375 NLRB No. 17
ArtCenter College of Design
375 NLRB No. 17
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
ArtCenter College of Design and California Federation
of Teachers, AFL–CIO. Case 31–CA–325485
July 30, 2026
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS PROUTY
AND MAYER
On November 26, 2025, Administrative Law Judge
Andrew S. Gollin issued the attached decision. The Gen-
eral Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered the
decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings,1 and conclusions, and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 30, 2026
______________________________________
James R. Murphy, Chairman
______________________________________
David M. Prouty, Member
________________________________________
Scott A. Mayer, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Jacob A. Yocham, Esq., for the General Counsel.1
Megann McManus and Mary-Ann Czak, Esqs., for the R-
espondent.
Julia Harumi Mass, Esq., for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
ANDREW S. GOLLIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. This hear-
ing was held on July 22–23, 2025, in Los Angeles, California,
over allegations that ArtCenter College of Design (the Respond-
ent) violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act) by failing to provide the California Federation
of Teachers, AFL–CIO (the Union) with adequate notice and a
meaningful opportunity to bargain over the effects of the creation
of two nonunit positions.
The Union represents the Respondent’s nearly 800 teaching
faculty. On June 5, 2023, the Respondent informed the Union
that it planned to implement a multiphased “realignment” of the
managerial structure within its academic departments. The
second phase of the realignment plan would include the creation
of two new rotating positions within the managerial hierarchy—
assistant chair and associate chair. These two new manageri-
al/supervisory positions would assume the administrative and
oversight duties previously performed by the faculty directors.
The Respondent informed the Union that existing faculty direct-
ors may be offered the inaugural chair positions. Those who
were not offered, or did not accept, one of the chair positions
would lose their title and the additional compensation and bene-
fits they received; those who accepted one of the chair positions
would be excluded from the bargaining unit.
The Union requested that the Respondent delay implementa-
tion of its realignment plan to allow the parties an opportunity to
bargain over its impact. The Respondent declined to delay im-
plementation, but it agreed to bargain over any effects to unit
employees. The parties exchanged correspondence and met for
effects bargaining on August 1, 2023. The Union made propos-
als, which the Respondent largely rejected. The Respondent
stated, repeatedly, that it remained willing to continue effects
bargaining, particularly over the impact on the faculty directors.
The parties did meet on October 2, 2023, without any resolution.
Thereafter, the Union stopped pursuing effects bargaining.
On September 7, 2023, the Union filed the charge in this case,
alleging, in relevant part, that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by implementing its realignment plan
1 For the reasons stated in the judge’s decision, we agree with his
finding that the Respondent provided the Union with adequate notice and
a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the effects on unit employees’
terms and conditions of employment of the creation of two new non-unit
positions, and we affirm his dismissal of the Consolidated Complaint. In
affirming the judge’s determination that the effects remained open for
negotiation as of the parties’ August 1, 2023 negotiating session and
during their subsequent correspondence on August 7 and 11, 2023, we
emphasize that the record shows that the new positions and titles did not
become effective until August 20, 2023, at the earliest. Moreover, there
is no evidence that any unit employee’s position as faculty director was
eliminated before September 2023. We additionally note that it is undis-
puted that some effects of the creation of the two new nonunit positions
—such as the loss of stipends for faculty directors—did not impact unit
employees until after the parties’ final negotiating session on October 2,
2023.
1 On February 3, 2025, President Donald J. Trump appointed William
B. Cowen to be Acting General Counsel, replacing former General
Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo. For ease and consistency, I will refer to the
Acting General Counsel, the former General Counsel, and counsel for
the General Counsel collectively as the General Counsel.
2 Abbreviations in this decision are as follows: Transcript citations
are “Tr. ___”; Joint Exhibits are “Jt. Exh. __”; General Counsel Exhibits
are “GC Exh. __”; the Union’s Exhibits are “U. Exh. ___”; and Respond-
ent’s Exhibits are “R. Exh. ___”. Although I have included citations to
highlight particular testimony or exhibits, my findings and conclusions
are not based solely on those specific citations but rather on my review
and consideration of the entire record.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2
without engaging in decisional bargaining with the Union. (GC
Exh. 1(d)). The Union amended the charge on November 18,
2024, alleging that the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) by failing to bargain with the Union over the effects of
the decision to create the assistant and associate chair positions.
(GC Exhs. 1(g).) On December 23, 2024, the Regional Director,
on behalf of the General Counsel, issued the complaint.3 As
amended, the complaint narrowly alleges the Respondent viol-
ated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) since June 5, 2023, by failing to
provide the Union with adequate notice and an opportunity to
bargain over the effects of the creation of these two new chair
positions. (GC Exh. 1(j).) On January 6, 2024, the Respondent
filed its answer denying the allegations and raising various de-
fenses, including that the Union waived its right to bargain over
the effects. (GC Exh. 1(l).)
All the parties appeared at the hearing and had the opportunity
to introduce evidence and examine witnesses. The parties also
filed post-hearing briefs, which I have carefully considered.
For the reasons discussed below, I conclude the General
Counsel has failed to establish the Respondent committed the
alleged violations. I, therefore, recommend dismissing the com-
plaint.
FINDINGS OF FACT4
A. Jurisdiction
The Respondent is a California non-profit corporation en-
gaged in the business of providing higher education. In conduct-
ing its operations during the period ending April 29, 2022, the
Respondent derived gross revenues available for operating ex-
penses in excess of $1 million, and it purchased and received
products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $5000 directly
from points outside the State of California. The Respondent
admits, and I find, that it has been an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Respondent also admits, and I find, the Union has been a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
B. Background
The Respondent offers undergraduate and graduate degrees in
several art and design disciplines. The Respondent’s model of
academic organization historically has been that one degree
equaled one department. Each department had a chair and an
administrative team. Initially, all chairs answered to the college
president. Later, they reported to the provost. (Jt. Exh. 1(c).)
The Respondent’s president is Karen Hofmann, and its provost
is Dr. Anne Burdick.
