Palby Lingerie, Inc.

PALBY LINGERIE, INC. Palby Lingerie, Inc. and Argus Lingerie Corp. and Local 57, Nassau-Suffolk District Council, In- ternational Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO Elmont Underwear Corporation, Richwear Sports- wear, Inc., Palby Lingerie, Inc. and Argus Lin- gerie Corp. and Local 57, Nassau-Suffolk Dis- trict Council, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 29-CA-7084, 29-CA-7139, 29-CA-7163, 29-CA-7219 September 16, 1980 DECISION AND ORDER On May 30, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Julius Cohn issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party Union filed an answering brief. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. 3 In his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) by laying off employee Sharon Hunter on Feb- ruary 12, 1979, and by constructively discharging her on May 1, 1979. While we agree, for the rea- sons stated by the Administrative Law Judge, that Hunter was discriminatorily discharged on May 1, we conclude the evidence does not support his finding that she was discriminatorily laid off on February 12. Prior to her February 12 layoff, Hunter had been employed for 2 days. At the end of her second day of employment, she informed Respondent that she preferred work other than that to which she had been assigned, and that she did not care to return to the same job she had been performing. When it was explained that the only work available was that which she had been doing, Hunter agreed to Respondent's request that she come in the following workday. On the third day, Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi- bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con- vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 2 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Re- spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act by terminating Rosetta Lyons. we note that Respondent does not contend Lyons' discharge was the result of an attempt to enforce a lawfully promulgated rule restricting distributions in working areas during nonworking time. See Stoddard- Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962). a In accordance with his dissent in Olympic Medical Corporaion, 250 NLRB 146 (1980), Member Jenkins would award interest on the backpay due based on the formula set forth therein. however, Hunter did not arrive at work by the normal starting time, but was at home when Re- spondent called to inform her not to bother coming to work. At the time of her layoff, Hunter's single in- volvement in the union organizing campaign had been to sign a union authorization card, which she did after her second day at work. However, there is no evidence that Respondent had any knowledge of her signing such a card prior to her layoff. Al- though the Administrative Law Judge correctly states that Respondent did not provide Hunter with an explanation for her layoff, we draw no adverse inference therefrom, because at the time Hunter had worked only 2 days, had expressed a clear lack of desire to perform the work she had been as- signed, and failed to appear for work at the sched- uled time on the third day. In these circumstances, the absence of an explanation to Hunter is not pro- bative of a discriminatory motive. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint allegation that Respond- ent laid off Hunter on February 12 in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. We further find, contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, that Respondent has not engaged in surveillance of its employees' protected concerted activity. The only evidence in support of his find- ing of surveillance consists of testimony that var- ious members of the Israel family, which controls all four corporations found to constitute a single employer, were seen observing nonemployee union organizers "demonstrating" and soliciting employ- ees in front of Respondent's Elmont plant. Such evidence, indicating no more than a brief inspec- tion by Respondent of open union activity in front of its property does not constitute surveillance and we shall dismiss that allegation of the complaint. See ITT Automotive Electrical Products Division, 231 NLRB 878 (1977); see also Ravenswood Electronics Corporation, 232 NLRB 609 (1977). Finally, we shall dismiss the allegation in the complaint that Respondent has created the impres- sion of surveillance. The predominant evidence to support this allegation is that Respondent's Pauline Israel informed a group of employees, as well as employee Lyons individually, that somebody in the shop was giving the Union information about em- ployees, and that she heard that the "the Union was going to the people in the shop." Such gener- alized statements to employees, which are not di- rected at any employee's organizing activities, are insufficient to create the impression of surveillance. The remaining evidence, the remark that an em- ployee is known to be wearing a union button and the noting of the presence of a union organizer out- side the plant, is similarly not unlawful on this 252 NLRB No. 32 176 PALBY LINGERIE, INC. ground, as it is based on public observations which are not themselves unlawful. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi- fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Palby Lingerie, Inc.; Argus Lingerie Corp.; Elmont Underwear Corporation; and Richwear Sportswear, Inc., Elmont, Long Island, and Brook- lyn, New York, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Delete paragraph (c). 2. Delete "laying off" from paragraph I(e) of the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order. 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu- nity to present evidence and state their positions, the National Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has ordered us to post this notice. The Act gives employees the following rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choice To engage in activities together for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from the exercise of any or all such activities. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of jobs and closure of our garment manufac- turing business if they select Local 57, Nassau- Suffolk District Council, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, to repre- sent them. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate any employee concerning his or her union activi- ties or sympathies, or their interest or other employees' interest in the above Union or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT create a rule or try to enforce a rule prohibiting solicitation by employees for union membership or distribution by our em- ployees of union literature during nonwork time. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise dis- criminate against any employee because of that employee's union sympathies. