Lebanon Steel Foundry

In the Matter of LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY 1 and STEELWORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, AFFILIATED WITH THE C. I. O. Case No: C-1843.-Decided July 10, 1941 Jurisdiction : steel castings manufacturing industry. Unfair Labor Practices Collective bargaining: majority designation by check-off cards authorizing de- duction of dues froj wages during life of contract to be made by employer and union-refusal to meet and negotiate:. refusal to grant exclusive recognition;. termination of conferences by employer upon union's filing charge ; employer's persistent injection into negotiations with union of apparently dormant "inside" organization ; refusal to enter into consent election agreement or otherwise to state in writing intention to comply,with statutory duty. to bargain.; dilatory and evasive treatment of union's attempts to bargain. Remedial Orders : employer directed to bargain collectively: Unit Appropriate for Collective Bargaining :' all production and maintenance employees, including shipping department and truck drivers, but excluding supervisory employees, office and clerical employees, and laboratory assistants. Mr. Jack Davis, for the Board Becker cf Ehrgood, by Mr. Clarence D. . Becker and Mr. William H. Egli, of Lebanon, Pa., for the respondent. Mr. Harold Fritchman, of Hellertown, Pa., for the Union. Mr. Louis ?Vewmnan, of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed by Steel Workers Organizing Committee, affiliated with the C. I. 0., herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by its Regional Director for the Fourth Region (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), issued its complaint dated February 1,, 1941, against Lebanon Steel Foundry, Lebanon, Pennsylvania, herein called the.respondent, alleging that the respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section 2 'The charge, complaint, and other formal papers in which ' the respondent's name appeared incorrectly as "Lebanon Steel Foundry Company" were amended at the hearing. 33 N. L. R. B., No. 58. 233 234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and of notice of hearing thereon were duly served on the respondent and the Union. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance that all production and maintenance employees, including the shipping department and truck drivers, but excluding supervisory employees, office and clerical employees, in the Lebanon plant of the respondent constitute an appropriate. bargaining unit ; that, since on or about December 16,'1940, the Union has been the representative for collective bargaining purposes of the employees in that unit; and that on or about December 16 and December 21, 1940, January 10, 1941, and at other times, the Union requested the respondent to bargain collectively with it as the exclusive representative of these employees, and that the respondent refused and still refuses to do so. Thereafter, the respondent duly filed its answer dated. February 8, 1941, in which it denied the material allegations of the complaint, except those relating to its business operations. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on February 13, 14, 15, and 17, 1941, at Lebanon, Pennsylvania, before James C. Paradise, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board, the respondent and the Union were represented at and partici- pated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded the parties. At the close of the hearing, a motion by counsel for the Board to amend the complaint to conform with the proof as to names and dates was granted by the Trial Examiner with- out objection. The Trial Examiner reserved decision on motions to dismiss the complaint made by. the respondent at the close of the Board's case and at the close of the hearing, but subsequently denied these motions in his Intermediate Report. Also at the close of the hearing, the parties were accorded, but did not avail themselves of, an opportunity to argue orally before the Trial Examiner. Rulings on other motions and on objections to the admission of evidence were also made by the Trial Examiner during the course of the hearing. The Board has reviewed all the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed., The rulings are hereby affirmed. Subsequent to the close of the hearing herein, the respondent pro- posed to the Regional Director in writing that a consent election be conducted by the Board .among the employees of the respondent to determine their duly, designated representative for collective bargain- ing.purposes. The Regional Director was subsequently informed by the Union in writing that it would not then consent- to such an election. On March 10, 1941, the respondent filed with the Trial Examiner a LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY 235 motion that its written -proposal and the Union's written refusal to agree thereto be made a part of the record. In his-Intermediate Report the Trial Examiner denied the motion, on the ground that "the matter sought to be made part of the record is irrelevant and immate rialto the issues." The ruling is hereby'affirmed.2 After the respondent on March 13, 1941, had filed a brief with the Trial Examiner, the latter issued his Intermediate Report dated March 24, 1941, copies. of which were duly served on the respondent and the Union. The Trial Examiner in his Intermediate Report found that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor prac- tices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. He recommended that the respondent cease and desist therefrom, and that it take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. On May 1 and May 19, 1941, respectively, pursuant to extensions of time granted at.the, respondent's request, the, respondent filed with the Board its exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief in support thereof. Thereafter, pursuant to notice duly served upon the parties, oral .argument was had before the Board at. Washington, D. C., on May 22, 1941. The respondent was represented by counsel and participated in the argument; the Union did not appear. The Board has considered the exceptions and the briefs filed by the respondent and finds the exceptions to be without merit in so far as they are inconsistent with the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order set forth below. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Lebanon Steel Foundry is a Pennsylvania corporation, having its principal office and plant at Lebanon, Pennsylvania. It is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of stainless, special alloy and carbon steel castings. In the manufacture of these products, it uses steel scrap, ferro alloys, nickel, iron ore, pig iron, sand, clay, oxygen, and fuel oil. During 1940 the respondent used such materials valued at approximately $498,000, - and manufactured finished prod- ucts valued at approximately $1,900,000. Approximately 55 per cent of the raw materials used by the respondent are obtained from out- side Pennsylvania, a.nd approximately 70 per cent of its finished prod- uctsvareashipped to points outside Pennsylvania.. 2 See Matter of Dela-ware-New Jersey Ferry Company and United Marine Division, Local No. 333, affiliated with the A. F. L. and the I. L. A.; 30 N. L. R. B. 820, at page 26. 236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Steel Workers Organizing, Committee, affiliated with the C. I. 0., is a labor organization which admits to membership persons em- ployed in the steel industry.' III.. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The refusal to bargain collectively A. The appropriate unit The complaint alleges, and it was stipulated by the parties at the hearing, that all production and maintenance employees in the re- spondent's plant, including the shipping department and truck driv- ers ,3 but excluding supervisory employees, office and clerical employees, constitute an appropriate bargaining unit. Counsel, for the Board contended at the hearing that the em- ployees in the chemical laboratory, of whom there are 8, are not production employees and should therefore be excluded from the unit. These employees, who are classified as laboratory assistants, are young men most of whom are high school graduates. Their work consists of analyzing steel, reading the temperature of steel pourings, and keeping records of their tests under the supervision of the chief chemist. They work in a separate building apart from the rest of the plant.. Although the respondent's plant manager testified that the work of the laboratory assistants requires no special skill, he admitted that some knowledge of mathematics is a prerequisite and that a 3- month training period is necessary. The analyses of the laboratory assistants are reported to the melters, to the metallurgical depart- ment and to the heat treating department, so that the steel may be properly processed after having been cast. It is evident that the laboratory assistants are not production or maintenance employees within the meaning of the stipulated unit, and they will therefore be excluded. . We find that all production and ,maintenance .employees in the re- spondent's plant, 'including the shipping department and truck drivers, but excluding supervisory employees, office and clerical em- ployees, and laboratory assistants, at all times material herein con- stituted, and that they now constitute ; ' a unit appropriate for the. purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment, and that said unit insures to 'employees of the. respondent the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining and other- wise effectuates the policies of the Act. a These so-called truck drivers are engaged solely in the operation of small hand trucks inside the plant: LEBANON STEEL -FOUNDRY 237 B. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit Pay-roll records of the respondent show that on December 16 and .December, '21, 1940, there were 585 employees in the appropriate unit; that on January 10, 1941, there were 608 employees in the appropriate unit; and that on January 24, 1941, there were 623 employees in the .appropriate' unit.4 Union activities among the employees of the respondent began in :September 1940, when a group of employees approached a union organizer at a nearby steel plant and obtained from him membership .application cards. Each of these cards contained not only an appli- -cation for membership but also an, express designation of the Union as collective bargaining representative of the person signing. A num- ber of these cards had been signed by employees of the respondent when Harold E. Fritchman, district representative of, the Union, met with some of the employees in September 1940 at their request. At this meeting the employees present expressed a desire that union -dues be deducted or checked off from their wages. Accordingly, Fritchman instructed them to us "Wage Deduction Authority" 'or check-off cards in place of the membership-application cards in solicit- ing union members. Those who had previously signed membership ap- plication cards were given check-off cards to sign, and thereafter 'only the check-off cards were used in soliciting union members. The, check-off cards were of two types which were used inter- changeably and were in the following form: WAGE DEDUCTION AUTHORITY No-------- - Dated------------ To the Paymaster of I hereby authorize you to deduct, from my wages one dollar ($1.00) per calendar month, beginning with the month of-------_, 19-- provided I have worked a. total of five (5) days or more during the calendar month. This payment to be sent to.. the Secretary-Treasurer of the S. W. 0. C., David J. McDonald, 1500 Commonwealth' Building, Pittsburgh, Pa. This authority to be'effective during the life of the agreement. This authority will automatically be cancelled if, as-and when the labor,and working agreement between your Company and the S. W. 0. C. terminates. -------------------- -------------------- (Signature ) (Address) 4 These totals include 3 employees not listed on the pay rolls, one of whom had been called to military service and 2 of whom were on sick leave. The parties agree that these 8 employees should be included in the unit. 238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WAGE DEDUCTION 'AUTHORITY No. -------- Dated ------------ To the paymaster of I hereby authorize you to deduct from my wages union dues amounting to one dollar ($1.00) per calendar month, provided I have worked a total of five (5) or more days during the calendar month; and my initiation, fee (amount specified below) which shall be deducted within one month from the date you receive this card from the Financial Secretary of the local union. Money so deducted to be sent to David- J. McDonald, Secretary- Treasurer of the S. W. 0. C., 1500 Commonwealth Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. This authority shall only be effective during a collective bar- gaining agreement between the 'S. W. 0. C. and your Company that includes the check-off'system. Initiation fee, $-------- -------------------- -------------------- (Signature ) ( Address) Fritchman testified that the check-off cards have been used through= out his district to signify union membership, as well as authority 'to check off union dues; that the Union customarily organizes plants in this area by having employees sign such cards; and that employers whose plants were thus organized have accepted the, check-off cards as proof of the desire of the employees that the Union represent them. This testimony is uncontradicted and is credited by us, as it was by the Trial Examiner. The respondent in its briefs 'contends that the check=off cards are "effective only during the life of an agreement which never came into being," and are therefore "wholly without probative value as to the membership of the signatories thereto in 'the union, and particularly without probative value of the delegation of authority to the union by the signatories thereto to represent them as sole bargaining agent." The Act requires no special words or formula for designation of a representative for collective bargaining purposes. Thus, it has been held that the signing of membership applications 5,-or registration cards 1 is sufficient, although the signers had not paid dues or initiation N. L. R. B. v. Louisville Refining Co.; 102 F. (2d) 678, 680 (C. C. A. 6), cert. denied 308 U. S . 568; N. L. R. B. v. Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F. ( 2d) 681 (C. C. A. 1). 6 Matter of Elbe File and Binder Company, Inc. and Bookbinders, Manifold and Pamphlet Division, Local Union No. 119, International Brother h ood of Bookbinders, 2 N. L. Ti. B. 906, 910. LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY 239 fees or been admitted to membership.' We believe that an employee who authorizes his employer to deduct union dues from his wages during the life of a contract to be made by the employer and the union thereby evidences a present desire to become and be a member of that union", although actual deduction of dues is postponed until the contract is made. In any event, an employee who signs such a check-off card thereby clearly evinces a desire,to have the union in whose favor the check-off is authorized negotiate a contract with his employer as his collective bargaining representative. This seems to us the reasonable intendment of the check-off cards, and no evidence was . adduced or offered in the present proceeding to show that the respondent's em- ployees understood otherwise. On the contrary, there is uncontroverted testimony that the check-off, cards were used in lieu of membership -application cards in the campaign for union members. We believe and find that those employees of the respondent-who signed check-off cards thereby designated the Union as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining. The Union placed in evidence a total of 358 check-off cards. The respondent checked these cards against the authentic signatures of its employees- and made other-checks with, respect to some of the cards. Thereafter, counsel for the respondent: admitted that in no instance "did we find any lack of authenticity so far as the signature was con- cerned." Of the 358 cards, 337 bear dates earlier than January 14, 1941. It was stipulated at the hearing that the names of the