Red Food Store

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Red Food Store and Anna B. Guthrie. Case 10-CA- 13567 September 11, 1980 DECISION AND ORDER On June 13, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Bernard Ries issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Re- spondent filed a brief in response. The Board has considered the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decid- ed to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, except as noted below, and to adopt his recommended order, as modified herein. ' The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by asking its employees whether they had signed union cards. We find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions to this conclusion. On March 4, 1980, Store Manager Holley and Assistant Store Manager West called a meeting of the 30 employees at Respondent's LaFayette, Georgia, store. During this meeting, Holley told the employees that a unionized competitor, Bruno's, was trying to get the Union into Respond- ent, recounted incidents of violence during a previ- ous organizational campaign, said Respondent would not hire anyone who had worked for a unionized store, and asked the employees to report the presence of any Bruno's employees so that Re- spondent could take action against their activity.2 According to the uncontradicted and credited testi- mony of Anna Guthrie, in the middle of this meet- ing West asked "if anyone had signed Union cards," and, in response, "[s]ome of the boys shook their head no." The Administrative Law Judge, in dismissing the allegation that Respondent coercively interrogated the employees, relied, inter alia, on his finding that there was no coercion inherent in West's single question and that it did not appear any of the em- ployees would have seriously thought they were required to respond to it. Contrary to the Adminis- trative Law Judge, we find that in the context of a meeting attended by all employees during which Respondent expressed its intent to prevent union I The Administrative Law Judge recommended that Respondent be or- dered to post notices at six of its stores. Since the unfair labor practices found herein occurred only at Respondent's LaFayette, Georgia, store and absent special circumstances warranting a broader posting, we shall amend his recommended Order to limit posting to that location. 2 The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree, that the latter request constituted coercive solicitation to report the activities of suspect- ed union organizers in violation of Sec. 8(aXI) of the Act. 252 NLRB No. 23 organization by indicating, inter alia, it would not hire anyone who had worked for a unionized store, and also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by so- liciting employees to report the activities of sus- pected union organizers, West's remark constitutes coercive interrogation. Furthermore, we note that, although the Administrative Law Judge speculated that the employees did not feel they were required to respond to West's question, he also found that several employees did respond. Accordingly, we find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating employees by asking whether they had signed union cards. Finally, al- though not specifically alleged in the complaint, we find that Holley's statement that he would not hire anyone who had worked at a unionized store constituted an unlawful threat in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3 AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Substitute the following for the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusion of Law 3: "3. By coercively soliciting employees to report the activities of other employees suspected of being union organizers, coercively interrogating employ- ees by asking them whether they had signed union cards, and by stating that it would not hire anyone who had worked in a unionized store, on March 4, 1978, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi- fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Red Food Store, LaFayette, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Insert the following as paragraphs l(b) and (c) and reletter the subsequent paragraph accordingly: "(b) Interrogating its employees by asking them whether they have signed union cards. "(c) Stating that it will not hire anyone who has worked in a unionized store." 2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a): "(a) Post at its place of business in LaFayette, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 21 Copies of said notice, on forms pro- vided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's representa- 3 See, generally, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 225 NLRB 911, 912 (1976). 116 RED FOOD STORE tive, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi- al." 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu- nity to present evidence and state their positions, the National Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has ordered us to post this notice. The Act gives employees the following rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choice To engage in activities together for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from the exercise of any or all such activities. WE WILL NOT coercively solicit our em- ployees to report to us the presence in our stores of other employees thought to be union organizers. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees by asking them whether they have signed union cards. WE WILL NOT state that we will not hire anyone who has worked in a unionized store. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ- ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. RED FOOD STORE DECISION BERNARD RIES, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard in Chattanooga, Tennessee, on January 21-22, 1980. The complaint alleges that at six of Re- spondent's stores ' in Georgia and Tennessee, Respond- ent violated the Act by virtue of certain conduct direct- ed not only at its own employees, but at employees of Mayfield Dairy Farms, Inc., a separate and independent employer. Briefs have been received from counsel for the Gener- al Counsel and counsel for Respondent. On the basis of the entire record 2 and the briefs, I make the following findings and conclusions. 3 1. THE SECTION 10(B) ISSUE At the hearing, Respondent moved to dismiss most of the allegations of the complaint on the ground that the charge filed in the case did not support those allegations. I reserved ruling on the motion. Respondent has re- newed the motion in its brief to me. The charge upon which the complaint is predicated was filed on April 3, 1978, by Anna B. Guthrie. The "Employer Against Whom Charge Is Brought" is shown on the form as "Red Food Store," with an address of "N. Main Street, LaFayette, Georgia 0728," at which the "Number Of Workers Employed" is "Approx. 