Within each of the academic departments, the Respondent had
faculty directors. These were teaching faculty selected (usually
for a term) to perform certain administrative and oversight duties
within their department. These duties, which were in addition to
teaching courses, included: attending director meetings, meeting
with the department chair about ongoing initiatives and issues,
participating in curriculum planning, supporting the chair in the
faculty review process, and leading program review activities.
(R. Exh. 2.)
In exchange for performing these duties, the faculty directors
received an additional stipend and a reduced course load, which
is also referred to as a “course release.”5 The amount of the sti-
pend paid to the faculty directors ranged from $10,000 to
$45,000 per academic year. The course release was usually one
course per term, for a total of three fewer courses per academic
year.
On June 22, 2022, the Union was certified as the bargaining
representative for all full-time and part-time faculty who
taught/teach in degree-earning and non-degree earning programs
at the Respondent’s four instructional facilities in Pasadena,
California; excluding all other employees, department chairs,
non-faculty employees, confidential employees, managerial
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined by the Act. The
name of the local union representing the employees is the Art-
Center Faculty Federation (ACFF). The ACFF president is Al-
lison Dalton. Dalton is a former faculty director who lost that
position as part of the realignment plan.
Shortly after the Union’s certification, the parties began nego-
tiations over an initial collective- bargaining agreement. The
Respondent’s chief spokesperson was attorney Jon McNutt. The
Union’s chief spokesperson was field representative Daniel Mar-
tin.
C. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
1. Respondent Notifies the Union of the Realignment Plan
On June 5, 2023,6 McNutt emailed Martin a memo announ-
cing the Respondent’s planned realignment within its academic
departments. (Jt. Exh. 1(c).) The memo explained that the new
managerial hierarchy would begin with the appointment of
deans, each of whom would oversee a division of up to four aca-
demic departments. Those departments, led by a chair, would
continue to be the center for domain expertise. But instead of
focusing on a single degree, the chair would be responsible for
the full span of educational offerings in a discipline. Under the
chair, each degree would be overseen by a new “associate chair”
who would be responsible for the curriculum, accreditation,
admissions processes, and students. The larger departments that
organize their curricula into tracks, minors, or other emphases
3 The complaint originally included allegations from Case
31–CA–311351, concerning wage increases. Prior to the start of the
hearing, the Respondent settled those allegations, and the Regional Dir-
ector issued an order severing that case and withdrawing those allega-
tions from the complaint. (GC Exh. 33) . It also resulted in a change to
the remaining allegation. (Tr. 254; 279–280).
4 Although most of the critical facts are undisputed, there are certain
facts that rest on witness credibility. My credibility assessments rely
upon a variety of factors, including the witness’ demeanor, the context
of the testimony, the quality of the recollection, testimonial consistency,
the presence or absence of corroboration, bias, the weight of the respect-
ive evidence, established or admitted facts, inherent probabilities, and
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole. See
Double D Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi
Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001), citing Shen Automotive Dealership
Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996), enfd. sub nom. 56 Fed.Appx. 516
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
5 The Respondent has three terms (fall, spring, and summer) per aca-
demic year. Faculty typically teach three-to-four courses per term, for a
total of nine-to-12 courses per year.
6 All dates hereinafter refer to 2023, unless otherwise stated.
ARTCENTER COLLEGE OF DESIGN
3
would be overseen by a new “assistant chair.” These new chair
positions would have terms and be offered on a three-year rotat-
ing cycle.
Beginning in the 2023–2024 academic year, the faculty in a
department would be permitted to apply for one of the rotating
chair positions. At the conclusion of their rotation, they would
have “retreat rights” to return to their faculty position. The memo
explained that the procedure for determining eligibility and rota-
tion would be developed in the upcoming year and through con-
versations between the administration and the Union.
The memo further explained that “[s]ome faculty may see
changes in their current responsibilities, compensation, and titles
starting Fall 2023. To ensure coverage for the upcoming aca-
demic year, inaugural chair positions may be offered as ap-
pointments to faculty who have been doing administrative and/or
faculty director work in 2022-23.” (Jt. Exh. 1(c).)
The memo concluded with the expected timeline for the plan’s
phased implementation. The first phase, involving the search for
the inaugural set of deans, would begin in about mid-June. The
second phase, involving the creation and selection of the associ-
ate chairs and assistant chairs, would begin in about mid-July.
The goal was to complete that process before the start of the up-
coming 2023–2024 academic year. The memo went on to state
that the Union would be notified once the Respondent had a
complete list of the faculty members who may be affected by the
realignment.
2. Communication with Faculty and Realignment Plan
The following day, on June 6, the Respondent began holding
group meetings with the faculty to announce the realignment
plan and the expected timeline for its phased implementation.
(U. Exhs. 1 and 2.) The Respondent notified the faculty that, as
part of phase two, it would be creating and selecting the associate
and assistant chair positions beginning in about mid-July (U.
Exh. 2, pgs. 34–35), and that the impact of the plan on the fac-
ulty’s terms and conditions of employment would be discussed
with the Union. (U. Exh. 2, pgs. 64, 75.)7 The Respondent later
reiterated these points in emails and website posts to faculty.
(GC Exhs. 25-27) (U. Exh. 8).
3. Correspondence About Bargaining
On June 8, Union Representative Martin emailed Respond-
ent’s attorney McNutt, stating that because the parties were cur-
rently in negotiations, and because the realignment plan has not
been fully developed, and because it is unclear the impact that
the plan will have on the faculty’s terms and conditions of em-
ployment, the Union was requesting that the Respondent not
move forward with implementation at that time. He added it was
important that the negotiations over “the impact” take place prior
to implementation so that faculty know what to expect and can
make informed decisions affecting their lives and careers. (Jt.
Exh. 1(f).)
