respondent did not violate the Act by requiring employees to attend captive audience meetings between February and April 2022, and I accordingly recom- mend that the complaint allegation about those meetings be dismissed. The General Counsel may, of course, ask the Board to overrule the current case law regarding captive audience meetings. 5. Analysis—February 11 meeting between Reid and employees The record establishes that on February 11, 2022, Reid met with three employees in the back of the store (at the employees’ request). The employees gave Reid a copy of a February 11 letter to Respondent’s CEO in which employees asked Re- spondent to recognize the Union as their exclusive collective- bargaining representative, and briefly explained to Reid that employees at the Oak Creek store were seeking to unionize. Reid, who was surprised by this news and had not yet read the letter, then asked each of the three employees why they wanted to unionize. The entire discussion lasted about 15 minutes and the employees were free to leave the discussion at any time. (FOF, Sec. II(B)(3); see also FOF, Sec. II(B)(2) (describing the letter to Respondent’s CEO).) The Board has long held that a respondent engages in coer- cive interrogation if, under all the circumstances, the interroga- tion reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights granted under the Act. Relevant factors include: the back- ground; the nature of the information sought; the identity of the questioner; the place and method of the questioning; and the truthfulness of the employee’s reply to the questioning. NCRNC, LLC d/b/a Northeast Center for Rehabilitation, 372 NLRB No. 35, slip op. at 10; Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1178 fn. 20 (1984), affd. 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). The General Counsel maintains that Respondent committed such a violation in the February 11 meeting. I do not find that Respondent unlawfully interrogated em- ployees in the February 11 meeting. Employees initiated the meeting and the discussion about the union organizing cam- STARBUCKS CORP. 13 paign. Since this was the first time that Reid heard about the campaign, he understandably was surprised and asked each of the three employees why they were seeking to unionize. Reid did not seek any additional information about the organizing campaign or union activities and employees remained free to leave the conversation at any time. Under those circumstances, I do not find that Reid’s questions to employees had a reasona- ble tendency to restrain, coerce, or interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights, and I therefore recommend that the complaint allegation regarding the February 11 meeting be dismissed. See Rossmore House, 269 NLRB at 1176, 1178 (finding no unlawful interrogation where a manager learned about a union organizing campaign through a mailgram, approached the em- ployee who sent the mailgram to ask, “what’s this about a un- ion?,” and stated that the employer would not like it and would fight it). 6. Analysis—February 12 meeting between Reid and Norton-Abad On February 12, Reid asked Norton-Abad to meet with him in the back of the store after her break. In that meeting, Reid (among other things) again asked Norton-Abad why she wanted to unionize, stated that he feared that unionizing would inhibit the close relationship that he had with employees, and asked Norton-Abad if she thought unionizing was worth the risk. (FOF, Sec. II(B)(4).) I find that Reid’s remarks violated the Act. First, Reid un- lawfully threatened that unionization could lead to unspecified reprisals. Specifically, Reid identified the close working rela- tionship with him as a benefit that employees enjoyed but were putting at risk by seeking to unionize. That threat would rea- sonably tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in the exercise of the employee’s Section 7 rights. See Cadillac of Naperville, 368 NLRB No. 3, slip op. at 3 (2019) (citing Colonial Parking, 363 NLRB 836, 842 (2016), and explaining that a supervisor unlawfully threatened unspecified future re- prisals by warning that although they had a close and good working relationship in the past, employees’ terms and condi- tions of employment would change for the worse because of their protected activity), enfd. in pertinent part, 14 F.4th 703 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied 142 S.Ct. 2650 (2022); Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services (Phoenix), 357 NLRB 353, 353 fn. 2 (2011) (supervisor’s statement that “there would be prob- lems” if an employee continued engaging in union activities constituted an unlawful threat of unspecified reprisals).19 Second, Reid unlawfully interrogated Norton-Abad in the meeting. Unlike the February 11 meeting, Reid was the one who initiated the discussion with Norton-Abad on February 12 about why she wanted to unionize. Norton-Abad was by her- self in the meeting, and there was no longer an issue of Reid being unfamiliar with the organizing campaign since, the day before, employees (including Norton-Abad) notified him about 19 In light of my finding that Reid’s remarks constituted threats of unspecified reprisals, I need not separately find that Reid