Hydril Co. of California

In the Matter Of HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and Ou.. WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION , LocAL 128, C. I. O. Case No. C-1506.-Decided May 18, 1940 Pressure Drilling Equipment Manufacturing Industry-Interference , Restraint, and Coercion-Unit Appropriate for Collective Bargaining : all production and maintenance employees , excluding supervisory and clerical employees ; stipula- tion as to-Representatives : proof of choice : prior certification ; objections to evidence upon which finding of majority and certification thereof were based, without merit-Collective Bargaining : refusal to negotiate in good faith : refusal of employer to recognize certified Union as exclusive bargaining representative ; failure of employer to enter into discussions with a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement concerning the issues presented and to make contractually banding such understandings reached in a written signed agreement ; procedure followed by respondent during and after conferences restricted negotiations to mere discussions to clarify employer policy and reduce Union to role of mere advisory body to the management ; ordered to bargain with the Union on request, and to embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement, upon request. Mr. M. A. Prowell, for the Board. Latham d Watkins, by Mr. Paul R. Watkins, of Los Angeles, Calif., for the respondent. Mr. Fred L. Phillips, of Los Angeles, Calif., for the Union. Mrs. Augusta Spaulding, of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF, 'THE CASE Upon charges duly filed by Oil Workers International Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region (Los Angeles, California) issued its complaint, dated January 24, 1940, against Hydril Company of Cali- fornia, Los Angeles, California, herein called the respondent, alleg- ing that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor 23 N. L. R. B., No. 105. 970 HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 971 Relations Act; 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing, were duly served upon the respondent and the Union? In respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged in substance (1) that although the Board on July 7, 1939, had found that the Union represented a majority of the respondent's employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and had certified the Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, 2 the respondent, on or about July 16, 1939, and at all times thereafter, refused, upon request, to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union in that, inter alia, it refused to embody understandings reached with the Union in a written agree- ment for a definite period of time; and (2) that by the above and other acts the respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The respondent filed an answer, dated February 2, 1940, denying that the Board had jurisdiction over it and that it had engaged in any unfair labor practices, and asserting that the Board's certifica- tion of the Union as exclusive bargaining representative, dated July 7, 1939, was invalid. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on February 5, 1940, at Los Angeles, California, before William B. Barton, the Trial Exam- iner duly designated by the Board. The Board and the respondent were represented by counsel, the Union by one of its officials,' and all participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties the record of all the pro- ceedings in the prior representation case, Case No. R-1381,3 was made 'a part of the record in the instant case. During the hearing the Trial Examiner made various rulings as to the admission of evidence and' granted a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof. The Board -has reviewed these rulings and finds that no prejudicial errors were committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. On March 4, 1940, the Trial Examiner filed his Intermediate Report, a copy, of which was duly served on all parties, finding that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and recommending that • 1 Fcrcice of notice of hearing was also made upon Central Labor Council and Los An. geles Industrial Union Council Neither organization appeared at the hearing. 2 Mat ter of Ilytd, it Company of California and Ott Workers International Union, Local A.8, C. I. 0., 13 N. L. R. B. 507 0 See footnote 2, supra 972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the respondent cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and, affirmatively, that it bargain collectively with the Union and embody, understandings reached in a signed, written contract. On April 3, 1940, the respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and on April 16, 1940, a brief. The Board has considered the respond- ent's exceptions and brief and in so far as the exceptions are inconsistent with the findings, conclusions, and order set forth below, finds them to be without merit. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The respondent, Hydril Company of California, is a California corporation. At its plant in Torrance, Los Angeles County, Cali- fornia, it is engaged in the threading of drill pipe and casing and in the manufacture of pressure-drilling equipment and tool joints for drill pipe. During the year 1939 the respondent used $394,708 worth of raw materials, consisting chiefly of steel, forgings, castings, and sundry commercial articles. Of this amount $465 represented the value of raw materials purchased from points outside California. During the same year the respondent's sales exceeded $1,250,000, of which about $300,000 represented the value of products sold by the respondent to purchasers in other States and foreign countries. In 1939 the respondent advertised its products in the following publications : -Oil Weekly, Institute of Petroleum Technologists, Oil Equipment, Oil and Gas Journal, Petroleum World, and World Petroleum. II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Oil Workers International Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., is a labor ,organization affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. It admits to membership production and maintenance employees at the respondent's plant, excluding supervisory and clerical employees. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES C A. The refusal to bargain collectively 1. The appropriate unit The complaint alleges and the parties stipulated that all produc- tion and maintenance employees of the respondent at its Torrance, California, plant, excluding clerical and supervisory employees, con. stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. i HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 973 We found this unit appropriate in the previous representation case.' We see no reason for departing from the unit agreed to by the parties and previously found appropriate by this Board. We find that all production and maintenance employees of the re- spondent at its Torrance, California, plant, excluding clerical and supervisory employees, constituted and constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of elnploy= ment, and that said unit insures to the employees of the respondent the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining and otherwise effectuates the policies of the Act. 2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit In our Decision and Certification of Representatives of July 7, 1939, we found that a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit had designated and selected the ITnion as their bargaining repre- sentative and certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining rep- resentative of all the employees in such unit. The respondent questions the validity of this certification. The finding of majority and the certification thereof were based upon five petitions, which were introduced in evidence in the representation case over objection of the respondent, and testimony concerning the petitions. These petitions stated that the "undersigned employees" of the respondent designated the Union as "their sole agency for collective bargaining on the matters of wages, hours, and working conditions in their em- ployment with the Company." All the petitions are dated February 25, 1939, and contain 129 names, which the Union claimed were sig- natures of employees of the respondent. The names of 123 of the 199 employees in the appropriate unit, as shown by the respondent's pay roll of May 13, 1939, which was introduced in evidence in the representation proceeding, appear among the 129 names on the peti- tions. Uncontradicted testimony of two 5 of the five members of a committee of the Union appointed for the purpose of securing signa- tures of employees of the respondent to the petitions showed the manner in which the petitions were circulated among the employees and established that the names on the petitions which also appeared on the respondent's pay roll of May 13, 1939, were the signatures of employees in the appropriate unit .6 Both of these witnesses were 4 See footnote 2, supra c One of these two was chairman of the union committee and supervised the preparation and circulation of all ffie petitions and saw some signatures affixed by employees on each of the petitions. In our Decision in the representation case we said : "Union Representative Phillips tes- tified that because the Union did not desire to place its membership cards in evidence, and in oidcr to bring its authority to represent the Company 's [respondent's] employees up to date, these petitions w ere prerarcd and circulated among employees of the Company on and after February 25, 1939, which date each petition bears . Maurice K. Loyd, chairman of a 974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD cross-examined by the respondent's counsel who in no way chal- lenged the truthfulness of their testimony. The respondent intro= duced no evidence in the representation case which cast the slightest doubt on the genuineness of any of the signatures on the petitions or the manner in which the signatures were obtained. We find the objection to the introduction of the petitions in evidence, made by the respondent in the representation proceeding on the ground that "no proper foundation" had been laid and on other grounds, and now urged in the instant case, is without merit.? We find that on July 7, 1939, and at all times thereafter, the Union was the duly designated representative of a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit and that, by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act, was, on that date and at all times thereafter, the exclusive rep- resentative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with the respondent in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. 3. The refusal to bargain collectively The Company, the Union, and counsel for the Board stipulated, and we find, the following facts : During September and October 1939 a series of conferences be- tween the respondent and the Union was held for the purpose of bargaining collectively. During these conferences the Union pre- sented to the respondent a proposed agreement covering rates of pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment.a Also during the conferences the respondent presented the Union with a written counterproposal.° At the first conference, and again at subsequent conferences, the respondent stated to the Union that the respondent was going into committee of the Union appointed for that purpose , and four members of the committee clicu 'ated the five petitions among employees of the Company. They advised the em- ployees solicited , both members and non-members of the Union, to read the caption and sign the petitions if they chose , and that signing was an authorization for the Union to repiescnt the si ;ners for purposes of collective bargaining only and was not an assumption of membership in the Union . Boyd supervised the solicitation of signatures carried on by the other four members of the committee . The solicitation occurred on Company property, before and after work and during lunch hour , but not during working hours." 7 The respondent excepted to certain statements in the Board's decision in the representa- tion case as erroneous . These exceptions are without merit and , if meritorious, are immateiial. 8 A copy of this agreement , designated Exhibit "A," is attached to the stipulation of the parties, designated Board Exhibit No. 4. The preamble of this agreement pros ides "The Articles of Agreement are entered into between the Hydril Company of California, Torrance, California, called as 'the Company,' and the Oil Workers International Union, hereinafter called `the Union,' for and on behalf of all employees of the Company , covered by the certification of the National Labor Relations Board on the 7th day of July, 111)39.", Article I provides : "Agency and employees covered-The Company recognizes the Oil Workers International Union and Local #128 of said Union , as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees covered herein on matters of wages, hours , and conditions ,of employment." 