ONGOING INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF B–2 AIRCRAFT PRO-GRAM

SEC. 115. ONGOING INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF B–2 AIRCRAFT PRO-GRAM (a) Independent Assessment.—The Secretary of Defense shall provide for an ongoing independent assessment of the technological capabilities and performance of the B–2 aircraft. The Secretary shall appoint a panel of experts and shall use the resources of federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) to conduct the assessment. The Secretary shall provide the panel such resources as are necessary, including technical assistance by private contractors and the United States intelligence community, to assist the panel In conducting the assessment. Individuals appointed to the panel shall 103 STAT. 1375be independent of the Air Force and shall have no arrangements with the Air Force that would constitute a conflict of interest. (b) Report.—The panel shall submit periodic reports of its findings to Congress. The first such report shall be submitted not later than April 1, 1990. Subsequent reports shall be submitted every six months thereafter until B–2 aircraft procurement is completed. Such reports shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form. Each such report shall address the following matters: (1) The capability of air defenses of the Soviet Union to defeat the B–2 aircraft during the designed service life of that aircraft, taking into consideration in particular— (A) the low radar signature and anticipated performance of the aircraft; (B) technological capabilities of the Soviet Union; (C) developments by the Soviet Union of alternatives to defeat the B–2 aircraft; and (D) the estimated cost to the Soviet Union to defeat the B–2 aircraft. (2) The rationale for building the B–2 aircraft as a manned penetrating bomber, taking into consideration in particular— (A) the missions of the aircraft; (B) the capabilities of the aircraft to complete those missions; and (C) the capability of the aircraft to search for, identify, and destroy strategic relocatable targets. (3) The opportunity costs associated with the B–2 program as compared to other available or emerging technologies and operational concepts that could perform the missions of the B–2 aircraft at lesser costs. (4) The planned service life of the B–2 aircraft and the potential for growth in that planned service life through the incorporation of preplanned product improvements and other modifications. (5) The requirements for any follow-on aircraft or system that incorporates both low observable technology and high speed maneuverability. (6) An assessment of the capability of the United States to defeat, identify, and destroy low observable vehicles, including manned aircraft and unmanned systems.