Union Manufacturing Co.

In the Matter- of UNION MANUFACFURINO' COMPANY and ',TExT1L,Z 'WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA Case 'No. C-160,8.-Decided December 7, 1910 Jurisdiction : yarn and hosiery manufacturing industry. Unfair Labor Practices Discrimination-Testifying under the Act: discharge because of employee's activities on behalf of-the union and because he gave testimony under the Act; alleged acts of insubordination and inefficiency as reason for the discharge held not convincing. Remedial Orders : reinstatement and back pay awarded. Mr. Alexander E. Wilson,-Jr., and Mr. Warren Woods, for the Board. - Weekes c Candler, by Mr. John Wesley Weekec and Mr. Murphey Candler, Jr., of Decatur, Ga., for the respondent. "Mr. R. H. Brazzell, of Atlanta, Ga., and Mr. David Jaffe, of New York City, for the Union. Miss Marcia Hertzmark, of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon charges duly filed by Textile Workers Union of America, herein called the Union,' the National Labor Relations Board herein called, the Board; by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued its complaint dated April 22, 1940, against Union Manufacturing Company, Union Point, Georgia, herein called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (4) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. The complaint and notice of hearing were duly served upon the respondent and upon the Union. 1 William J. Frazier, a representative of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, testified that the charge was filed by Textile Workers Union of America on behalf of Branch No. 126 of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers. 28 N. L. R. B., No. 62. 357 l 358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The complaint alleged, in substance, that on or about March 29, 1940, the respondent discharged and thereafter refused to reinstate Frank Barker 2 for the reason that he had joined and assisted the Union- and its affiliate, the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, herein called the Hosiery Workers, and for the reason that he ap- peared and gave testimony under the Act at a hearing on March 21 and 22, 1940; and that from on or about March 8, 1940, to the date of the complaint the respondent restrained, coerced, and intimi- dated its employees 'in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec- tion 7 of the Act. On April' 30, 1940, the respondent filed its an- swer, denying the commission of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Greensboro, Georgia, on May 6, 1940, before Herbert Wenzel, the Trial Examiner duly desig- nated by the Board. The Board,, the respondent, and the Union were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded all parties. . At the commencement of the hearing, the respondent moved to dismiss paragraph 7 of the complaint which alleged that the respondent, through its agents,' had made statements to its em- ployees derogatory to the Union, had advised employees that it disapproved their attitude toward the respondent, as indicated by their membership in the Union,, had advised its employees not to join or remain affiliated with the Union, and threatened to close down its plant and discharge its employees if they persisted in activities on behalf of the Union. The Trial Examiner denied the motion without prejudice to a later renewal of the motion. He granted a motion by the respondent to make the allegations of paragraph 7 of the complaint more specific. At the conclusion of the Board's case the Zrial Examiner granted a motion by counsel for•the,Board to dismiss paragraph 7 of the complaint, and a motion fo incorporate in the record the record and exhibits in a previous proceeding involving the same parties 3 for consideration where ap- plicable to the allegations as to Frank Barker. The Trial Examiner 'denied without prejudice a motion'by the respondent to dismiss the complaint. At the conclusion of the Board's case and at the conclusion of the hearing the Trial Examiner granted motions of counsel for the Board to. amend the pleadings to conform to the proof. ' Referred to in the complaint as W. Frank Barker. 8Matter of Union Manufacturing Company and Temtile Workers Union of America, 27 N L R B 1300. UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY 359 Mn June 12, 1940, the Board, acting pursuant to Article II, Sec- tion 36, of National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations- Series 2, as amended, transferred the proceeding to and continued it before the Board for action pursuant to Article II, Section 37, of said Rules and Regulations. The Order directed that no Interme- diate Report be issued, that Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order be issued, that the parties should have the right, within 20 days from the date of the said Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Pro- posed Order, to file exceptions thereto and to request oral argument before the Board, and should have the right, within 30 days from the date of the Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order to file a brief with the Board. On October 5, 1940, the Board issued Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order in these pro- ceedings, copies of which were duly served upon all parties. Ex- ceptions to the Proposed Findings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order, and Request for Oral' Argument were filed by the respondent on October 28, 1940. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before the Board in Washington, D. C., on November 12, 1940, for the purpose of oral argument. The respondent and the Union were represented by coun- sel. The Board has considered the exceptions to the Proposed Find- ings of Fact, Proposed Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order, and the oral argument in support thereof, and, in so far as the exceptions are inconsistent with the findings, conclusions, and order set forth below, finds no merit in them. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE.RESPONDENT Union Manufacturing Company, Inc., is a Georgia corporation, having its plant and principal place of business at Union Point; Georgia, where,it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of yarns and men's and boys' hosiery. The yarn and hosiery departments are operated as one-plant, under a common management and adminis- tration. The respondent uses the major portion of the yarn it produces. The materials used by the respondent in its business include cotton, rayon, rayon staple, celanese, celanese staple, wool, yarn, dyestuffs, strawboard, needles, and machinery replacements. The value of the raw materials used by the respondent annually is approximately $241,000, of which more than 33 per cent represents the value of 360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD materials obtained outside the State of Georgia. The respondent annually sells products valued at approximately $900,000 of which about 95 per cent are shipped outside the State of Georgia. H. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Textile Workers Union of America is a labor organization affili- ated with the Congress, of Industrial Organizations. It admitted to membership employees of the respondent until March 30, 1940, when Branch No. 126 of the American Federation of Hosiery Work- ers was granted a charter. American Federation of Hosiery Workers is 'a labor organization affiliated with Textile Workers Union of America. It admits to membership employees of the respondent. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The discharge of Frank Barker Frank Barker was discharged on March 29, 1940. He had been employed by the respondent for about 12 years, during the last 8 years as a machine fixer: He joined the United Textile Workers, of America, a predecessor of the Union, in 1934 and went on strike with that organization for 3' weeks. The following year he held a minor office in that organization. In -the spring of 1937, the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, which succeeded the United Textile Workers of America, conducted an intensive organizing campaign among employees of the respond- ent during which Barker personally signed up about 300 members. During the latter part of that year Barker was made chairman of the local and of the shop committee in the plant and he retained both offices after the Textile Workers 'Organizing Committee changed its name to "Textile Workers Union of America," in the spring of 1939. As chairman of the shop committee, Barker met frequently with the respondent throughout 1938 and 1939, and he was the most active member of the Union in the plant. On the day before his discharge he and William Frazier, an organizer for the Hosiery Workers, distributed in front of the respondent's offices, handbills announcing the fact that a charter would be granted to Branch-126 on March 30. On March 29, 1940, Barker failed to receive his weekly pay check as usual. His foreman, Fletcher Chapman, said he did not have it and advised Barker to inquire of Owen C. Scott, plant superin- tendent. Scott handed Barker the check with a typewritten mem- orandum attached which stated, "By reason of insubordination and inefficiency the Union Manufacturing Company feel justified in UNION, MANUFACTURING COMPANY 361 severing their relations with you. To takeeffect today (March 29th) at end of first shift." The slip was signed by Scott. Barker there- upon asked Scott what "insubordination" meant and was told to buy a dictionary and look the word up, that he would "have plenty of time to" do so. Barker insisted that he would like a reason for being discharged and suggested that Scott write him the reason. Scott answered that he had already given Barker ample reason. Barker thereupon left the plant and, after discussing the matter with Frazier, went with Joe Wray and Donald Lyle, members of the shop committee, to see Lamb, president of the respondent. Barker again requested a definition of the word "insubordination" and was told, "It could mean several things." Lamb refused to furnish a specific example of Barker's insubordination or of his inefficiency and stated that the note-spoke for itself. When Barker expressed the desire to apply for reinstatement, Lamb agreed to accept the application but explained, "That doesn't mean that you will ever work here any more." On April 1 Barker and Frazier attempted to interview Lamb but were told that Lamb's attorneys -advised him not to talk to them. No further attempt was made to secure Barker's reinstatement. The Union alleges that Barker was discharged because of his activities in behalf of the Union and because he had given testimony at a hearing conducted by the Board on March 21 and 22, 1940, involving the respondent and the Union. In support of its con- tention that Barker was discharged because of his union activities, the Board offered the testimony of James Cook, an employee of the respondent, who testified that in April 1939, when he complained to Lamb that he was unable to afford certain paving assessments, Lamb asked, "Well, you know who your enemy is, don't You?" Cook replied,. "Frank Barker" and Lamb said, "Yes." Cook thereupon inquired, "Why don't you fire him then?".. and Lamb informed him, "Well, we have to have a cause, and I am just wait- ing for the first chance." Cook stated at the hearing that his reason for naming Barker was that he, had received numerous letters from the respondent, attached to his pay checks, in which the respondent stated that it was having to cancel orders "on account of disturb- ances" and that since Barker was the most active member of the Union he assumed that Lamb referred to him. Lamb did not testify and Cook's version of his conversation with Lamb is not denied. Scott admitted that the decision to discharge Barker was made after the hearing on March 21 and 22. He testified, however, that he had recommended Barker's dismissal several times before but was unable to secure Lamb's permission to discharge him. 362 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR ' RELATIONS BOARD The respondent denied thjtt Barker was discharged' for the reasons alleged by the Union and contended that he was dismissed because of insubordination and inefficiency. To substantiate its contentions in part, the respondent offered evidence of insubordination by Barker in the following events. Scott testified that, at a conference in No- vember 1939 between the shop committee and representatives of the respondent, Barker called Scott a liar. As -to this incident, Scott testified that Lamb had accused Barker' of gathering together a group of men in the plant and reading a certain letter to them during working hours, that Barker denied the accusation and stated that 'whoever reported that he had'done that was.a liar; and that Barker was looking at him and he assumed that Barker was talking about him. Scott also testified that at the same meeting Barker told him, when Scott denied knowledge of the activities of a certain employee in the plant, "If that is all you know about it, you should go home." Barker admitted having made these statements. Scott further recalled two occasions upon which Barker was guilty of cursing in the plant. One incident occurred 2 years prior to the hearing and Scott then reprimanded Barker. The second in- stance was about 60 days before the hearing and was reported to Scott by Chapman who threatened at that time to resign if Barker did not become more efficient. Scott did not reprimand Barker at that time but made a note of the occurrence. The final example of insubordination related by Scott concerned a statement made by Barker at an open union meeting about March 16, 1940, in which Barker is alleged to have stated that "Lamb was a gambler and was broke, and that he joined the Presbyterian Church and had stopped gambling, but that he [Barker] didn't want a gambler to handle his money." Barker explained that he had made a speech at the meeting after a non-union employee had made a "loyalty speech" in which "she praised Mr. Lamb for taking care of ' hospital bills and things like that for the workers . ' .. and the,company loaning money to the workers without charging them any interest ...." Barker testified' that' he was merely quoting Lamb as to his former habits, and that he had said that "he [Lamb] had been taking chances, long chances in dealing with contracts, dealing with us as 'workers, and that that is a form of gambling other than gambling with cards . . . ." In view of the harmless nature of the-events just recited, we cannot find that Barker's alleged insubordination was a factor in his discharge. Apparently, none of the incidents were considered serious enough to warrant action at the time they occurred, although Scott testified that about 2 years before he had told Barker, "If there is any cussing to be done around here, let me do it. I will UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY 363 certainly run you away from this place if you indulge in any more vile language." Moreover, the statements of Barker in November 1939 were made during a bargaining conference wherein Barker was acting as a committee member, rather than as an employee, and the statement on March 16, 1940, was made in a union meeting. As above stated, the respondent also alleged that Barker was inefficient. It introduced in evidence a 51-week record of the num- ber of stops per week on machines serviced by Barker and 25 other fixers. Each fixer is in charge of, and responsible for, the perfect me- chanical operation of the 25 knitting machines being operated by one knitter. His duties include, among other things, making re- pairs, keeping the machines properly adjusted at all times, replacing broken needles, and seeing that the yarn is correctly set in the machines. The inspector on each shift stops a machine whenever she finds it producing imperfect work and these stops are charged against the fixer. Scott admitted that it was possible that some of the stops counted against a fixer might be due to the incompetency of a knitter or inspector. Barker is shown to have had more stops on his machine than any other fixer. The records of some 16 additional fixers employed during this period are not shown, however, and Scott testified that this apparently indicated a perfect 'record for them. Barker testi- fied that it was impossible for a fixer to have a perfect record even for as long as 30 days, and a consideration of the testimony with reference to the work performed by these employees convinces us that the exhibit introduced by the respondent does not correctly reflect the records of all of the fixers in the plant and cannot serve as an accurate basis of comparison. Barker explained /his high stoppage record on the ground that for the past 6 months about 80 per cent of his work had been on samples and 75 per cent to 85 per cent on plated work, an operation which requires the use of colored borders on men's socks.4 Scott admitted that Barker had done more plated than plain work in this period, that plating was more difficult than plain work, and that it involved the likelihood of more stops for defective work. He was unable to name another fixer who was doing plated work during that period and did not deny that the only 108 needle reverse plating - machines in the plant were being fixed under Barker for 3 or 4 months before the latter's discharge. The respondent's witness Un- derwood, the knitter whose machines Barker fixed, stated that 18 of the 25 machines on which he and Barker worked were the 108 needle machines and that, as far as he knew, these were the only 4 It is clear that part of the plated work performed by Barker was on the samples 364 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD machines of that type then running in the plant. Underwood also testified, as did Ruben Ogletree, a fixer who had been employed by the respondent for 30 years, that there was difficulty operating the plating machines because they were equipped with home-made ad- justments and special parts. Ogletree added that it was