8 Exhibit "B" attached to Board Exhibit No. 4. This counterproposal does not contain the two provisions , set forth in footnote 8, supra, of the Union 's proposed agreement. HYDRIL COMPANY, OF CALIFORNIA - 975 the negotiations with an open mind on all questions, specifically in-, eluding the advisability of a contract, and if made with whom it should be made. As a result of the above-described conferences concerning the re- spondent's counterproposal, it was revised and rewritten.10 A con- ference was then had on the revised counterproposal. • At this confer- ence the Union stated that the revised counterproposal was not entirely satisfactory to it but apparently was as far as the respondent would go, and then requested that the terms of the revised counter- proposal be embodied in a written agreement, for a definite period of time, to be executed by both parties. The respondent advised the Union that the respondent had given this matter considerable thought and had concluded that it should not make an agreement with either its employees or the Union; that the respondent intended to have these principles govern its relationship with its employees; and that these principles were mat- ters which, in the practical operation of the business, may be changed from time to time. The respondent thereafter advised the Union that so long as the Union represented the majority of the employees there would be no change in wages, hours, or working conditions without first taking it up with the Union. Subsequently the respondent caused to be published and posted in its plant a bulletin dated October 25, 1939,11 and thereafter on November 24,1939, a further bulletin.12 We further find'that each bulletin contains numbered statements covering hours of work, rates of pay, and other conditions of em- ployment; that like the original and revised counterproposals, neither bulletin contains the two provisions of the Union's proposed agree- thent set forth in footnote 8 above, but that each bulletin merely states : "This bulletin has to do with the employees who are paid on an hourly basis"; that neither bulletin is signed by the Union or the respondent; that neither bulletin mentions or refers to the Union by name or in any way expresses recognition of the Union. On the basis of the above underlying facts we find that: (1) -The respondent has refused and failed to recognize-the-Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the respondent's em- ployees in the appropriate unit. This is shown by the respondent's words and deeds during and after the conferences, in particular by the omission from the respondent's original and revised counter-' proposals of any provision recognizing the Union as exclusive bar-. 10 Exhibit "C" attached to Board Exhibit No. 4. The revised and rewritten counter proposal also does not contain the two provisions, set forth in footnote 8, supra, of the Union's proposed agreement. 11 Exhibit "n" attached to Board Exhibit No. 4. 10 Exhibit "E" attached to Board Exhibit No. 4. 976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD gaining representative, although the,proposed agreement submitted by the Union contained such provisions, by the respondent's un- willingness throughout the conferences to accept the Union as an equal and responsible participant with whom a mutually binding agreement- embodying understandings reached should be made, by the respondent's posting of unilateral bulletins, and by the omission from such bulletins of any reference to the Union. (2) The respondent entered into the discussions without a sin- cere purpose to find a basis of agreement concerning the issues pre- sented and to make contractually binding such understandings upon terms as might be reached.13 This is shown by the respondent's statement at the first and subsequent conferences that it was confer- ring with an "open mind" on the matter of whether it would make a contract at all, and with whom, by its statement at the final confer- ence that it had concluded not to make an agreement with either, the Union or the employees, and by the posting of the unilateral bulletins. (3) The respondent and the Union reached an understanding on many subjects, but the respondent, upon request, refused to embody such understanding in a signed, written agreement with the Union .14 (4) The procedure followed by the respondent during and after the conferences restricted the negotiations to mere discussions to clarify employer policy and reduced the Union to the role of a mere advisory body to the management. (5) By the conduct specified in the four preceding paragraphs the respondent refused to bargain with the Union in good faith. (6) The conduct of the respondent specified in the five preceding= paragraphs did not constitute collective bargaining within the mean- ing of the Act. Collective bargaining, as contemplated by the Act, is a procedure looking toward the making of a collective agreement by the employer with the accredited representatives of his employees concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. The duty to bargain collectively, which the Act imposes upon employers, has as its objective the establishment of such a contractural relation- 13 In its brief the respondent states : "The record very clearly and without any contradiction whatsoever shows (1) that the Company was unwilling to enter an acreement with anybody, and (2) that what it pro- posed would be only piincipics goxerning its relationship with its employees" "While tl-e Union stated that the revised counterproposal was not entirely satisfactory to it. it demonstrated its willingness to accept the counterproposal by requestin the re- spondent to (moody the terms thereof in a signed, written agreement for a definite period of time. The request of the Union t"at the agreement be for a definite period of time does not indicate that the parties had not reached an understanding on the revised counter- proposal Theie is nothing in the record to suggest that the respondent refused to embody the terms of the revised counterproposal in a signed, written agreement because it was unwilling to make it for a definite period of time or because there was any disagreement between the respondent and the Union over the duration of an agreement. See footnote 13, supra. HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 977 ship to the end that employment relations may be stabilized and ob- struction to the free flow of commerce thus prevented. The duty is not limited to the recognition of the employees" representatives qua' representatives, or to a meeting and discussion of terms with them. The duty encompasses an obligation to enter into discussion and negotiation with an open and fair mind and with a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement concerning the issues presented, and to make contractually binding the understanding upon the terms that are reached. In none of these'respects has the respondent ful- filled its duty to bargain collectively. We find that the respondent, by the acts and conduct set forth in each and all of the six preceding paragraphs, refused to bargain col- lectively with the Union as the exclusive, representative of its em- ployees in the appropriate unit in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employmentl' We find that by such refusal to bargain collectively witli the Union, the respondent interfered with; restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and pro tection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. IV. TIIE EFFECT OF TIIE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and with foreign countries and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. 