On June 10, McNutt emailed Martin. He wrote, in relevant
part, that while the Respondent respected the Union’s request, it
would be moving forward with implementing the plan, which
was its right. He noted the college would seek ongoing input
from “our community” as it rolled out the changes and looked
forward to working with the faculty, where appropriate, in fur-
therance of the shared governance structure. McNutt, however,
acknowledged “the need to bargain over any effects that may
result from the realignment on bargaining unit employees.” He
noted that although those effects were not clear at that time, he
expected they would be known in the next 4-to-6 weeks. He
wrote: “In anticipation of that, we would like to schedule a time
to meet with the Union [for effects bargaining] sometime during
the weeks of July 24 or 31. Please reply with your availability.”
(Jt. Exh. 1(d).)8
Martin emailed McNutt on June 29.9 (Jt. Exh. 1(g).) He wrote
that after meeting with its legal counsel that week, the Union was
requesting to bargain over the proposed realignment plan prior
to its implementation, and he proposed they meet on July 20. (Jt.
Exh. 1(g).) On July 5, McNutt emailed Martin. He referenced
his June 10 email—to which he noted Martin had not yet replied-
-in which he acknowledged the need to bargain with the Union
over any effects, and that he had proposed the weeks of July 24
or 31 for that purpose. He stated the Respondent was not avail-
able to bargain on July 20. (Jt. Exh. 1(h).). A week later, on July
12, Martin proposed the parties meet on July 24 for “[r]ealign-
ment [p]lan negotiations.” (Jt. Exh. 1(i).) The following day,
McNutt responded that July 24 was no longer possible for the
realignment meeting.10 He proposed that they meet on July 31,
August 1, 2, or 3. On July 18, Martin emailed McNutt that the
Union could meet on August 1, from 10 a.m. to noon. (Jt. Exh.
1(j).)
The following day, Martin emailed McNutt requesting the job
descriptions for the assistant and associate chief positions. (Jt.
Exh. 1(k).) On July 24, the Respondent provided the requested
information. (Jt. Exh. 1(k).) The job descriptions stated the asso-
ciate and assistant chairs would be considered managerial/super-
visory because they had the authority, in the interest of the col-
lege, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, direct, reward, discipline, and adjust grievances
for other employees, or effectively recommend such action, us-
ing independent judgement. The descriptions also stated the
assistant chairs would be expected to teach seven courses per
academic year, and the associate chairs would be expected to
teach five courses per year.
7 The information management shared with the faculty largely
tracked the information in the June 5 memo to the Union. One aspect not
included in that memo was that the new chairs would be expected to
teach a reduced course load. The faculty were advised that the associate
chairs would teach a 1/3 course load, and the assistant chairs would teach
a 2/3 course load. (U. Exhs. 1 and 2.) As discussed below, the Respond-
ent later shared this information with the Union in correspondence prior
to the initial effects bargaining session.
8 On June 27, Dr. Burdick emailed the faculty stating that she and
President Hofmann would be meeting with the Faculty Council on June
29, to discuss faculty inclusion in how the realignment plan might be
shaped to meet the specific realities of each of the programs. (GC Exh.
24). The record does not reflect whether this meeting occurred and, if so,
what was discussed. In July and August, Dr. Burdick emailed faculty
providing periodic updates on the realignment and the expected timeline
for its phased implementation. (GC Exhs. 25–32).
9 Martin, in his testimony, did not explain why it took 19 days to
respond to McNutt’s offer to bargain.
10 McNutt, in his testimony, did not explain why the Respondent was
no longer available on July 24.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4
On July 25, McNutt emailed Martin a supplemental memo in
advance of the parties’ August 1 bargaining session. (Jt. Exh.
1(l).) It stated the new positions and titles would be effective
August 20. It also included tables listing the 47 faculty members
who would be affected by the realignment plan. Table 3 identi-
fied 19 members whose assessment liaison assignments (and
course release) would be reduced while their compensation re-
mained the same; Table 4 identified 21 members whose current
assignments (and their course release) would be eliminated and
replaced with offers for either a new chair opportunity or teach-
ing assignments; Table 5 identified four members whose as-
signments (and course release) would be eliminated and replaced
by a new teaching assignment; and Table 6 identified three
members whose assignments (and course release) would be elim-
inated and replaced by a new teaching assignment, but with a
loss of their current stipend.11
On July 26, Martin asked the Respondent for the total number
of chairs, associate chairs, and assistant chairs by department
under the realignment plan, as well as the current number of
chairs. (Jt. Exh. 1(m).) Two days later, McNutt emailed Martin
the requested information, plus two corrections to the supple-
mental memo. (Jt. Exh. 1(n).) He wrote the Respondent expec-
ted there to be 12 assistant chairs and 24 associate chairs.
4. August 1 Bargaining Session and Union Proposals
On August 1, the Respondent and the Union met for effects
bargaining.12 The focus of the session was on the status and
work of the newly created chairs and the eventual elimination of
the faculty directors. The Union asserted the administrative and
oversight duties performed by the faculty directors constituted
unit work, and if those duties were being reassigned to the new
chairs, the chairs should be part of the bargaining unit. If not,
the Respondent should backfill the positions being lost. The
Union also asserted that anybody who was negatively impacted
financially by these changes, including the loss of stipends, be
made whole. According to Martin, the Respondent rejected each
of these proposals and offered no counterproposals. (Tr. 30-32).
5. Correspondence Following August 1 Bargaining Session
On August 7, Martin emailed McNutt reiterating the Union’s
positions and proposals regarding the effects of the planned
changes. (Jt. Exh. 1(o).) First, the Union proposed that the new
chairs be included in the bargaining unit because they were going
to be teaching and performing administrative and oversight du-
ties. Second, the Union proposed that if management rejected
this proposal, management should backfill those unit positions
being displaced by the new chairs. Third, the Union proposed
that the Respondent not force the faculty members to choose
between “at-will” employment (as an assistant or associate chair)
and a significant loss of compensation if they decline a chair
position and remain in the unit. Finally, the Union proposed that
no faculty member suffer any loss of compensation because of
the realignment.
On August 11, McNutt emailed Martin responding to the pro-
posals. (Jt. Exh. 1(p).) He began by disagreeing with the conten-
tion that the new chair positions should be part of the bargaining
unit. He explained that while the chairs have teaching duties,
they also have substantial supervisory and managerial functions.
