SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. D/B/A CHI SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH - SAINT JOSEPH LONDON

373 NLRB No. 78 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Saint Joseph Health System, Inc. d/b/a Chi Saint Jo- seph Health—Saint Joseph London and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 227. Case 09–CA–297427 July 26, 2024 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS KAPLAN, PROUTY, AND WILCOX On September 28, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Renée D. McKinney issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below.2 1 There are no exceptions to the judge’s dismissal of allegations that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by making unilateral changes to pay, work schedules, medical benefits, and other unknown terms and conditions of employment. 2 We have amended the judge’s conclusions of law to reflect the fact that the unfair labor practice occurred on June 10, 2022, when the Re- spondent refused the Charging Party’s request to bargain, rather than on June 9, 2022, when the Charging Party made the request. We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance with our deci- sions in Paragon Systems, Inc., 371 NLRB No. 104 (2022), and Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997). We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified and the Board’s standard remedial language. Member Prouty would order the notice-reading remedy requested by the General Counsel in the complaint. See CP Anchorage Hotel 2 d/b/a Hilton Anchorage, 371 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 9–15 (2022) (Mem- ber Prouty, concurring) (urging the Board to adopt a reading of the notice aloud and distribution to employees at a group meeting as a standard remedy for unfair labor practices because “[h]aving the notice to employees read aloud to them in a group meeting, with a copy in hand to follow along if they choose, is a superior means of disseminat- ing and amplifying the Board’s message to maximize the extent to which employees hear and comprehend it.”), enfd. 98 F.4th 314 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Member Prouty also finds notice reading fully warranted in this case considering the nature of the Respondent’s violation. The Respondent failed and refused to recognize and bargain with the Charg- ing Party who, up until the Respondent assumed operations, represent- ed every single food service employee later hired by the Respondent. Accordingly, the Respondent’s conduct was “serious and widespread,” as it denied every employee the representation they selected just 3 years prior. See Homer D. Bronson, 349 NLRB 512, 515 (2007) (citing Federated Logistics & Operations, 340 NLRB 255, 258 (2003), enfd. 400 F.3d 920, 929–930 (D.C. Cir. 2005)), enfd. mem. 273 Fed.Appx. 32 (2d Cir. 2008). He believes that a public reading of the notice is necessary to “dissipate as much as possible any lingering effects” of the The judge found that the Respondent is a Burns3 suc- cessor that violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with the Charging Party, on request, after the Respondent took over the food-service department from predecessor So- dexo. In its exceptions, the Respondent argues that the judge improperly concluded that it became a Burns suc- cessor to Sodexo. Specifically, the Respondent argues that the historical food-service bargaining unit is no longer an appropriate unit because it does not conform to any of the units deemed appropriate under the Board’s Health Care Rule (Rule).4 The Respondent argues that, even in the absence of the Rule, the Board should apply the disparity of interest test articulated in St. Francis Hospital, 271 NLRB 948 (1984) (St. Francis Hospital II), remanded by Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 474, AFL–CIO, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987), to find that the unit of food-service employees is no longer an appropriate unit for bargaining. For the reasons stated in the judge’s decision and below, we find no merit to the Respondent’s exceptions. We adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to recognize and bargain with the Charging Party. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Respondent operates an acute-care facility in Lon- don, Kentucky, and performed its own food service be- tween 2010 and 2014. In 2014, the Respondent out- sourced food service to Sodexo. On August 8, 2019, the Charging Party was certified to represent Sodexo’s 25 to 30 food-service employees at the Respondent’s facility. On December 12, 2019, Sodexo and the Charging Party entered into a collective-bargaining agreement, effective December 13, 2019, to December 12, 2022. On October 29, 2021, the unit ratified a memorandum of understand- ing that, among other things, extended the agreement for an additional year. On or about March 9, 2022,5 a Sodexo supervisor ad- vised the Charging Party that the Respondent was not renewing its contract with Sodexo and that the Respond- ent would provide its own food service going forward. On June 7, the Respondent assumed control of food ser- vices from Sodexo and employed approximately 15 to 18 employees, all of whom were formerly Sodexo employ- ees. On June 9, the Charging Party emailed the Re- spondent asserting majority status and demanding that Respondent’s unfair labor practice and allow the employees, who have been without representation for almost 2 years, to fully perceive that the Respondent is bound by the requirements of the Act. 3 NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 4 Sec. 103.30(a) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations. 5 All dates are in 2022 unless otherwise noted. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 the Respondent recognize the Charging Party. On June 10, the Respondent replied, refusing to recognize the Charging Party. DISCUSSION Under NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, supra, and its progeny, an employer that acquires its pre- decessor’s operations succeeds to the predecessor’s col- lective-bargaining obligations and is required to recog- nize and bargain with a union representing the predeces- sor’s employees when: (1) there is a substantial continui- ty of operations after the takeover; (2) a majority of the successor’s employees at the acquired facility were for- mer predecessor employees; and (3) a majority of the new employer’s workforce in a unit remains appropriate for collective bargaining under the successor’s opera- tions. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 41–43 (1987); Van Lear Equipment, Inc., 336 NLRB 1059, 1063 (2001). The first two requirements are not in dispute. The Re- spondent’s exceptions to the judge’s decision focus only on whether the unit remains appropriate for collective bargaining under its operations. The Respondent argues that, under the Rule, the unit is no longer an appropriate unit because the Respondent is an acute-care facility, and the unit of food-service employees does not conform to any of the eight enumerated units found appropriate in the Rule. We initially note that the judge properly found that the Rule, which sets forth the specific units appropriate “for petitions filed pursuant to Section 9(c)(1)(A)(i) or 9(c)(1)(B) of the [Act],” does not apply to cases, like this one, where no such petition has been filed. See Patholo- gy Institute, 320 NLRB 1050, 1050 (1996), enfd. 116 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1028 (1997). In the alternative, even assuming the Rule ap- plies in unfair labor practice cases, we agree with the judge that the historically appropriate unit is an “existing non-conforming unit” within the meaning of Section 103.30(a).6 The question, therefore, is whether the unit 6 The Respondent’s claim that the existing non-conforming unit ex- ception covers only bargaining units in existence before the Rule’s effective date is inconsistent with the structure of the Rule as a whole and belied by the regulatory history. In this regard, the Rule contem- plates the certification of non-conforming units, see, e.g., Sec. 103.30(d) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations (authorizing regional directors to “approv[e] stipulations not in accordance with paragraph (a), as long as the stipulations are otherwise acceptable”), and it would be anomalous to treat non-conforming units created pursuant to the Rule differently than nonconforming units predating the Rule. Indeed, during the rulemaking process, the Board explained that it would treat non-conforming units created by stipulation the same as any other non- conforming unit (including those predating the Rule’s enactment). Compare Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry (Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,932 remains appropriate under traditional representation prin- ciples. See Pathology Institute, supra at 1051. We agree with the judge that it does.7 Citing cases where the Board has applied the existing nonconforming unit exception in an acute-care facility, the judge found that “the animating public policy princi- ple repeatedly articulated by the Board is that ‘it was not the intent of the Rule to require the abandonment of, and replacement of, existing historical units with units that specifically conform to those set forth in the Rule.’” See St. Mary’s Duluth Clinic, 332 NLRB 1419, 1421 (2000) (citing Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 312 NLRB 933, 934–935 (1993); Crittenton Hospital, 328 NLRB 879, 879 (1999)). The judge concluded that, respecting the Board’s longstanding policy of according great deference to collective-bargaining history and promoting labor sta- bility, the existing non-conforming unit of food-service employees at Respondent’s London facility remained an appropriate unit. In affirming the judge, we emphasize that this is a suc- cessorship case, not a representation case.8 Under tradi- tional representation principles applied to successorship cases, the Board accords deference to the historical unit, as “a mere change in ownership should not uproot bar- gaining units that have enjoyed a history of collective bargaining unless the units no longer conform reasonably well to other standards of appropriateness.” Stein, Inc., 369 NLRB No. 10, slip op. at 20 (2020) (citing Cadillac Asphalt Paving Co., 349 NLRB 6, 9 (2007); Indianapolis Mack Sales & Service, 288 NLRB 1123, 1123 fn. 5 (1988)); see also Trident Seafoods, Inc., 318 NLRB 738, 738 (1995), enfd. 101 F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The (proposed Sept. 1, 1988), reproduced in Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry (Federal Register Rulemaking Publications, 1987–1989), 284 NLRB 1515, 1573 (1987) (“To the extent a stipula- tion may later result in the creation of a residual group of unrepresented employees, the Board will address their representation concerns as it would those of other groups of residual employees present in partially organized acute care hospitals—on a case-by-case basis applying the rules insofar as practicable.”), with Sec. 103.30(c) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations (“Where there are existing non-conforming units in acute care hospitals, and a petition for additional units is filed pursuant to sec. 9(c)(1)(A)(i) or 9(c)(1)(B) [of the Act], the Board shall find appropriate only units which comport, insofar as practicable, with the appropriate unit set forth in paragraph (a) of this section.”). 