373 NLRB No. 75
Starbucks Corporation
373 NLRB No. 75
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Starbucks Corporation and Workers United. Case 03–
CA–310676
DECISION AND ORDER
July 24, 2024
BY CHAIRMAN MCFERRAN AND MEMBERS PROUTY AND
WILCOX
On February 9, 2024, Administrative Law Judge Mi-
chael P. Silverstein issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed an answering brief. In addition, the
General Counsel filed an exception and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.1
The Board has considered the decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs2 and has decided to af-
firm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions4 and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth
in full below.5
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Re-
spondent, Starbucks Corporation, Liverpool, New York,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
1 The Respondent asserts that Members Prouty and Wilcox should
recuse themselves, claiming that their “past, present, and perceived rela-
tionships with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), SEIU
Local Unions, and their affiliates, including Workers United” create a
conflict of interest. Members Prouty and Wilcox have determined, in
consultation with the NLRB Designated Agency Ethics Official, that
there is no basis to recuse themselves from the adjudication of this case.
2 In its brief, the Respondent challenges the constitutionality of the
statutory removal protections afforded to Board Members and Board ad-
ministrative law judges. This argument, raised for the first time on ex-
ceptions and not raised before the judge, is deemed untimely and accord-
ingly is waived. See Yorkaire, Inc., 297 NLRB 401 (1989), enfd. 922
F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1990).
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance
of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stand-
ard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d
Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for
reversing the findings.
4 There are no exceptions to the judge’s dismissal of the allegation
that the Respondent threatened an employee with decreased wages in vi-
olation of Sec. 8(a)(1) by telling her that it would have the right to nego-
tiate pay downwards.
The judge correctly concluded, based on current Board law, that the
Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) by holding mandatory captive
audience meetings. We are open, however, to reconsidering Babcock &
(a) Soliciting grievances from employees and promis-
ing to remedy them in order to discourage employees from
selecting union representation.
(b) Threatening employees with loss of pay and bene-
fits if they select the Union as their bargaining representa-
tive.
(c) Creating the impression that it is engaged in surveil-
lance of its employees’ union or other protected concerted
activities.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its facility in Liverpool, New York, copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”6 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 3, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business
Wilcox Co., 77 NLRB 577 (1948), and the legality of mandatory captive
audience meetings, in a future appropriate case.
5 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to the
Board’s standard remedial language and in accordance with our deci-
sions in Paragon Systems, Inc., 371 NLRB No. 104 (2022), and J. Picini
Flooring, 356 NLRB 11 (2010). We shall substitute a new notice to con-
form to the Order as modified.
6 If the facility involved in these proceedings is open and staffed by a
substantial complement of employees, the notice must be posted within
14 days after service by the Region. If the facility involved in these pro-
ceedings is closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employ-
ees due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the no-
tice must be posted within 14 days after the facility reopens and a sub-
stantial complement of employees have returned to work. If, while
closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees due to
the pandemic, the Respondent is communicating with its employees by
electronic means, the notice must also be posted by such electronic
means within 14 days after service by the Region. If the notice to be
physically posted was posted electronically more than 60 days before
physical posting of the notice, the notice shall state at the bottom that
“This notice is the same notice previously [sent or posted] electronically
on [date].” If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States
court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2
or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former em-
ployees employed by the Respondent at any time since
December 20, 2022.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director for Region 3 a sworn certification
of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to com-
ply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not spe-
cifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 24, 2024
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Chairman
________________________________________
David M. Prouty, Member
________________________________________
Gwynne A. Wilcox, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vi-
olated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT solicit grievances from you and promise
to remedy them in order to discourage you from selecting
union representation.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of pay and benefits
if you select the Union as your bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that we are engaged
in surveillance of your union or other protected concerted
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION
The
Board’s
decision
can
be
found
at
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CA-310676 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of
the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Abigail Snelling, Esq. for the General Counsel
Jacqueline Phipps Polito, Esq. and Alexa Beining, Esq. for the
Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL P. SILVERSTEIN, Administrative Law Judge. In this
case, the General Counsel alleges that Starbucks Corporation
(Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act in response to an organizing campaign at its Liver-
pool (Clay), New York store. For the reasons described below,
I find that Respondent has violated the Act by 1) soliciting em-
ployee complaints and grievances; 2) more closely monitoring
store employees; 3) telling employees they would lose access to
certain benefits like free college tuition through Arizona State
University if they selected the Union as their collective-bargain-
ing representative; and 4) telling employees that they would
work fewer hours, get less pay, and lose an annual raise if em-
ployees voted in favor of the Union. I, however, recommend
dismissal of the lone remaining allegation, that Respondent held
unlawful captive audience meetings.