40." The charge form states that the "above-named employer" has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. The section entitled "Basic [sic] of the Charge" reads: "The Employer, in order to discourage membership in a labor organization, discriminate in regard to the hire and tenure of employ- ment and to the terms and conditions of employment of Anna B. Guthrie, on or about and after March 9, 1978." At the bottom of this section of the form appear the printed words, "By the above and other acts, the above- named employer has interfered with, restrained, and co- erced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act." While this is the language of Section 8(a)(1), that section is not expressly mentioned. The transcript of hearing shows that Guthrie believed that she was discharged for some reason relating to an organizing campaign by Retail Clerk's Local Union 1557 at the store at which she worked as a cashier. By letter of May 16, 1978, however, the Regional Director for Region 10 told Guthrie that it did not appear that "fur- ther proceedings are warranted on the allegation that you were discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act." While he refused to issue complaint on that al- legation, the Regional Director added, "This decision in no way affects the remaining Section 8(a)(1) allegations." On June 2, 1978, the Regional Director issued the complaint in this case. The complaint contains two alle- gations relating to the LaFayette, Georgia, store, at which Guthrie had worked. The record shows that these I Although Respondent's correct name is probably "Red Food Stores" or "Red Food Stores, Inc.,-" I shall, in the absence of a motion to amend, leave the caption as it is styled in the complaint. 2 Certain errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected. a The answer to the complaint, as amended, admits that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. I con- sider it appropriate for the Board to assert jurisdiction here. The answer further concedes that "Retail Clerk's [sicl Local Union 1557" and Team- sters Local Union 515, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, are labor organizations within the meaning of the statute 117 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD allegations-pertaining to solicitation of Red Food Store employees to report union activities of their fellow em- ployees and unlawful interrogation of Red Food Store employees-are based on a speech made by the La- Fayette store manager on March 4, 1978. The remaining 20 substantive allegations of the complaint refer to con- duct by managers at 5 other Red Food Stores in Tennes- see and Georgia directed against employees of Mayfield Dairy Farms, Inc., an independent supplier which fur- nishes milk and other dairy products to Respondent at the stores involved. The record discloses that on February 7, 1978, Team- sters Local Union 515 filed a petition to represent the Mayfield Dairy drivers located at Mayfield's distribution branch in Chattanooga. Testimony reveals that sometime in February Respondent held a meeting of its store man- agers and supervisors at which Don Blevins, president and chairman of the board of Red Food Stores, was the presiding officer. At this meeting, the supervisors were told that the Retail Clerks and the Teamsters were both conducting organizational campaigns, the former at Red Food Stores and the latter at Mayfield Dairy. The super- visors were told that if they didn't "have the guts to fight the Union to get up and leave the room." They were instructed to "bird-dog" anyone attempting to pass out cards in the grocery stores, to retrieve any cards from the employees, and to inform the office and the other stores of such activity. They were told that if they suspected that some employees favored the Union, those employees should be eliminated. They were told to notify their employees that, if the Union were selected, Respondent would have to "cut back on our help" and some people would lose their jobs. They were further in- structed to tell the Mayfield drivers, as they came into the grocery stores, "to take a look at what had happened to Holsum Bread Company, their shelf space, and to tell them that if they went union that their space would be cut, that they'd sell very few products in our stores." The evidence shows that after this meeting various Red Food Store managers did in fact solicit Mayfield drivers to withdraw their support from the Teamsters, threatened them with a reduction of display space for their products, questioned them about their interest in the Teamsters, and apparently reduced space at certain of the stores.4 This conduct is alleged to violate, various- ly, Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Respondent contends that the complaint issued by the Regional Director, insofar as it alleges unlawful conduct by Red Food managers addressed to Mayfield Dairy em- ployees, departed so drastically from the charge filed by Guthrie alleging that her dismissal was caused by her ac- tivities on behalf of the Retail Clerks campaign at the LaFayette store, that a fatal variance exists between the charge and the complaint. s After reviewing the authori- 4 Two former managers of Respondent's stores testified on behalf of the General Counsel at the hearing, as did several Mayfield drivers. Re- spondent presented no testimony to contradict that given in the General Counsel's case-in-chief. I found no reason to disbelieve any of the uncon- tradicted testimony given by the witnesses for the General Counsel. b Respondent also argues that an employer is legally incapable of com- mitting unfair labor practices against employees who are neither his own employees nor under his control. The complaint allegations relating to the Mayfield employees are founded on the seminal case of Fabric Serv- ties in a vain attempt to isolate a clear set of principles applicable to this subject, I must say that I am in full agreement with then Judge John Paul Stevens, who stated, in his dissent in N.L.R.B. v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 486 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 1973), "Exactly when one alleged unfair labor practice should be considered sufficiently related to another to permit one charge to support two Board complaints-or per- haps I should say two counts in one complaint-is un- clear." Section 10(b) of the Act reads, in pertinent part: Whenever it is charged that any person has en- gaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency desig- nated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that re- spect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made .... The requirement that the Board act only upon a charge filed with it, as opposed to granting the Board a roving commission to investigate possible unfair labor practices, may be said to have been a reasoned and delib- erate decision by the Congress, or at least part of it, when the Wagner Act was enacted in 1935. The legisla- tive history shows that S. 1958, the Senate bill which eventually was enacted, originally began, in the counter- part of Section 10(b) "Whenever there is a charge or the ices. Inc., 190 NLRB 540 (1971). In that case, then Trial Examiner Arthur Leff held that the respondent employer violated Sec. 8(aXl) by refusing to permit a nonemployee repairman to wear a union emblem on the em- ployer's premises. After careful analysis of the statute and relevant au- thorities, the Trial Examiner concluded that because the stranger employ- er "was in a position of sufficient control effectively to enforce its direc- tion" to the offending stranger employee, its conduct constituted interfer- ence with, and restraint of, the employee's protected activity, in violation of Sec. 8(a)(l). In so