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec- tion 7 of the Act. WE WILL. offer Rosetta Lyons and Sharon Hunter immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings, plus interest. WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bar- gain with Local 57, Nassau-Suffolk District Council, International Ladies Garment Work- ers Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive repre- sentative of our employees in a unit of all pro- duction, maintenance, shipping and receiving employees, employed at our Elmont plant and our Brooklyn plant combined, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree- ment. PALBY LINGERIE, INC., ARGUS LIN- GERIE CORP.; EI.MONT UNDERWEAR CORPORATION AND RICHWEAR SPORTSWEAR, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE Julius COHN, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at Brooklyn, New York, on August 8, 9, and 10, and September 17 and 19, 1979. Upon charges filed in Cases 29-CA-7084 and 29-CA-7139 by Local 57, Nassau-Suffolk District Council, International Ladies Garment Workers Union AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the Regional Director for Region 29 issued an order consolidating cases and complaint on April 30, 1979, alleging that Palby Lingerie, Inc., Argus Lingerie Corp., Elmont Underwear Corporation, and Richwear Sportswear, Inc., herein respectively called Palby, Argus, Elmont, and Richwear, and collectively called Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) of the Act. Thereafter upon charges filed in Cases 29-CA-7163 and 29-CA-7219, the Regional Director issued an Order consolidating those cases and a complaint alleging that Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of 177 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Act. By order dated July 3, 1979, the Regional Di- rector consolidated all of the above cases for hearing. Respondent filed answers denying the commission of unfair labor practices. The principal issues are whether Respondent's four corporations constitute a single employer operating an integrated business; whether Respondent by its officers and agents, engaged in various violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; whether Respondent unlawfully laid off an employee, and thereafter discharged that employ- ee, and discharged another employee, all in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act; and whether Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by its refusal to recog- nize and bargain with the Union, upon demand, as the majority representative of its employees. In this latter connection, the issues relate to whether a two-plant unit is appropriate, and whether Respondent's violations, if any of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act are of sufficient severity and pervasiveness to warrant issuance of a bar- gaining order. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses, to argue orally and to file briefs. All parties have submitted briefs, which have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record of this case and from my ob- servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Palby, Elmont, and Richwear are all New York corpo- rations with principal places of business in one building in Elmont, Long Island, New York. Argus is also a New York corporation, but it has its principal office and place of business in Brooklyn, New York. Palby annually ships merchandise valued at more than $50,000 from the Elmont, Long Island, plant to States outside the State of New York. Elmont, Richwear, and Argus are all en- gaged as contractors for Palby and they in turn ship merchandise to Palby valued in excess of $50,000 annual- ly. The complaint alleges and Respondent admits that the four corporations, individually, are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and I so find. However, Respondent denies that the four corpora- tions described above constitute a single or joint employ- er engaged in a common integrated enterprise. The four corporations are all owned, operated, and controlled by the Israel family. Isaac Israel is president of all four, sole stockholder of Palby and one-third stockholder of Elmont, and director of Palby, Elmont, and Argus. His wife, Pauline, is one-third stockholder of Elmont and two-thirds stockholder of Argus, secretary-treasurer of Elmont, Argus, and Richwear, and director of Elmont and Argus. Marcel Israel, Isaac's brother, is a one-third shareholder of both Elmont and Argus, as well as vice president and director of both those corporations. In ad- dition, he serves as a salesman with Palby. The directors and shareholders of Richwear are the three sons of Isaac and Pauline: Richard (who also works with Palby and Elmont), Saul, and Arthur. Palby has no manufacturing employees, and is the sell- ing arm of the enterprise. In addition, Palby also pur- chases piece goods and other material. In the same build- ing at Elmont, Long Island, with Palby are Richwear and Elmont. Richwear performs the function of cutting the piece goods as well as making the trims for the gar- ments, which consist of women's nightgowns and sleep- wear. The sewing is done by Elmont and by Argus in Brooklyn. Finishing is done by both Elmont and Argus, but some of the garments sewn by Argus are finished by Elmont. Shipping of these garments is usually done by Palby through the utilization of Richwear employees, principally Richard Israel, who is assisted by Richwear and perhaps Elmont employees as needed. It is clear that the Israels supervise the entire operation on a day-to-day basis. Pauline runs the production at Elmont, Richard and Marcel run the production at Rich- wear, and Isaac is in overall control and in charge of the entire operation. At Argus in Brooklyn there is a super- visor, Mary Peri, who runs the shop there. However, Isaac visits that plant several times a week and there is constant telephone communication. It is equally clear from this record that Isaac controls and formulates labor relations policies for all of the corporations involved. As the four corporations are completely controlled by one family, manufacture a product in an integrated fash- ion whereby three corporations are in effect contractors of the fourth which is the selling arm, and the family, particularly Isaac, controls the labor relations of the four companies, I find them to be a single employer within the meaning of the Act.' II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOL.VED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED A. The Alleged 8(a)(l) Violations The Union commenced its organizational campaign on January 29, 1979, when organizer Ann Jackson visited the homes of Elmont employees seeking authorization cards. Shortly thereafter, another organizer, Michael Grimaldi, did the same thing with respect to the Argus employees in Brooklyn. Within less than 3 weeks the Union succeeded in obtaining signed authorization cards from a majority of the employees employed in Long Island as well as half of those at Argus in Brooklyn. Re- spondent was no stranger to union organization cam- paigns, having succeeded on two prior occasions in warding off the Union, the first having occurred as far back as 1964. i Radio and Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U S. 255 (1965); Sloll Industrres, Inc., 223 NLRB 51 (1976). 