Workers United (the Union or Charging Party) filed the
charge in this case on January 23, 2023. The complaint issued
on June 12 and Respondent filed its amended answer on Novem-
ber 30.
This case was tried in Syracuse, New York, on January 9,
2024. At trial, all parties were afforded the right to call, examine,
STARBUCKS CORP.
3
and cross-examine witnesses,1 to present any relevant documen-
tary evidence, and to argue their respective legal positions orally.
Counsel for the General Counsel and Respondent filed post-
hearing briefs.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by
the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
JURISDICTION
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is a Washington corpo-
ration headquartered in Seattle, Washington, and is engaged in
operating retail stores selling food and beverages throughout the
United States, including the Clay store that is the subject of this
case, located at 3820 NY-31, Liverpool, New York. In conduct-
ing its business operations over the last 12 months, Respondent
derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchased and
received goods in the State of New York valued in excess of
$5,000 from points located outside the State of New York2. Re-
spondent also admits, and I find, that Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects com-
merce and that the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Section 10(a) of the
Act.
ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES3
The facility involved in this case is a Starbucks store in Liver-
pool, New York (the Clay store), which is located about 15 to 20
minutes outside the city of Syracuse. (Tr. 31). This is a
standalone store with a drive-thru that employs about 20 to 30
employees. (Tr. 30). The store opens at 6:00am and closes most
days at 9:00pm. (Tr. 42, 48). About 5 to 9 baristas work at the
store in the mornings and afternoons (mid-shift) and 3 to 4 baris-
tas work the closing shift. (Tr. 30, 64).
At the Clay store, there is one coffee bar where baristas make
hot and cold beverages. Customers walking in the front door of
the store see baristas stationed at the bar in the back left corner
and tables and chairs set up to the right of the store entrance. (Tr.
25, 42, 53).
On December 9, 2022, the Charging Party released a state-
ment via Twitter congratulating Clay store partners for filing for
a representation election. Attached to the Twitter statement was
a copy of a letter store employees sent to Respondent’s CEO an-
nouncing their intent to unionize. (GC Exh. 2, Tr. 19–20). Re-
gion 3 of the Board processed the Charging Party’s petition on
December 12, 2022, as Case 03–RC–308620. The Region
1 The General Counsel called two witnesses—Makaela Maciariello
and Taylor Strouse—while the Respondent did not call any witnesses.
2
Respondent’s amended answer mistakenly referred to its Vestal
(New York) store when confirming the purchase and receipt of goods
from outside the State of New York. Vestal is a suburb of Binghamton,
New York, but all parties acknowledge that the dispute at the center of
this case took place in Liverpool (Clay), New York, which is a suburb of
Syracuse.
3 The record on p. 15, lines 13–15 is hereby corrected to note that
Theresa Sellitto was not called as a witness at the hearing. I also grant
conducted a secret ballot election on January 27, 2023, with a
final vote of 10 to 8 in favor of the Union. On February 6, 2023,
Region 3 issued a certification of representative for the following
bargaining unit:
“All full-time and regular part-time baristas and shift supervi-
sors employed by the Respondent at Store #52420 located at
3820 NY-31, Liverpool, New York; excluding office clerical
employees, Store Managers, Assistant Store Managers, guards,
and professional employees and supervisors as defined in the
Act.” (GC Exh. 3).