holding, the Trial Examiner distinguished Local 'o. 447, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices (Malbaff Landscape Construction Co.), 172 NLRB 128, 129 (1968), which concluded that an employer could not violate Sec. 8(a)(3) "by ceasing to do business with another employer because of the union or nonunion activity of the lat- ter's employees." In view of my conclusion that Respondent's motion to dismiss should be granted, I need not reach the question of where Malbaff leaves the 8(aX3) allegations contained in the present complaint. I do note that Dews Construction Corp., 231 NLRB 182, fn. 4 (1977), approved a finding that a stranger employer violated Sec. 8(a)(3) by causing the discharge of an- other employer's employee based on his union activities; in so holding, the Board cited, with apparent approval, both Fabric Services and Mal- baff In A. M. Steigerwald Co., 236 NLRB 1512, 1515 (1978), the Board also found a nonemployer credit union guilty of maintaining a bylaw dis- criminative against organized employees, although the violation found was limited to Sec. 8(a)(1). Similarly, I also note, but need not consider here, the question of the extent to which such conduct as interrogation and solicitation to with- draw union support has coercive impact when directed against employees by supervisors who are not their own 118 RED FOOD STORE Board shall have reason to believe .... " I Leg. Hist. 1301. When the Senate Committee on Education and Labor reported the bill out on May 1, 1935, the "reason to believe" language had been deleted and the present language substituted therefor. II Leg. Hist. 2292.6 The Board and the courts have viewed with some lib- erality the statutory requirement that complaint allega- tions be bottomed on a charge. As expressed by the Su- preme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307-308 (1959): A charge filed with the Labor Board is not to be measured by the standards applicable to a pleading in a private lawsuit. Its purpose is merely to set in motion the machinery of an inquiry. N.L.R.B. v. I. & M. Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18. The responsibility of making that inquiry, and of framing the issues in the case, is one that Congress has imposed upon the Board, not the Charging Party. To confine the Board in its inquiry and in framing the complaint to the specific matters alleged in the charge would reduce the statutory machinery to a vehicle for the vindication of private rights. This would be alien to the basic purpose of the Act. The Board was cre- ated not to adjudicate private controversies but to advance the public interest in eliminating obstruc- tions to interstate commerce, as this Court has rec- ognized from the beginning. The Court went on to hold that, with respect to viola- tions occurring after a charge has been filed, no further charge need be filed in order for the General Counsel to include such violations in a complaint, so long as the added allegations are unfair labor practices "which are related to those alleged in the charge and which grow out of them while the proceeding is pending before the Board." The Court cautioned, however, that "[w]hat has been said is not to imply that the Board is, in the words of the court of appeals, to be left "carte blanche to expand the charge as they might please, or to ignore it all together." Id. at 309. As noted by the court in N.L.R.B. v. Kohler Company, 220 F.2d 3, 6, 7 (7th Cir. 1955), some early cases held that, "because Section 10(b) gives the Board the power to issue a complaint only after a charge has been filed, the Board's complaint must be limited to the allegations of the charge," but "the courts then began to interpret Section 10(b) as requiring something less than exact simi- larity between charge and complaint." The problem of constructing a standard which describes the permissible "something less"-but not too much less-than "exact similarity between charge and complaint" has not been easy to resolve. Some of the earlier court cases, cited by the Court in Kohler Company, supra, 220 F.2d at 6, al- lowed any specific allegations in the complaint which 6 The only reference I have been able to find in the testimony before the Committee on this point was given by William H. Davis, a repre- sentative of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., at a hearing on April 1, 1935 In passing. Davis said that he would "go very far in the direction of limiting the powers of this board to initiate the investigation. I am not sure that I would limit it absolutely to questions where complaints had been filed, because there is always the difficulty of getting an employee to file a written complaint." I Leg. Hist. 2095. were of "the same general nature" as the matter asserted in the charge. In the Kohler case itself, the court stated (220 F.2d at 7): There must be some relationship between charge and complaint, however. Section 10(b) makes the filing of a complaint contingent upon the existence of a charge, and it has been consistently held that the Board can not initiate a complaint on its own motion. N.L.R.B. v. National Licorice Co., 2 Cir., 104 F.2d 655, affirmed 309 U.S. 350, 60 S.Ct. 569, 84 L.Ed. 799. So long as the Board entered the con- troversy pursuant to a formal charge, it may allege whatever it finds to be a part of that controversy. But if it gets so completely outside of the situation which gave rise to the charge that it may be said to be initiating the proceeding on its own motion, then the complaint should fall as not supported by the charge. The court went on to hold that charges which accused the employer of unlawfully discharging certain employ- ees properly supported allegations in the complaint set- ting out certain statements made to employees in viola- tion of the Act. While these were "totally different kinds of acts," they were "done during a common endeavor for a single purpose." Id. at 7. In N.L.R.B. v. Dinion Coil Co., Inc., 201 F.2d 484, 491 (2d Cir. 1952), a case frequently cited, the court summa- rized its position on the question: If a charge was filed and served within six months after the violations alleged in the charge, the com- plaint (or amended complaint), although filed after the six months, may allege violations not alleged in the charge if (a) they are closely related to the vio- lations named in the charge, and (b) occurred within six months before the filing of the charge. The "closely related" test often recurs in the cases, and the Board has frequently made use of it. See, e.g., North Country Motors, Ltd., 133 NLRB 1479, 1480, fn. 3 (1961); Sunrise Manor Nursing Home, 199 NLRB 1120, 1121 (1972); Pennco, Inc., 212 NLRB 677 (1974). At other times, the Board seems to have settled for a less-than- "close" relationship between the charge and the com- plaint allegations. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 130 NLRB 869, 872 (1961) ("Since a charge must be filed before any complaint may issue, some relationship is required be- tween the charge and the complaint."); Triboro Carting Corporation, 117 NLRB 775 (1957). ("[S]ome relationship is required between the charge and allegations of the complaint.") In N.L.R.B. v. Central Power & Light Com- pany, 425 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1970), enfg. 173 NLRB 287 (1968), the court appeared to disapprove the "closely re- lated" doctrine of Dinion Coil. supra, saying that it "does not seem to be in keeping with the purpose of the charge-complaint procedure." The court went on to say, "The relationship need be close enough only to negate the possibility that the Board is proceeding on its own initiative rather than pursuant to a charge." 