Resolution of advice and consent, Treaty Doc. 102-8

TEXT OF RESOLUTION OF ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION AS APPROVED BY THE SEMATE: @Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), #That the Senate advise and consent to ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), with protocols on existing types (with annex), aircraft reclassification, reduction, helicopter recategorization, information exchange (with annex), inspection, the Joint Consultative Group, and provisional application; all signed at Paris on November 19, 1990 (Treaty Doc. 102-8), provided that the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the Executive, and the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate: (a) Conditions (1) Treaty-Limited Equipment. The United States shall regard actions inconsistent with the Statement by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated June 14, 1991, resolving a dispute concerning the application of the Treaty's principal counting rules in Article III, as equivalent under international law to actions inconsistent with the CFE Treaty. (2) Data. Whereas data supplied by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pursuant to Article XIII and the Protocol on Information Exchange, regarding its equipment holdings in the Atlantic to the Urals area as of November 19, 1990, differed from United States estimates of such equipment, the United States shall - (A) continue to seek clarification of those holdings of Treaty-limited equipment as of November 19, 1990; and (B) seek to obtain additional reductions of equipment in Treaty-limited categories in the event the President determines that actual holdings of Treaty-limited equipment by any state party exceeded its declaration concerning its holdings of such equipment as of November 19, 1990. (3) Equipment East of the Urals. The United States shall regard militarily significant actions inconsistent with the Statement by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Joint Consultative Group, dated June 14, 1991, with respect to certain equipment in Treaty-limited categories located outside of the Atlantic to the Urals area, as potentially warranting a United States response pursuant to Article XIX; and, in the event of such actions, the President shall report to the Senate concerning the appropriate United States response. (4) Soviet Equipment Temporarily in the Baltics. The United States shall regard actions inconsistent with the Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group on October 18, 1991, with respect to the inclusion in the reduction liabilities set forth in the Treaty of equipment owned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and temporarily located on the territory of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, as equivalent under international law to actions inconsistent with the CFE Treaty. (5) Area of Application and New States. If in the future a new state is formed in the "area of application" that existed on the date of Treaty signature and such state declines to accept the obligations of the Treaty, the President - (A) shall consult with the Senate regarding the effect on the Treaty of such developments; (B) shall, if he determines that such state's holdings, or potential holdings, of equipment in Treaty-limited categories are of such military significance as to constitute a changed circumstance affecting the Treaty's object and purpose, and if he decides not to invoke the withdrawal right under Article XIX, request the depositary to convene, in accordance with paragraph (2) of Article XXI, an extraordinary conference to assess the viability of the Treaty and to determine if an amendment is needed to accomodate the changed circumstance, or undertake other appropriate diplomatic steps; and (C) shall, if he has made the determination described in paragraph (B)- (i) submit for the Senate's advice and consent any change in the obligations of the states parties under the Treaty that is designed to accomodate such circumstance and is agreed to by all states parties, unless such change is a minor matter of an administrative or technical nature; or (ii) if no such change in the obligations is agreed to by all states parties but the President determines nonetheless that continued adherence to the Treaty would serve the national security interests of the United States, seek a Senate resolution of support to such continued adherence, notwithstanding the changed circumstance affecting the Treaty's object and purpose. (6) Presidential Report on Soviet Compliance. Within 30 days of the Senate's approval of the resolution of ratification, the President shall certify in a classified and unclassified report to the Senate whether or not the Soviet Union is in violation or probable violation of the terms of the CFE Treaty and protocols thereto. (b) Declarations (1) Accession to the CFE Treaty. The Senate urges the President to seek the accession to the Treaty by any new state that may in the future be formed in the land area that constituted the "area of application" on the date of Treaty signature. (2) Treaty Interpretation. The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally-based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition (1) in the resolution of ratification approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, with respect to the INF Treaty. (3) Further Arms Reduction Obligations. The Senate declares its intent to approve international agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to the Treaty Power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. (4) Compliance Issues and Future Strategic Arms Treaties. The Senate declares that it will take into account, as part of its consideration of the START Treaty, whether -- (A) the SS-23 missiles of Soviet origin that the President has determined constitute a probable violation of the INF Treaty have been dismantled in accordance with procedures consistent with such Treaty; and (B) the large phased-array radar located at Krasnoyarsk, which constitutes a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, has been dismantled in compliance with such treaty.