At the time the representation petition was filed in December
2022, and continuing through the late January 2023 election,
Angeline Schaefer and Emily Tokich served as co-managers of
the Clay store and Theresa Sellitto served as the district manager
responsible for the Clay store. Respondent stipulated that during
this time period, Schaefer, Tokich, and Sellitto were supervisors
of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act
and agents of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13)
of the Act. (Tr. 11, 17–18, 48).
Makaela Maciariello’s Testimony
Makaela Maciariello started working as a barista at Respond-
ent’s Clay store in about October 2020. Maciariello testified that
Sellitto was the store’s district manager when she (Maciariello)
started working for Respondent. (Tr. 16, 18). Maciariello typi-
cally worked Mondays through Fridays for 5.5 hours/day - either
in the morning or the mid-afternoon, for a total of 20–25
hours/week. (Tr. 16–17, 34–35).
Prior to the December 2022 announcement of the union cam-
paign, Maciariello had only spoken to Sellitto about five times
during the course of her two and a half years of employment.4
Those conversations only consisted of pleasantries such as hello
and goodbye and how are you doing. (Tr. 21). But following the
initiation of the representation petition, Maciariello noticed a
pronounced uptick in Sellitto’s presence at the Clay store.
Sellitto started working out of the Clay store about 1 to 2
times/week, parking herself at a table closest to the front doors
(facing the baristas working at the coffee bar) at about 9 a.m. or
10 a.m. Sellitto spent most of the time in the Clay store working
on her laptop and then left the store at about 3 p.m. or 4 p.m. (Tr.
22, 25, 42). Maciariello estimated that between the time of the
Twitter announcement through the January 27 election, she saw
Sellitto in the store about 8 to10 times. (Tr. 42).
In about late December 2022, Maciariello was at the end of
her 10:30am to 4:00pm shift when she sat down to speak with
Sellitto. This conversation took place at the table by the front
door where Sellitto had regularly stationed herself.5 Sellitto
Counsel for the General Counsel’s motion to correct the record (prof-
fered in her posthearing br.—p. 13, fn. 16) on page 72, line 17 of the
hearing transcript to add the word “not” such that the sentence reads:
“…so our position would be that we would not withdraw that allega-
tion…”
4 Sellitto took a leave of absence at some point in 2020 and again in
2022. These leaves of absences lasted anywhere from 2 to 6 months. (Tr.
18, 49).
5 No store official told Maciariello that she had to meet with Sellitto
on this occasion. (Tr. 38).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4
asked Maciariello if she had any concerns at work. Maciariello
said that her main concern was her hours being cut from about
20 to 25 hours/week to about 15 hours/week. (Tr. 27, 35).
Maciariello had previously raised this concern with store man-
agers Scheaefer and Tokich, but they had simply told her that
everybody’s hours were being reduced. (Tr. 36). Sellitto con-
firmed that everybody’s hours were being cut but said that if she
(Maciariello) wanted Sellitto to do anything further for her,
Sellitto needed a little more information. (Tr. 27). Maciariello
said OK and then raised a separate issue concerning a barista
who had been forced to transfer from the Clay store to a store in
Cicero. Maciariello asked when this barista would be allowed to
return to the Clay store and Sellitto said that she wasn’t allowed
to give out information concerning another barista. (Tr. 27).
Maciariello testified that Sellitto had not asked previously asked
her about her workplace concerns and Sellitto did not reference
the Union during this conversation. (Tr. 29, 37).
A few days before the January 27 election, either a shift su-
pervisor (bargaining unit employee) or store manager told
Maciariello that Sellitto wanted to speak with her. This was not
a pre-scheduled meeting and Maciariello stopped her shift work
to sit down and talk with Sellitto. The conversation began with
Sellitto asking Maciariello if she had any workplace concerns.