425 F.2d at 1321, fn. 3. At the same time, however, the court seemed 119 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to adopt the principle of prior cited cases that "sufficient relation has generally been found between acts that are part of the same course of conduct, such as a single cam- paign against a union." Id. at 1320. The difference be- tween that test and the "closely related" standard is not entirely clear.7 It should be noted that a determination that a com- plaint allegation is sufficiently related to the charge, whichever standard-"closely related," "some relation- ship" "close enough to negate the possibility that the Board is proceeding on its own initiative," "a part of that controversy," or whatever-is applied, will resolve not only the question of whether the Board is acting pursu- ant to the mandate that its machinery be triggered from outside the agency, but also whether the 6-month statute of limitation of Section 10(b) has been satisfied. It is now quite clear that a charge which specifically alleges that a certain employee was discharged because of his partici- pation in a union organizational campaign will support allegations of similar discriminatory conduct uncovered during the investigation of that charge, even though the amended charge and/or the complaint may not come to the attention of the employer until more than 6 months after the conduct is added to the charge or the com- plaint. 8 In the Dinion Coil case, for example, where the charge alleged unlawful discharges on a certain date, the Gener- al Counsel was allowed to amend the complaint at the hearing to allege two discharges occurring during the same week as the discharges originally complained of but some 7 months before the amendment was filed. Accord, Cathey Lumber Company, 86 NLRB 157 (1949), enfd. 185 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1951), enforcement denied on rehear- ing on another ground 189 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1951), where the complaint, which issued more than 6 months after the discharges, alleged 17 additional discharges not mentioned in the charge. It might be contended that such freedom to add violations tends to subvert the in- tention of Section 10(b) to put stale claims to rest and to free an employer of concern if 6 months have passed after a specific action without notification to him of its claimed unlawfulness.9 The cases hold, however, that the filing of a timely charge, indicating to the charged party that "other acts and conduct" of a related nature within the preceding 6 months may be held up to scruti- ny, provides sufficient notification for purposes of Sec- tion 10(b) so as to make such other conduct actionable. As discussed above, the requirement that there be a nexus between the charge and all of the allegations of the complaint arises not only from the imperatives of the 6-month limitation period but also from the prerequisite 7 Subsequently, in N.L.R.B. v. International Union of Operating Engi- neers, Local 925 [J. L. Manra, Inc.), 460 F.2d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 1972), the court applied the "closely related" test, calling it "settled." 8 ome of the cases rely on the form language printed on the charge form that the employer violated the Act not only by the specified mis- conduct but also by "other acts and conduct." See, e.g.. N.L.R.B. v. Cen- tral Power & Light Company, supra, 425 F.2d at 1320; N.L.R.B. v Reli- ance Steel Products Company., 322 F.2d 49, 53 (th Cir. 1963); North American Rockwell Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 389 F.2d 866., 870 (10th Cir. 1968). 9 Until the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, Sec. 10(b) contained no limitation period at all for the filing of charges. that some charging party other than the Board initiate the complaint of an unfair labor practice. When the cases attempt to describe the required relationship in terms other than such abstractions as "closely related" or "some relationship," language such as that found in Kohler (the Board "may allege whatever it finds to be a part of that controversy"), Central Power & Light Compa- ny ("part of the same course of conduct, such as a single campaign against a union"), and Rock Hill Telephone Company v. N.L.R.B., 605 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1979) ("all of the allegations in this case concern the Compa- ny's response to the Union's organizing effort"), is often encountered. During one period, the Board applied the test of "was related to and arose out of the same situa- tion as that conduct alleged to be unlawful in the timely filed charges," Stainless Steel Products, Inc., 157 NLRB 232, 234 (1966); Exber, Inc., d/b/a El Cortez Hotel, 160 NLRB 1442, 1447 (1966). This sort of language indicates that a charged party, upon receipt of the charge, may regard himself as subject to inquiry about and possible prosecution on any matters arguably pertaining to the controversy to which the charge alludes and to the con- text in which it may reasonably be said to have arisen. Board cases finding an impermissible variance between the charge and the allegations of the complaint are in some instances explicable by this rationale and in others, not so easily explained. In the following six cases, the Board held that the necessary relationship was absent. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., supra, 130 NLRB 869, apply- ing the "some relationship" standard, held that the Trial Examiner should have granted a motion to dismiss where the charge had alleged that the charged union had "force[d] representation" on the employees and the com- plaint had alleged that the union had in fact threatened to refuse to represent them as it was obliged to do. The Board said, "We perceive no relationship between a charge which alleges a violation based on insistence on representation and a complaint which alleges refusal to represent." 