15 National Labor Relations Board v Sunshine Mining C9 , 110 F (2d) 780 ( C. C A 0),' enf'g as modified Matter of Sunshine Mining Company and International Union of Aline, dill and Smelter lVorlers , 7 N. L R . B. 11.;2; National Labor Relations Board v. Biles- Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F. (2d ) 18 (C. C. A. 9), enf'g Matter of Biles-Coleman Lumber Company and Puget Sound District Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, 4 N. L. Ii. B. 071); National Labor Relations Board v. Griswold Manufacturing Co, 106 F. ( 2d) 713 (C. C. A. 3), ent'g Matter of The Griswold Manufacturing Company and Amalgamated Ass'u of lion , Steel and Tin IVo9, ers of North America, Lodge No 1193, 6 N L. R B 298; Heinz Company v National Labor Relations Board, 110 F ( 2d) 843 (C C A 6), enf'g Mat- ter of II J. Ileinr Company and Canning and Pickle Workers, Local Union No 325, etc., 10 N L. R B 963; Hartsell Mills Co v National Labor Relations Board, 111 F (2d) 291, (C. C. A. 4), enf'g as mocl'ficd as to other issues Matter of Hartsell Mills Company and Textile Workers Oigan'zrng Committee, 18 N. L R B 269; Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. V Notional Labor Relations Board, 111 F ( 2d) 869 ( C C A 7 ), enf'g Matter of Fort I1,ayne Corrugated Paper Company and -Local No. 182, International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers, 14 N. L R. B 1; Matter of Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company, et at. and United Eldetrical, Radio and , Machine Work- ers of America, et al, 22 N. L. R. B. 147 , and the court and Board decisions collected therein. 978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. THE REMEDY , Having found that the respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom. We have found that the respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees within the appropriate bargaining unit although the Union vas and is the statutory representative of these employees for the purposes of collective bargaining. Among other things, the respond- ent has refused to grant the Union recognition as the statutory rep- resentative and has refused to embody understandings reached with it in a signed, written agreement. We shall address our order specifi- cally to the wrongs sought to be remedied. In order, therefore, to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act, we shall, in aid of our cease and desist order, order the respondent to recognize and otherwise bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, and, if understandings are reached with the Union, to embody such under= standings in a signed agreement, if requested to do so by the Union. , Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon ' the entire, record in the, case, the Board makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Oil Workers International Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., is^ a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. All production and maintenance employees of the respondent at its Torrance, California , plant, excluding supervisory and clerical employees, constituted and constitute a unit appropriate for the pur- poses of collective bargaining , within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 3. Oil Workers International Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., is and at all times since July 7, 1939, has been the exclusive representative of all employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 4. By refusing to bargain collectively with Oil Workers Interna- tional Union , Local 128, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all its employees in such unit , the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act. 5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its, employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. HYDRIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 979 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices, and each of them, are unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER , Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of la-w', and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent, `ydril Company of California, Los Angeles, California, and its, officers, agents, successors, and assigns- shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Oil Workers Inter- national Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all its production and maintenance employees at its Torrance, Cali- fornia, plant, excluding supervisory and clerical employees; (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con- certed activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National- Labor Relations Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Oil Workers Inter- national Union, Local 128, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all its production and maintennace employees at its Torrance, Cali- fornia, plant, excluding supervisory and clerical employees, in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment; and, if an understanding is reached on such matters, embody said understanding in a signed agreement with said labor organization, if requested to do so by said labor organization ; (b) Post immediately in conspicuous places at its plant, and main- tain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date of posting, notices to its employees stating : (1) that the responder tt will not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered to cease and desist in paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of this Order; and (2) that the respondent will take the affirmative action set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of this Order; (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region in writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what,steps it has taken to comply herewith.'