7 Member Kaplan agrees with his colleagues that the judge correctly found that the Respondent is a Burns successor and that the Rule is not applicable here. Given those unanimous findings and given that the Respondent is maintaining the preexisting bargaining unit in its entire- ty, he does not believe that there is any question that the bargaining unit remains an appropriate unit. 8 We affirm the judge’s rejection of the disparity of interest test set forth in St. Francis Hospital II, supra, as that test has been superseded by the Rule. In any event, even before promulgation of the Rule, the test was applied only in representation cases, not in successorship cases such as this one. SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. 3 party challenging a historical unit bears the burden of showing that the unit is no longer appropriate. The evi- dentiary burden is a heavy one that can be met by show- ing that a historical unit is “repugnant to Board policy”; that “compelling circumstances” are present that “over- come the significance of bargaining history”; that the unit is “so constituted as to hamper employees in fully exercising rights guaranteed by the Act”; or that the his- torical units no longer “conform reasonably well to other standards of appropriateness.” Trident Seafoods, Inc. v. NLRB, supra at 118 (and cases cited therein); see also Ready Mix USA, Inc., 340 NLRB 946 (2003); Deferiet Paper Co. v. NLRB, 235 F.3d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Banknote Corp. of America, 315 NLRB 1041 (1994), enfd. 84 F.3d 637 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). We find that the Respondent did not make this showing and thus failed to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating that the unit of food-service employees is no longer appropriate. Accordingly, having found that the Charging Party made a timely request that the Re- spondent recognize and bargain over an appropriate unit on June 9, and that the Respondent declined to do so on June 10, we affirm the judge’s finding that the Respond- ent unlawfully failed and refused to recognize and bar- gain with the Charging Party upon request and, therefore, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1). AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 5: “The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by, on or about June 10, 2022, failing and refus- ing to recognize the Charging Party as the exclusive col- lective-bargaining representative of the above Unit.” ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Saint Joseph Health System, Inc. d/b/a CHI Saint Joseph Health—Saint Joseph Lon- don, London, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 227 (the Union) as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa- tive of the employees in the bargaining unit. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclu- sive collective-bargaining representative of the employ- ees in the following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed agree- ment: All full-time and regular part-time food service em- ployees, employed in the food service operation at Saint Joseph London Hospital, 1001 Saint Joseph Lane, London, Kentucky; but excluding all other employees, confidential employees, office clerical employees, tem- porary employees, and all professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Post at its facility in London, Kentucky, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”9 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being signed by the Respondent’s author- ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic means, if the Respondent cus- tomarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur- rent employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since June 10, 2022. (b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director of Region 9 a sworn certifica- tion of a responsible official on a form provided by the 9 If the facility involved in these proceedings is open and staffed by a substantial complement of employees, the notice must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the facility involved in these proceedings is closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pan- demic, the notice must be posted within 14 days after the facility reo- pens and a substantial complement of employees have returned to work. If, while closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees due to the pandemic, the Respondent is communicating with its employees by electronic means, the notice must also be posted by such electronic means within 14 days after service by the Region. If the notice to be physically posted was posted electronically more than 60 days before physical posting of the notice, the notice shall state at the bottom that “This notice is the same notice previously [sent or posted] electronically on [date].” If this Order is enforced by a judg- ment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice read- ing “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. Dated, Washington, D.C. July 26, 2024 ______________________________________ Marvin E. Kaplan, Member ________________________________________ David M. Prouty, Member ________________________________________ Gwynne A. Wilcox, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities. WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to recognize and bargain with United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 227 (the Union) as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of our employees in the bargaining unit. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employees in the following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an under- standing is reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement: All full-time and regular part-time food service em- ployees, employed in the food service operation at Saint Joseph London Hospital, 1001 Saint Joseph Lane, London, Kentucky; but excluding all other employees, confidential employees, office clerical employees, tem- porary employees, and all professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. The Board’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/09-CA-297427 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washing- ton, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940. Shay Chandler and Jamie Ireland, for the General Counsel. Jon Bierman and Sarah Robertson, for the Respondent. Joe Torres, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RENÉE D. MCKINNEY, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried1 in London, Kentucky, on July 25, 2023. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 227 (Charging Party) filed the first amended charge on March 6, 2023,2 and the General Counsel issued the complaint on March 27, 2023.3 The complaint alleges that Respondent Saint Joseph Health System, Inc. d/b/a CHI Saint Joseph Health—Saint Joseph London is a successor employer to Sodexo, with whom Charg- ing Party had a collective-bargaining agreement in effect, cov- ering a bargaining unit consisting of food service workers who worked at Respondent’s facility (the Unit). The complaint also alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National 1 The transcripts and exhibits in this case generally are accurate. During my review of the record, however, I identified transcript correc- tions that are warranted: Page 1—“Fiscal Courtroom” is corrected to “Community Room”; Page 100, line 22—“USCW 227” is corrected to “UFCW 227”; Page 109, line 21—“retired” is corrected to “rehired”; Page 206, line 5—“By Ms. Ireland” is corrected to “By Mr. Bier- man”. 2 All dates are in 2022 unless otherwise indicated. 3 At hearing, counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend par. 5(c) of the complaint to state that since about June 7, [2022], based on the facts described in pars, 2(a), 2(b), and 5(b), the Union has been the designated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Unit. (Tr. 10.) Respondent denied the amended paragraph. (Tr. 10.) I inad- vertently did not rule on the motion but hereby grant it. SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. 