Maciariello said that she didn’t really have any she wished to
discuss with Sellitto. (Tr. 28, 38–40). Sellitto then pivoted to
discuss the election, where the voting would take place, and how
partners could return to the store at the end of the day to witness
the vote count. Maciariello also recalled Sellitto stating that Re-
spondent would have the right to negotiate employees’ pay
downwards because the Union had the right to negotiate pay up-
wards. (Tr. 29).
After the election, Maciariello saw Sellitto in the store less
frequently—perhaps once in the month following the election.
(Tr. 43). Sellitto stopped working for Respondent on April 9,
2023. (Tr. 11).
Taylor Strouse’s Testimony
Taylor Strouse worked as a barista at the Clay store from Jan-
uary 2022 through November 2023. She usually worked about
20 to 28 hours/week either on the mid-day or closing shift. (Tr.
47).
Prior to the filing of the representation petition, Strouse had
only seen Sellitto in the Clay store two or three times and Strouse
did not speak with Sellitto during these visits. (Tr. 53). After the
filing of the petition, Strouse saw Sellitto in the store a couple of
times each week. During these visits, Sellitto would sit at a table
in the lobby of the store positioned so that she could see the bar
area where the baristas were working. Sellitto would have her
laptop with her and stay in the store for a few hours at a time.
(Tr. 52–53).
On one occasion about a week before the January 27 election,
a shift supervisor informed Strouse that Sellitto wanted to meet
with her. The shift supervisor covered Strouse’s shift so that
Strouse could sit down and talk to Sellitto.6 This conversation
took place at the table by the front door of the Clay store and
6 This conversation was not on the daily schedule prepared for store
employees. (Tr. 63).
lasted about 5-10 minutes. (Tr. 53–54, 63). Sellitto started the
conversation by telling Strouse that she (Sellitto) had heard
things about the Union and she (Sellitto) wanted to know how
Strouse felt about everything going on, about joining the Union,
and what Strouse was going to do (regarding the Union). Strouse
said that she was indifferent about the Union and she wanted to
do more research before she made a decision one way or the
other. (Tr. 54–55).
In response, Sellitto said that store employees would lose ben-
efits if they chose to unionize. Sellitto specifically said that em-
ployees would lose the Arizona State University tuition benefit
available to Respondent employees who regularly work more
than 20 hours/week. This benefit allows Respondent employees
to earn a bachelor’s degree online without having to pay tuition.
(Tr. 55, 66). Sellitto then said that if employees unionized, they
would get fewer hours and less pay. Sellitto specifically noted
that employees would not receive their annual, tenure-based
raises if they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative. (Tr. 55–56). Additionally, Sellitto told Strouse
that if employees unionized, they would lose their Lyra mental
health benefit, which entitled Respondent’s employees to free
online mental health therapy sessions. (Tr. 56–57). At this point
in the conversation, Sellitto showed Strouse her laptop screen
and referenced resources that Respondent had available for em-
ployees to educate themselves about the Union. Sellitto said that
the Respondent was there for employees and the conversation
ended. (Tr. 57). On cross-examination, Strouse confirmed that
Sellitto was expressing her opinions about the Union, but Strouse
could not recall the exact words that Sellitto used to convey that
she was only stating her opinions about the Union. (Tr. 68).
Strouse did not discuss the Union with store managers
Schaefer or Tokich, nor did she discuss the Union with a differ-
ent district manager, Makayla Murphy, who came to the Clay
store during the runup to the election. (Tr. 51–52, 63, 69).
ANALYSIS
Respondent Violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Soliciting
Grievances from Makaela Maciariello in December 2022—
Complaint § 6(a)
An employer’s solicitation of grievances during a union or-
ganizing campaign is unlawful when it “carries with it an im-
plicit or explicit promise to remedy the grievances and im-
press[es] upon employees that union representation [is]. . . un-
necessary.” Tesla, Inc., 370 NLRB No. 101, slip op. at 6 (2021),
citing Albertson’s, LLC, 359 NLRB 1341, 1341 (2013). That an
employer’s representative does not make a commitment to spe-
cifically take corrective action does not “abrogate the anticipa-
tion of improved conditions expectable for the employees in-
volved. The inference that an employer is going to remedy the
same when it solicits grievances in a pre-election setting is a re-
buttable one.” Albertson’s LLC, 359 NLRB at 1341.