harder to do plating because of the use of elastic yarn which the machines were not made to handle, and that he believed Barker's work was largely, on plating. Underwood stated that there had been as many stops on his machines after Barker's discharge as before. Although Scott testified that numerous stops on machines tended to reduce a fixer's production rate, he admitted that Barker's production record "stacks up pretty well." Scott was unable to say what percentage of Barker's work since January 1, 1940, was on samples, but he estimated that it may have constituted 10 to 50 per cent. As above stated, Barker claimed that sample work made up about 80 per cent of his total and that such work is also more difficult and causes more stops than regular pro- -duction. He was corroborated in this by Ogletree who'testified that more care must be given to samples, that this work requires constant adjustment of the machines, and that new cones of yarn which are used each time a different pattern is put on a machine cause waste and are at first likely to be faulty and break easily. Scott denied generally that sample work is more difficult than regular work. Barker testified also that his excessive stops for the first part of the 51-week period were due to the fact that, a new and inexperienced inspector, who was later removed from this position and put to work on clippers, was then on duty on his shift. The respondent- did not deny Barker's contention with regard to the inspector. As further evidence of Barker's inefficiency, the respondent intro- duced another exhibit which shows that Barker's "sizing" record from October 1939 to the time of his discharge was poorer than'that of the, other fixers on his shift. There is no evidence as to Barker's comparative rating prior to October. 1939, nor does it appear how his total compared with 15 to 20 other fixers in the plant besides the 12 shown on the exhibit. Moreover, Barker's record did not grow worse over the period from October 1939 to the date of his discharge. In fact, for all that appears in the record before us, Barker may have had more sizing errors than others, during the entire 8-year period during which he had been a machine fixer with- out any action having been taken by the respondent. The respondent also claimed that Barker frequently left his ma- chines and that Chapman was forced to reprimand him on numerous occasions because of this. Chapman testified as to certain notes made by him, after a discussion with Lamb and Scott, during the month prior to Barker's discharge, which indicated that Barker left his UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY 365 machines on five occasions between March 8 and 19. Chapman testified, however, that it was a common practice for Barker to leave his machines and that only because he "just wanted to see how many times he did leave", did Chapman suddenly start keeping records on Barker. Barker testified that during the past year or two Chapman had engaged in constant surveillance of his work and was continually checking up on him, that often when Barker was looking around the plant for Chapman he would return to his machines to find Chapman waiting for him there. If the respondent discharged Barker on March 29, 1940, because of his organizational activity and affiliation, it committed an unfair labor practice. While proof of the presence of proper causes at the time of discharge may have relevancy, and circumstantial bearing in explaining what otherwise might appear as a discriminatory discharge, such proof is not conclusive. The issue is whether such causes in fact induced the discharge or whether they are but a justification of it in retrospect. On the other hand, it is equally true that a failure to show proper causes, indeed any cause, for the discharge does not necessarily establish an unfair labor practice.5 As we have stated above, Barker was, as the respondent knew, the outstanding exponent of the Union in the respondent's plant. He had personally solicited the applications of a great majority of the Union's members, was the spokesman for the committees which met with the respondent's representatives, and at the hearing a week before his discharge had testified at length on behalf of the Union. The evidence relied upon by the respondent to show that Barker was discharged because of insubordination and inefficiency is not convincing. The examples of insubordination recalled by Scott be- gan with an incident which occurred 2 years before, and none of them impresses us as serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee with 12 years' service. The evidence submitted by the respondent to show that Barker was discharged because of inefficiency falls short of achieving its purpose since it fails to present an accurate or complete picture of Barker's work in relation to that of others similarly employed. The exhibit showing stoppages does not disclose Barker's record prior to early 1939 and fails to include the records of a number of fixers employed during the same period. Moreover, this exhibit does not -afford an accurate basis for judging Barker's work since the other fixers listed thereon are not shown to have done as much of the difficult plated and sample work as Barker; in fact, it is not shown that any of them did this work. 5 See Matter of The Kelly-Springfield Tire Company and United Rubber Workers of America, Local No. 26 and James M Reed and Minnie Rank, 6 N. L. R B 325 , consent decree entered, Kelly-Springfield Tire Company v National Labor-Relations Board, 97 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 4). 