signers of these 337 cards appear on the respondent's pay rolls for the period from December 16, 1940, to January 24, 1941. Of the additional 21 cards, the authenticity of which.is not disputed but which were segre- gated because of their dates or other reasons, those of Carlin Bell, dated November 14, 1940, Charles Brandt, dated January 14, 1941, John A. McKinney, dated January 17, 1941, and Milton Blogovich, dated January 21, 1941, should be included. Thus, the total number of valid check-off cards placed in evidence by the'Union and dated January 21, 1941, or earlier is 341. Fritchman testified that he counted the union check-off cards on December 15, 1940, and on January 10, 1941, and that as of those dates they totalled 335 and 342 respectively. He also testified that in the course of his official duties he met with employees of the respondent at frequent intervals, starting in September 1940, and collected such 'Matter of National Motor Bearing Company and International Union, United Auto- mobile Workers of America, Local No. 76, 5 N. L. B. B. 409, 427-8, mod. and enf'd, N. L. R. B. v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 9) ; Matter of Clifford M.'DeKag and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 649, 2 N. L. R. B. 231, 237. .240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD cards as had been signed ; that he took' the cards to' the district office of the Union, where he instructed Charles Medrick, the union secretary, to make alphabetical lists of the names on the cards and then to file the lists and the cards ; and that such alphabetical lists were made- periodically and were kept up to date as additional cards were received. and filed. Fritchman identified the lists which he said had been pre- pared by Medrick pursuant to his instructions. He testified that the first list was prepared either late iu October or early iii November 1940,.that the second list was prepared not later than the second week in December, and that the last list was prepared by January 27, 1941. He also testified that all the names on each list other than the first were taken from the check-off cards which he brought to the union office. It was stipulated at the hearing that, if Medrick were called. as a witness, he would testify that he prepared the lists above men- tioned at the, times testified by Fritchman and from the membership, cards brought to the office by Fritchman from-time to time. We find that, the membership lists were prepared at the times and in the manner testified by Fritchman. Examination of these membership lists shows that two copies of the December list, which was prepared in triplicate, are identical, and that.each of them contains 318 names. The third copy of the December list contains 333 names. All but four of the names on each of the three copies of the December list appear on check-off cards included in the total of 341 mentioned above and dated on or before January 21, 1941. We find, therefore, that the Union on December' 16, 1940, had been designated collective bargaining representative for a minimum of 314 employees out of 585 employees in the unit which we have found is appropriate. The January membership list contains 348 names, and includes all but 8 of the names appearing on the 341 check-off cards mentioned above. Of the 333 cards which therefore bear names appearing on the January membership list, 328 are dated earlier than January, 10. We find, therefore, that the Union had by January 10, 1941, increased the number of employees of -the respondent whom it was authorized to represent for collective bargaining purposes to 328 out of a total of 608 in the appropriate unit. In its brief's the respondent attacks the accuracy and reliability of the membership lists, points to alleged, discrepancies between the lists and the check-off cards, and asks why certain names' on the check-off cards do not appear on the lists. All the names in question were checked by the respondent against its pay rolls and other records, and it is conceded that there is no evidence of any lack of authenticity in the signatures and that each of the names appears on the respondent's. pay rolls. Examination ofthe cards, the lists, and the pay rolls shows that all but one of the discrepancies cited by the.respondent-in its briefs LEBANON'STEEL FOUNDRY 241 resulted from ob^,ious errors in transcribing illegible si gnatures.8 The respondent's contention that the membership lists are inaccurate and unreliable is unfounded. We find that on December 16, 1940, and at all material times there- after, the Union was the duly designated representative of a ma- jority of the employees in the appropriate unit, and that, pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the Act, it was and is the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit fort•he purposes of collective bargain-. ing with respect to rates of, pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. C. The refusal to bargain 1. The negotiations On December 15, 1940, the Union designated a negotiating commit- tee and instructed. it to submit: a contract to the respondent the follow- ing day and to arrange a date for the beginning of negotiations. Oil December 16, Henry D. Phillips, the respondent's plant manager, was informed by the personnel director, Gamber, that Leo Moyer, an em- ployee of the respondent, wished to meet with him. Moyer was a mem- ber of the negotiating committee designated by the Union, but Phil- lips testified that Moyer was chairman of a group of employee repre- sentatives ° and that Phillips therefore assumed that the requested meeting was to be with that group. He agreed to meet with Moyer at 3:30 p. in. that day, and at the appointed time Moyer and two other union members appeared and submitted the proposed contract. Moyer told Phillips that he represented the Union and a majority of the em- ployees and that he had been designated to submit the contract and to $ I. The card of "Earl Barr " was listed as Earl Darx. 2. The card of "Jacob W. Burch" is listed as Jacob Bruder , and is probably the em- ployee listed on the pay rolls as Jacob Busch. 3. The card of "Joseph Crnovich" was misread by. the respondent. It is Joseph Arnovich and is so listed. 4. The card of "David Fuester" is listed as such, and should probably'be David Fire- stone. 5. The card of "Donald Kirkwood-is listed as Don Kirkwood. 6. The card of "John C. Mason" is not listed . This is the sole omission. 7. The card of "Raymond R. Millie " was misread by the respondent. The surname is Miller, and the name of Ray Miller is listed. 8. "C. W. Putt" is listed as C. W. Dutt. 9. "Roy S . Sheetz" is listed as Roy Sheetz. 10. "Levi F. Spotts" is listed as Levi Spott. 11. "Clifford Sholly" is listed as Clifford S. Holly. 12. "J. 13. Uhler" is listed as J. Huhler. 13. "George M. Vrogovich" is apparently listed as George Pisgovice , and examination of his signature indicates the likelihood of such an error. The respondent also asks why the name of James Gutikunst on the October list is not found on the later ones . The December and January lists mention James Gulkert, which is what Gutikunst's signature looks like. 9Th - is group of employee representatives were part of an unaffiliated labor organiza- tion in the respondent's plant which is described more fully below. ' 242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD arrange a date for the beginning of negotiations. Phillips replied, ac- cording to his own testimony, "Well, we will meet with anybody who claims to represent any of our employees, and if, he has a sincere grievance, we will discuss it with him at any time." He then stated, after having glanced over the agreement "not too casually," that it was a mighty important thing to the respondent, that he would study it, and that he would advise the Union as promptly as possible as to when a meeting could be held. He added, however, that it might be a couple of days, a week, or a month before a date could be-set. The next day Moyer reported the result of this conference to Fritch- man, who was not satisfied with Phillips' disposition of the matter and therefore communicated with T. S. Quinn, the respondent' s treasurer and Phillips' superior. Fritchman then met with Quinn on December 18 and they agreed upon a meeting for discussion of the contract on December 21. The union negotiating committee, Fritchman, and Tony Lynch, an- other district representative of the Union, met on December 21 with Phillips, Gamber, and Frank Stanley, the general superintendent of the respondent's plant. Fritchman testified that at this meeting he stated. to the respondent's representatives that the Union represented a majority of the employees and that he was ready to present proof of that if the respondent doubted it, but that the respondent raised no question on this score. Fritchman also testified that he had the union check-off cards in his automobile outside the building when he made this offer. Although the memorandum of this meeting made by Phil- lips 10 does not mention Fritchman' s offer, Phillips did not deny that it was made, and we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that.Fritchman's testimony accurately states what happened.