In this case, there is no evidence that prior to the filing of the
representation petition, Theresa Sellitto regularly, or even occa-
sionally, met with workers seeking their feedback about
STARBUCKS CORP.
5
workplace changes. In fact, Maciariello provided unrebutted tes-
timony that her handful of encounters with Sellitto over two
years of employment consisted of hello, goodbye, and how are
you. But after the Charging Party filed its representation peti-
tion, Sellitto suddenly became a regular visitor to the Clay store.
And then later in December 2022, Sellitto called Maciariello
over and asked her about specific concerns she had at work.
Maciariello responded to this pointed question with a pointed an-
swer—expressing her concerns about her reduction in hours.
Sellitto responded by telling Maciariello that if she wanted her
“to do anything further” about this issue, she needed more infor-
mation from Maciariello. Thus, Sellitto’s statement went be-
yond an implied promise to remedy Maciariello’s concerns – of-
fering a more explicit promise to remedy these grievances to
blunt employees’ support for the Union.
In its post-hearing brief, Respondent asserts that no violation
of the Act has been established because there was no evidence
that Sellitto made an express or implied promise to remedy any
grievances. Respondent, however, omitted one critical fact from
its summary of Maciariello’s testimony—that Sellitto told
Maciariello that she would need more information from her “to
do anything further.” Such a statement clearly put Maciariello
on notice that Respondent wished to address her scheduling con-
cerns – Sellitto just needed additional information to try to make
this happen. And Respondent’s strategy not to call witnesses in
this case means that Respondent has failed to rebut the inference
that Respondent was going to remedy Maciariello’s grievances
when it solicited these grievances before the election. Based on
the above, Sellitto’s overture to Maciariello about her workplace
concerns and the information Sellitto would need to remedy
these concerns violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent Violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Telling Em-
ployees That They Would Lose Specific Benefits if They Un-
ionized—Complaint § 6(c), (e), (f)7, and (g)
Taylor Strouse offered unrebutted testimony that in the week
before the January 27 representation election, Theresa Sellitto
conveyed her opinion that employees would lose benefits if they
voted in favor of the Union. Sellitto specifically identified the
free tuition employees received through Arizona State’s online
university as a benefit employees would lose. Sellitto also told
Strouse that employees would lose work hours, lose pay, and
would not receive their annual raises if employees selected the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative. Sellitto’s
statements violated the Act.
Section 8(c) of the Act states that:
“The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence
of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this Act…if such expression contains no threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit.”
During an election campaign, employees may permissibly en-
gage in legitimate campaign propaganda that is not objectively
7 Complaint par. 6(f) alleges that on about January 20, 2023, Re-
spondent threatened that employees would lose benefits if they selected
the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. Complaint par.
coercive. NLRB v. Gissel Packing, Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969). The Board has upheld the right of an employer to inform
employees that benefits can be lost through the give and take of
negotiations. So-Lo Foods, Inc., 303 NLRB 749, 750 (1991)
(when a respondent official describes bargaining from scratch as
part of first-contract negotiations, the Board distinguishes be-
tween a lawful statement that benefits could be lost through the
bargaining process and an unlawful threat that benefits will be
taken away and the union will have to bargain to get the benefits
back). An objective standard is used to determine whether a
statement amounts to an unlawful threat of retaliation for engag-
ing in union or other protected activity. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 370
NLRB No. 102, slip op. at 3 (2021); Midwest Terminals of To-
ledo, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 158, slip op. at 21 (2017). The ques-
tionable threats “need not be explicit if the language used by the
employer or his representative can reasonably be construed as
threatening.” NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45, 49 (9th
Cir. 1970). When applying this standard, the Board considers
the totality of the relevant circumstances. Saginaw Control &
Engineering, Inc., 339 NLRB 541, 541 (2003); Mediplex of Dan-
bury, 314 NLRB 470, 471 (1994); Noah’s Bay Area Bagels, 331
NLRB 188, 188 (2000)(attendees at a captive audience meeting
could reasonably believe from the employer official’s remarks
and gestures that they would suffer a loss in wages and other
benefits as a direct result of the union, rather than as a possible
outcome of good-faith bargaining between the employer and the
union).