5 Labor Relations Act (the Act) by (1) about June 7, making unilateral changes to the pay, work schedules, medical benefits and other, unknown, terms and conditions of employment of the Unit and (2) failing and refusing to recognize the Charging Party as the 9(a) representative of the Unit. On April 10, 2023, Respondent filed its answer to the complaint. Respondent ad- mitted in part and denied in part the essential allegations of the complaint. After the conclusion of the trial, Respondent and the General Counsel filed briefs. Based on the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent is a corporation with an office and place of busi- ness in London, Kentucky, where it has been engaged in the business of operating an acute care hospital. In conducting its operations during the 12-month period ending February 1, 2023, Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $250,000 and purchased and received goods valued at more than $5000 from points outside the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Re- spondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that Charging Party is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Respondent opened its London facility in 2010. Prior to 2014, Respondent directly employed food service workers to staff its kitchen, cafeteria, and to provide meals onsite to pa- tients, their families, staff, and guests. (Tr. 64, 83, 99–100.)4 From about 2014 to June 6, 2022, food and nutrition services were provided to these Respondent constituencies by Sodexo, which employed the food service workers assigned to Re- spondent’s London facility. (Tr. 82; GC Exh.4.) On July 31, 2019, Charging Party was certified as the collec- tive-bargaining representative for the full-time and regular part- time food service employees of SDH Services East, LLC, a subsidiary of Sodexo, Inc.,5 working at Respondent’s London 4 I use the following abbreviations in this decision: “Tr.” for tran- script; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel exhibit; “R. Exh.” for Respond- ent exhibit; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; and “R. Br.” for the Respondent’s brief. Although I have included citations to the record to highlight particular testimony or evidence, my findings and conclu- sions are based not solely on the evidence specifically cited but rather are based my review and consideration of the entire record, including the demeanor of the witnesses. I have also considered the relevant factors in making my credibility findings which includes: “the weight of the respective evidence, established or admitted facts, inherent prob- abilities, and ‘reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole.’” Daikichi Corp., 335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (quoting Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 5 Witnesses and the parties referred to entities Sodexo Operations, LLC, SDH Services East, LLC, and Sodexo, Inc. simply as “Sodexo”; therefore, I do the same in this decision going forward. Similarly, the General Counsel’s witnesses made little distinction between Respond- facility (Tr. 77–78; GC Exh. 11.) Sodexo and Charging Party entered into a collective-bargaining agreement, effective De- cember 13, 2019, to December 12, 2022. (Tr. 78; GC Exh. 12.) The Unit ratified this agreement on December 12, 2019. (Tr. 78.) Prior to the expiration of the collective-bargaining agree- ment, about September 2021, Sodexo requested to bargain with Charging Party over a vaccine mandate, wage increases, and a potential extension of the contract. (Tr. 78–79.) On October 8, 2021, those parties reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) extending the collective-bargaining agreement’s dura- tion until December 12, 2023, and providing for wage increases to take effect on September 24, 2021, in lieu of the wage in- crease scheduled for December 13, 2021, to employees in the following food service job classifications: cook, dietetic clerk, host-hostess, utility worker, grill cook/cashier, food service worker, lead, cook-senior. (Tr. 81; GC Exh. 13.) The Unit rati- fied the MOU on October 29, 2021. (Tr. 79.) B. Charging Party and the Food Service Employees Learn that Respondent’s Contract with Sodexo is being Terminated and Respondent Will Become Their Employer; the Food Service Employees Apply for Work with Respondent In early 2022, cook-senior and Chief Union Steward Bran- don Partin began hearing rumors that Sodexo would no longer be his employer and Respondent would be taking over. (Tr. 103.) About February or March 2022, in an apparently sponta- neous discussion prompted by employee questions, manager Joe Higgins informed Partin and other employees that Sodexo was going out and Respondent was taking over. (Tr. 103, 114, 145.) At the time, Higgins managed food service at Respond- ent’s London and Berea, Kentucky facilities and was employed by Sodexo.6 (Tr. 32, 101.) Higgins informed the employees that they would all need to reapply for employment with Re- spondent. (Tr. 103, 104, 146.) Higgins did not tell the employ- ees that everyone would be rehired. (Tr. 146.) Higgins told the employees that benefits might change; he was uncertain—and there would probably be cuts. (Tr. 103, 147.) Higgins did not convey any information to the employees about what their new benefits would be. (Tr. 103.) About March 9, 2022, the Charging Party’s Area Repre- sentative Marty Larkin spoke to a Sodexo human resources representative, Mark Combs, who informed him that Respond- ent would not be renewing its contract with Sodexo. (Tr. 91, 92.) Combs informed Larkin that the food service employees would be staying on at the hospital. (Tr. 93.) Thereafter, Larkin ent and related entities CHI (“Catholic Health Initiatives.” (Tr. 60.)) and CommonSpirit. Yet, no party has raised the issues of single or joint employer status and I am making no finding as to whether Com- monSpirit Health, CHI, and Respondent are single or joint employers. I refer to the three entities separately, by name, in this decision—not collectively. 6 The complaint does not allege that Higgins or Sodexo Human Re- sources Representative Mark Combs were agents of Respondent. Fur- ther, at hearing, Respondent’s counsel specifically declined to stipulate that Higgins was an agent of Respondent. (Tr. 32.) Counsel for the General Counsel’s brief does not argue that either Sodexo representa- tive was an agent of Respondent. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 made several telephone calls to Respondent’s Director of Hu- man Resources Operations, Sandra Turqueza (an admitted 2(11) supervisor and 2(13) agent) and to John Yanes, Respond- ent’s President. (Tr. 30, 94; GC Exh. 1(i), GC Exh. 5(a).) The record does not reflect the dates of those telephone calls, but Larkin did not receive return calls from either official. (Tr. 94.) About early March, Area Representative Larkin informed his boss, Secretary-Treasurer Paul Whitely, what he had learned regarding Sodexo’s loss of the contract at Respondent’s facility and Respondent’s plan to handle food service with its own workforce. (Tr. 83–84.) Whitely called Combs, who confirmed. (Tr. 84.) Combs told Whitely that Respondent would employ the food service workers beginning about early June, but he was unsure of the precise time. (Tr. 84.) Whitely did not con- tact Respondent at that time. (Tr. 85.) At some point—it is not clear when from testimony— Sodexo’s manager Higgins conveyed to Partin a deadline for applying to work for Respondent. (Tr. 104.) Higgins also stat- ed that if the employees did not apply by the deadline, they probably would not be considered for a job. (Tr. 104.) The record does not disclose the deadline Higgins imparted. The record does not disclose how Partin knew to apply online for work with Respondent but on April 22, Partin ap- plied online to work for Respondent for a Cook position. (Tr. 104; GC Exh. 2.) Partin was not interviewed for a position but received a telephone call “one day” from Senior Recruiter Amanda Scarbrough (an admitted 2(11) supervisor and 2(13) agent) when he was in his supervisor, Michael Gilley’s, office. (Tr. 104; GC Exh. 1(i).) Partin took the call on his speaker- phone. (Tr. 104.) Scarbrough offered Partin a job as a cook and told him how much money he would make based on his years of experience. (Tr. 104.) Partin orally accepted the offer. (Tr. 104.) On May 5, Scarbrough sent Partin an email message set- ting his start date as June 7 and directing him to click a link in the email “to access the details of your offer, including start date, compensation, benefits, and the conditions of your antici- pated employment.” (Tr. 105–106; GC Exh. 7.) Partin clicked on the link and was presented with a letter dated May 5 with terms and conditions of employment that will be detailed be- low. (Tr. 106; GC Exh. 9.) Following this first e-mail, Partin received others from Scarbrough—none of which emails were offered into evidence—regarding pre-employment screening for drugs, a physical, a background check, and the like. (Tr. 107.) Partin completed the requisite preemployment steps. (Tr. 107.) The letter that Partin received on May 5 at the email link from Senior Recruiter Scarbrough set forth his start date, hourly pay rate, that he would be entitled to the standard employee benefits beginning on the first day of the month following his first full 30 days of employment, and employment was being offered on an at-will basis. (GC Exh. 8.) Partin digitally signed his acceptance on May 5 at 8:21:06 PM CDT. (GC Exh. 8.) The Sodexo food service bargaining unit consisted of 25–30 employees; either 15 or 18 of them were subsequently em- ployed by Respondent as of June 7; they all received similar letters.7 (Tr. 33, 46–47, 101; GC Exh. 3, GC Exh. 8.) The food service employees participated in a Zoom orientation after their first day of work. (Tr. 61–62, 116.) They were also required to complete a suite of training modules online. (Tr. 62–63; GC Exh. 10). C. The Food Service Employees’ Old and New Terms and Conditions of Employment 1. Terms and Conditions of Employment under Sodexo Sodexo’s food service employees provided the services at Respondent’s London facility outlined in the agreement be- tween Sodexo and CHI, including the preparation and delivery of meals to patients; preparation and service of meals in Re- spondent’s cafeteria, in-house catering; and related functions such as picking up trays and dishes from patient rooms, dish- washing; cleaning the kitchen; and taking out the trash from these areas. (Tr. 124, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135; GC Exh. 4.) The Sodexo food service employees’ hours of work varied— some worked 12-hour shifts, some worked 8-hour shifts, and some, apparently, worked variable hours. Employee Partin’s testimony on this point used both informal titles describing job duties and formal job classifications, which was, frankly, con- fusing. From this testimony, however, I gleaned that under Sodexo, Partin’s hours as “homestyle” cook8 were both 5:30 a.m.—2 p.m. and 6 a.m.—2:30 p.m., Monday—Friday. (Tr. 114, 128.) In addition, Partin testified that the dietetic clerks worked Monday—Friday, 6 a.m.—2:30 p.m. (Tr. 122.); patient cooks worked Sunday—Wednesday at Noon and Wednesday at Noon to Sunday (Tr. 117); and the dishwasher or utility worker worked either 6:30 a.m.—7 p.m. or 7 a.m.—7:30 p.m. (Tr. 124, 125.). Partin testified that the hosts/hostesses worked 12-hour shifts—“probably” 7 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. (Tr. 123.) The retail cooks, to whom Partin also referred as grill cooks and cashiers, worked 6 a.m.