- Phillips' memorandum of this meeting does. state that he told the union representatives that the proposed contract "left much to be de- sired from the standpoint of Management, and much to be discussed .from the. standpoint of employee representation." At the hearing, Phillips first testified that he was uncertain as to the meaning of the words -"much to be discussed from the standpoint of employee repre- sentation." but later testified that these words meant that he told.the union representatives there was a question in his mind as to who rep- 10 Phillips made memoranda of his various meetings and conversations with union repre- sentatives . These memoranda were admitted in evidence with the understanding that the respondent would be free to adduce testimony correcting , explaining, or amplifying them. 11 Phillips also made a memorandum of the next meeting between the respondent's and the Union's representatives , which was held on January 10, 1941 , and at which it is admitted that the union check-off cards were offered to the respondent ' s representatives for inspection. This is not mentioned , however, in Phillips' memorandum, and he ex- plained at the hearing that the omission was the result of an oversight . It is possible that a similar oversight accounts for the omission in Phillips ' memorandum of the meeting of December 21,of any reference to the Union 's offer of its cards during that meeting. LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY, 243 resented the employees. In view of Phillips' vacillating testimony'on the point and of the evidence with respect to Phillips' attitude toward the- Union during the entire'course of negotiations, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that no question as to the representation of the re- spondent's employees was raised by Phillips at the meeting of De- cember 21. Phillips, however, according to both Fritchman's testimony and Phillips' memorandum of the meeting, did tell the union repre- sentatives at the meeting of December 21 that the respondent had been dealing with another group as sole bargaining agent. Despite their expressed unreadiness to discuss the agreement,12 the respondent's representatives agreed to listen to Fritchman read it section by section and to comment on it. When Fritchman reached Section 2, dealing with recognition. of the Union as exclusive bargain- ing- agent,. Phillips stated, according to his own memorandum of the meeting, ``. . . this, of course, is a subject which we are in no posi- tion to discuss and have no comments to make other than that we Will recognize and deal with anyone who claims to represent any of our employee.,, but that we have been.dealing with an Independent Group as sole collective bargaining agency." Phillips' memorandum. further shows that, later in the meeting, he reiterated the respondent's policy "of willingness to meet with any. employee-or anyone claiming to rep- resent any employee or employees at any reasonable time to discuss such matters as concerned the employee." After the contract 'had been read, Fritchman asked when another meeting could be held and stated that the Union desired to expedite completion of the negotiations. Phillips replied that, although the respondent would meet with the Union as frequently as was rea- sonably possible, the pressure of business, combined with the addi- tional demands on the time of the respondent's representatives resulting from the year's end and the holiday season, made it difficult to hold another meeting until after the first of the year. It was agreed that Fritchman should telephone Phillips on December 23 to arrange a date for the next meeting. The evidence indicates that, although the Union, expressed a desire to expedite the negotiations, its repre- sentatives did not strenuously oppose Phillips' proposal that the next meeting be held after the first of the -year. On December 23 Fritchman called on Phillips to discuss the date for the next meeting. Phillips said that the respondent was very busy and that a definite date could not be set, and told Fritchman to com-' municate with him again on January 6, 1941, for the purpose of setting a date. Fritchman protested, but Phillips insisted that no earlier date could be set. 12 As Phillips testified at the hearing, the respondent "saw no need of .. . . a discussion on such an agreement." 450122-'42-v-oI. 33- -17 244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On January 6, 1941, Fritchman again called on Phillips and was told that a meeting could be held on January 10. Fritchman asked for an earlier date, telling Phillips that some of the employees felt the respondent was "stalling" and that they were becoming restive. Phillips insisted that no earlier date was possible, and Fritchman reluctantly acquiesced. - On January 10 the representatives of the Union and the respondent met for the second time to discuss the contract. Fritchman testified without contradiction, and we find, that George Medrick, one' of the union' representatives present' at the meeting, placed the union check- off cards on the table and invited the respondent to examine and count the cards and look at the signatures if there was any doubt of the-Union's majority; but that the respondent neither questioned the majority status of the Union nor examined the cards. Although his memorandum of this meeting contains no reference to this incident, Phillips testified that Medrick exhibited the' cards during the course of the meeting, stated that they numbered 473,13 asked if the respondent wished to see them, and invited the respondent to check them. Phillips admitted 'that the respondent's representatives indicated no desire either to see or to check the cards. - Phillips claimed at the hearing that he treated with apparent indif- ference the presentation of the Union's cards at the meeting, of January 10 because he intended to recognize and deal with the Union and the independent group as the representatives of their respective members until the definite status of each was established. The Trial Examiner has found, and we agree, that Phillips in fact had no such intention, but intended at most to permit the Union to present grievances for its members, reserving sole collective bargaining rights to the inde- pendent group. If it is assumed that Phillips' testimony. concerning his intent was truthful,- it can only be said that he failed to' state his intention to the union representatives on January 10. Moreover, on that:.occasion, as on December 21, Phillips raised no question as to the majority status of the Union and gave no indication that he enter= tained doubts on that score. He refused even to discuss the question of; exclusive recognition when it was raised at both meetings, and,. whatever his intention may-lave been, he neglected to express it. Whether his intention was that to which he testified or that which we .have found. above, it is plain that he had no ' intention of granting exclusive. recognition to the Union. The manner.in which Phillips' on January 10 equivocated on the question of exclusive recognition is illustrated by the following excerpt from his memorandum of the meeting, stating what happened after 18 Fritchman explained at the hearing that Medrick probably arrived at the figure of 473 by including in his count cards which had been signed by employees of the respondent dur- ing an organizing campaign conducted by the Union ' in 1987. LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY 245 the respondent's representatives had raised questions as to the various provisions of the proposed contract: Mr. Fritchman at this point asked whether he could take it for granted, in view of the fact that we dealt first with Section 3, that Sections 1 and 2'.4 were agreeable to Management. The writer's reply was that this was not intended. The discussion ,of these sections being purposely delayed until such time as more informa- tion was obtained on the sections dealing with Wages, Hours of Work, Vacations, and Check-off. 