366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The exhibit dealing with Barker's sizing record covers an even shorter period of time and is less complete than the stoppage record. Barker's habit of leaving his machines was characterised by his foreman as a "common practice." , We are unable to find from the record before use that any of Barker's alleged shortcomings precipitated the decision to discharge him. It is uncontradicted that in about April 1939 Lamb stated, when asked why he did not discharge Barker for being the "enemy" of the employees, "Well, we have to have a cause, and I am just waiting for the first chance." Plainly, the respondent did not dis- charge Barker for the reasons it now assigns. However, on March 21 and 22, 1940, Barker testified on behalf of the Union at a hearing before the Board. A week later he was discharged. We conclude that Frank Barker was discharged and refused reinstatement because of his activities on behalf of the Union and because he gave testi- mony under the Act.7 We find that the respondent has discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Frank Barker, to discourage and thereby discouraging membership in the Union, and because he gave testimony under the Act, and by such action has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent de- scribed in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. THE REMEDY Having found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action which we find necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. We have found that the respondent discriminated against Frank Barker by discharging him on March 29, 1940, and thereafter refus- ing' to reinstate him. We shall order the respondent to offer him immediate reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent We do not find it necessary to consider the record in the prior case between the parties. ° See N. L. R B. V. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co , 301 U. S 58, reversuig National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman -Harry Masks Clothing Company, 85 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A 2) and enf'g Matter of Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Company, Inc and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 1 N. L. R B 411 UNION MANUFACTURING COMPANY 367 position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privi- leges, and to make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount which he would normally have earned as wages from March 29, 1940, to the date of the offer of reinstatement less his net earnings 8 during said period. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Branch No. 126 of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers and Textile Workers Union of America are labor organizations, within the meaning of -Section 2 (5) of the Act. , 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the resondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac- tices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. 3. By discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of employment of Frank Barker, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organi- zation, the respondent has engaged in and in engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8'(3) of the Act. 4. By discriminating against Frank Barker because he gave testi- mony under the Act, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (4) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of -the Act. ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent, Union Manufacturing Company, Union Point, Georgia, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns; shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of Amer- ica or American Federation of Hosiery Workers, or any other labor 'By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room, and board , incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else- where than for the respondent, which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere See Matter of Crossett Lumber Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Amer- ica, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2,590, 8 N L R B. 440. Monies received for work performed upon federal, state, county, municipal, or other work-relief projects shall be considered as earnings . See Republic Steel Corporation v N. L R. B., decided by United States Supreme Court, November 12, 1940. 368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD organization of its employees, -by discharging or refusing to rein- state any of its employees or by otherwise discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment ; (b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any em- ployee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the Act; (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coerc- ing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist Textile Workers Union of America, Branch No. 126 of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 -of the National Labor Rela- tions Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Offer to Frank Barker immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges; and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the respond- ent's discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum of, money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages from March 29, 1940, until the date of the offer of reinstate- ment, less his net earnings 9 during said period; (b) Post immediately in conspicuous places in its plant and keep posted for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days-from the date of posting, notices to its employees stating (1) that the respond- ent will not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered to cease and desist in paragraphs 1 (a), (b), and (c) of this Order; (2) that the respondent will take the affirmative action set forth in paragraph 2 (a)- of this Order; and (3) that the respondent's employees are free to become or remain members of Textile Workers Union of America and Branch No. 126 of American Federation of Hosiery Workers and that the respondent will not discriminate against any employee because of membership or activity in-those organizations; (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what. steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith. CHAIRMAN HARRY A . MILLIs took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. I See footnote 8.