130 NLRB at 874. Under a more expansive approach, it might be argued that notification to the union that a question was raised about its representation- al rights and obligations to certain employees sufficiently preserved the General Counsel's authority to issue the sort of complaint to which his investigation of the charge had led. In Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co., 152 NLRB 300, 301, fn. 1, 302, 303 (1965), the Board held that the filing on July 20, 1964, of a charge alleging violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) by granting a wage increase, by transferring employees, and by "other acts," did not sup- port a complaint allegation that the company violated either Section 8(a)(2) or (1) by establishing a grievance committee at the end of January 1964, even though all the allegations arose in the context of a union organizing campaign which had commenced "at the beginning of 1964." Again, since it would appear, on the face of the evidence recited, within range of reasonable argument that the establishment of the committee was part of a campaign to defeat the union, it might be contended that the 8(a)(2) allegation was authorized. However, although the Board itself referred to the Section 8(a)(2) violation 120 RED FOOD STORE as "time-barred," the case may be explained by the fact that the General Counsel had so conceded. In Prince Pontiac, Inc., 174 NLRB 919 (1969), the Board adopted without comment the decision of a Trial Examiner holding that a charge alleging that the employ- er had unlawfully discharged an employee because of his activities on behalf of Local 259 did not support an alle- gation that the employer had violated Section 8(a)(2) by giving assistance to Local 815. Although Local 259 filed its own charge about the latter conduct, that charge was filed outside the 6-month period, and the Regional Di- rector attempted to predicate the validity of the unlawful assistance allegation on the 8(a)(3) charge filed by the in- dividual charging party. The Trial Examiner found that there was no adequate connection either in the charge or on the evidence as developed to satisfy the requirement of relationship. Sunnen Products, Inc., 189 NLRB 826 (1971), held that a charge alleging a threat in violation of Section 8(a)(l) did not support a complaint of an act of unlawful assist- ance in violation of Section 8(a)(2). The Trial Examiner held that the alleged assistance was not "closely related" in character or time to the alleged threat, and that the intent of Section 10(b) would be disregarded by relying on the catchall "other acts and conduct" form language. Two of the more recent cases, one citing the other, seem to apply a fairly stringent test of relationship. In Hunter Saw Division of Asko, Inc., 202 NLRB 330 (1973), the complaint challenged the legality of a layoff of three employees in November 1971, claiming that it had been instigated by a grievance filed by one of the three; the underlying charge, however, referred only to the failure to recall from layoff in January 1972 the employee who had filed the grievance. The Board held (id. at fn. 1): In reaching our conclusion herein, we find it un- necessary to pass on the Administrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions with respect to the legality of the November 5, 1971, layoff and the General Counsel's exceptions to his findings and conclusions. The record shows that the original charge filed March 23, 1972, only related to the fail- ure to recall in January 1972 and made no refer- ence, direct or indirect, to any other unlawful con- duct. The amended charge, alleging, for the first time, the illegality of the November layoff was filed on July 19, 1972. In these circumstances, and since more than 6 months had elapsed prior to the filing of the amended charge, further proceedings with re- spect to the November layoff are precluded by the provisions of Sec. 10(b) of the Act. It might be contended, on the basis of some prior deci- sions, that the original charge appropriately raised a question about the layoff as well as the failure to recall. Subsequently, in Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local Union No. 594 (Warren Molded Plastics Incorporated), 227 NLRB 1541 (1977), the Board cited Hunter Saw Division with approval. In Warren, an employee had filed a charge on December 17, 1975, complaining that her union had brought intraunion charges and levied excessive fines against her because of her activity on behalf of another union. The charge also set out a "broad general allegation of 8(b)(1)(A) restraint and coercion." On June 18, 1976, she amended the charge to allege that the union had unlawfully expelled her from a union meeting on June 27, 1975, and the com- plaint as issued contained only this allegation. Ruling in the union's favor on a motion for summary judgment, the Board stated: We agree with Respondent that the original and amended charges allege distinct and separate viola- tions even though the broad language concerning 8(b)(1)(A) restraint and coercion of Thorp in the ex- ercise of her Section 7 rights appears in both. In effect the amended charge contains new matter and omits the specifics of the original charge, as does the complaint. We therefore conclude that further proceedings with respect to the treatment of Thorp at the June 27, 1975, union meeting as alleged in the complaint and necessarily based on the amended charge of June 18, 1976, are precluded by the provi- sions of Section 10(b) of the Act. See Hunter Saw Division of Asko, Inc., 202 NLRB 330, fn. 1 (1973). Given the nature of the original charge and the other broad catchall language, it could be argued that the charge and the complaint allegation, both evidently aris- ing from the same dispute between the charging party and the union, were closely enough related, at least in the view of certain of the precedents. The Board con- cluded, however, that the violations alleged in the two charges were too "distinct and separate" to support the complaint. Research has unearthed no case bearing a strong re- semblance to the situation presented here. Closer than any, I would say, are the facts in N.L.R.B v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 196 NLRB 76 (1972), enfd. 486 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1973). In that case, the union which represented the employees at the employee's Chicago terminal filed charges, in January 1970, alleging viola- tions of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5). In November 1970, the complaint was amended to allege 8(a)(3) violations at the employer's Braswell's unrepresented Atlanta and Jackson terminals, occurring more than 6 months prior to the amendment. The record showed that Respondent's president played a direct role in the events at all three terminals. The Board's decision did not refer to the 10(b) issue. A majority of the court panel found the relation- ship between charge and complaint, while presenting a "difficult" question, to be acceptable (id. at 746): The record here reveals a sufficient nexus be- tween the Chicago conduct mentioned in the origi- nal charge and the Atlanta and Jackson conduct al- leged in the complaint so that the Board was not precluded by Section 10(b) from considering the Atlanta and Jackson allegations. The practices com- plained of all occurred within the same general time period, a one to two month span of time. Although different locals were involved at each location, they were all members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. When the testimony concerning the 121 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD specific unfair labor practices is viewed in the con- text of the respondent's past relationship with the teamsters, it is clear that the company's conduct at the three locations was part of an overall plan to resist organization by the Teamsters. Too, the spe- cific allegations in the complaint with respect to the Atlanta and Jackson terminals were of the same class and character as those set out in the original charge. Thus, we conclude that the respondent's conduct at its Atlanta and Jackson terminals was properly before the Board. Then Judge Stevens dissented for the following reason (id. at 747-748): Exactly when one alleged unfair labor practice should be considered sufficiently "related" to an- other to permit one charge to support two Board complaints-or perhaps I should say, two