—2:30 p.m. and a second crew started at 11 a.m. (Tr. 125.) The end time of the retail cooks’ second shift was not elicited. Yet, Partin testified that the retail cooks worked an 8- hour shift. (Tr. 125.) Partin also testified that there were leads, whose hours he did not recall but who worked until closing (Tr. 126, 127.), and food service workers whose hours varied and were usually college kids or floaters. (Tr. 126.) Under the contract extension and wage increase MOU agreed to by Charging Party and Sodexo, the following pay rates applied, effective September 24, 2021: 7 Charging Party Secretary-Treasurer Whitely testified that 13 So- dexo employees were hired by Respondent (Tr. 88.) and employee Partin testified that the number was 15 (Tr. 101.). Documentary evi- dence and Director Turqueza’ s testimony (Tr. 46–47; GC Exh.3, GC Exh. 9.) leads me to conclude that the correct number is 15 or 18— depending on whether Respondent’s job classifications of clinical dieti- cian and clinical dietician lead, whose incumbents are listed as non- exempt employees previously employed by Sodexo in GC Exh. 3, are performing the same work that Unit employees performed under So- dexo. The record does not address this issue directly. 8 Partin also referred to himself as a retail cook. (Tr. 117.) SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. 7 Job Classification Pay per Hour Cook $16.00 Dietetic Clerk $16.00 Host/Hostess $15.25 Utility Worker $15.00 Grill Cook/Cashier $15.50 Food Service Worker $15.00 Lead $16.50 Cook—Senior $17.50 (GC Exh. 13.) The main record evidence of Sodexo’s employee benefits and employment policies is contained in the collective- bargaining agreement. (GC Exh. 12.) Article 27 of the Sodexo collective-bargaining agreement provides that unit members were eligible for the Standard Benefits Plan. (GC Exh.12.) No details about that plan’s provisions or rates are set forth. There was no evidence entered into the record about the food service employees’ medical benefits under Sodexo except employee Partin’s testimony that his medical benefits are “still” provided by Anthem Blue Cross. (Tr. 141–142.) When taking unscheduled time off work, Sodexo’s food ser- vice employees “called in” to dietetic clerk Margie Rednour, who staffed the food service call center used by patients and their family members to request meals. (Tr. 139.) There was no evidence offered as to how the food service employees’ work- ing time was recorded under Sodexo. Michael Gilley supervised the food service employees as- signed to Respondent’s London facility under Sodexo. (Tr. 45, 104, 213.) Gilley was supported by a shift manager and an area general manager, as well. (Tr. 213.) Joe Higgins was food ser- vice manager at Respondent’s London facility. (Tr. 32.) Both Gilley and Higgins were employed by Sodexo prior to June 7. (Tr. 32, 213.) 2. Terms and Conditions of Employment under Respondent As of the date of hearing, excluding 2(11) supervisor Gilley, the following 23 food service employees had been hired9 by Respondent at its London facility: Name Start Date Previously Em- ployed by Sodexo 1 Benge, Rhonda 7/25/2022 No 2 Colwell, Ellen C. 6/7/2022 Yes 3 Craft. Misty G. 6/7/2022 Yes 4 Creech, Regina R. 6/7/2022 Yes 5 Goforth, Kiara I. 6/7/2022 Yes 6 Hail, Alisha M. 6/7/2022 Yes 7 Hanagan, Edward L. 6/7/2022 Yes 8 Hazelwood, Owen C. 5/15/2023 No 9 Heller, Edith 6/7/2022 Yes 10 Hinkle, Melinda 6/7/2022 Yes 9 Employees Benge, Creech, Rogers, Amanda Smith, and Woods were no longer employed with Respondent as of the date of hearing. 11 Lefler, Sarah 6/7/2022 Yes 12 Mathes, Geneva N. 6/7/2022 Yes 13 Miracle, Tammy A. 6/7/2022 Yes 14 Morris, Ryan 6/7/2022 Yes 15 Partin, Brandon L. 6/7/2022 Yes 16 Ramirez, Zuan G. 6/7/2022 Yes 17 Rednour, Margie J. 6/7/2022 Yes 18 Robinson, Hannah G. 6/26/2022 No 19 Rogers, Tammy L. 6/7/2022 Yes 20 Smith, Amanda M. 6/7/2022 Yes 21 Smith, Sebastian J. 6/26/2022 No 22 Vanover, Veronica M. 6/26/2022 No 23 Woods, Shelby G. 6/7/2022 Yes (GC Exh. 2, GC Exh. 3.) Thus, all food service employees hired by Respondent when it began food service operations on June 7 had previously worked for Sodexo. (Tr. 47–48, 110–112; GC Exh. 2, GC Exh. 3.) I note that although HR Manager Turqueza stated that Re- spondent did not seek employees other than those who formerly worked for Sodexo from March through June 2022, she also testified repeatedly that only the employees so designated on Respondent’s food service employee roster, which is GC Exh. 3, had previously worked for Sodexo. (Tr. 41, 46–47.) There- fore, although their applications are not reflected in GC Exh.2, which Turqueza testified comprised the job applications Re- spondent received for its food service employees in 2022, Rob- inson, Sebastian J. Smith, and Vanover all began working for Respondent during that period of time—and did not previously work for Sodexo. (GC Exh. 3.) On their first day of work, June 7, Dr. Deisell Martinez told these employees that their years of service would be honored. (Tr. 115.) For the former Sodexo employees who had previous- ly been employed by Respondent prior to CHI entering the 2014 food service agreement with Sodexo—this could be a matter of many years’ differences. Partin had a 2010 original start date with Respondent. (Tr. 115, GC Exh. 3.) When Respondent resumed food service using its own em- ployees on June 7, according to employee Partin, it was using a “model” to staff and schedule its kitchen, cafeteria, and provide food service. (Tr. 33, 139.) This “model” was developed by Dr. Deisell Martinez.10 (Tr. 139.) Respondent’s “model” provided for leaner staffing and fewer food-related services than under Sodexo. (Tr. 141.) For example, certain job classifications, such as the utility worker, were eliminated. (Tr. 125.) Respondent hired its food service employees into different classifications than had existed under Sodexo. The new classifications are 10 Director Turqueza testified that Dr. Martinez’ title is vice- president of nutritional services, but Turqueza did not know what entity Dr. Martinez works for. (Tr. 33.) Dr. Martinez’ name does not appear on the organization charts in evidence for either Respondent’s facility or CommonSpirit. (GC Exh. 5(a-b).) DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8 cook, nutrition assistant I, and nutrition assistant II. (GC Exh. 3; GC Exh. 5(a).) The loss of food service employees meant that the remaining employees perform the duties of job classifi- cations that no longer existed, such as expediters (who stage patient trays for delivery) and the utility techs. (Tr. 117–118.) In addition, concomitant with the more limited hours for the cafeteria, which closed at 7 p.m. under Sodexo but closes at 2 p.m. now, there are fewer cooks and cashiers. (Tr. 117–118.) There are also fewer tray passers. (Tr. 124.) Employees have to all pitch in and do whatever tasks are necessary when col- leagues are absent. (Tr. 118.) Employee Partin testified that although there is no backup plan if someone calls in, the work the food service employees were doing remained the same. (Tr. 140.) Therefore, the food service employees still prepare food for patients, their families, staff, and the public; they still staff the call center; they still deliver trays to patient rooms and pick those trays up; they still wash the dishes, take out the trash and staff the cafeteria— albeit with the more limited hours for the cafeteria and with the addition of self-serve kiosks and more vending machines. (Tr. 123, 125–126, 130, 132, 133, 143.) Partin also testified that although he still prepared soup for the doctor’s lounge daily, all other in-house catering has been outsourced. (Tr. 134.) The equipment that the food service employees use is the same as that they used under Sodexo. (Tr. 129–29). The food service employees’ new job classifications came with new wage rates. Respondent slotted in the food service job classifications to its existing pay grades for hourly, non- exempt, unskilled job classifications for which a high school diploma or a GED is the educational requirement. (Tr. 189, 194, 195–196; GC Exh. 3, R. Exh. 10.) The pay grade for nutri- tional assistants I is A50, and the pay range is $15–$20.16 an hour. (Tr. 195–196.) The pay grade for cooks and nutritional assistants II is A56 and the pay range is $15.92–$23.88. (Tr. 195–96.) Director Turqueza testified that the vast majority of unskilled classifications fall into pay grades A50 or A56. (Tr. 196.) Such employees are paid biweekly. (Tr. 168.) Likewise, the food service employees share other terms and conditions of employment with one another and Respondent’s other full-time hourly unskilled job classifications. These em- ployees all apply for work with Respondent through an online platform, iCIMS, and receive a standardized offer letter, which is the same as those provided to the former Sodexo food service employees. (Tr. 167, 168; GC Exh. 9, R. Exh. 1.) They learn their duties on the job. (Tr. 197.) Such employees are offered the same benefits as those offered to the food service employ- ees in their offer letters. (Tr. 168; GC Exh. 9, R. Exh. 1.) Those benefits are summarized in CommonSpirit’s “Your benefits at a glance,” which is distributed to employees via Respondent’s intranet, “Employees Central.” (Tr. 173, 174–179; GC Exh. 6, R. Exh. 2.) Eligible employees can go to the “My Benefits” section of the Intranet to enroll in benefits, make changes, etc. (Tr. 174.) Respondent’s full-time hourly unskilled employees are also subject to CommonSpirit’s employment policies for nonexecutive severance, bereavement, years of service, attend- ance and tardiness, corrective action, disruptive behavior, and vacation-paid time off, (Tr. 179–186; R. Exh. 3, R. Exh. 4, R. Exh. 5, R. Exh. 6, R. Exh. 7, R. Exh. 8, R. Exh. 9.) Employee Partin denied receiving any specific information regarding his benefits or hours of work prior to June 7, which was his first day of work for Respondent. (Tr. 107.) Yet, Partin testified that he has the same insurance, Anthem Blue Cross, and provider as when he worked for Sodexo and, at hearing, he did not remember what specific changes occurred to his medi- cal benefits, if any—although he thought it may have improved a little bit. (Tr. 141–142.) All of Respondent’s hourly employees punch a timeclock. (Tr. 187.) They use the time clock located on their floor except for the ground floor employees, such as the food service em- ployees. (Tr. 187.) There is no ground floor timeclock so food service employees punch in and out using the first-floor time clock, which they share with other hourly employees who work in administration, HR, environmental services, plant operations, and outpatient service. (Tr. 187.) Regarding working hours, employee Partin testified that on his first day working for Respondent, June 7, he started at 5:30 a.m. and it seemed like he “worked 13 hours or something.” (Tr. 114.) His schedule was variable for some unspecified length of time but, at the time of the hearing, had settled back to starting at 5:30 a.m. and ending at 2 p.m., which were his hours under Sodexo. (Tr. 118.) Partin did not use Respondent’s job classifications in describing the hours worked by other employ- ees but referred to their job duties or roles, instead. Thus, Partin testified that cooks (other than himself) now work 6:30 a.m.