178 PALBY LINGERIE, INC. 1. The Interrogations On November 29, 1978, Rosetta Lyons applied for em- ployment as a floorgirl and was interviewed by Pauline Israel. In the course of that interview, Pauline stated that she needed someone and asked Lyons whether she be- longed to a union and what local. Lyons shook her head negatively and was then employed as a floorgirl. Al- though Pauline Israel testified at the hearing, she did not refer to or deny this occurrence. In the period immediately following the commence- ment of the union campaign, Pauline interrogated a number of employees. Teresa Proce testified that within a couple of weeks after signing an authorization card, she and Margaret Andriano went to the bathroom and met Pauline who asked them if they signed cards for the Union, to which both replied they had. Lydia Pagan, a floor girl at Elmont, said that one day, while sitting at lunch, Pauline asked her if she had signed a card. Lyons testified that on February 8, she heard Pauline question an employee, Carmella Fiuregge, whether any union people had come to visit her and Carmella replied that they had and wondered how the Union found her house. Pauline said she wondered who called in the Union. Lyons further stated that on the same day Pauline asked Theresa Liberti if any union people had come to her house and if she had signed a card. Theresa did not reply. Pauline then told her if she signed a card she should ask for it back. In her own testimony, Pauline ad- mitted asking Liberti if the Union had visited her house, as well as asking Josephine Montalbano whether the Union had visited her house too. On February 12, Pauline asked Rosetta Lyons if she had ever worked for a Union. She told Lyons that the Union was coming around and pressuring girls at their homes and signing them to cards. Pauline said that if the Union does come in then employees would only do one job, and when that was finished they would have to go home. On February 12, Pauline gave a speech to the employ- ees which will be hereinafter discussed, but 2 days later Lyons heard Lisa Brigandi ask Pauline what she had said in her speech because she had been out that day. Pauline replied by asking Lisa whether she signed a card and Lisa said no. Pauline professed not to believe her and Lisa said she swears she did not sign. Pauline then told her that she did not want a union and all the people that signed cards were ignorant and could get them back. Pauline herself testified to having been informed by an employee, Elda Spielvogel, that the Union had been to her house and seemed to know everything, including Lyons' rate of pay. She then called Lyons to the office and had Spielvogel repeat what she had just said. Pauline asked Lyons how the Union knew her rate of pay and Lyons replied that she did not know as she had only told this to one employee who had asked her. Sharon Hunter, one of the alleged discriminatees herein, was employed early in February. Within the next day, she was approached by Isaac Israel who asked her whether she was with a Union, and she replied that she was not. Isaac, who was called as a witness by the Gen- eral Counsel at the outset, was not recalled by Respond- ent and did not testify with respect to this and other inci- dents involving his conduct. In the meantime the Argus employees in the Brooklyn plant were subjected to similar interrogations. Isaac Israel himself, after a telephone conversation with Mary Peri, the Brooklyn supervisor, called Miguel Gonzales to the phone and asked him what he was doing wearing union buttons. Gonzales said that he was just fooling around and Isaac said that this is nothing to fool around about. In addition, Mary Peri admitted to the union or- ganizers, Michael Grimaldi and Gasper Sciacca, who had visited Argus on February 21 to demand recognition, that she had spoken to all the employees and they told her that nobody wanted the Union and that nobody signed a card. Admina Perez, an employee at Argus, tes- tified that in February Mary Peri asked her and Gon- zales, Perez' son, whether they had signed union cards. She also asked if the Union had come to her house. Gon- zales testified to the same effect. Peri did not testify at the hearing. Described above are numerous occasions on which Pauline, Isaac, and Peri singled out employees and inter- rogated them concerning their signing of cards and union activities. The Board has held that attempts by employ- ers to ascertain employee views and sympathies regard- ing unionism generally tend to cause fear and reprisal in the mind of the employee if he replies in favor of union- ism and, therefore, tends to impinge on Section 7 rights. Big Three Industries, Inc., 192 NLRB 370 (1971). The in- terrogations herein cannot be considered isolated as they were directed against many of the employees in the bar- gaining unit. Moreover, the interrogations were made without assurance against reprisals. I find therefore that the interrogations of employees conducted by the Israels and Peri concerning their union activities were coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Lorraine Ur- bauer d/b/a Kimmel's Shop Rite, 213 NLRB 440 (1974). 2. Threats Admina Perez testified that one day in February, during one of his visits to the Brooklyn plant, Isaac Israel said he did not want the Union and he would close the factory. Perez testified credibly and, as indicated above, Israel did not testify at all as to the alleged unfair labor practices. In addition, on another occasion in Brooklyn, Isaac told Gonzales that all the Union wanted was to take $10 a month from the workers, and before he got the Union, he would prefer to close up the shop. In February, prior to the Union's demand for recogni- tion, Pauline Israel spoke to the employees of Elmont during the lunch break. According to Theresa Murena, Pauline told the employees that the Union was trying to get in and that she would not have it. She said that the Union would put them out of business. In the course of her speech, Murena said that Pauline told the employees that those who want to stay, can stay, but those who did not, could leave. Employee Proce said Pauline told them that she was not going to have the Union because they had worked so many years without it. She said that if they wanted it, it was up to them to find another job. On cross-examination, Proce reiterated that Pauline said they 179 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD were free to quit and find another job or else to stay. She insisted that Pauline said that they are not forcing those who want a union to stay. Lydia Pagan, an em- ployee since 1973, and still employed, testified that Pau- line told the assembled employees she did not want a union in the shop, and if it did come in, Ike (Isaac) was going to close the shop. Rosetta Lyons also testified concerning Pauline's speech. She stated Pauline told the employees she heard the Union was going around and she did not want it and was not going to negotiate with the Union. Pauline said the Union had tried 15 years ago and lost and there was a strike. She went on to say that if a Union came in there would be a strike and people would be out of work. Pau- line said that anybody who was not happy was free to go. Pauline admitted making the speech and testified at some length about it. She said she spoke to almost all of the employees who were having lunch one day, about 1 week before the Union made its demand. She told them the Union was trying to organize and they may be vis- ited at their homes. She said the Union tried 15 years ago and there was picketing, but that her girls knew the Union made empty promises. She contends she told them there had been an election 15 years ago and what it was like. Pauline said that she did not want a union shop, that there were 250,000 union members unemployed in New York, that plants who