counts in one complaint-is unclear. It does not seem to me that the fact that the same company, or even the same executive of that company, was involved in both transactions should be sufficient to supply the nexus. And, of course, neither uncouth language nor a consistent antiunion purpose should be con- trolling; for at least the latter can always be alleged and I would suppose the Board's jurisdiction should be tested by the General Counsel's allegations rather than his proof. In my judgment it seems more reasonable to focus on the employees' interest in the proceedings. If all of the allegations involved the same bargain- ing unit, I would assume that a wide variety of ap- parently separate transactions could appropriately be included in a single complaint based on a charge filed by a member of that unit. However, if the stat- utory requirement of a charge is to be meaningful, it does not seem to me that a charge filed by a Chica- go local should be sufficient to authorize a nation- wide investigation of all layoffs within the recent past. I do not reach the question whether it would be wise policy to authorize such broad investigatory powers for the Board. I simply am not persuaded that Congress has yet executed that "carte blanche." 3 I therefore respectfully dissent. a In the final paragraph of its opinion in Fant Milling, the Court stated: "What has been said is not to imply that the Board is, in the words of the Court of Appeals, to be left "carte blanche to expand the charge as they might please, or to ignore it altogether," 258 F.2d . at 856. Here we hold only that the Board is not pre- cluded from 'dealing adequately with unfair labor practices which are related to those alleged in the charge and which grow out of them while the proceeding is pending before the Board.' National Licorice Co.v. Labor Board, 309 US 350 . . at 369." 360 US at 309 .... Some of the factors relied on by the majority in Bras- well are present in the instant case, others are not. The practices here complained of in the charge and the ex- panded complaint all occurred, as in Braswell, within the same general time period. The allegations in the charge and in the complaint might be said to be of the "same class and character." Here, however, the employer was not fighting on several fronts against locals of the same International union, nor is there any indication that Re- spondent has had any "past relationship" with either of the two unions, at least a hostile one.' 0 Examining only the charge and the complaint plead- ings, as then Judge Stevens apparently would have done, " one might wonder how it came about that a charge alleging discrimination at the LaFayette store evolved into a complaint containing two paragraphs re- lating to statements made in a speech at the LaFayette store and 20 other paragraphs pertaining to conduct by Respondent's managers at five other stores in Georgia and Tennessee addressed to employees other than Re- spondent's own, none of which stores included the La- Fayette store. There was no testimony on this question. A document in the file strongly suggests, however, that the information came to the attention of the Regional Di- rector by virtue of an investigation into objections filed after an election held among the employees of Mayfield Dairy on March 17, 1978. The Regional Director's report on objections shows that during the investigation, five Mayfield employees testified that supervisors at var- ious Red Food Stores had threatened them with loss of shelf space should the Mayfield employees select the Teamsters Union as their representative. Three Mayfield witnesses also testified that, during the critical period, their shelf space at Red Food Stores had in fact been de- creased, according to the report. The report on objections in the Mayfield representa- tion case issued on May 3, 1978. The complaint in this case issued on June 2, 1978. While the burden of the al- leged conduct by Respondent's store managers fell upon the Mayfield employees and thus upon the Teamsters Local seeking to represent them, there is, curiously, no clear showing on this record that the Teamsters ever of- ficially complained to the Board that Respondent had violated the statute. I say that with some hesitation be- cause the present transcript contains statements by both counsel for Respondent and counsel for the General Counsel which suggest the contrary. At the present hearing, in attempting to determine, for purposes of cross-examination of a General Counsel wit- ness, the number of statements the witness had given to the Board, counsel for Respondent stated that the wit- ness had been "named in this charge that the Teamsters filed against Red Food Stores in case number 10-CA- 13825." He further stated that the witness was "alleged to have been discriminated against in a charge filed against Red Food Stores as well, subsequently with- drawn." Counsel subsequently repeated that "this charge was withdrawn." Counsel for the General Counsel agreed to contact the Regional Office to see if the wit- ness had given any other statements, and subsequently reported that "a check was made of the Regional Office files regarding a charge filed by the Teamsters Union at the Red Food Stores, 10-CA-13825, I believe is the case number, and there was [sic] no affidavits at all in that 'o Research discloses no prior Board cases involving this Respondent. I As Judge Stevens stated: "I would suppose the Board's jurisdiction should be tested by the General Counsel's allegations rather than his proof' supra. 122 RED FOOD STORE case and none for Mr. Bettis .... " On the basis of these statements, I can properly conclude nothing more than that the Teamsters did file a charge of some sort against Red Food Store. There is no legitimate basis for characterizing its contents or its ultimate resolution. As earlier discussed, the court in N.L.R.B. v. Kohler Company, supra, 220 F.2d at 7, stated, "So long as the Board entered the controversy pursuant to a formal charge, it may allege whatever it finds to be a part of that controversy. But if it gets so completely outside of the situation which gave rise to the charge that it may be said to be initiating the proceeding on its own motion, then the complaint should fall as not supported by the charge."'1 2 If my speculation concerning the source of the majority of the complaint allegations here is a cor- rect one, and I have little doubt of that, it might con- vincingly be argued that the Board was "initiating the proceeding on its own motion" insofar as it swept into Guthrie's complaint against Red Food Store the informa- tion obtained from the Mayfield Dairy representation in- vestigation. It seems rather forced to conclude that the allegations involving the Mayfield employees are "a part of that controversy" to which Guthrie's charge referred. It further seems clear that the Region did not "find" the Mayfield material as a result of entering the Guthrie con- troversy; that material was evidently adduced by Team- sters Local Union 515 in support of its objections filed on March 21, 1978, 2 weeks before Guthrie filed her charge. ' 3 The Region engaged in no improprieties here; it sent out no investigators to plow virgin ground; from all that appears, the material simply fell into its lap. But the fact is that the Teamsters, which seemingly had the most direct