–7 p.m. (Tr. 121.) Partin could not recall the work hours of tray passers but speculated that it is probably 7 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. (Tr. 123.) Cashiers work 6 a.m.–2:30 p.m. (Tr. 126.) As under Sodexo, when taking unscheduled time off work, Respondent’s food service employees call in to Margie Rednour, who is now a nutrition assistant I. (Tr. 139.) Michael Gilley, formerly of Sodexo, became Manager for Nutritional Services for Respondent’s food services on June 7. (Tr. 203.) There was no evidence presented at hearing of shared supervision or management—other than high-level London facility management such as Kentucky’s Market CEO, Anthony A. Houston and President John C. Yanes—between the food service employees and other hourly unskilled employees at Respondent’s facility. (Tr. 5(a).) Manager Gilley testified that the food service employees— particularly the nutrition assistants I and II—have contact with other hourly non-skilled employees in the course of carrying out their duties on patient floors bringing trays to patients and picking up empty trays. (Tr. 207–210; R. Exh. 11, R. Exh. 12.) Specifically, environmental services employees might call the call center and speak to a nutrition assistant II to convey meal preferences, missed items, dropped items, or that a patient needs a menu. (Tr. 207–208.) A patient care assistant might do the same to convey diet changes. (Tr. 208.) And a pharmacy tech might interact with a nutrition assistant to convey a drug interaction or the need for food at certain times due to medica- tion. (Tr. 209.) In addition, environmental services employees take out the trash from food service areas. (Tr. 210.) Manager Gilley also conveyed limited one-way interchange between the nutrition assistants and patient care assistants, who deliver and pick up food trays for patients in isolation, where nutrition assistants are not allowed to enter. (Tr. 210.) The rec- SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. 9 ord does not disclose whether this also occurred when Sodexo employed the food service workers. D. Charging Party Demands Recognition and Respondent Refuses On June 9, via email, Charging Party’s Secretary-Treasurer Whitely sent a letter to Respondent’s Director of Human Re- sources Operations Turqueza. (Tr. 86; GC Exh. 8.) Whitely’s letter claimed that Charging Party represented a majority of all full-time and regular part-time employees employed “in the food service operation at St. Joseph London Hospital.” (GC. Exh. 8.) Whitely also enclosed a copy of the Charging Party’s collective-bargaining agreement with Sodexo and the MOU extending the agreement. (GC Exh. 8, GC Exh. 12). On June 10, CommonSpirit Health Vice President, Labor Relations Chris Scanlan, whom Respondent stipulated at hear- ing is a 2(13) agent, replied to Whitely by e-mail. In pertinent part, he wrote: The Hospital is not a party to any agreement with the Union. Nor has it ever agreed to extend representation to the Union and/or to assume the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and Sodexo. And the Hospital does not intend to do so. As such, there has been no assumption of that agreement by that Hospital. To the extent that the Union claims recognition under the Burns or any other successorship doctrine, the Hospital does not find that claim persuasive. Even assuming (for argument's sake) that other elements of successorship have been met, the employees must comprise an "appropriate" unit under the Na- tional Labor Relations Act. The NLRB's Health Care Rule, which applies to all acute care hospitals under the Board's ju- risdiction, does not recognize a unit limited to dietary/food and nutrition employees. Instead, a health care unit must fit one or more of eight permissible employee groupings, none of which has been identified here. Accordingly, the Hospital does not recognize the Union as the representative of the employees referenced in your corre- spondence. It also declines to become a party to, or otherwise be bound by, any collective bargaining agreements between Sodexo and the Union. (Tr. 22; GC Exh. 8.) Whitely did not respond to Scanlan but contacted counsel. (Tr. 88.) The initial charge in this case was filed on June 10. (GC Exh. 1(a).) DECISION AND ANALYSIS I find that Respondent is a Burns successor of Sodexo as to its food service employees working at Respondent’s London facility and, under the circumstances presented in this case, a bargaining unit comprised solely of food service employees is an appropriate unit in an acute care hospital. Respondent was obliged to bargain with Charging Party as of June 9 because Respondent maintained a substantial continuity of operations with Sodexo, the Charging Party made a timely demand to bargain in an appropriate unit, and Respondent had hired a “substantial and representative complement” of its food service workforce by that date. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) when it failed to recognize and bargain with the Charging Par- ty. Yet, Respondent was free to set its own terms and condi- tions of employment for the food service employees prior to a bargaining obligation attaching on June 9. I. RESPONDENT IS A BURNS SUCCESSOR OF SODEXO A successor employer is not bound by the substantive terms of a collective-bargaining agreement negotiated by the prede- cessor and is generally free to unilaterally set initial terms and conditions of employment. NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272, 281–295 (1972). Yet, it is well established that a successor employer is obligated to recognize and bargain with a union representing the predecessor's employees, when (1) there is a substantial continuity of operations, (2) the union makes a timely demand to bargain for an appropriate unit, and (3) the employer has hired a “substantial and representative comple- ment” of employees, the majority of whom were represented by the union under the predecessor. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43, 47 (1987). A. At its London facility, Respondent maintained generally the same food service business as Sodexo and there was, therefore, substantial continuity of operations The question of whether there is substantial continuity be- tween the old and new business is to be examined from the perspective of the employees affected. The pertinent inquiry is whether there has been enough of a change in operations to defeat the employees' expectation of continued union represen- tation. Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 46; Capitol Steel & Iron Co., 299 NLRB 484, 488 (1990). It is undisputed that Respond- ent operates an acute care hospital, while Sodexo, as least as relevant to this case, was in the business of providing food service at Respondent’s facility. Yet, the record establishes Respondent ended Sodexo’s contract to provide that service and, as of June 7, Respondent took over those operations itself. Certainly, Respondent made operational changes when it took over providing its own food service at the London facility. Namely, Respondent ceased providing made-to-order meals delivered to patient rooms, ceased in-house catering service, and ceased using the in-house food service employees to pre- pare and serve food in the physicians lounge other than soup. Yet, an employer can be found to be successor even if it pur- chases or assumes only a part of the predecessor's operations. Miami Industrial Trucks, 221 NLRB 1223, 1224 (1975). Here, I find the affected employees would conclude that there is substantial continuity of operations between Sodexo and Respondent. Specifically, working in the same kitchen, cafeteria, and overall facility that Sodexo’s food service em- ployees did, Respondent’s food service employees still prepare and cook food at Respondent’s London facility, they still serve and sell that food to patients and their families, to staff, and to the public visiting the hospital; they still distribute patient food trays and pick them up; and they still clean up the kitchen and dining areas related to food service. Moreover, they use the same equipment to perform their duties as they did under So- dexo and still report to the same supervisor, Michael Gilley. Thus, the record also establishes that Respondent used the same facility as Sodexo; that Respondent employs the same DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10 supervisors as Sodexo; that Respondent uses the same machin- ery, equipment, and methods of production as Sodexo; and offers essentially the same services as Sodexo. See Armco, Inc., 279 NLRB 1184, 1212 (1986) (citing NLRB v. Security- Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135, 138-139 (3d Cir. 1976)), enfd in relevant part, 832 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1987). And, as explained below, Respondent also has the same or substantially the same work force and the same jobs exist, albe- it under different titles—but not under the same working condi- tions. B. Respondent hired a majority of its food service workforce from predecessor Sodexo’s represented food service bargaining unit Where there is a substantial continuity of operations, the ap- propriate time for determining successorship status is when a demand for bargaining has been made and a "substantial and representative" complement of employees has been retained. Ride Right, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 16, slip op at 2 (2018) (citing Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 43, 47). There is no contention here that Respondent did not have a substantial and representa- tive complement of employees by June 7. I find that as of June 7, when it commenced operations providing its own food ser- vice within the London facility, Respondent had hired 15 for- mer Sodexo bargaining unit employees as food service employ- ees. Therefore, I find that Respondent had a substantial and representative complement as of that date. Respondent, therefore, maintained a substantial continuity of operations from Sodexo, and a majority of Respondent’s work force consisted of Sodexo’s former employees on June 7. The only remaining issue as to whether Respondent is a Burns suc- cessor to Sodexo as to the unit of food service employees—and therefore obliged to recognize and bargain with the Charging Party--is whether the Unit is appropriate. Upon review of the record and the Board’s jurisprudence, I conclude that it is. C. An acute care hospital bargaining unit comprised solely of food service employees is an appropriate unit under the circum- stances presented