have unions are forced to close, and that if there are strikes, there is loss of pay. She also told them she would not negotiate with the Union unless they won an election and they could vote either yes or no. She mentioned that many union plants close and move to the south. It is further alleged that Isaac Israel made threats to employees at Elmont. Thus, employee Murena said Isaac spoke one day during lunch, and told them a union would put them out of business, and if the Union came in, he would close the shop. Pagan also testified that Isaac spoke to a number of employees in February to the effect that he did not want the Union, and it was not going to get him. Of course, this testimony is uncontra- dicted. While there are apparently a number of threats con- tained in the speech made by Pauline, her testimony re- flects an attempt to soften the impact by claiming to have referred to an election and election procedures. None of the employees who were asked had any recol- lection of the use of the word "election" by Pauline while she talked to the employees on that particular day. Moreover, Pauline admitted that Respondent did not at- tempt in any manner to utilize the election procedures available under the Act. And, curiously, a leaflet distrib- uted by Respondent to the employees with a paycheck, with respect to the union campaign, makes no mention of elections. In the circumstances, I cannot credit Pauline Israel insofar as her testimony states that she discussed elections with the employees. I found her to be a less than candid and sometimes evasive witness, not only with regard to this particular matter but concerning other aspects to which she testified. Her lack of candor was exhibited in her testimony concerning the corporate setup when she denied having almost any knowledge of Argus while at the same time she was an officer of that corporation. Finally, no employee or any other witness testified in corroboration of Pauline's version of her speech. I find, therefore, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act through the speech of Pauline Israel in a number of ways. Most serious, of course, are the threats of plant closure and its consequent loss of jobs. Such a threat is not only contained in the speech of Pau- line described above but also in the conduct of Isaac Israel both at Elmont and at Argus.2 A further violation is derived from Pauline telling the employees that if they didn't like it, they could leave, obviously referring to keeping the Union out of the plant.3 Pauline's admitted reference to strikes in the event of the Union coming in with a consequence of loss of pay to employees is a pre- diction also violative of Section 8(a)(l).4 Pauline also stated to the employees that she would never negotiate with the Union if it came into the plant and this is a vio- lation of Section 8(a)(1) as it is bound to discourage em- ployees from their activity because they would feel there would be no use in having the Union.5 3. Rules against distribution and solicitation There is no contention by Respondent that it ever maintained or enforced rules in its plant against solicita- tion or distribution of any kind. Pauline Israel admitted and employees testified that employees themselves were freely permitted to sell one another candies and cookies in behalf of their children and schools, and that commer- cial solicitors were permitted in the plant to sell items such as toasters. With respect to the Argus plant in Brooklyn, the uncontradicted testimony is that just prior to the events described herein, a person came into the plant and solicited employees for the purchase of stock- ings. However, immediately after the Union made its demand for recognition, Respondent attempted to stop employee solicitation or distribution on behalf of the or- ganizational campaign. On February 21, during lunch, the union representa- tives made their demand for recognition. Rosetta Lyons, who had accompanied them, then went to talk to the employees. Pauline Israel attempted to stop her and told her that she could not talk to the girls. Lyons stated that she was going to explain to the employees what had hap- pened and Pauline insisted that she could not. Lyons proceeded to do it anyway and in the meantime Pic- cione, the union representative, explained to Pauline that Lyons had a perfect right to do this as it was during lunchtime. Lyons further testified, without contradiction, that a few days later, during lunchtime, she was handing out leaflets and Pauline told her to stop. In addition, Lyons was speaking to the girls, and Isaac Israel, who was present, told her to shut up and that he did not want her talking in the shop. Finally, on March 27, Lyons was 2 Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). s Aero Corporation, 237 NLRB 455 (1978). Richard Tischler, et al., a limited Partnership d/b/a Devon Gables Nursing Home, 237 NLRB 775, (1978). 6 Multi-National Food Service, Division of Schwan's Sales Enterprises Inc., 238 NLRB 1031 (1978). 180 PALBY LINGERIE, INC. distributing newspapers during lunchtime when Pauline attempted to stop her, an event which ultimately led to her discharge. At Argus, in Brooklyn, Miguel Gonzales tried one day in March to distribute, during lunchtime, some union newspapers to the employees. Mary Peri, the supervisor, directed him to stop and wait until after 4:30 to give out the papers. This again is uncontradicted. Since admittedly Respondent had no rules regarding solicitation and distribution, the conduct of Pauline and Isaac Israel in Elmont, and Mary Peri at Argus, was tan- tamount to promulgating a rule against such activities on the spot. As the incidents described above all occurred during lunchtime, such rule is overly broad as Respond- ent would apply it to nonworktime. By promulgating and attempting to enforce such a rule, Respondent vio- lated Section 8(aX)(1) of the Act.6 4. Surveillance Union Organizers Jackson and Grimaldi stated that on February 27, a morning on which the Union was "dem- onstrating" in front of the Elmont plant, they were ob- served from the windows and doorway of the plant, while talking to employees, by members of the Israel family. Thus Jackson said that while she was talking to Maria Ferrante, an employee, Richard, Marcel, Pauline, and Ike Israel were watching from office windows. Gri- maldi similarly testified that as he was speaking with Ferrante and Lyons he recognized Richard, Isaac, and Marcel Israel standing near the office windows and ob- serving. Grimaldi also stated he spoke to Ferrante for about 4 minutes and, as she turned to go into the shop, he saw Richard Israel standing on the steps, watching them. There are other incidents which give rise to an impres- sion that Respondent was keeping the activities of their employees under surveillance. Pauline Israel told Lyons in effect that the Union knew all about Lyons, what her job was, and how much money she made. She confirmed this by confronting Lyons and Spielvogel, who repeated to Lyons what she learned about her from the Union. Particularly with regard to her rate of pay, Pauline di- rected Lyons not to give this information to other em- ployees. As a result of this confrontation, Spielvogel said she would not talk to anybody in the factory again about these matters. During the course of her speech to the employees, Pauline stated that "[s]he heard the Union was going to the people in the shop" and that "[t]here's somebody in this shop giving out information," according to the un- contradicted testimony of Lyons. With respect to the Argus plant, Isaac Israel sum- moned Gonzales to the telephone, stating that he heard he was wearing a union button; and on another occasion Isaac told Gonzales that his "Italian friend" from the Union was outside the shop, presumably referring to Gri- maldi. 