He went on to explain, in detail, what those functions would be.
McNutt acknowledged that the resulting elimination of some
faculty director positions would impact certain unit employees,
and that the Respondent will continue to negotiate with the Uni-
on over the impact on those positions. He noted that faculty who
previously held a director assignment with a reduced course load
would see their teaching assignments reinstated, allowing them
to maintain their compensation level. In addition, all but three of
those who had their assignments superseded by the new chair
positions were offered the opportunity to join the college’s lead-
ership team (as chairs, associate chairs, or assistant chairs).
Those who accept would have their compensation increased.
The three faculty members identified (in Table 6) were not losing
compensation because of realignment, but rather because their
closed-end assignments were ending.
McNutt next expressed confusion over the Union’s demand to
“backfill” the unit positions affected by the realignment. He
advised that no unit positions were being displaced by the newly
created chair positions, and that the Respondent was not chan-
ging the total number of course offerings or sections because of
the realignment.
He also noted that positions outside the unit, including de-
partment chairs and executive directors, have historically taught
courses. Moreover, the newly created chair positions would be
teaching fewer courses than they had in their faculty role. He
noted that, in total, no more than 3.33 percent of the courses
offered each semester will be taught by associate and assistant
chairs, and the courses they would have taught had they re-
mained in the unit will be taught by other faculty members, in-
cluding newly hired faculty who will be part of the bargaining
unit.
Finally, in response to the Union’s concern about “at-will”
employment for those that accept a chair position, McNutt em-
phasized the Respondent offered retreat rights to those that ac-
cept and later return to a faculty position at the end of their term.
He added the Respondent was willing to expand the retreat rights
for those who take a chair position and later change their mind.
He stated the college will allow them to resign and retreat to a
faculty position at the start of the semester prior to the end of
their contract, so long as they provide at least 6 weeks’ notice
prior to the end of the then-current semester. McNutt concluded
by stating he looked forward to the Union’s response on these
issues.
11 In late July, management began notifying the faculty directors that
they would be losing their title, administrative and oversight duties,
stipend, and course release. (GC Exhs. 16 and 34) (U. Exh. 3). Certain
of the faculty directors were offered one of the new chair positions, and
several accepted. The timing of this was not entirely clear from the re-
cord. Allison Dalton was one of the faculty directors who was offered a
chair position. She rejected the offer in early August, and she was even-
tually relieved of her faculty director responsibilities by September. (Tr.
116–118).
12 McNutt and Martin were the only witnesses to testify about the
August 1 session, and each struggled to confidently and specifically
recall what was said. (Tr. 28–31; 221–225). As such, I primarily rely
upon their subsequent written correspondence (discussed below) as
setting forth the bargaining proposals and responses.
ARTCENTER COLLEGE OF DESIGN
5
On August 28, Martin responded. (R. Exh. 5.)13 He wrote that
up to that point the Respondent had refused to bargain concern-
ing the “many decisions” reflected in its July 25 supplemental
memo, and that the Respondent’s “willingness to bargain effects
alone is unacceptable.” Martin noted that, despite the Respond-
ent’s protestations to the contrary, the realignment plan removes
significant duties, i.e., teaching work and work that has been
performed by unit employees serving as faculty directors who, in
addition to teaching, performed administrative duties. The July
25 supplemental memo also underscores the Respondent’s uni-
lateral actions to (1) diminish the work of unit employees by
detailing significant compensation losses for those affected, and
(2) change the character of work performed by unit employees
who have until now performed some degree of administrative
responsibilities but will now have increased teaching loads.
Martin went on to state that the Respondent’s realignment and
refusal to bargain could not have been more poorly timed. The
parties have been negotiating for almost a year. “Had we made
better progress earlier and achieved a contract, this realignment
would have been discussed without carrying the implicit, and we
believe intended, message to the faculty that their choice of uni-
onization was misguided and their hopes for a bilateral approach
to decision-making were illusory.”
Martin concluded by stating the Union was available to bar-
gain the realignment decisions reflected in the July 25 memo, not
just the effects of those decisions, and the bargaining committee
members will make themselves available at the earliest oppor-
tunity. Martin then asked for the Respondent’s availability dur-
ing the week of September 1.
Later that same day, McNutt responded to Martin. In his
email, McNutt wrote:
It's disappointing that you have sent a communication that is so
rife with misstatements and wild accusations. Months ago, the
College notified the Union of its planned realignment and sub-
sequently issued several detailed memos. We offered to meet
with the Union to provide additional information and address
any questions and concerns that the [U]nion had.
After waiting weeks for the [U]nion to set a meeting time, fi-
nally, on August 1, 2023, the Union met with the College in
what you subsequently described as “Realignment negotiation-
s.” You then wrote to me on August 7, addressing several of
the Union’s “positions” as to the realignment. In an effort to
further communicate with the Union and explain the College’s
responses on the Union’s positions, I sent a lengthy email to
you on August 11, 2023. Attempting to continue the conversa-
tion, I concluded my email with “I look forward to your re-
sponse on these issues.”
Your implication that the College’s realignment is somehow
related to our ongoing collective bargaining is equally false.
The realignment discussion began well before the union was
certified as the representative for [the faculty.] And, as you
have confirmed, the realignment is purely a management right
—for the College to determine how its management and ad-
ministration are structured.
. . .
As for the next meeting that you have proposed concerning the
realignment, the College can be available on the morning of
September 1.
(R. Exh. 5.)
The parties did not meet on September 1. McNutt and Martin
exchanged emails trying to schedule a bargaining session for that
week. (R. Exh. 6.) On September 8, McNutt sent Martin an
email to confirm the Union’s availability to meet on September
12, between 2–3 p.m. Martin responded that the Union was not
available at that time because the bargaining committee would
be teaching their courses. McNutt proposed meeting later in the
day, between 5:30–6:30 p.m. (R. Exh. 6.). The record does not
reflect whether Martin responded. The parties did not meet on
September 12, or at any other time in September, to bargain over
the effects.14
6. October 2 Meeting and Subsequent Communications
The parties next met on October 2, where they discussed effec-
s.15 According to McNutt, Martin asked which faculty members
had been offered the new chair positions, and whether they had
accepted. The two sides then discussed each of those individuals
and their status. (Tr. 229–230.) Neither side made any propos-
als. (Tr. 233–234.)