and immediate interest in Respondent's conduct, filed no official complaint about it, so far as we can per- missibly infer from the record, and that Union may have had its own reasons for not doing so. 4 If the test be, as the court said in N.L.R.B. v. Central Power & Light Com- pany, supra, 425 F.2d at 1321, fn. 3, that "[t]he relation- ship need be close enough only to negate the possibility that the Board is proceeding on its own initiative rather than pursuant to a charge," it could well be contended here that the relationship between the charge and the eventual complaint is not close enough "to negate [that] possibility." This a troublesome issue. Generally speaking, as dis- cussed, the Board and the courts have been reasonably generous in finding a relationship between a charge and a complaint. The fact that in the present case the inspira- tion for the conduct directed to Mayfield employees came at a high-level meeting of Respondent's managers at which time they were also instructed to engage in an- tiunion activity against their own employees seems to 12 In Alberici-Fruin-Colnon, 226 NLRB 1315, 1316 (1976), the Board quoted this language from N.L.R.B. v. Reliance Steel Products. Co.. supra, 322 F.2d at 53, which in turn had quoted from Kohler Company. '3 The Teamsters objection reads: Red Food Stores agent acting on behalf. The employees of Mayfield dairies. By telling the employees they would reduce the amount of counter space in the stores [sic] "1 I am, of course, aware that anyone, with or without a legal or bene- ficial interest in the matter, may file a charge with the Board. bolster the appeal of concluding that there was a qualify- ing relationship. However, it seems probable that Re- spondent was by many leagues less interested in prevent- ing the unionization of Mayfield employees than in thwarting the organizational effort of its own employees. Moreover, it is most likely that the General Counsel was totally unaware of the background evidence regarding the February 1978 supervisors meeting until long after the complaint issued in June 1978. One former supervisor who testified about the meeting said that he had been asked to resign from Respondent in January 1979, at which time he "decided to go to the Labor Board and make an affidavit"; the other former supervisor who cor- roborated the first did not leave Respondent's employ until August 1979. Further equitable appeal is found in the fact that the complaint itself was issued within 6 months of all the conduct charged against Respondent relating to the Mayfield employees. That is, however, strictly an equita- ble consideration, because the threshold legal question is not whether sufficient notice was given to Respondent of the allegations against it, but whether the Region was empowered to issue those allegations on the basis of this charge. The issue boils down to one of authority. It is my obligation to apply the law as construed by the Board. Two of the more recent Board cases, Hunter Saw Division and Warren Molded Plastics Incorporated, appear to me to betoken a thrust toward limiting the im- plications of the charge. 15 But even under a more expan- sive view, I think it is reasonable to conclude that the allegations relating to the Mayfield employees were not "a part of that controversy" (Kohler Company, supra) to which Guthrie's charge was addressed. While the Region apparently did not root out the Mayfield evidence on its own initiative, it does appear to have taken advantage of the material entered into the Mayfield representation proceeding and, without any official complaint, to have itself imported that material into this proceeding. In Fant Milling, the court said that the Board was not to be left "CARTE BLANCHE, to expand the charge as they might please, or to ignore it altogether." What happened here seems to me to have been a reaching out "to expand the charge." I would therefore recommend that the com- plaint allegations relating to the Mayfield employees be dismissed, as requested by Respondent's motion. This conclusion may be deemed to rest on a technicality, but it is a technicality imbedded in the statute which ex- presses the will of the Congress. In a statute thorny with technicalities, upon which both employers and unions are sometimes impaled, technical dispositions are not a rarity. There appears to be still another relevant technicality which might be noted. Guthrie's 8(a)(3) complaint was dismissed by the Regional Director. In Pennco, Inc.., supra, 212 NLRB 677, the Board held that when the only 8(a)(3) allegation in the charge was dismissed by a Regional Director, the General Counsel could not add to the complaint an 8(a)(3) allegation pertaining to another '" In both cases, as noted, an argument might certainly be made that the uncharged complaint allegation was related to and "a part" of the un- derlying controversy brought to the Board's attention by the charge 123 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD subject. The Board stated that such an allegation "could not relate back to a viable 8(a)(3) subject covered in the charge since the only 8(a)(3) allegation originally in the charge had been specifically dismissed."' On that rea- soning, it would appear that the 8(a)(3) allegations in the present complaint claiming that Respondent reduced shelf space for certain of the Mayfield drivers (and im- posed more onerous working conditions on one of them by virtue of his being required to make an extra delivery each week) would not be supportable. It would further seem, from the Board's language in Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co., supra, 152 NLRB at 301, fn. 1, that this conduct also could not be treated simply as violative of Section 8(a)(1). ' 7 II. THE VIABLE ALLEGATIONS There remain for consideration two allegations of the complaint which charge that the manager at the La- Fayette, Georgia, store, in a speech to assembled em- ployees on March 4, 1978, "solicited [Respondent's] em- ployees to report to [Respondent] the Retail Clerk's Union activities of their fellow employees" and "interro- gated [Respondent's] employees concerning their Retail Clerk's Union membership, activities and desires and the Retail Clerk's Union membership, activities and desires of other employees." Respondent does not contend that these allegations are beyond the scope of the charge. Anna Guthrie testified that on March 4, Store Man- ager Wayne Holley and Assistant Store manager Her- schel West called a meeting of the 30 employees at the LaFayette store. Holley told the employees that Bruno's, a competitor chain, was "pushing the Union trying to get it into Red Food Stores." Holley mentioned that the Union had tried to organize once before, that damage had been done to employees' cars, and that Respondent would pay for such damage if it happened again, as Re- spondent had done before. He further said that Respond- ent would not hire anyone who had previously worked for a unionized store. Guthrie testified that Assistant Manager West at one point in the meeting "asked if anyone had signed union cards." She said that in re- sponse, "some of the boys shook their heads no." The others did not say anything. While Guthrie's testimony was rather confusing on this point, it ultimately appeared that Holley also said that "if we seen anyone from Bruno's in our store, we