6 The Times Publishing Company, 231 NLRB 207 (1977); Daylin Inc.. Discount Division d/b/o Miller's Discount Dept. Stores, 198 NLRB 281 (1972). I find, on the basis of the incidents described above, that Respondent engaged in surveillance of some of its employees, and in addition created the impression that their activities were being kept under surveillance. Such conduct is in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.7 B. The Alleged 8(a)(3) Violations 1. Rosetta Lyons Lyons commenced work on November 27, 1978, as a floor girl. In that capacity she did a variety of duties at various parts of the second floor of the plant. Thus, she did some hanging work, packing, separating, cleaning, and folding. On February 21, 1979, Lyons came into the plant with two union organizers who proceeded to make their demand for recognition of Pauline Israel. At that time Lyons was wearing for the first time a union button. According to organizer Piccione, as Pauline and Richard Israel were escorting the union organizers to their office, Pauline told Richard, "I should never have hired Rosetta." As narrated above, Rosetta commenced talking to the employees after the demand letter was read to Pauline who then attempted to prevent her from doing this. The next day, February 22, Lyons, who nor- mally had been supervised by Pauline, was directed by Isaac to do only one job, that of hanging panties at one work location. Lyons testified that during the rest of the time she was employed, she performed this job by almost constantly standing in one spot. Lyons further stated that in the ensuing period Pauline primarily stayed at a ma- chine, while Isaac took over the floor supervision and gave the orders. Lyons testified without contradiction that Isaac watched her constantly and kept telling her she was doing things wrong. She had never before been subjected to this type of observation and criticism. There followed a number of incidents described above, in connection with Respondent's violation of Section 8(a)(1), during which Lyons had been distributing leaflets and newspapers during lunch period in spite of attempts by Pauline or Isaac to stop her. The activities of Lyons climaxed on March 27, when she returned from lunch and entered the plant, still during the lunch period, and attempted to distribute some union newspapers printed in Italian to the employ- ees. All parties agreed that the attempt by Pauline to stop this resulted in a shouting match involving Lyons, Pauline, and Richard Israel. Lyons testified that Pauline said she did not want her to give them out in the shop and Lyons replied she should leave her alone because she would give them out if she wanted to, that she had done this before. Pauline asked if she wanted to get fired, but Lyons ignored her and gave out the newspapers. Lyons stated that Richard came over hollering for her to stop giving those out, that he did not want any soliciting in the shop, and that it was private property. They then told her she was fired. She said she had a right to orga- nize and proceeded to give out papers and they screamed at her to get out of the shop and told her she was fired. I Rockingham Sleepwear, Inc., 188 NLRB 698 (1971). 181 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In her testimony, Pauline insisted she was telling Lyons she did not want her to distribute the papers "on my time." However, Pauline admitted that the bell to signal the end of the lunch period had not yet rung. As for Richard, he claimed he had run over to prevent Lyons from shouting at his mother. Richard did admit, however, that he was upset and was screaming along with the two women, and he did twice say he would fire her if she kept up. Respondent contends and Richard testified that when Lyons heard the threats that she would be fired if she continued, she said "so I'm fired" and then walked out. Lyons' version is corroborated by two employee wit- nesses. Murena stated she saw Lyons giving out pam- phlets and heard Richard saying they were not going to have these pamplets passed around, and then heard, in the midst of screaming, Richard say "you're fired." Pagan also testified that Lyons brought some papers into the shop during lunchtime and she heard Pauline tell her not to give the papers out in the shop. Pagan said she then heard both Pauline and Richard telling Lyons she was fired. Although it appeared that Pauline, after this incident, through her bookkeeper, obtained statements from four employees concerning it, no one was produced or testified on behalf of Respondent. I do not credit Richard and Pauline Israel to the effect that Rosetta Lyons quit rather than was fired by them, not only for the general reasons of credibility indicated above, but also for the following specific reasons relating to the termination. First, Pauline admitted that this final incident with Lyons occurred during lunchtime and she never before had stopped Lyons from distributing mate- rials at that time. This casts doubt on her testimony that she insisted to Lyons that no distributions be made on "my time"; i.e., company time. I also credit the employ- ee witnesses who stated that Richard and Pauline said to Lyons that she was fired, rather than the statement by Richard that he said "I will fire you." Finally, Respondent would find Lyons incredible on the ground that she was admittedly a paid staff worker of the Union, who obtained employment in order to assist in organization. However, the Board has held that this condition does not denigrate from an employee's status as such, and she is entitled to the protection of Section 8(a)(3).8 Even if Lyons were deemed to be a temporary employee, which is doubtful in view of her employment at Respondent for about 5 months, she would still be covered by the Act as an "employee." I find in all the circumstances, particularly in view of the extensive violations of Section 8(a)(1) by Respond- ent, the fact that Lyons, herself, was subjected to inter- rogation and surveillance, and, as she was clearly the leading union adherent in the plant, wore union buttons, and appeared with union organizers, that she was dis- charged by Respondent because of her union activities, and, by such conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. s Oak Apparel. Inc., 218 NLRB 701 (1975). 