In the months following the October 2 meeting, McNutt in-
formed Martin that the Respondent remained willing to bargain
over the effects. He made those offers through January 2024.
(Tr. 234.) The Union did not request or otherwise pursue effects
bargaining.16
13 Martin, in his testimony, again did not explain why it took him 17
days to respond to McNutt.
14 The record does not reflect the dates the parties met for their negoti-
ations over their initial agreement.
15 Martin testified he could not recall whether the parties had a second
meeting over effects. (Tr. 29–30.). The first reference to this October 2
meeting occurred during McNutt’s testimony, during which the Re-
spondent presented him with his meeting notes. The General Counsel
objected, noting their subpoena to the Respondent requested any bargain-
ing notes, and McNutt’s notes were not produced. (Tr. 230–232.) As a
sanction, the General Counsel requested that the Respondent be pre-
cluded from questioning McNutt about the October 2 meeting. I did not
grant that request, but I barred the Respondent from offering the notes or
otherwise relying upon them as evidence. I determined that to be more
appropriate because the Respondent’s failure to produce the notes was
inadvertent, and the General Counsel could have recalled Martin, or
presented another witness, to rebut McNutt’s testimony. (Tr. 231–232.)
That being said, I make no findings based on the General Counsel’s
decision not to recall Martin or present another witness on this topic.
16 Dalton, who was on the Union’s bargaining committee for the
parties’ initial collective-bargaining agreement, testified that when the
Union brought up the realignment plan, the Respondent stated that it was
not part of those negotiations, and they would schedule a separate meet-
ing to discuss that topic. (Tr. 101–102.) Dalton did not provide any
further specifics, including when and by whom the statements were
made. Martin, in contrast, testified the Union was never precluded from
making proposals regarding realignment. (Tr. 46–47.) I credit Martin
over Dalton on this matter. Martin was the Union’s chief spokesperson
throughout all the negotiations, and his testimony on this topic was clear-
er and more definitive.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6
7. Parties’ Reach Initial Collective-Bargaining Agreement
The parties continued to meet and bargain over their initial
agreement. They eventually reached an agreement, which is
dated May 1, 2024, to April 30, 2027. (R. Exh. 4.)17
LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Overview
1. Allegation and Applicable Framework
The complaint narrowly alleges that the Respondent has viol-
ated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act since June 5, 2023, by
failing to provide the Union with adequate notice and an oppor-
tunity to bargain over the effects of the creation of the assistant
and associate chair positions.18
It is well established that an employer has a duty to give a
union notice and opportunity to bargain about the effects of a
managerial decision even if it has no obligation to bargain about
the decision itself. See Comau, Inc., 364 NLRB 523, 524–525
(2016). See also Good Samaritan Hospital, 335 NLRB 901, 902
(2001); Allison Corp., 330 NLRB 1363, 1365 (2000). Bargaining
over the effects of a decision “must be conducted in a meaningful
manner and at a meaningful time.” First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681–682 (1981). In determining
if this has occurred, a relevant consideration is “whether the uni-
on is afforded an opportunity to bargain ‘at a time when it still
represented employees upon whom the [employer] relied for
service.”’ Komatsu America Corp., 342 NLRB 649, 649 (2004)
(quoting Metropolitan Teletronics Corp., 279 NLRB 957, 959
(1986), enfd. mem. 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987)). Once the
employer has provided timely notice, the onus is on the union to
both request and pursue effects bargaining. See Frontier Co-
munications, 370 NLRB No. 131, slip op. at 10 (2021). See
also Berklee College of Music, 362 NLRB 1517, 1518 (2015)).
2. Positions of the General Counsel and the Union
The General Counsel and the Union argue the Respondent, by
its course of conduct, failed to provide the Union with adequate
notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the effects.
They contend the notice was given shortly before the Respondent
began implementing the plan and notifying the unit employees.
It took these steps despite the Union’s request that it delay im-
plementation to allow the parties an opportunity to bargain over
the impact on unit employees.
The General Counsel and the Union also argue that while the
Respondent later offered to engage in effects bargaining, that
offer was illusory. They contend the Respondent refused or
delayed bargaining over the effects until the end of July, 2
months after it had begun implementation. They point out that
by the time the parties met on August 1, the Respondent had
begun notifying faculty directors about the changes to their terms
and conditions of employment. Collectively, the General Coun-
sel and the Union argue the Respondent’s conduct foreclosed a
meaningful opportunity to bargain over the effects.
Next, the General Counsel and the Union argue that when the
parties met on August 1, the Respondent did not engage in actual
bargaining. Despite the Union’s attempts to follow up the meet-
ing with clarification and requests for information, the Respond-
ent shut every topic of discussion down. Rather than bargain in
good faith, the Respondent’s approach to effects bargaining was
to deny that the effects cited by the Union existed at all. Al-
though the parties were regularly meeting to negotiate an initial
collective-bargaining agreement, the Respondent refused to
engage in any effects bargaining during those meetings. And
there is no evidence the Respondent engaged in meaningful bar-
gaining when the parties met on about October 2.
3. Position of the Respondent
The Respondent denies these allegations and asserts it bar-
gained in good faith over the effects of the creation of the chair
positions. It points out that it proactively informed the Union
about its realignment plan and then offered to bargain over the
impact on the unit employees. It also contends it responded to
the Union’s information requests and made proposals designed
to reduce the impact on unit employees. The Respondent asserts
the Union did nothing in response, and after a 2-month delay
demanded that the Respondent refrain from implementing the
plan and sought a “make whole” remedy for affected faculty.
The Respondent further contends that when the parties met on
August 1, the Union focused on everything but effects, and it
made no proposals specific to any affected faculty member.