in this case The Board’s jurisprudence indicates that where no petition has been filed, the Health Care Rule does not apply. Crittenton Hospital, 328 NLRB 879, 880 (1999); Pathology Institute, 320 NLRB 1050, 1051 (1996), enfd. 116 F.3d 482 (9th Cir 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1028 (1997). Alternatively, where, as here, the bargaining unit is essentially the same as the unit that existed in a predecessor, non-acute care employer, the Board has found that the acute care hospital successor employer’s unit falls into the existing non-conforming unit exception of the Health Care Rule. Specialty Hospital of Washington–Hadley, LLC, 357 NLRB 814, 817 (2011) (citing Pathology Institute, Inc., 320 NLRB at 1051). The Board’s Health Care Rule, Board Rules and Regula- tions, Section 103.30, provides that, except in “extraordinary circumstances” or where “existing non-conforming units” are present, for acute care hospitals, eight—and only eight— bargaining units are appropriate: (1) all registered nurses; (2) all physicians; (3) all professionals except for registered nurses and physicians.; (4) all technical employees; (5) all skilled maintenance employees; (6) all business office clerical employ- ees; (7) all guards; (8) all nonprofessional employees except for technical employees, skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards. Yet, in successor cases, the Board places a heavy evidentiary burden on a party attempt- ing to show that a historical unit is no longer appropriate. Ready Mix USA, Inc., 340 NLRB 946, 947 (2003) (successor failed to show that historical predecessor unit was no longer appropriate); Banknote Corporation of America, 315 NLRB 1041 (1994), enfd. 84 F.3d 637 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1109 (1997) (same). It is undisputed that Respondent is an acute care hospital within the meaning of Section 103.30(f)(2) of the Health Care Rule. Under circumstances distinct from those herein no bargaining unit other than one of the eight ap- propriate units as defined in the rule would be acceptable. I find, however, that the circumstances in this case11 are such that the Health Care Rule is inapplicable. In Crittenton Hospital, 328 NLRB 879, the Board discussed in-depth the meaning of the Board’s existing non-conforming unit exception in the context of a nonconforming unit of regis- tered nurses. While the regional director concluded that a his- torical nonconforming unit must be enlarged to fit within the units set forth in the Health Care Rule, the Board stated that, “[b]y its own terms, the Rule applies only to initial organizing attempts or, where there are existing non-conforming units, to a petition for a new unit of previously unrepresented employees, which would be an addition to the existing units at the Employ- er's facility.” Ibid. Neither circumstance was present in Critten- ton Hospital—nor are they present here. Thus, because the bargaining unit at issue in this case is not the subject of a peti- tion, the Health Care Rule does not apply. See, Pathology Insti- tute, 320 NLRB at 1051(Sec. 103.30(a)) sets forth the specific units appropriate “for petitions filed pursuant to Section 9(c)(1)(A)(i) or 9(c)(1)(B) of the . . . Act.”), enfd. mem. sub nom. Alta Bates Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.3d 482 (9th Cir 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1028 (1997); Kaiser Foundation Hospi- tals, 312 NLRB 933, 934 (1993) (“[b]y its terms, Section 103.30(c) applies only to petitions for “additional units,” that is, petitions to represent a new unit of previously unrepresented employees, which would be an addition to the existing units at a facility.”) Yet, where, as here, the bargaining unit is essentially the same as the unit that existed in a predecessor, non-acute care employer, the Board has also found that the acute care hospital successor employer’s unit falls into the existing non- conforming unit exception of the Health Care Rule. Specialty Hospital of Washington–Hadley, LLC, 357 NLRB 814, 817 (2011) (citing Pathology Institute, Inc., 320 NLRB at 1051). As a preliminary matter, Respondent argues that only non- conforming units that existed at the time that the Rule was promulgated can be excepted under Section 103.30(a). (R. Br. 12.) I do not agree that the cases cited support Respondent’s limited interpretation of the Rule’s existing nonconforming unit 11 I decline Counsel for the General Counsel’s invitation to recom- mend that the Health Care Rule is inapplicable to all successor cases. (GC Br. 13–17.) I cannot agree that any Board case cited by counsel for the General Counsel contains such a definitive rule of law. SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. 11 exception. In Temple University Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 39 F.4th 743 (D.C. Cir. 2022), the court concluded that “The Board acted within its discretion in determining that the professional- technical bargaining unit was an ‘existing’ unit at the time of the Health Care Rule’s promulgation.” Id. at 755. Yet, the Board’s underlying decisions state the unit’s date of certifica- tion by the state labor board as a fact; they do not interpret the applicability of the Rule based on the fact that the unit existed at the time the Rule was promulgated. 370 NLRB No. 106, slip op. at 1 (2021) (determining that judicial estoppel is not availa- ble to defeat Board jurisdiction on remand from 929 F.3d 729), enfd. 39 F.4th at 756; Temple University Hospital, Inc., and 366 NLRB No. 88, slip op. at 1 (2018) (granting summary judgment in refusal to bargain case), enforcement denied, 929 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In Rush University Medical Center v. NLRB, 833 F.3d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2016), the court remarked that “The [Health Care] Rule, however, included an exception from that mandate for non-conforming units already in existence at the time of the Rule’s promulgation.” Rush University Medical Center, 833 F.3d at 205. As in Temple University Hospital, in the underly- ing proceeding, the Board concluded that the unit was an exist- ing nonconforming unit under the Rule but the issue of whether the exception applied only when the unit existed at the time that the Health Care Rule took effect was not litigated. 362 NLRB 218 (2015). That the D.C. Court of Appeals cases above set forth the court’s interpretation of the Rule’s language as requiring the existence of the unit at the time of the advent of the final Health Care Rule does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the Rule’s exception is only applicable to such bargaining units according to the Board. I do not agree with Respondent’s plain language argument. (R. Br. 11–12.) The plain language of the exception certainly does not indicate that “existing” is linked in time to the date that the Rule took effect; there is no explana- tion at all of how to interpret “existing” in the plain language in the Rule. The court’s interpretation may be reasonable, but it is also reasonable to me that “existing” is to be interpreted as meaning any bargaining unit in being at the point in time when a party seeks to apply the Health Care Rule. Respondent does not cite a single Board case in which the Board has considered Respondent’s interpretation of the meaning of “existing” in this regard. See, Pathmark Stores, Inc., 342 NLRB 378, 378 fn. 1 (2004) (the Board instructs its administrative law judges to follow Board precedent, not court of appeals precedent, unless overruled by the United States Supreme Court). Therefore, I decline to adopt Respondent’s argument on this point. Respondent also argues that if I determine that the existing non-conforming unit exception applies, I must determine whether the food service employees bargaining unit is an ap- propriate unit under the categories set forth in the Health Care Rule. (R. Br. 12.) The Board has previously rejected this inter- pretation of the exception’s requirements in Pathology Institute, 320 NLRB at 1051 (disagreeing with the judge’s conclusion that because an existing, but smaller, unit of medical laboratory technologists is not one of the eight appropriate units enumerat- ed in Section 103.30(a) of the Rule, it was not an appropriate one and could not be the subject of a bargaining order). Rather, the Board reasoned that, if the Health Care Rule applied in unfair labor practice cases, the case would fall under the exist- ing nonconforming unit exception and “the appropriate unit issue must be decided not under the Rule, but under traditional representation principles.” Id. The Board also examined the appropriate unit issue under traditional representation principles in Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 312 NLRB 933, 935 (1993) (applying craft severance test of Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 NLRB 387 (1966), to a skilled maintenance employee bargaining unit after determining that the Health Care Rule does not apply where there is an existing nonconforming unit in an acute care facility). Respondent insists that the application of a test that preceded the final Health Care Rule and found in St. Francis Hospital, 271 NLRB 948 (1984) (St. Francis Hospital II), remanded by Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474, AFL–CIO, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987), is the correct one to use to eval- uate whether a unit is appropriate in a health care institution where the existing nonconforming unit exception applies. As with its interpretation of the limits on the applicability of the existing nonconforming unit exception, Respondent does not cite any Board case in support of its argument that the dispari- ty-of-interests test is of current application following the advent of the Health Care Rule—nor have I located one. In fact, that test was superseded by the Health Care Rule itself. See, Mid- dletown Hospital Assn., 291 NLRB 465 (1988) (noting that the Board decided to engage in rulemaking instead of continuing to pursue the disparity-of-interests test but applied the test pend- ing issuance of the final rule). I decline to apply the superseded disparity-of-interests test as urged by Respondent. Rather, consulting those cases where the Board has applied the existing nonconforming unit exception in an acute care facility, I conclude that the animating public poli- cy principle repeatedly articulated by the Board is that “it was not the intent of the Rule to require the abandonment of, and replacement of, existing historical units with units that specifi- cally conform to those set forth in the Rule.” St. Mary's Duluth Clinic, 332 NLRB 1419, 1421 (2000) (citing Kaiser, 312 NLRB at 934–935 and Crittenton Hospital, 328 NLRB at 879). The Board has stated: [T]he Board's long-standing policy of according great defer- ence to collective-bargaining history also supports our deci- sion not to apply the Rule automatically to preexisting non- conforming units. We conclude that this result is consistent with the design and purpose of our decision to engage in rulemaking—and to further the long-standing policy of pro- moting industrial and labor. Hartford Hospital, 318 NLRB 183, 194 (1995), enfd. 101 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Kaiser, 312 NLRB at 935.) Thus, respecting the Board’s longstanding policy of according to deference to collective-bargaining history and promoting labor stability, I find the existing nonconforming unit of food service employees at Respondent’s London facility to be an appropriate unit. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 12 D. Respondent is not a perfectly clear successor to Sodexo and Counsel for the General Counsel does not argue that it is At hearing, in her opening statement, counsel for the General Counsel stated that “Respondent forfeited its right to set initial terms and conditions of employment” (Tr. 25.), which Re- spondent apparently took (Tr. 150, 164.; R. Br. 3, 18–20) to mean that the General Counsel was advancing a perfectly clear successor theory in this case. Counsel for the General Coun- sel’s brief does not argue that Respondent is a perfectly clear successor in any manner. Citing Burns, 406 U.S. at 294–295, Respondent’s brief, however, accurately sets forth the black letter rule for perfectly clear successor status: There is a limited exception to this “ordinary” successor rule that obligates a successor employer to initially consult with the employees’ bargaining representative regarding terms and conditions of employment when “it is ‘perfectly clear’ that the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit” or a sufficient number of employees in the unit to make it evi- dent that the Union’s majority status would continue. (R. Br. 18.) Further, as again cited by Respondent, the Board applies the perfectly clear exception narrowly in that it is: restricted to circumstances in which the new employer has ei- ther actively or, by tacit inference, misled employees into be- lieving they would all be retained without change in their wages, hours, or conditions of employment, or at least to cir- cumstances where the new employer. . . has failed to clearly announce its intent to establish a new set of conditions prior to inviting former employees to accept employment. Ibid. (citing Spruce Up Corp., 209 NLRB 194, 195 (1974)). As Respondent’s brief notes (R. Br. 19), the record estab- lishes that it did not hire all of the Sodexo food service workers and clearly conditioned offers of employment upon the ac- ceptance of the terms contained in the offer letter, which were changes to the wages, benefits, and working conditions of the Sodexo employees. Therefore, Respondent did not mislead employees into believing that they would all be retained with- out a change in their wages, hours, or conditions of employ- ment. Nor did Respondent fail to clearly announce its intent to establish a new set of conditions prior to inviting former em- ployees to accept employment. Yet, the Board has nullified a Burns successor’s unilateral right to set initial terms and conditions of employment because the employer pursued a course of conduct intended to evade hiring employees such that a bargaining obligation would at- tach. See U.S. Marine Corp., 293 NLRB 669 (1989) (to avoid having to recognize the union, employer refused to hire the predecessor's employees solely because they were represented by a union), enfd. 944 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 503 U.S. 936 (1992); State Distributing Co., 282 NLRB 1048 (1987) (same); Love's Barbeque Restaurant No. 62, 245 NLRB 78 (1979) (same), enfd. in pertinent part sub nom. Kallman v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1102–1103 (9th Cir. 1981). The Board has also expanded this doctrine to include cases where the employer did hire its predecessor’s employees but tainted the hiring process by applying unlawful conditions on hiring. With regard to Respondent’s conduct alleged in para- graphs 6(a) and 6(c), this is the essence of the General Coun- sel’s theory of the violation alleged in paragraph 8 of the com- plaint. E. The General Counsel failed to establish that Respondent forfeited its right to unilaterally establish initial terms and con- ditions of employment under current Board precedent While the Board recognizes an exception to a Burns succes- sor’s right to unilaterally set initial terms and conditions of employment rule where an employer imposes facially unlawful employment terms, Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc., 323 NLRB 529 (1997), enfd. in relevant part, 208 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2000), amended 233 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 534 U.S. 948 (2001), such exception does not ap- ply in this case. Thus, in Advanced Stretchforming, 323 NLRB 529, the em- ployer hired a majority of its workforce from its predecessor while telling them it would not recognize the union. Thereby, the employer “blatantly coerce[d] employees in the exercise of their Section 7 right to bargain collectively through a repre- sentative of their own choosing,” which constituted a facially unlawful condition of employment. Id. at 30. In so doing, the employer “blocked the process by which the obligations and rights of such a successor are incurred.” Ibid. (citing State Distributing Co., 282 NLRB 1048, 1049 (1987)). Similarly, in Eldorado, Inc., 335 NLRB 952 (2001), cited by Counsel for the General Counsel (GC Br. 19–20), in response to an employee question, the employer communicated to employees at the out- set that there would be no union, thereby communicating a facially unlawful condition of employment. Ibid. According to counsel for the General Counsel, Respondent likewise “preempted the representational status” of Charging Party by relying on the Health Care Rule’s established unit definitions for acute care facilities to negate the appropriate unit aspect of the Board’s Fall River Dyeing successorship test. (GC Br. 20.) Counsel for the General counsel argues that by assert- ing its baseless Health Care Rule theory to the Charging Party, Respondent effectively attempted to avoid its bargaining obli- gation in a manner comparable to the employer’s remarks to employees that there would be no union in Advanced Stretch- forming. (GC Br. 20–22.) I reject this analogy. In this case there is no credited evi- dence12 that Respondent’s supervisors or agents communicated any views or plans about union recognition to employees— either during the application and hiring process or afterwards. I also note that despite receiving the testimony of two Charging 12 In volunteered hearsay testimony, which not relied upon by coun- sel for the General Counsel in its brief, employee Partin stated that another employee, Cook Edward Hanagan, informed him that when Hanagan was notified of his hire, he was told that there would be no union. (Tr. 136–137.) Counsel of the General Counsel failed to call Hanagan to testify. Despite the hearsay nature of Partin’s claim, I as- sume that it is true that someone made this statement to Hanagan, but the record does not reflect who it was. Was it another employee? A supervisor? Which one? Without knowing such legally significant details via an appropriate witness with firsthand knowledge, I decline to rely on this Partin’s testimony on this point. SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. 13 Party officials at hearing, there is no record evidence that either communicated Respondent’s June 10 position on recognition to employees at any time. Counsel for the General Counsel cites no Board case in support of the proposition that advancing a misguided legal theory regarding an appropriate unit amounts to the type of facially unlawful condition on employment de- scribed in Advanced Stretchforming. Without such Board au- thority—and with Advanced Stretchforming and similar cases so clearly distinguishable—I decline to adopt counsel for the General Counsel’s argument that Respondent forfeited its right to set initial terms and conditions of employment without bar- gaining with Charging Party. Yet, I do find that Respondent was required to recognize Charging Party as the collective-bargaining representative of its food service employees after setting the initial terms and condi- tions of employment for the London facility’s food service employees once a bargaining obligation attached on June 9. II. RESPONDENT FAILED AND REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE CHARGING PARTY AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ITS FOOD SERVICE EMPLOYEES AT RESPONDENT’S LONDON FACILITY Having found that Secretary-Treasurer Whitely made a time- ly request that Respondent recognize and bargain in an appro- priate unit with Charging Party on June 9, and that Respond- ent’s 2(13) agent Chris Scanlan declined to do so on June 10, I find that Respondent unlawfully failed and refused to recognize and bargain with Charging Party upon request. Van Lear Equipment, Inc., 336 NLRB 1059, 1063 (2001) (citing Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 41–43 and Burns, 406 U.S. at 280 fn. 4). Therefore, I find and recommend that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged in paragraph 8 of the complaint with regard to paragraph 7(b). However, counsel for the General Counsel failed to establish that Respondent impermissibly made any material changes to terms and conditions of employment after its bargaining obliga- tion arose on June 9 as alleged in paragraphs 6(a), 6(c), and 8 of the complaint. III. COUNSEL FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENT IMPERMISSIBLY UNILATERALLY CHANGED TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF ITS REPRESENTED FOOD SERVICE EMPLOYEES In a Burns successor situation, the employer has the right to set initial terms and conditions of employment. 