threatened that unionization would inhibit the relationship between himself and employees (complaint par. 7(d)), as such an additional finding would be duplicative. Accordingly, I recommend that the allegation in complaint par. 7(d) be dismissed. the campaign and explained why they wanted to unionize. Further, as noted above, Reid warned Norton-Abad that union organizing could have adverse consequences in the form of employees losing the benefit of a close working relationship with him as store manager, and asked Norton-Abad if she thought unionizing was worth the risk. Considering the totality of all circumstances, I find that Reid unlawfully interrogated Norton-Abad about her views on unionizing in a manner that reasonably tended to restrain, coerce, or interfere with Norton- Abad’s Section 7 rights. I do not find that Reid threatened Norton-Abad with job loss in their February 12 discussion. The General Counsel asserts that Reid made such a threat when he stated that he feared los- ing his job because of the organizing campaign. (GC Posttrial Br. at 14–15; see also FOF, Sec. II(B)(4).) I do not find that argument to be persuasive, as on the facts of this case, it is too far of a leap to infer that a reasonable employee hearing Reid’s concerns about his own job security as store manager would conclude that their job was also at risk because of their union activities. Reid, as a store manager, was not similarly situated as employees who were seeking to unionize. Accordingly, I recommend that this complaint allegation (complaint par. 7(c)) be dismissed. 7. Analysis—late February/early March 2022 meeting with Fogarty When Fogarty was preparing to leave after finishing her shift in late February or early March, she and Reid said goodbye to each other. They then began a conversation about the union organizing campaign, during which Fogarty said she was nerv- ous that she might lose her job for organizing. Reid responded that Fogarty would never be fired for organizing but now his back was on the line and if Fogarty needed to be coached mul- tiple times on one issue in the same day then she could be fired. Reid added that he would have to be more vigilant from now on. (FOF, Sec. II(D)(1).) The problem in this conversation began when Reid stated that his back was on the line. Through that statement and those that followed it, Reid indicated that because of the organizing campaign, Reid would need to be more vigilant with coaching employees about work rules, which could lead to an employee (such as Fogarty) being discharged.20 Reid’s warnings of more strict enforcement of work rules and the resulting potential for being discharged had a reasonable tendency to restrain, coerce, or interfere with employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights, and therefore violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. Analysis—remarks during Fogarty’s performance review During Fogarty’s performance review, Reid and Fogarty 20 Respondent points out that Fogarty testified that Reid did not threaten her or anyone else with termination or job loss based on their union support or union activity. (See R. Posttrial Br. at 29 (citing Tr. 134).) Fogarty’s subjective impressions of Reid’s remarks, however, are not probative of whether Respondent violated the Act. Instead, the legal standard is an objective one, turning on whether Reid’s remarks would reasonably tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in the exercise of the employee’s Sec. 7 rights. See Discussion and Analysis, Sec. B(2), supra.. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 14 spoke again about the union organizing campaign. Reid stated that he was concerned he would not be able to be flexible about the schedule as he had been in the past, and also stated that employees might lose the benefit of having Reid assist them on the floor when the store was busy. (FOF, Sec. II(D)(2).) As with Reid’s remarks to Norton-Abad on February 12 (see Discussion and Analysis, Sec. B(5), supra), I find that Reid’s remarks to Fogarty during her performance review were unlaw- ful. Specifically, Reid warned that unionizing could put em- ployees at risk of losing Reid’s flexibility with scheduling, as well as Reid’s assistance with tasks on the floor when the store was busy. Those warnings that unionization could lead to un- specified reprisals concerning employee working conditions would reasonably tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in the exercise of the employee’s Section 7 rights, and accordingly I find that the warnings were unlawful.21 9. Analysis—Reid’s March 2022 remark to Lebarron-Fahl about enforcing the dress code In about late March 2022, Reid told Lebarron-Fahl that he was going to start enforcing Respondent’s dress code, particu- larly regarding employees’ shoes. Lebarron-Fahl notified other employees about Reid’s plan to enforce the dress code. (FOF, Sec. II(D)(3).) The General Counsel did not present enough evidence to es- tablish a connection between Reid’s remark about enforcing the dress code and employees’ union activities. Reid did not mention the union organizing campaign or employee union activities when he spoke to Lebarron-Fahl about the dress code. And to the extent that Reid previously