'These things concern us most from the standpoint of economy and speed of production and that it was intended that further discussion would take 'place on- the first two sections. It is evident that Phillips gave the impression that exclusive recog- nition might be granted to the Union after the respondent had satis- fied itself with respect to the other provisions of the contract. The entire record shows, however, that Phillips at no time intended to grant to the Union the exclusive recognition to which it was entitled under the Act. Although Phillips' memorandum states that the above quoted comments satisfied Fritchman, the latter testified,. and we find, that he and Medrick asked for a definite answer on the section dealing with exclusive recognition and accused the respondent of "stalling." That the union representatives -proceeded to.discuss other contract provisions despite the position taken by Phillips on exclusive recognition indicates only that they did not desire to break off negotia- tions so long as they thought agreement. possible.. The respondent's representatives at the meeting_ of January 10 raised questions as to a number of provisions in the proposed contract other than that dealing with exclusive recognition, and discussed them with the union representatives, but made no definite proposals- and committed the respondent to nothing. , After approximately 2 hours of discussion, Medrick accused the respondent's. representatives of wasting time and attempted to impress them with the need for. ex= pediting the negotiations. Phillips replied that the respondent was moving as fast as possible and that. as a result of the meeting "Man- agement had secured It lot of additional information which would be used for further consideration of the proposed agreement." - The parties then discussed a date for the next meeting. Phillips stated that -no-definite date could be 'set but that Fritchman should telephone him on January 13, when a date would be fixed.. The union repre- sentatives protested against delay and warned that their members were becoming impatient at the respondent's failure to agree to anything or 14 Section 1 defined the employees covered by the proposed contract . Section 2 pro- vided , among other things, for recognition of the'Union as the sole collective bargaining agency for the respondent's employees. 246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to make any definite proposals. They offered to meet with the respond- ent's representatives at night or on Saturdays or at any other time convenient to the respondent, so long as the meetings were held at frequent intervals. Phillips insisted that he could not set a date because of the pressure of work, and that lie could not meet with the union representatives at night after having worked all day at the plant. The union representatives replied that the respondent 's atti- tude might lead to serious difficulties among the employees and that they might "take other action" to compel the respondent to bargain. Medrick stated that if the respondent were not more cooperative he might have to appeal for "outside help", and that unless a definite answer were given in the near future he would feel obliged. to appeal to the Board and to notify the Defense Commission that the respondent refused to cooperate and bargain collectively, "thus interfering with the National. Defense Program." However, Phillips insisted that the union representatives telephone him on January 13 to fix a date for the next conference, and so the matter rested. On January 13 Fritchman called on Phillips and was told that the earliest possible date for the next meeting, "due to a heavy schedule for Mr. Quinn and other representatives of Management in the coming 2 weeks," was January 24. Fritchman protested, pointing out that at a union meeting held on the previous day a resolution had been adopted calling for "further action" if an agreement with the respondent were not reached by February 1. Fritchman also stated that other. com- panies with which he had negotiated met with the union representatives several times weekly and in the evenings, but Phillips replied that he should not be expected to meet with the Union after having spent a full day at the plant. Later the same day, Medrick telephoned Phillips and attempted to, persuade him to set an earlier date. Medrick again' told Phillips that he might have to call in a government official in order to expedite the negotiations, and that he. might have to broadcast the fact that the respondent was interfering with the Defense Program .by ref ising. to bargain with the union. Phillips' memorandum of his talks with Fritchman and Medrick on January 13 states in part : As had been stated earlier in the day to Mr. Fritchman, it was explained .to Mr. Medrick that there must be a clear distinction made between the handling of grievances and the negotiations for a contract and that it was the disposition of management to deal with the S. W. O. C. in the handling of any grievances which came from such members who so designated them as their agents, and this the management was quite willing to do and could get together with the interested parties on a comparatively short. notice, but that any negotiations for a contract, involving as it does an increase in wages, the possible curtailment of hours of LEBANON STEEL -FOUNDRY 247 work and other special considerations, required lengthy aud, de- liberate attention by management. In the nwantin e we intended to recognize and deal with the Independent Group as sole collec- tive bargaining agent until the definite. status of each. group: was established. (Italics supplied) Phillips admitted at the hearing that he told Medrick on January 13 that he intended to recognize and deal with the. so-called independent group as sole collective bargaining agent "until the definite status of each group was established," but testified further that he used the term "sole collective bargaining agent" without proper knowledge of its implications.15 He later testified, however, that he had been dealing with the so-called independent group, as the exclusive representative of all the employees and had that in mind in writing the memoranda. of his meetings with the Union. He then denied having in fact used the term "sole collective bargaining 'agent" in talking to the union representatives, and stated that the appearance of this expression in his memoranda of the conversations of December 21 and January 10 and 13 was erroneous. . Phillips' testimony as to his relationship with the so-called independent, group and as to his statements concerning that relationship made to the union representatives during the negotia- tions was vacillating, contradictory, and unconvincing. We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the statements as to the so-called inde- pendent group which appear in Phillips' memoranda of his conversa- tions with the union representatives were made by him substantially as they appear in his memoranda. At the conclusion of the telephone conversation on January 13; Phillips said that he intended to review again the question of a date for the next meeting, and told Medrick to telephone him again the following day. On January 14, Medrick again spoke to Phillips and was informed that no date earlier than January 24 could be set. Med- rick, replied that this did not meet with his approval and.that it was becoming necessary for him to seek the help of the Board-to settle the matter sooner. Later the same day, the Union filed a charge with the Board's Regional. Office, and a Field Examiner of the Board tele- phoned Phillips and told him that the charge had been filed and that he wanted to hear the respondent's side of the story. Phillips immedi- ately stated that the respondent's representatives were entirely at the Board's. disposal and that a meeting could be had. at any time that was 15 The respondent contends in its briefs that it requires no "stretch of the imagination" to infer that Phillips was not entirely clear in his own mind as to the respondent's rights and duties "under the circumstances ." The record leaves little doubt that Phillips and the respondent were fully aware of their obligations under the Act. The record shows that the respondent's officers were receiving legal advice during the' period of the negotia- tions with the Union. 