72 U.S. at 284. Yet, where the employer does not specify the terms and condi- tions of employment, it is obliged to bargain with the union over mandatory subjects, which includes wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. NLRB v. Borg- Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). The Board recognizes that changes to employees’ work assignments are mandatory subjects of bargaining, Pepsi-Cola Bottling of Fayetteville, 315 NLRB 882, 895 (1994), as are health insurance benefits, Pitts- burgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 159 (1971). Thus, an employer violates its duty to bargain when it makes “a material, substantial, or significant change on a mandatory subject of bargaining without first giving the union notice and a meaning- ful opportunity to bargain about the change to agreement or impasse, absent a valid defense.” NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962). Here, prior to any demand for recognition from Charging Party, when Respondent offered employment to the Sodexo employees represented by Charging Party, it simultaneously informed employees that it would be offering them its “stand- ard” benefits and specified their wages. Therefore, employees were aware that Sodexo’s benefits would no longer be available and that they would have different wages when they accepted Respondent's offer of employment. The bargaining obligation attaches when a successor em- ployer receives a valid demand for recognition. Fall River Dye- ing, 482 U.S. at 52; Ride Right, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 16, slip op at 2 (citing Fall River Dyeing); MSK Corp., 341 NLRB 43, 44 (2004) (bargaining obligation matured when (1) respondent had hired a substantial and representative complement of em- ployees, a majority of whom had been the predecessor’s unit employees; and (2) the union had made an effective demand for recognition and bargaining. These two necessary conditions need not occur in any particular order.) “Once a Burns succes- sor has set initial terms and conditions of employment, howev- er, a bargaining obligation attaches with respect to any subse- quent changes to terms and conditions of employment,” as required by Katz. Tramont Mfg., LLC, 369 NLRB No. 136, slip op. at 4 (2020) (quoting Monterey Newspapers, 334 NLRB 1019, 1021 (2001)). Regarding the June 7 change to job titles, and the change in duties, Respondent reduced its workforce when it hired from among Sodexo’s employees. The concomitant reorganization, while insufficient to extinguish a bargaining obligation, also meant that job responsibilities changed, working hours changed, employee job classifications changed, and certain employees filled in for others. The changes that took effect on June 7, including wages, medical benefits, and work schedules, in the instant case were simply a part of Respondent’s permis- sible reorganization of its workforce as a Burns successor and occurred prior to any bargaining obligation in any event. Moreover, although counsel for the General Counsel elicited extensive testimony from employee Partin regarding working hours for various job classifications, that testimony was not grounded in time. I cannot conclude that any changes to em- ployee work schedules occurred after June 9 based on Partin’s testimony. Partin testified that on the first day of the transfer, June 7, it “[s]eemed like I worked 13 hours or something” but his hours settled back to his usual Monday-Friday 8-hour schedule. Counsel for the General Counsel did not elicit any details as to when Partin’s hours changed. I discredit Partin’s testimony because it was vague and incomplete. Without know- ing whether there were any changes that occurred once the bargaining obligation attached, I cannot conclude that Re- spondent violated the Act by changing employee work sched- ules. Likewise, the record does not disclose specific changes to “other terms and conditions of employment of the Unit, all of which are unknown to the General Counsel but within Re- spondent’s specific knowledge” after June 7, as alleged in par- agraph 6(a) of the complaint—or, more significantly, any spe- cific changes that occurred after the bargaining obligation at- tached on June 9. - DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 14 Accordingly, I find and recommend that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by making unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment on June 7 as alleged in the complaint—or at any time prior to June 9, which is when Charging Party requested recognition and bargaining. The changes that occurred on June 7 were permissible. With regard to paragraphs 6(a) and (c), paragraph 8 of the complaint is therefore dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, Saint Joseph Health System, Inc. d/b/a CHI Saint Joseph Health—Saint Joseph London, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Charging Party, United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 227, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following constitutes a unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All full-time and regular part-time food service employees, employed in the food service operation at Saint Joseph Lon- don Hospital, 1001 Saint Joseph Lane, London, Kentucky; but excluding all other employees, confidential employees, office clerical employees, temporary employees, and all pro- fessional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. Respondent is a successor to Sodexo with respect to the obligation to recognize and bargain with the Charging Party labor organization representing employees in the above Unit. 5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by, on or about June 9, 2022, failing and refusing to recognize the Charging Party as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of the above Unit. 6. The unfair labor practice committed by Respondent af- fects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Because I have found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. Counsel for the General Counsel has requested a notice read- ing to remedy the unfair labor practices alleged. (GC Br. 23.) The Board has recently recognized that a notice reading is an appropriate remedy where a broad order is warranted. WR Re- serve, 372 NLRB No. 80, slip op. at 6 (2023). That is to say, “when a respondent is shown to have a proclivity to violate the Act or has engaged in such egregious or widespread miscon- duct as to demonstrate a general disregard for the employees’ fundamental statutory rights.” Id. at 4 (quoting Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357, 1357 (1979)). There is no indication that that Respondent has met either prong of this standard so as to war- rant a broad order. Nor is a notice reading warranted under past articulations of the standard for imposing that remedy. See e.g., Postal Service, 339 NLRB 1162, 1163 (2003) (notice ready appropriate where the violations are so numerous and serious that the reading aloud of a notice is considered necessary to enable employees to exercise their Section 7 rights in an at- mosphere free of coercion, or where the violations in a case are egregious.”). I decline to recommend a notice reading remedy in this case. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended13 ORDER14 Respondent, Saint Joseph Health System, Inc. d/b/a CHI Saint Joseph Health—Saint Joseph London, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from a. Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively in good faith with the Charging Party as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of the following bargaining unit: All full-time and regular part-time food service employees, employed in the food service operation at Saint Joseph Lon- don Hospital, 1001 Saint Joseph Lane, London, Kentucky; but excluding all other employees, confidential employees, office clerical employees, temporary employees, and all pro- fessional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. b. In any like or related manner, interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. a. On request, bargain with the Union in good faith as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate units concerning terms and condi- tions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, em- body the understanding in a signed agreement: All full-time and regular part-time food service employees, employed in the food service operation at Saint Joseph Lon- don Hospital, 1001 Saint Joseph Lane, London, Kentucky; but excluding all other employees, confidential employees, office clerical employees, temporary employees, and all pro- fessional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. b. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa- cility in London, Kentucky, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix,” in English. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being signed by Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical post- 13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom- mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt- ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. 15 ing of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily com- municates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Re- spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in- volved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em- ployees and former employees employed by Respondent at any time since June 9, 2022. c. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director of Region 9, a sworn certification of a re- sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso- far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. Dated, Washington, D.C., September 28, 2023 APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no- tice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be- half Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 227 (the Un- ion) is your representative in dealing with us regarding your wages, hours, and other working conditions in the following bargaining unit: All full-time and regular part-time food service employees, employed in the food service operation at Saint Joseph Lon- don Hospital, 1001 Saint Joseph Lane, London, Kentucky; but excluding all other employees, confidential employees, office clerical employees, temporary employees, and all pro- fessional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employees in the appropriate bargaining unit above. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employees in the appropriate bargaining unit above concerning terms and condi- tions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, em- body the understanding in a signed agreement. SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. D/B/A CHI SAINT JOSEPH HEALTH—SAINT JOSEPH LONDON The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/ 09-CA-297427 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the deci- sion from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.