2. Sharon Hunter Hunter was referred to Respondent for employment from the unemployment insurance division as a merrow operator. She was interviewed by Richard Israel who told her he had no need for merrow operators but that he had a lot of work downstairs (Richwear) and could use her on the spooling machine or the other automatic machines operated there. She reported on February 8, a Thursday, and remained through February 9. During these 2 days, Hunter worked at the spooling machine and at one point inquired of Richard as to whether she could work sitting down. Richard left and returned with Isaac who asked if she wanted a chair. He said that this work was not normally done sitting down, but in any case he gave her a chair. At the end of the day on Friday, she told Richard she preferred to work as a merrow operator and therefore would noftcre to return to the same job she had been doing. Richard informed her he had a great deal of work on these automatic ma- chines downstairs but not sufficient work upstairs and asked if she would help him out by coming in on Monday to which she said she would. During the course of these first 2 days, it will be recalled that Isaac had asked her whether she was a union member and she had replied no. That night, February 9, Hunter signed an au- thorization card for the Union. On Monday morning, she was still at home at approximately 8:05 a.m. when she re- ceived a call from Richard who told her not to bother coming in. No other explanation was given. By letter dated April 16, Richard Israel wrote her re- questing that she return from "layoff" on April 23. Hunter reported for work on that day and was initially assigned to the same work on the automatic machines as she had performed in February. When she came in on April 23, Hunter wore a union button. About the middle of that week, Richard brought downstairs some boxes of panties and showed her how to hang them. She did this while sitting down for a day or two and Richard said nothing about her sitting. Richard testified, as did Hunter, that the work of hanging panties previously had not been done downstairs but was performed only by the employees upstairs and indeed it necessitated bringing down boxes of panties in order to have that work done by Hunter. After a day or so of hanging panties while sitting, Richard came over and told her that she had to stand and took away her chair. After lunch she asked him why she could not sit and he said that that work is done standing. She reminded him that she had sat before and asked if the union button had anything to do with his attitude and he said no. In the afternoon, Richard and Isaac came in and saw her sitting again and said nothing. She said she alternated standing and sitting but then suddenly the chair was taken away by Isaac who said she could not sit down. Hunter continued to stand for several days while work- ing on the automatic machines. On May , she was again given the job of hanging panties and once again sat down. This time Isaac came over and told her she was hanging the panties incorrectly. He then proceeded to show her another method of hanging panties, although she had been shown how to do this job by Richard and 182 PALBY LINGERIE, INC. no one had complained to her about the way she was doing it. After this demonstration as to how to hang the panties, Isaac left but returned later and again told her that she did not have to sit down while doing the work of hanging panties. Hunter protested that she had sat while doing it the day before but Isaac persisted and took her chair away. Isaac then asked why she was stay- ing if she did not like the work and said he was not going to fire her. He repeated this several times and, on each occasion, requested the cutter, Iraggi, to listen. After hearing this a number of times, Hunter finally told Isaac that he had just fired her and she punched her card and left. There is no question that the employees who hung panties upstairs, which was the only place it was done prior to the assignment to Hunter, did their work while standing. But the folding tables from which they worked while hanging panties were high and were not conducive for someone to sit and work. On the other hand, the table, from which Hunter was working downstairs, was low and one could do the work while sitting. The General Counsel has contended that Respondent violated Section 8(aX3) of the Act by first "laying off' Hunter on the morning of February 12, and again on May 1, when she was allegedly constructively dis- charged. Respondent offered no explanation as to the so- called layoff on February 12. When Richard called Hunter, he merely said she did not have to come in and gave no reason for stopping her coming to work. At the hearing, Respondent submitted evidence to reflect that Hunter had been late on 1 of 2 days she had worked the previous week and of course she would have been late on Monday since Richard was able to reach her at home at am. However, at no other point did Respondent raise the issue of lateness as a reason for this so-called layoff. Moreover, it is also clear that Respondent, according to Richard, had plenty of work for her to do downstairs. Significantly, Hunter had signed a union card on Febru- ary 9, Friday night, and it appears by that time the Union had amassed more than 15 authorization cards from Respondent's employees. Moreover, Hunter had al- ready been interrogated by Isaac as to whether she be- longed to a union, and Respondent, in view of its wide- spread interrogation in the previous week, was certainly aware of the union activity going around. Indeed, Pau- line made her speech to the employees at lunchtime of the day that Richard called Hunter and told her not to come in. I find, in view of the unfair labor practices al- ready committed by Respondent at the time of Hunter's unexplained layoff of February 12, Respondent's conduct was discriminatorily motivated and therefore in violation of Section 8(aX3) of the Act. By the time she was recalled, Hunter was an open union supporter as she reported to work wearing the union button. The events of May 1 are essentially uncon- tradicted as Isaac did not testify and Richard did not controvert the facts as set forth above. The arguments concerning the chair and hanging panties or working the automatic machines while sitting seem essentially con- trived especially since she was permitted to sit at the outset. Hunter was working by herself under different conditions than the other girls who hung panties upstairs. It is also peculiar that Respondent would go to the trou- ble of carrying boxes of panties downstairs when it cus- tomarily used people working upstairs to do that job as they were free. Isaac's goading of Hunter on that last day urging her to leave, telling her he would not fire her, admonishing the cutter to listen to what was said, so that he would have a witness to whatever was going to happen, was undoubtedly a form of harassment that led Hunter to quit. It must also be pointed out that, by May 1, Hunter had already been named in the unfair labor practice charge filed initiating this proceeding. I find, therefore, that Respondent created the condi- tions which forced Hunter to quit her employment or be subjected to continued harassment. In view of Respond- ent's demonstrated animus toward the Union and its other unfair labor practices, I further find that Hunter was constructively discharged because of her support for the Union and thereby Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.9 C. The Alleged 8(a)(5) Violation 1. The appropriate unit The parties are agreed as to the composition of the unit or units to be found appropriate. The sole issue is whether a single overall bargaining unit of the two plants, in Long Island and Brooklyn, is appropriate or whether the only appropriate units are the individual plants. The General Counsel is seeking an overall two- plant unit while Respondent contends that only two sep- arate units are appropriate. The