MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-23-0012-I-1
David Bradbury v. Department of Homeland Security (DA-0752-23-0012-I-1)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
DAVID BRADBURY,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY,
Agency.
DOCKET NUMBER
DA-0752-23-0012-I-1
DATE: July 12, 2024
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1
Lawrence A. Berger , Esquire, Glen Cove, New York, for the appellant.
Beverlei E. Colston , Esquire, Irving, Texas, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
Henry J. Kerner, Member*
*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.
FINAL ORDER
¶1
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
upheld his removal based on a sustained charge of conduct unbecoming a Federal
law enforcement officer. On petition for review, the appellant challenges the
administrative judge’s decision to sustain both specifications and the charge and
1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
her assessment of the penalty. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3. Generally,
we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the
initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is
based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous
application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings
during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent
with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting
error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal
argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section
1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition
for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to supplement the administrative
judge’s penalty analysis, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
¶2
We have considered the appellant’s arguments on review, but none warrants
a different outcome. For example, we are not persuaded by the appellant’s effort
to characterize specification 1 as an allegation of failure to follow instructions,
instead of conduct unbecoming. Id. at 7-11. We acknowledge that the
administrative judge did not make any explicit credibility determinations on
whether the appellant heard the Assistant Special Agent in Charge’s (ASAC’s)
instruction to stop, id. at 9-10, but she later found that the appellant
“disregard[ed]” the ASAC’s instructions in this regard, Initial Appeal File (IAF),
Tab 30, Initial Decision (ID) at 10. Where, as here, an administrative judge has
heard live testimony, her credibility determinations must be deemed to be at least
implicitly based upon the demeanor of the witnesses. Little v. Department of
Transportation, 112 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 4 (2009). Moreover, the Board must defer
to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based,
explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a
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hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only when it has
“sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice,
288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The appellant has not identified such
reasons. Ultimately, the appellant has not persuaded us that the administrative
judge erred when she found that the appellant’s conduct during and after the
October 20, 2021 meeting constituted conduct unbecoming a Federal law
enforcement officer. We find that she correctly sustained specification 1.
¶3
The appellant does not appear to challenge the administrative judge’s
substantive findings regarding specification 2, and we affirm the initial decision
in this regard. We also affirm the administrative judge’s decision to sustain the
conduct unbecoming charge.
¶4
We have also considered the appellant’s arguments regarding the penalty.
For example, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge must
independently assess the relevant penalty factors to determine whether the penalty
imposed was reasonable. PFR File, Tab 3 at 17-19. Contrary to the appellant’s
assertion, the administrative judge reviewed the deciding official’s evaluation of
the penalty factors and then conducted her own assessment of many relevant
factors. ID at 15-16.
¶5
Additionally, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred when
she relied on the appellant’s lack of remorse as undermining his rehabilitative
potential. PFR File, Tab 3 at 19-20. He cites to Raco v. Social Security
Administration, 117 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 16 (2011), for the proposition that an
appellant’s decision to defend himself against an agency’s charges does not
indicate that he lacked remorse or failed to admit to wrongdoing. PFR File, Tab 3
at 19-20. The appellant mischaracterizes the administrative judge’s findings.
Importantly, the administrative judge did not find that the appellant’s pursuit of
this appeal evidenced a lack of rehabilitative potential. Rather, she found that he
lacked rehabilitative potential because of, among other things, his lack of
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remorse, continued justification of his actions, 2 and failure to display
professionalism despite being on notice that the agency’s code of conduct
required it. ID at 16. Importantly, we agree with the administrative judge that
the appellant’s testimony that he thought the email described in specification 2
was “respectful,” and he did not see a “problem” with the “professionalism” of
the email, suggests that he is apt to repeat it and shows a lack of rehabilitative
potential. Id.
¶6
The appellant correctly notes that the administrative judge did not explicitly
discuss the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions. 3 PFR File, Tab 3
at 18-19. We supplement the initial decision to explicitly consider this factor.
However, given the temporal proximity of the June 2021 Letter of Counseling,
which was based on similar allegations of unprofessionalism described in
specification 2, coupled with the evidence that the administrative judge discussed
in her analysis of the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation, there remains a
question as to whether a penalty less than removal would work as a deterrent.
¶7
We have also considered mitigating factors. As discussed in the initial
decision, the appellant did not have any prior discipline, he had nearly 20 years of
Federal service, and he had high performance ratings. ID at 14; IAF, Tab 7
at 32-33. Additionally, we have considered, as a mitigating factor, the
circumstances surrounding the incidents described in specifications 1 and 2,
which could fall under the heading of unusual job tensions. Douglas v. Veterans
Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981). For example, the administrative
judge acknowledged that the appellant was “shaken by the circumstances” during
the meeting. ID at 11. Regarding specification 2, the administrative judge noted
that the appellant was “extreme[ly] frustrat[ed]” with being the subject of an
investigation that was ultimately unsupported, and he sent the December 17, 2021
2 The administrative judge noted that the appellant blamed his frustration on a
later-unsupported investigation, office rumors, and an attempt to clear his name. ID
at 16.
3 The deciding official discussed this factor. IAF, Tab 7 at 35.
4
email because he “felt his complaints and concerns had been ignored,” he felt
“humiliated,” and he wanted to “clear his name among his peers.” ID at 16. We
have also considered that the appellant’s conduct, which the administrative judge
found caused the agency officials to fear for their safety and the safety of others
in the room during the October 20, 2021 meeting, lasted only a few seconds. PFR
File, Tab 3 at 16. Finally, we have considered as a mitigating factor the
administrative judge’s decision to credit the appellant’s testimony that he did not
mean the “grinders” comment in his email as a threat. ID at 12; PFR File, Tab 3
at 15.
¶8
However, when evaluating whether a penalty is reasonable, the Board
considers, first and foremost, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct and its
relation to the employee’s duties, position, and responsibilities. Jackson
v. Department of the Army, 99 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 6 (2005). Conduct unbecoming is
a serious charge. Hellein v. Department of Agriculture, 8 M.S.P.R. 373, 375
(1981). The Board has long recognized that a higher standard of conduct and
degree of trust are required of an incumbent of a position with law enforcement
duties, such as the appellant. Luongo v. Department of Justice, 95 M.S.P.R. 643,
¶ 13 (2004) aff’d, 123 F. App’x 405 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Cantu v. Department of the
Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 253, ¶ 8 (2001). Although there are several mitigating
factors in this case, there are also significant aggravating factors. We believe that
the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, and we discern no error
with the administrative judge’s finding that the removal penalty was reasonable
for the sustained misconduct.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS4
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
4 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
6
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
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requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
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disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction.5 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
5 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
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Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD:
______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
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