In this case, Strause’s unrebutted testimony revealed a blunt
warning from Sellitto – if employees selected the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative, they would lose their Ari-
zona State tuition benefit, lose pay, and lose their annual raises.
There was no hedging about the give and take of bargaining -
Sellitto did not reference negotiations at all. Plus, Sellitto used
the word “would” instead of “could” regarding the consequences
of unionization. And Sellitto was very specific about the benefits
that employees would lose. Even though Strouse understood
Sellitto to be expressing her opinion, such naked threats are not
protected by Section 8(c) of the Act.
Respondent argues in its post hearing brief that Strouse’s tes-
timony is unreliable because she did not testify verbatim to what
Sellitto said to her about a year earlier and because she inter-
changeably used the terms “would and could” in her testimony.
I disagree. In this regard, Strouse on direct provided strong detail
in response to open ended questions. She testified that Sellitto
asked her how she felt about the Union, she told Sellitto that she
was indifferent, and she wanted to do some more research before
she made her decision. In response, Sellitto told Strouse that she
“would lose benefits” if the employees unionized. When asked
on direct about these benefits, Strouse testified that Sellitto said:
“we would lose the ASU (Arizona State University) benefit.”
Strouse then offered that Sellitto said this (ASU tuition) could be
a benefit “we would lose.” When I asked Strouse if Sellitto said
that employees “would lose” or “could lose” these benefits,
Strouse testified that Sellitto said: “we would lose them.” (Tr.
6(c) alleges that on the same date, Respondent threatened that employees
would lose a specific benefit—free Arizona State University tuition – if
they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6
54–56).
On cross-examination, Strouse initially confirmed that Sellitto
told her that she would lose Arizona State University benefits if
employees unionized. (Tr. 64–65). Then when Respondent
counsel asked whether Sellitto expressed her opinions only about
what could happen if the employees unionized, Strouse said yes
and no other questions on this subject were asked. (Tr. 65). I
asked the witness to clarify her testimony regarding the opinion
part as well as the “would vs. could” piece. On the latter, Strouse
solidly confirmed her direct testimony, and the first part of cross,
that Sellitto said that employees would lose benefits if they un-
ionized. (Tr. 69). Regarding Sellitto expressing her opinion,
Strouse confirmed that this was the case – she just couldn’t recall
the words that Sellitto used. Strouse genuinely tried to recall
those exact words, but she could not. To me, Strouse’s struggles
made her overall testimony more genuine and truthful. On the
matters she had good recall (e.g. all of the benefits that employ-
ees would lose, including the Lyra mental health benefit),
Strouse was confident and detailed. On the matters she could not
recall (e.g. the words that Sellitto used to confirm she was ex-
pressing her opinion), Strouse did not embellish and did not man-
ufacture any answers to reach a pre-ordained conclusion. In-
stead, she plainly stated that she could not remember. I certainly
do not believe that a witness must retell a year-old conversation
verbatim to be judged credible. Instead, the witness must
demonstrate good recall coupled with a willingness to admit
when they do not always remember everything that was said.
Such forthrightness was the hallmark of Strouse’s testimony, and
I credit her testimony that Sellitto said that employees would lose
certain pay and benefits if they selected the Union as their col-
lective-bargaining representative. Thus, Sellitto’s threats of re-
prisal violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.8 See UNF West, Inc.,
361 NLRB 387, 39 (2014) (employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by
telling employees that they would lose their 401(k) and other
benefits if they unionized).