248 DECISIONS OF .NATIONAL LABOR:, RELATIONS BOARD convenient.to the Board's representatives. Accordingly, a meeting was arranged .for January 20.18 On January 20, the Board's- Field Examiner and Fritchman met with Phillips and Stanley. 'The Examiner asked Phillips whether or not the respondent was engaged in any collective bargaining. Phil- lips replied, as his memorandum indicates, "in the affirmative", and then proceeded to give •"a brief history of our bargaining activities with the Association of Independent Lebanon Steel Foundry Work- ers ..." The Examiner then asked Phillips why_he had met with the Union, and Phillips replied,, again according to his memorandum of the meeting, by restating "the Company policy of meeting with any sincere person or group claiming to represent any. of our employees." It was then suggested by the Examiner that the matter could perhaps be disposed. of through a consent election. The respondent's attorney joined the meeting and the question of a consent election was discussed. The respondent's representatives indicated that it would agree to a consent election in which the names of both the Union and the so-called independent group appeared on the ballot. As to this, Fritchman stated that he could not consent without taking'the matter up with the Union. The Examiner then asked whether the respondent would be willing to sign the usual form of consent election agreement, which provides that the respondent will grant exclusive recognition to the Union if it' is. certified as a result of the election, that the respondent will:bargain in good faith, and that it will reduce to writing any agree- ment arrived at as the result of such bargaining. Phillips testified at the hearing that his reply to the Examiner's question on January 20 was that the.acts set forth in the usual form of consent election agree- ment are required by law and .that the respondent would obey the law. However, Phillips' notes of the meeting specifically state : "Neither the writer nor Senator Becker [the respondent's attorney] were in a position to give Mr. House, [the Field Examiner]. our answer on this, stating, however, that when he" next came to Lebanon on Thursday, January 23rd, as he had announced he would, that we would be in a position to give him a definite reply as to whether or' not we would sign such a paper." In view,of this and of subsequent events, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that.Phillips did not at the conference of January 20 state that the respondent would obey the law. Before the conference. ended, the Examiner suggested that negotia- tions continue pending the holding of an election, so that no time would be lost in consummating an agreement in the event that the Union won the election. The respondent rejected this proposal. .'e The expressed willingness and ability of the respondent to confer with the Board's representative at his convenience contrasts with its refusal to meet with the Union before' January 24. LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY 249 On,January 23, Phillips, on the advice of counsel, communicated with Fritchman and advised him that since the Board had intervened in the case there would be no point in further negotiations . Accord- ingly, he canceled the conference which the respondent had previously said would be held on January 24. On the same day, January 23, the Field Examiner .conferred with representatives of the so-called independent group, and was told by them that they had no desire to participate in any election that was held. The respondent was advised of this fact . However, the re spondent had not yet clearly stated whether it would accord exclusive recognition to the Union if it won an election , would bargain in good faith with the Union, and would reduce to writing any agreement reached. This was apparently the only obstacle remaining in the way of an election at this point. On January 25, the Board's representa- tive wrote a letter to the respondent's attorney which read, in part, as follows : In accordance with our telephone conversation of Thursday even- ing, I am writing to ask for a clear statement of the Lebanon Steel , Foundry Company 's position on the following question; If the Steel Workers Organizing Committee represents a ma- -' jority of the employees in an appropriate unit at the Lebanon Steel Foundry, will the company recognize the Steel Workers Organizing , Committee as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, and bargain. with it in good faith, reducing ' to writing any agreement which might be arrived at as the result of such collective bargaining? To this the respondent's attorney replied, on January 29 , as follows: Answering your letter of the 25th instant in this :matter we state the position of the Lebanon Steel Foundry, as follows : First. Section 8 of the Wagner Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (5) to refuse to bar- gain collectively with the representatives of his employees, and Section 9 provides that (a) representatives designated or. se- lected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided that an employer may be required to reduce to writing any agreement arrived at as the result of collective bargaining. Under the circumstances we have advised our client and they take the position upon our recommendation that a request to 250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD put into writing that which the law already requires them to do is unreasonable _ and capricious and our client's answer to your first inquiry is in the negative. It is to be noted that the Field Examiner was merely asking whether the respondent would engage in certain conduct if the Union repre- rented a majority of its employees, and that the conduct as to which inquiry was thus made is part of the obligation imposed on employers by the Act. In view of the circumstances under which the respond- ent'sreply was made and of all the events which had preceded it, particularly the respondent's prior refusal to grant exclusive recog- nition to the Union as. required under the Act, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the respondent's refusal to commit itself on this point in the letter of January 29 establishes its determination to make no declaration indicating its willingness in fact to comply with the law. 2. The so-called independent group The evidence as to the so -called independent group is vague. It appears only that there is some sort of employee representation plan in the respondent's plant and that the respondent has dealt with representatives designated under the plan with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions . Leo Moyer, who has been in the re- spondent's employ for 13 years and ,was one of the plan representa- tives elected in- September or October 1940, testified without contradic- tion, and we find, that he had never seen any bylaws or constitution for the so-called independent group and had never heard it referred to by name until the alleged bylaws of the Association of Independ- ent Lebanon Steel Foundry Workers were displayed to him at the con- ference of January 20 , 1941; that the plan had no membershp ,:require- ments ; and that it collected no dues. Phillips