were to let him know and he would stay on their tails until they left the store." He described certain Bruno em- ployees who were thought to be circulating cards and said that they might approach the Red Food employees on the parking lot or they might call at 3 in the morning. Guthrie's final testimony on this subject, intended to 1' Ace Drop Cloth Co., Inc., 178 NLRB 664, fn. 1, 665 (1969), cited by the General Counsel, appears to be factually distinguishable; if it is not, it is inconsistent with the later case. 17 The Board stated: "The Trial Examiner found, nevertheless, that the allegation as to the meetings on grievances (paragraph 8(d) of the com- plaint) was an attempt to relitigate, under the guise of an independent Section 8(a)(1) violation, what the General Counsel had previously al- leged to be unlawful support to an Employee Grievance Committee in violation of Section 8(aX2), but which was time-barred under Section 10(b). We agree with the Trial Examiner's disposition as to paragraph 8(d)." clarify ambiguity in the record, made it plain to me that she intended to state that Holley was discussing only cir- culation of cards by Bruno's employees, in contrast to such circulation by Red Food employees.'s The complaint alleges that Store Manager Holley co- ercively interrogated the employees, but the evidence shows that Holley asked no questions. It does indicate, however, that Assistant Manager West asked "if anyone had signed union cards." Guthrie testified that West posed this question but once, and the only response was that some of the employees shook their heads negatively. I do not find any coercion inherent in this single ques- tion. It does not appear that any of the employees would have seriously thought that they were required to re- spond to it. It was hardly the kind of systematic polling which might have turned the spotlight on the individual employees, thereby having a restraining effect on their Section 7 activities. The other allegation of the complaint is that Respond- ent, by Holley, "solicited its employees to report to it the Retail Clerk's Union activities of their fellow employ- ees." As discussed above, it appeared in the end, from Guthrie's testimony, that what Holley in fact said related to employees from Bruno's rather than to Guthrie's "fellow employees." Despite this discrepancy, I think a violation was committed here. This adjuration to the La- Fayette employees-"if we seen anyone from Bruno's come into the store we were to come tell him and he said he would stay on their tails until they left the store"-plainly tended to convey to the employees the extreme animosity by Respondent's management toward any such activity and would have had the foreseeable effect of restraining their own efforts on behalf of the Retail Clerk's Union. The instruction further put the em- ployees in the untenable and unacceptable position of having to inform on union organizers, thereby effectively interfering with their right to sympathize with the union effort. I find, therefore, that by instructing the LaFayette employees to report the presence in the store of employ- ees of another employer, so that action might be taken against those employees in order to deter their organiz- ing activity, Respondent engaged in conduct having the natural and foreseeable effect of restraining its employees from engaging in Section 7 activity, and of interfering with that activity. 9 '8 The testimony is as follows: JUDGE RIFE: Just to follow up on that last one and to make sure that Mrs. Guthrie understands what she is being asked. The general thrust of what Mr. Holley was saying to you as I understand what you've been telling us is that there are these outsiders who might be coming trying to circulate Union cards and those are the ones that he wanted you employees to tell him about if they showed up? The Witness: Yes, sir. 19 While Respondent argues on brief that "these remarks referred to activities of Bruno personnel in public areas of Red's store and at places where employees were at work," and were thus an assertedly legal pro- scription, it seems to me that the threat to follow around any Bruno's employee who "come into the store" was not confined to a statement of legal rights. Bruno's employees were undoubtedly free, under the law, to enter the store like other citizens. 124 RED FOOD STORE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Red Food Store, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Retail Clerk's Local Union 1557 and Teamsters Local Union 515, affiliated with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By coercively soliciting employees to report the ac- tivities of other employees, suspected of being union or- ganizers, on March 4, 1978, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The variance between the charge and complaint in this case precludes any findings or conclusions that Re- spondent in any other manner alleged in the complaint violated the Act. 5. The unfair labor practice described in paragraph 3, above, is an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice, I shall recommend that the tradi- tional remedies be applied to it. While I have found only a single violation of the statute, it seems to me to be a reasonably serious one, in that Respondent told 30 of its employees that it would attempt to rout any employees from another firm, thought to be organizers for a union, who were seen in Respondent's store, and reasonably communicated to its own employees that they would similarly be subject to punitive action should they be found engaging in protected activity. I think that behav- ior merits remedial action, and it is my understanding of the position of a present majority of the Board that the Board would think so as well. United States Postal Serv- ice, 242 NLRB 228 (1979). I shall therefore recommend that Respondent be re- quired to post the customary notices, and that a cease- and-desist order be entered. I shall further recommend that these remedies be extended to all of Respondent's stores referred to in the complaint, since the uncontra- dicted evidence is that the misbehavior found at the La- Fayette store emanated from the highest councils of management and was done pursuant to company policy as announced at a meeting of all the store managers. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 2 0 The Respondent, Red Food Store, LaFayette, Geor- gia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively soliciting its employees to report to it the presence in Respondent's stores of any other employ- ees thought to be union organizers. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which is con- sidered neccessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its place of business in Fort Oglethorpe, Rossville, Trenton, and LaFayette, Georgia, and South Pittsburgh and Tiftonia, Tennessee, copies of the at- tached notice marked "Appendix." 2 ' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's rep- resentatives, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the date of of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 20 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections there- to shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 21 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pur- suant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 125