By Regularly Placing Theresa Sellitto in the Lobby of the Clay
Store, Respondent More Closely Monitored Employees in Vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act—Complaint § 6(b)
In deciding whether an employer’s conduct violates Section
8(a)(1), the Board uses an objective standard—whether the con-
duct would reasonably tend to interfere with the free exercise of
an employee’s statutory rights. Midwest Terminals of Toledo,
365 NLRB 1645, 1665 (2017). Management officials may ob-
serve open and public union or protected activity on the em-
ployer’s premises without violating Section 8(a)(1) unless this
behavior is “out of the ordinary,” and thereby coercive. Aladdin
Gaming, LLC, 345 NLRB 585, 585–586 (2005). In determining
whether the employer’s surveillance is unlawful, the Board
8 My findings of a violation here are only based on Strouse’s testi-
mony. Maciariello’s testimony about her January 2023 conversation
with Sellitto only referenced Respondent’s right to negotiate pay down-
wards just like the Union would have the right to negotiate pay increases
for Clay store employees. Such testimony does not contain an explicit
or implied threat and does not amount to a violation of the Act.
9 Even if Sellitto was on two six-month coffee breaks during Maciar-
iello’s employment, this leaves at least a year of overlap when Sellitto
worked as a district manager and Maciariello worked as a barista at the
considers indicia of coerciveness such as the duration of the ob-
servation, the employer’s distance from its employees while ob-
serving them, and whether the employer engaged in other coer-
cive behavior during its observation. Id. at 586.
In this case, Maciariello testified that in about two years as the
district manager of the Clay store, she had only seen Sellitto in
the store a handful of times and had no meaningful conversations
with her during those earlier visits.9 But when the Union filed
the representation petition in December 2022, Sellitto suddenly
became a regular at the Clay store. Strouse and Maciariello saw
Sellitto in the store twice a week for several hours at a time. Each
testified that Sellitto strategically placed herself at a table where
she could observe all of the baristas working in the store. These
facts certainly satisfy the “out of the ordinary” standard. And the
fact that Sellitto purposely chose to park herself at a table where
she could monitor all baristas as they worked would lead an ob-
jective observer to conclude that the primary purpose for
Sellitto’s visits was to monitor and hopefully chill employees’
union activities in the runup to the January 27 election.10
In its post-hearing brief, Respondent relies on Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 352 NLRB 815, 816–817 (2008)11 for the proposi-
tion that the presence of additional managers does not, in and of
itself, create an impression of unlawful surveillance. Wal-Mart,
however, is distinguishable from the instant matter. To this end,
in Wal-Mart, a regional manager took over as interim manager
of a tire and lube center that was the subject of union organizing
activities. But the regional manager only took over as interim
manager because the regular manager was on extended leave and
no other manager had replaced him. In our case, the Clay store
had two co-managers, Schaefer and Tokich, at the time the peti-
tion was filed, and Sellitto’s out-of-the ordinary presence in the
store only added to the number of management eyes trained on
the store’s baristas.
Based on the above, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by increasing management’s in-store presence to create
the impression of surveillance of employees’ protected activities.
Respondent Did Not Violate the Act by Asking Maciariello and
Strouse to Meet with Sellitto—Complaint § 6(d)
Counsel for the General Counsel alleges that Respondent vio-
lated the Act by holding captive audience meetings about a week
before the election. The record evidence does not support a vio-
lation here and I recommend dismissal of this allegation. To this
end, Section 8(c) of the Act gives employers the right to educate
their employees about labor organizations, collective bargaining,
and the Act itself. The Board has interpreted Section 8(c) to al-
low employers to lawfully compel employees to attend individ-
ual or group meetings in which it urges them to reject union rep-
resentation. See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 NLRB 577, 578
Clay store. And there is no evidence that Sellitto stationed herself on her
laptop in the lobby of the Clay store for several hours/day at any point
during Maciariello’s employment prior to the filing of the representation
petition.