testified that, although he had been dealing with representatives under the plan since ap- proximately February 1, 1940, he never saw its bylaws until one of the representatives showed him the alleged bylaws of the Association of Independent Lebanon Steel Foundry, Workers on January 20: Whether the so-called independent group is identical with the Associa- tion and in fact has any constitution or bylaws does not appear from the record. The respondent , although invited to do so by the Trial Examiner, declined to adduce proof that the alleged bylaws of the Association are'the bylaws of the so-called ,independent group. Phillips testified, and we find , that no record was kept of his meetings with the representatives, that the representatives have never had either an oral or -a written contract with the respondent, that they have never requested exclusive bargaining rights, and that the respondent has never expressly accorded them such rights. Phillips LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY 251 'further testified that lie had been informed that, in the last election of representatives held in September or October 1940, 275 employees had participated, which was "very close to half" of the employees'then on the pay roll. In November 1940, after the Union had started its organizing campaign; Phillips called the employee representatives to his office in order, as he himself testified : To' acquaint the men that they were charged with the responsi- bility of bringing to our. attention such grievances, as arose within the plant, and that we had heard that such grievances were being neglected, and that we were engaged in a program of national defense work, and we did not care to have-any inter- ruption with our production. Therefore, we wanted to remind them of their duties in this respect. This is a significant commentary on the lack of interest of the ,re- spondent's employees in the so-called independent group and on the respondent's cognizance of the failure of the so-called representa- tives to represent and speak for the respondent's employees. Phillips was, informed. by Fritchman on December 21, and it is not disputed., that six :of, the nine representatives chosen at the last election were union men. There' is no evidence that the so-called. independent group at any time disputed the. Union's claim of majority -representation, claimed majority representation for itself, or was in fact designated as their bargaining agent by a majority of the, employees..: Nor is there any evidence that the respondent had reason to believe that the so-called independent group had been so designated by the employees. The request that the name of the.so-called independent group appear on the ballot in any consent election that was held was made not by it-but by, the respondent. - When some of. the employee representatives were asked by the Board's Field Examiner on January 23 whether. they desired to appear on the ballot in an election, they disclaimed all desire to do so. .. 3. Conclusions as to the refusal'to bargain Starting in the fall of 1940, there' was a considerable increase in the number of employee grievances in the respondent's plant. Whether this was due to the wage incentive plan which was then put into effect, or to the pressure of work under the defense program in which the respondent was engaged, or to other causes, is.of no great importance. When Phillips summoned the employee representatives to his office in November 1940, he implicitly recognized the special need for effective employee representation under then existing conditions and the impor- tance of such representation to continuity of production ' under the 252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD respondent's defense contracts. But employee representation is mean- ingless unless the duly designated collective bargaining representative of the employees is recognized as such by the employer, and refusal to grant such recognition is a major cause of the "industrial strife and unrest" which the Act is designed to remove. Nevertheless, Phillips and the other representatives of the respondent failed and refused to grant exclusive recognition to the Union, although they knew that 6 of the 9 representatives of the so-called independent group had gone over to the Union, and although they raised no question during the negotiations as to the appropriate unit or as to the Union's representa- tion of a majority in that unit. This failure and refusal to grant ex- clusive recognition to the Union constituted an outright refusal to bargain collectively within the meaning of the Act.17 As we have said before, Sections 8 (5) and 9 (a) of the Act "provide that the employer shall bargain with the agency selected by a majority of the employees, as exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit." 18 In the absence of such recognition of the Union, the respondent's discussions with the Union's representatives of the provisions of the proposed contract did not constitute collective bargaining. Even those discussions, however, were abruptly brought to a halt by the re- spondent on January 23, 1941, on the stated ground that a complaint had been filed by the Union with the Board and the Board had inter- vened in the case. We think it evident that the pendency of a proceed- ing before the Board does not in any way suspend the operation of the Act or relieve the respondent of any of its duties thereunder'9 By thus abruptly terminating the negotiations on January 23, the respond- ent simply refused to discharge its duty under the Act to bargain collectively. The respondent's failure to grant exclusive recognition to the Union and its unilateral decision to discontinue the negotiations constitute outright refusals to bargain collectively. They are also clear evidence of a lack on the respondent's part of the good faith without which gen- uine collective bargaining is impossible. An employer who does not question or investigate a union's claim of majority representation in an appropriate unit, but at the same time fails to extend exclusive rec- "Matter of Hobbs, Wall and Company, a corporation and Lumber c€ Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 61, International Woodworkers of America, 30 N. L. It. B. 1027. Cf. Matter of H. F. Wilcox Oil and Gas Company ; Wilcox Refining Division and/or W. M. Fraser and Oil Workers International Union, Local 257, 28 N. L. It. B. 79. 18 See Matter of Hartsell Mills Company and Textile Workers' Organizing Committee, 1S N. L. R. B. 268, at p. 277 , mod. and enf'd, Hartsell Mills Company v. N. L. R. B., 111 F. (2d) 291 (C. C. A. 4). 11 See Matter of Sheba Ann Frocks, Inc. and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union of America, Locals 121 and 204, 5 N. L. It. B. 12, 16. Cf. Matter of Hartsell Mills Company and Textile Workers' Organizing Committee, 18 N. L. R. B. 268, 279-80, mod. and enf'd, Hartsell Mills Company v. N. L. If. B., 111 F. ( 2d) 291 (C. C. A. 4). LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY 253 ognition to that union, does not display the willingness to negotiate on an equal basis which is a primary part of bona fide bargaining. Sim- ilarly, an employer who has entered into negotiations with an open mind and with a desire to arrive at an agreement does not, when he is charged with having already engaged in conduct constituting a refusal to bargain collectively, summarily sever all relations with the union and thereby make agreement impossible. We are convinced by the re- spondent's refusal to grant recognition and by its cessation of negotia- tions, even if there were nothing else, that the respondent did not enter upon or participate in the negotiations from December 16, 1940, to January 23, 1941, with the honest and sincere purpose of reaching an agreement if possible: The record, however, contains ample additional evidence of the re- spondent's lack of good faith in its negotiations with the Union. Al- though the so-called independent group had made no showing of mem- bership and had neither requested recognition nor attempted to ne- gotiate a contract, the respondent persistently injected the name of the independent group into the negotiations with the Union, first