17 McNutt testified that effects bargaining was later subsumed and
made part of the parties’ negotiations over an initial agreement. I give
no weight to this testimony. Much of what McNutt said on this topic was
in response to leading or highly suggestive questions from the Respond-
ent’s counsel, and his responses were vague and lacked the details and
context necessary to fully understand what was proposed, discussed, and
agreed to (or waived) as part of their negotiations over the parties’ initial
agreement. (Tr. 242–254.)
18 There is no allegation that the Respondent had a duty to bargain
over the creation of these chair positions. The Board has held the creation
of non-unit positions and the selection of individuals to fill those posi-
tions are managerial decisions, over which the employer has no duty to
bargain. See St. Louis Telephone Employees Credit Union, 273 NLRB
625, 627–628 (1984). Cf. Glades Electric Cooperative, Inc., 366 NLRB
No. 112 (2018).
The Union, however, contends in its post-hearing brief that the Re-
spondent had a duty to bargain over the creation of these chair positions
because they involved transferring or reassigning unit work to non-unit
employees, which is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Specifically, the
Union focuses on the transfer or reassignment of the faculty directors’
administrative and oversight duties. I decline to address the Union’s
contention for two reasons. First, the complaint does not allege this as a
violation, and the General Counsel did not seek to include it as part of
their case. It is well established that the General Counsel controls the
complaint, and the charging party cannot change or expand it or the Gen-
eral Counsel’s theory of the case. See e.g., Coastal Marine Services,
Inc., 367 NLRB No. 58, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2019); Smoke House Re-
taurant, 347 NLRB 192, 195 (2006), enfd. 325 Fed. Appx. 577 (9th Cir.
2009). Second, the record does not reflect whether the duties at issue
constituted unit work. Although the faculty directors existed at the time
of the petition, the election, and the Union’s certification, they are not
referenced in the unit description. There was no determination as to
whether their administrative and oversight duties constituted (included)
teaching work or (excluded) managerial work, see NLRB v. Yeshiva
University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), and these issues were not raised or fully
litigated during the hearing in this case.
ARTCENTER COLLEGE OF DESIGN
7
Then, on August 28, the Union stated that it would not engage in
effects bargaining without decisional bargaining, writing,
“[y]our willingness to bargain effects alone is unacceptable.”
The Union also made unfounded accusations that the Respond-
ent had nefariously timed the implementation of its realignment
plan to undermine the faculty’s faith in the Union, and it falsely
claimed that the Respondent refused to bargain over “the many
decisions reflected in the July 25 memo.” Later, when the Re-
spondent agreed to meet on September 1 for effects bargaining,
the Union never responded. Instead, on September 7, it filed a
charge alleging the Respondent violated the Act by failing to
engage in decisional bargaining over the realignment plan.
The Respondent argues that following the charge it again met
with the Union on October 2 to bargain over effects. At that
meeting, the Union did not raise any specific proposals regarding
the affected unit employees outlined in the tables in the supple-
mental memo. And following that session, the Union did not
request further bargaining, despite the Respondent’s expressed
willingness to continue meeting. Based on this conduct, as well
as the negotiated terms of the parties’ initial agreement, the Re-
spondent contends the Union has waived its right to further ef-
fects bargaining.
B. Adequacy of the Notice
The first issue is whether the Respondent provided the Union
with adequate notice of the creation of these assistant and associ-
ate chair positions. An employer has a duty to give pre-imple-
mentation notice to the union to allow for meaningful effects
bargaining. See Allison Corp., supra at 1366. That notice must
be given “sufficiently before . . . actual implementation so that
the union is not confronted at the bargaining table with . . . a fait
accompli.” Comau, Inc., 364 NLRB 523, 525 (2016) (quoting
Willamette Tug & Barge Co., 300 NLRB 282, 283 (1990)). See
also Komatsu America Corp., 342 NLRB 649, 649 (2004); Pen-
ntech Papers v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 1983), cert.
denied 464 U.S. 892 (1983).19 The reasoning for pre-implement-
ation notice is that in most situations there are alternatives that
the parties can explore to avoid or reduce the scope of the effects
without calling into question the employer’s underlying de-
cision. Frontier Communications, supra slip op. at 11 (citing
Good Samaritan Hospital, supra at 903–904 and Allison Corp,
supra at 1366). Whether the employer has provided adequate
notice is a question of fact that depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. Los Angeles Soap Co., 300 NLRB 289, 295
(1990) (citing NLRB v. Emsing's Supermarket, 872 F.2d 1279,
1286-1287 (7th Cir. 1989)); Emhart Industries, 297 NLRB 215
(1987).
To resolve this first issue, I turn to the record. The Respondent
first notified the Union about the planned creation of these chair
positions on June 5, when McNutt sent Martin the memo out-
lining the Respondent’s realignment plan and the expected
timeline for implementation. In that memo, McNutt advised
Martin that phase one, which involved the creation and selection
for the new dean positions, would begin in about mid-June, and
phase two, which involved the creation and selection of these
chair positions, would begin in about mid-July. The memo men-
tioned that as a result of the realignment some faculty may see
changes to their current responsibilities, compensation, and titles
starting in the fall. It also stated that the inaugural chair positions
may be offered to faculty who performed administrative and/or
faculty director work during the prior academic year. Based on
this evidence, I conclude the Respondent provided the Union
with notice of the creation of these chair positions and the poten-
tial effects on unit employees 6 weeks in advance of the planned
implementation (June 5 to mid-July).