10 As noted infra, Sellitto engaged in other coercive conduct during
her visits, namely her solicitation of grievances and threats involving the
loss of benefits if employees unionized.
11 This case was decided by a two-member Board and thus does not
carry precedential value.
STARBUCKS CORP.
7
(1948); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
In this case, both Maciariello and Strouse were directed by a shift
supervisor (bargaining unit employee) to speak with Sellitto in
late January 2023. These ad-hoc meetings did not appear on the
employees’ daily schedules and in these one-on-one conversa-
tions, Sellitto delivered her pitch as to why employees should not
select the Union as the employees’ collective bargaining repre-
sentative. But as the Board reiterated in Electrolux Home Prod-
ucts, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 34, slip op. at 5 (2019), it is lawful for
an employer to conduct a captive-audience meeting to persuade
employees not to unionize. As an administrative law judge, it is
not my place to make or alter existing law or policy – that is the
exclusive domain of the Board. Based on the above, no violation
of the law has been established.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Starbucks Corp. is an employer within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party, Workers United, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By engaging in the following acts and conduct, Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
a. Soliciting employee grievances with the implication that
Respondent will remedy those grievances;
b. Threatening employees with a loss of pay and benefits, in-
cluding a reduction in hours, pay, loss of annual raises, and loss
of the Arizona State tuition benefit, if employees selected the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative;
c. More closely monitoring unit employees by stationing dis-
trict manager Theresa Sellitto in the lobby of the Clay store.
4. All other allegations of the complaint are dismissed.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
I will order that Respondent post a notice at the Clay store in
the usual manner, and in accordance with Starbucks Corp., 372
NLRB No. 122, slip op. at 5 (2023), notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an in-
ternet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent cus-
tomarily communicates with its employees by such means.
The General Counsel also requests a reading of the notice and
training for supervisors. As for the notice reading, the Board gen-
erally grants this remedy where the unfair labor practices com-
mitted by the respondent are so pervasive that a notice reading is
necessary to dispel the impact of this unlawful conduct. I decline
the General Counsel’s request for a notice reading here because
of the relatively limited nature of the violations and because all
violations were committed by one individual, Theresa Sellitto, a
district manager who is no longer employed by Respondent.
Thus, high–level management officials did not openly partici-
pate in a widely disseminated course of unlawful conduct. See
Starbucks Corp., 372 NLRB No. 122, slip op. 1 fn. 3 (2023) (the
Board did not order a notice reading despite finding that a district
manager investigated and ultimately participated in the decision
to unlawfully terminate a barista in retaliation for their union
organizing activities). I also decline to order training for Re-
spondent’s managers as such a remedy is not warranted in this
matter.
ORDER
Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Soliciting employee grievances with the implication that
Respondent will remedy those grievances;
(b) Threatening employees with a loss of pay and benefits,
including a reduction in hours, pay, loss of annual raises, and loss
of the Arizona State tuition benefit, if employees select the Un-
ion as their collective-bargaining representative;
(c) More closely monitoring unit employees by stationing dis-
trict manager Theresa Sellitto in the lobby of the Clay store.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its Liverpool (Clay), New York facility copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix.” Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent, and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. The Respondent
shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Respond-
ent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
December 20, 2022.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 3 a sworn certification of a respon-
sible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 9, 2024
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the ex-
ercise of the above rights.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8
WE WILL NOT solicit your complaints or grievances, nor will
we imply that we will remedy these complaints and grievances,
to undermine your support for the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of pay or benefits for se-
lecting the Union as your designated collective-bargaining rep-
resentative.
WE WILL NOT have your district manager more closely super-
vise your work in response to your union organizing activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
STARBUCKS CORP.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/03-CA-310676 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from
the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015
Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202)
273-1940.