general rule of course is that a bargaining unit need ony be appropriate; it need not be the most appropriate or the only appropriate. In reaching a determination, some of the factors de- scribed above in connection with the discussion of the issue of whether Respondent's corporations constitute a single integrated employer, are the same. Thus, the prod- ucts manufactured in both plants are the same. Argus in Brooklyn, and Elmont in Long Island, both do sewing, and it is these entities who employ the bulk of Respond- ent's employees. Management of both are the same, and, indeed, this being a family enterprise, members of the family closely supervise the employees in both locations and it is clear that Isaac controls and formulates labor policy. While it is true that the immediate supervisor at Argus is Mary Peri, it is equally apparent from discus- sions of the events described above that Isaac Israel visits the Brooklyn plant frequently and Peri makes no move without consulting him either in person or by telephone. The flow of work from Richwear, the entity that does the cutting, is determined by either Marcel or Richard Israel or both so that the amount of work is divided by them between Elmont and Argus. Respondent urges that a single unit of both plants is not appropriate because there is no community of inter- est between the employees in Brooklyn and in Long Island. While it is true that there is no significant inter- change of employees-only one employee, Miguel Gon- zales, has been employed at both locations and the me- 9 J. P. Stevens and Company, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972); Liberty Markers, Inc., 236 NLRB 1486 (1978). 183 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD chanic, Amadeo, who works in Long Island, repairs and maintains the machinery in Brooklyn as well-that is not the only criterion for community of interest. However, it may be noted that in the case of Gonzales, it was Isaac Israel who determined at the beginning of each period of his segmented employment, where he should work. Nev- ertheless, the community of interest which the two groups share consists of many other factors. Thus, they do the same work on the same products, they have the same wage rates, the same vacations, workdays, and hours with one slight exception at Long Island, the same benefits or lack thereof, and most important the same management which derives principally from Isaac Israel. The entire operation with respect to bookkeeping and accounting is conducted through one bookkeeper located in Long Island, and one accountant serves both areas and all corporations with respect to tax returns and the like. The distance between the plants, only 15 to 20 miles, which can be driven in 30 minutes, is not such that would detract from the community of interest.' Finally, the Board has found in similar situations that an overall unit of two facilities which are functionally integrated is appropriate where a labor organization seeks to represent the employees in such overall unit.11 I find, therefore, the unit sought by the General Coun- sel and the Charging Party of the employees at both the Long Island and Brooklyn locations to be appropriate. Accordingly, the unit found appropriate herein, is as fol- lows: All production, maintenance, shipping and receiving employees of Respondent employed at its Elmont, Long Island plant and its Brooklyn (Argus) plant combined, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar- gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. The majority status The parties are agreed that there are 50 employees in the overall two-plant unit. Of these, the Union submitted 27 signed authorization cards. Respondent had objected to the receipt in evidence of the card of Josephine Mon- talbano on the ground that the card is dated February 5, 1979, whereas the notes of the Union organizer show a date of March 5, 1979. The organizer, Jackson, testified credibly that her writing of March 5, 1979, on her notes was in the nature of a clerical error. As the card itself is plainly marked February 5, 1979, a date on which orga- nizational activities were conducted, and there is no challenge to the authenticity of Montalbano's signature, I affirm my ruling at the hearing that the card should be received in evidence and counted. Respondent also ob- jected to the admission of the cards of Admina Perez and Anna Sanchez seemingly on the ground that the two cards contain no writing in the handwriting of Michael Grimaldi, the union organizer. There is no requirement that the information on the cards be written by any par- 'o Caron International, Inc., 222 NLRB 508 (1976). " Family Doctor Medical Group, a Professional Corporation, 226 NLRB 118 (1976). ticular individual so long as the card is dated and proper- ly signed by the employee. There is no evidence that the signatures on the two cards are other than authentic. Ac- cordingly, I shall count these two cards with regard to the majority status of the Union. I find therefore, that the Union, having submitted 27 cards, signed by employees of Respondent at both plants, has been designated as representative of a majority of the employees in the unit found appropriate herein as their collective-bargaining representative. 3. The bargaining obligation There remains the issue as to whether in the circum- stances the Union is entitled to a bargaining order. In a decision adopted by the Board, Administrative Law Judge Taplitz stated the law as follows:' 2 In N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., [395 U.S. 575 (1969)1 the Supreme Court held that a bargaining order would be appropriate in two situations. The first is in "exceptional" cases marked by "outra- geous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices of "such a nature that the coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional reme- dies, with the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had." The second is "in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede election processes." The court also held (at 600): "an employer can insist on a secret ballot election, unless, in the words of the Board, he engages 'in contemporane- ous unfair labor practices likely to destroy the Union's majority and seriously impede the elec- tion."' In Ship Shape Maintenance Co., Inc., 189 NLRB 395 (1971), the Board expressed the test to be applied in terms of whether the lingering effects of the unfair labor practices rendered uncertain the probability that traditional remedies could ensure a fair election, and whether the Union's majority card designations obtained before the unfair labor prac- tices provided a more reliable test of the employees' desires and better protected employee rights than would an election. As stated in Joseph J. Lachniet, d/b/a Honda of Haslett, 201 NLRB 855 (1973), enfd. 490 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1974), where a coer- cive atmosphere is created by the employer which conventional Board remedies may not adequately dissipate so that a fair election can be held with rea- sonable certainty, a bargaining order is warranted. See also Petrolane Alaska Gas Service, Inc., 205 NLRB 68 (1973). On February 21, 1979, when the Union concededly de- manded recognition, it represented a majority of the em- ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit. By this date, Respondent had commenced its campaign of coercive in- terrogation, surveillance, and threats of plant closing. The importance of this latter type of violation of Section 8(a)(1) cannot be overstated, particularly as in the instant 12 Boston Pet Supply, Inc., 227 NLRB 1891, 1900 (1977). 