The Board has consistently held 6 weeks (or less) is adequate
notice to allow for meaningful effects bargaining. See e.g., Had-
don Craftsmen, 300 NLRB 789, 790 (1990) (5-week notice of
proposed reclassification change held adequate), rev. denied
mem. sub. nom. 937 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1991); Gibbs & Cox, Inc.,
292 NLRB 757, 757 (1989) (2-week notice of discontinuance of
payments to mutual fund held adequate), dismissed as moot 904
F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1990); Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 289 NLRB
1441, 1442 (1988) (10-day notice of change to payment of
premiums held adequate); Salem College, 261 NLRB 327 (1982)
1-month notice before subcontracting agreement became final
held adequate); Citizens National Bank, 245 NLRB 389, 389-90
(1979) (less than 1 week notice of scheduling change held ad-
equate); Kentron of Hawaii Ltd., 214 NLRB 834, 834–835
(1974) (3-week notice of change to benefits was timely); Amer-
ican Oil Co., 164 NLRB 36 (1967) (9-day notice of closure held
adequate); Hartmann Luggage Co., 173 NLRB 1254 (1968)
(4.5-day notice of layoffs held adequate); and Cumberland Shoe
Corp., 156 NLRB 1130 (1966) (20-day notice of closure held
adequate).
The General Counsel and the Union contend the notice in this
case was inadequate because the Respondent immediately began
implementing its realignment plan and providing the faculty with
details about the process it would use for identifying and select-
ing the associate and assistant chairs, all while failing or refusing
to meet with the Union for another 2 months. Under the circum-
stances, they contend the Respondent announced the changes at
issue as a fait accompli, which effectively precluded meaningful
effects bargaining. I reject these contentions.
First, as stated, the only aspect of the realignment plan that is
at issue is the creation of the assistant and associate chair posi-
tions. The June 5 memo announced the Respondent planned to
begin creating the new chair positions in mid-July, as part of
phase two. The record shows the Respondent began creating
those positions in late July or early August.20 Although the Re-
19 Whether an employer provided notice of a fait accompli depends
on whether it had a duty to bargain over the decision or its effects. When
a case involves decisional bargaining, it is unlawful for the employer to
unilaterally formulate and announce a final decision, because it fore-
closes negotiations over potential alternatives to that decision. When a
case involves effects bargaining, it is lawful for the employer to unilater-
ally formulate and announce a final decision. However, it must provide
the union with an opportunity to bargain over how the implementation
will impact unit employees. It is unlawful when the employer fails to
provide reasonable notice and the opportunity to bargain before imple-
mentation when its failure forecloses negotiations over the potential
alternatives to those effects. Ultimately, the issue is whether notice was
given when the opportunity to bargain was ongoing or foreclosed.
20 The Union contends the Respondent’s communications with faculty
about the realignment plan differed from those with the Union. The
record shows the Respondent provided the Union much of the same
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8
spondent began implementing phase one of the plan in late June
and early July, which involved the creation and selection of the
four new dean positions, there is no contention that the Respond-
ent had any obligation to bargain over those matters.
Second, the Respondent did not fail or refuse to meet with the
Union for 2 months following the June 5 memo. McNutt’s June
10 email to Martin offering to bargain explained that the effects
were not yet clear, and more information would be known in the
next 4-to-6 weeks. He stated, “In anticipation of that, we would
like to schedule a time to meet with the Union [for effects bar-
gaining] sometime during the weeks of July 24 or 31. Please
reply with your availability.” (emphasis added). The Respond-
ent was not insisting on those weeks, it was stating a preference
for when it believed that effects bargaining should begin and the
reasons why. If the Union wanted to test the Respondent’s posi-
tion, Martin could have promptly responded to McNutt’s email
and requested earlier dates, stating the reasons why. He did not.
Instead, Martin waited 19 days to respond to McNutt, and he
stated, for the first time, that the Union wanted to bargain over
the “proposed” realignment plan itself before it was impl-
mented.21 In doing so, the Union changed the focus from ef-
fects bargaining to decisional bargaining, even though the Re-
spondent had no duty to bargain with the Union over its mana-
gerial decision to implement the plan. McNutt stated as much in
his July 5 response, but he reiterated the Respondent remained
willing to bargain over the effects, and he again proposed the
weeks of July 24 or 31. The parties eventually settled on August
1.
Based on the evidence presented, I conclude the Respondent
provided the Union with timely notice so that the Union was not
presented with a fait accompli when seeking to bargain over
effects.
C. Meaningful Opportunity to Bargain
The second issue is whether the Respondent provided the
Union with a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the effects.
Section 8(d) of the Act requires that the employer and the union
“meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
. . . but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to
a proposal or require the making of a concession.” Good-faith
bargaining “presupposes a desire to reach ultimate agreement.”
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960). In
determining whether a party has violated its duty to bargain in
good faith, the Board examines the totality of the party’s con-
duct, both at and away from the bargaining table. See, e.g.,
Overnite Transportation Co., 296 NLRB 669, 671 (1989), enfd.
938 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1991); Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271
NLRB 1600, 1603 (1984). It must be decided whether the em-
ployer is engaging in hard but lawful bargaining to achieve a
desirable resolution or is delaying or unlawfully endeavoring to
frustrate the possibility of arriving at any resolution. Although
the Board generally does not evaluate whether proposals are
acceptable, it will consider whether, objectively, a party’s bar-
gaining positions or demands constitute evidence of bad-faith
bargaining. Reichhold Chemicals, 288 NLRB 69 (1988), affd. in
relevant part 906 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498
U.S. 1053 (1991).
The General Counsel and the Union contend the Respondent
had no intention of bargaining in good faith or in reaching a res-
olution regarding the effects of its creation of these new chair
positions. They contend that by the time the parties finally met
on August 1, bargaining was futile because the Respondent had
begun notifying the faculty directors about the elimination of
their positions and offering these new chair positions, which
would have taken them out of the bargaining unit. Additionally,
they contend that during the August 1 bargaining session, and in
the communications that followed, the Respondent exhibited bad
faith when it rejected each of the Union’s proposals, failed to
offer any counterproposals, and denied each of the effects the
Union stated would result from the creation of these chair
positions.22 I reject these contentions as well.