warned Norton-Abad and Fogarty about potential unspecified reprisals, there is no evidence that Reid’s remark about dress code enforcement was communicated to either of those employees (by Reid directly or by Lebarron-Fahl) as an example of such a reprisal, nor is there evidence that Lebarron-Fahl knew about the prior warnings to Norton-Abad and Fogarty. That leaves the General Counsel with an argument that the timing of Reid’s remark is suspicious insofar as he made it during the organizing campaign. Since the dress code, including the prohibition on white shoes, was in place before the organizing campaign began, and Reid’s state- ment about enforcing the dress code could have originated for reasons unrelated to the campaign, I find that the General Counsel failed to show that Reid’s remark about enforcing the dress code had a reasonable tendency to coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Accordingly, I recom- mend that the complaint allegation (complaint par. 9) about that remark be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 21 The General Counsel suggested that I also find that Reid ran afoul of the Act when he remarked to Fogarty that a union contract starts from zero and employees ran the risk of losing benefits. (GC Posttrial Br. at 14 fn. 12; see also FOF, Sec. II(D)(2).) I decline to address the merits of such an alleged violation because the General Counsel did not identify Reid’s statement as a potential violation in the complaint or during trial, and thus the matter was not fully litigated. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By, on about February 12, 2022, unlawfully interrogating an employee about why they wanted to unionize and threaten- ing unspecified reprisals if employees unionized, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By, in about late February or early March 2022, threaten- ing that it would enforce work rules more strictly because of employees’ union activities and threatening that employees could be terminated because of that stricter enforcement, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. By, on a date between about February 11 and April 4, 2022, threatening unspecified reprisals if employees unionized, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. The unfair labor practices stated in conclusions of law 3– 5, above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended22 ORDER Respondent, Starbucks Corporation, Oak Creek, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Interrogating employees about why they wish to union- ize. (b) Threatening employees with unspecified reprisals if they choose to unionize. (c) Threatening to enforce work rules more strictly because employees engage in union activities, and threatening employ- ees that they could be terminated because of that stricter en- forcement. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. (a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Howell and Peutz store in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, a copy of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”23 Copies of the notice, on 22 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom- mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt- ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 23 If the facility involved in these proceedings is open and staffed by a substantial complement of employees, the notices must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the facility involved in these proceedings is closed due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic, the notices must be posted within 14 days after the facility reopens and a substantial complement of employees has returned to work, and the notices may not be posted until a substantial complement of employees has returned to work. Any delay in the STARBUCKS CORP. 15 forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical post- ing of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electroni- cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, Respond- ent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by Respondent at the facility at any time since February 12, 2022. (b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. Dated, Washington, D.C., March 3, 2023. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no- tice. physical posting of paper notices also applies to the electronic distribu- tion of the notice if Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by electronic means. If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be- half Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about why they wish to unionize. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with unspecified reprisals if they choose to unionize. WE WILL NOT threaten to enforce work rules more strictly be- cause employees engage in union activities, and WE WILL NOT threaten employees that they could be terminated because of that stricter enforcement. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed them by Section 7 of the Act. STARBUCKS CORPORATION The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/18-CA- 293653 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the deci- sion from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.