184 PALBY LINGERIE, INC. case, where the threats of closure were made in speeches to large groups of employees. References to closing the plant contain a threat of serious consequences for all em- ployees. Such threats clearly have the tendency to "impede the election process" and undermine the condi- tions for a fair election. Gissel, supra at 611. While the violations found of Section 8(aX1) of the Act are serious and pervasive enough to warrant a bar- gaining order, the case is further bolstered by the viola- tions of Section 8(aX3) with respect to the discharges of Lyon and Hunter. Particularly so is the case of Lyons who was the forward, outspoken, and leading union ad- herent in the plant and was discharged publicly at the conclusion of a shouting match, in full view of many em- ployees. Of course, discharge of prounion employees will undermine a union's majority or impede the election process. In sum, I conclude that Respondent has violated Sec- tion 8(aXS) of the Act by its refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union, and that a bargaining order is necessary. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations de- scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor dis- putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be or- dered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain af- firmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent discharged Rosetta Lyons and laid off Sharon Hunter on February 12, 1979, and then having recalled Hunter to employment on April 23, discharged her on May 1, both in violation of Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act, I recommend that Respondent be ordered to reinstate them to their former positions or, if no longer available, to a substantially equivalent posi- tion, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges; and make them whole for any loss of earnings or other monetary loss they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, less interim earnings, if any. The backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest to be computed in the manner described in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).' s It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining unit, as of February 21, 1979, the date of the Union's demand and the date on which, in is See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). this record, the Union's majority in the unit is estab- lished. 14 Finally, because of the egregious nature of the unfair labor practices herein, it is recommended that a broad order is warranted in this case.' 5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Palby Lingerie, Inc., Argus Lingerie Corp., Elmont Underwear Corporation, and Richwear Sportswear, Inc., are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Palby, Elmont, Richwear, and Argus constitute a single integrated business enterprise. 3. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by: (a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their union activities and sympathies. (b) Threatening employees with loss of jobs and clo- sure of its garment manufacturing business if the employ- ees selected the Union to represent them. (c) Engaging in surveillance of its employees' union and other protected concerted activities, and creating the impression of surveillance of their activities. (d) Promulgating and attempting to enforce a rule pro- hibiting solicitation by employees of union membership and distribution by employees of union literature during nonworktime. 5. Respondent violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Rosetta Lyons, laying off Sharon Hunter, and, after recalling her, constructively discharg- ing Sharon Hunter, because of their union activities. 6. All production, maintenance, shipping and receiving employees of Respondent employed at its Elmont plant and its Brooklyn (Argus) plant combined, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 7. The Union is the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the above-described unit. 8. By refusing, since February 21, 1979, to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of its employees in the appro- priate unit set forth above, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 9. The aforesaid are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom- mended: 14 Permanent Label Corporation, 248 NLRB 118 (1980). ' Hickmott Foods, Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). 185 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER' The Respondents Palby Lingerie, Inc., Argus Lingerie Corp., Elmont Underwear Corporation, and Richwear Sportswear, Inc., their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning union organizing or their interest in Local 57, Nassau- Suffolk District Council, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, or any other labor organization. (b) Threatening employees with loss of jobs and clo- sure of its garment manufacturing business if the employ- ees select Local 57, Nassau-Suffolk District Council, In- ternational Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, to represent them. (c) Surveilling and creating the impression that it is en- gaged in the surveillance of their employees' union activ- ities. (d) Promulgating and attempting to enforce a rule pro- hibiting solicitation by employees of union membership and distribution of union literature by employees during nonworktime. (e) Laying off, discharging, or otherwise discriminat- ing against any employee because of that employee's union activities. (f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Rosetta Lyons and Sharon Hunter full rein- statement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to a substantially equivalent position, without prej- udice to their seniority or other rights and privileges and make them whole for their loss of earnings in the manner 16 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. set forth in the section of the Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due. (c) Upon request, recognize and bargain with Local 57, Nassau-Suffolk District Council, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO in a unit of all pro- duction, maintenance and shipping and receiving em- ployees of Respondent, employed at their Elmont plant and their Brooklyn (Argus) plant combined, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined by Section 2(11) of the Act, respecting rates of pay, wage, hours or other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understand- ing in a signed agreement. (d) Post at its Elmont, Long Island, New York, and Brooklyn, New York, plants copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' 7 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being duly signed by its authorized representative shall be posted by it at its Long Island and Brooklyn plants immediately upon receipt thereof and be main- tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 17 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Jydgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 186