As discussed above, the Respondent provided timely notice
and an offer to bargain over the effects. The Union, in its delayed
response to that offer, attempted to change the focus from effects
to decisional bargaining. The Respondent declined to bargain
over its managerial decision to create the positions, but it advised
the Union that it remained willing to bargain over the effects. To
that end, prior to the August 1 bargaining session, the Respond-
ent provided the Union with the supplemental memo containing
relevant information about affected employees. The Respondent
then met with the Union on August 1 and later responded to each
of the Union’s proposals. It rejected including the chairs in the
unit because of their supervisory functions, and it challenged the
need to “backfill” because no unit positions were being displaced
by the chairs, and the total number of course offerings was not
changing. It, however, acknowledged the elimination of the
faculty director positions would impact certain unit employees,
and it stated it would continue to negotiate with the Union over
the impact on those positions.23 In response to the Union’s con-
cerns about faculty having to choose between at-will employ-
ment or higher compensation, the Respondent stated it was open
information about the creation and selection of these new chair positions,
as well as the potential effects on the faculty directors, that it provided to
the faculty. The only difference was the Respondent did not initially
notify the Union that the new chairs would also be expected to maintain
a reduced teaching load. That information was provided to the Union in
late July, prior to the August 1 bargaining session.
21 The Union contends that Martin first requested decisional bargain-
ing in his June 8 email, and he “again” requested it in his June 29 email.
Martin’s June 8 email only requested to bargain over “the impact” of the
plan—which is synonymous with the effects. As such, the June 29 email
was the first time the Union requested to bargain about the realignment
plan itself.
22 The General Counsel argues that despite the Union’s attempts to
follow-up the meeting with clarification and requests for information, the
Respondent shut every topic of discussion down. The General Counsel
fails to identify what clarification or requests for information the Union
made, and what the Respondent did that shut down further discussion.
I, therefore, need not address these vague arguments.
23 The Union asserts the course-load requirement for the new chairs
would necessarily reduce the number of courses available for the unit
employees to teach. It argues that its proposal for “backfilling” could
have meant guaranteeing that those course reductions would be absorbed
by the new chair positions rather than unit employees or creating addi-
tional courses to protect unit work. The record does not reflect that the
ARTCENTER COLLEGE OF DESIGN
9
to expanding the retreat rights for faculty who changed their
mind about accepting a chair position. The Respondent con-
cluded by stating that it looked forward to the Union’s response
on these issues. The Union waited another 17 days to respond,
and it again insisted that the parties also bargain over the plan
itself.
Additionally, the timing of the August 1 session did not fore-
close meaningful effects bargaining. Even though the Respond-
ent had begun implementing the second phase of its plan by the
time of this meeting, that process was ongoing. The Board held
that meaningful effects bargaining is not foreclosed simply be-
cause the employer has begun implementing the change(s) at
issue, and that having been furnished the opportunity to bargain
over the effects, it is incumbent on the union to test the employer-
’s intent to bargain, by engaging in negotiations. See Berklee
College of Music, 362 NLRB at 1518 (quoting Richmond Times-
Dispatch, 345 NLRB 195, 199 (2005)). In Berklee College, the
employer announced and later began implementing a policy of a
five-student minimum before a course would be held, which
would reduce the number of classes available for faculty to teach.
The union demanded the college cease further implementation of
the policy until the parties negotiated over its effects. When the
parties met, the union stated its objections to the policy, and the
college later addressed those objections. It also provided the
union with information about the number of courses cancelled to
date under the policy. Thereafter, the union took no further ac-
tion. The judge found the college violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by presenting the union with a fait accompli at that
meeting because it refused to rescind the policy. The Board re-
versed, holding the college provided the union with notice and
an opportunity to bargain over the effects because the policy had
not been fully implemented, and the primary effects of the
change had not yet been felt and would be felt in future semester-
s. Under these circumstances, the Board concluded the college
provided the union with a meaningful opportunity to bargain at a
meaningful time, and, therefore, the union “was not privileged to
discontinue effects bargaining.” 362 NLRB at 1518.
The same holds true here. Although the Union took additional
steps beyond those of the union in Berklee College, it essentially
abandoned its pursuit of effects bargaining. The Union’s two
stated concerns were the loss of the stipend and/or course release
for the faculty directors whose positions were eliminated, and the
potential loss or reduction of courses available for the unit em-
ployees to teach due to the requirement that chairs also maintain
a teaching course load. When the parties met on August 1, and
exchanged correspondence thereafter, the changes at issue had
not been fully implemented, and these topics remained open for
negotiation and possible resolution for months thereafter, if the
Union had continued to pursue them.
Finally, following the August 1 session, the Respondent stated
its willingness to continue effects bargaining, and it proposed
dates in early September (September 1 and 12). When the Union
responded that it was not available during the afternoon of
September 12, the Respondent proposed meeting in the evening.
The parties did not meet on either of those dates, or at any other
time in September, to bargain over effects. When the parties met
on October 2, the Respondent provided information regarding
those faculty who were offered and accepted the chair positions.
The Union made no proposals or requests for additional informa-
tion to formulate proposals. And while the Respondent stated it
remained willing to continue effects bargaining, and reiterated
that willingness over the next several months, the Union took no
further action to pursue effects bargaining.
Although unit employees were offered and had accepted these
new chair positions beginning in late July and early August, there
is no indication the Union was foreclosed from further bargain-
ing and reaching a possible resolution over its stated concerns.
The parties could have continued to meet and bargain over pro-
posals to address the former faculty directors who suffered the
loss of their stipend and/or course release, and they could have
continued to meet and bargain over proposals to ensure there
would be adequate courses available for unit employees to teach.
Under these circumstances, I conclude the Union was oblig-
ated to test the Respondent’s intent to continue negotiations over
the effects, and it was not otherwise privileged--as it did--to dis-
continue those negotiations.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based on the foregoing, I conclude the General Counsel has
failed to establish the Respondent committed the alleged
violations.24 On these findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended25
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 26, 2025
Union ever raised that, or that it was precluded from raising that, as pro-
posal.
24 Based on my conclusions, it is unnecessary for me to address the
Respondent’s affirmative defenses, including that the Union waived its
right to bargain over effects by agreeing to the terms of the parties’ initial
agreement.
25 If no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be waived for all purposes.