by insist- ing that it would recognize the independent group as the sole bargain- ing agent until the question of representation was settled, and second by requesting that the name of the independent group be placed on the ballot along with that of the Union in any election conducted by the Board. When representatives of the independent group indicated to the Board's Field Examiner that they had no desire. to have their group's name appear on the ballot in an election, the respondent still refused to enter into the usual form of consent election agreement, and declined even to state in writing that it would comply with its statu- tory duty to recognize the Union as sole and exclusive bargaining agent if it represented a majority of the employees, to bargain with it in good faith, and to reduce to writing any agreement reached as the result of such collective bargaining. When it did meet and confer with the rep- resentatives of the Union, the respondent was dilatory and evasive in setting the dates for such meetings and in considering the provisions of the proposed contract submitted by the Union, failing to commit itself in any way with respect to any provisions of the contract. There is no innocent explanation for the respondent's gratuitous in- jection of the independent group as a factor in the negotiations with the Union and in the proposed consent election, or for the repondent's unwillingness to undertake in writing to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively either by signing a consent election agreement or by responding favorably to the inquiry from the Board's Field Examiner. The first was an attempt by the respondent to use an ap- parently dormant labor organization as a screen against the Union's attempts to negotiate a contract; the second demonstrated an aversion 254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to collective bargaining deep enough to deter the respondent from un- equivocally stating its intention to comply with the statutory duty which the respondent now so earnestly contends it has fully discharged. At the hearing, the respondent attempted to explain and justify its dilatory and evasive conduct in the negotiations by testimony that its officers and executives were extremely busy during December 1940 and the early, part of January 1941 because of extra duties connected with the year-end, the pressure of government defense contracts, construction of a new plant, and other business matters. We are not convinced by this testimony. As we have pointed out above, the con- siderable increase in employee grievances in the fall of 1940 empha- sized the' importance of effective employee representation and of expeditious and bona fide collective bargaining to the efficient and uninterrupted performance ' of the respondent's defense contracts. Nevertheless, on December 21, after having had the Union's proposed contract for 5 days, the respondent's representatives' were able only to listen to a reading of it. On January 10, the respondent's representa- tives discussed certain provisions of the contract, but made no definite proposals or commitments and insisted upon an additional delay of 2 weeks before engaging in further discussion. Phillips, although he was admittedly cognizant of the dissatisfaction among the respond- ent's employees, refused to meet "at night or on Saturdays in order to expedite the negotiations. We ' do not believe that the multiplicity of year-end duties and the added burden of defense contracts were the reason, for the, respondent's dilatory and evasive treatment of the Union's attempts,to bargain, or that they justified the respondent's failure: to find time to bargain with the Union with reasonable expedi- tion. Such delay and evasion are not the hallmarks of bona -fide collective' bargaining. We find 'that' on December 16, 1940, at all times thereafter, 'and specifically on December 21, 1940, and on January 10, January 13, and January 23, 1941, the respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, and that it thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. IV. THE EFFEIJP OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I above, have a close, intimate and substantial relation to trade, traffic and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the 'free flow of commerce. LEBANON STEEL FOUNDRY 1 V. THE REMEDY 255 Having found that the respondent leas engaged in unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease anal , desist tlirefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. We have found that the respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union as exclusive representative ' of'the respondent's em- ployees in an appropriate unit. We shall therefore order the respond- ent, upon request , to bargain collectively with the Union as such representative with respect to rates of pay , wages, hours of 'employ- ment, and other conditions of employment , and, if an understanding is reached on any such matters, to embody such understanding in a signed, written agreement with the Union if requested to do so by the Union. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire. record in the case, the Board makes the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Steel Workers Organizing Committee, affiliated with the C. I. 0., is a labor organization, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. All production and maintenance employees in the respondent's plant, including the shipping department and truck drivers, but excluding supervisory employees, office and clerical employees, and laboratory assistants, at all times material herein constituted, and they now constitute, a unit appropriate for the purposes of col- lective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 3. Steel Workers Organizing Committee, affiliated with the C. I. 0., was on December 16, 1940, and at all material times thereafter the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining of all the employees in the appropriate unit, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 4. By refusing on December 16, 1940, and at all time thereafter, to bargain collectively with Steel Workers Organizing Committee, affiliated with the C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act. 5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the At. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Lebanon Steel Foundry, Lebanon, Pennsylvania, and its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Steel Workers Organ- izing Committee, affiliated with the C. I. 0., as the exclusive repre- sentative of all production and maintenance employees in the respond- ent's plant, including the shipping department and truck drivers, but excluding supervisory employees, office and clerical employees, and laboratory assistants; (b) Engaging in any like or related acts or conduct interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi- zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of col- lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Steel Workers Organ- ing Committee, affiliated with the C. I. 0., as the exclusive represen- tative of all production and maintenance employees in the respondent's plant, including the shipping department and truck drivers, but ex- cluding supervisory employees, office and clerical employees, and laboratory assistants, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an under- standing is reached on any such matters, embody such understanding in a signed, written agreement with the Union if requested to do so by the Union; (b) Post immediately in conspicuous places throughout its plant at Lebanon, Pennsylvania, and maintain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date of posting, notices to its employ- ees stating: (1) that the respondent will not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered to cease and desist in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of this Order; and (2) that the respondent will take the affirmative action set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of this Order; (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Fourth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply therewith.