SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROCUREMENT OF B–2 AIRCRAFT

SEC. 119. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROCUREMENT OF B–2 AIRCRAFT (a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States has devoted substantial resources over the past several decades to the strategic bomber force, including substantial resources for— (A) significant upgrades to B–52 aircraft; (B) research, development, and procurement of B–1 air-craft; and (C) research, development, and procurement of air-launched cruise missiles. (2) The current estimate of the Department of Defense of a cost of $70,200,000,000 for acquisition of a force of 132 B–2 aircraft is predicated on several assumptions, including the achievement of cost-reduction initiatives, not all of which have been contracted for. (3) The life-cycle costs for a force of 132 B–2 aircraft would be significantly higher than the acquisition cost estimate of $70,200,000,000. (4) Funds have been approved for the production of 10 B–2 aircraft through fiscal year 1990, but Congress has not decided the total number of such aircraft that should be produced. (5) If a substantial number of B–2 aircraft is not procured, additional funds could be made available for other important military programs. 103 STAT. 1378 (6) Fiscal year 1990 will constitute the fifth consecutive fiscal year for which the amount appropriated for national defense functions of the Government declined (after adjusting for inflation) from the preceding fiscal year. (7) Expected limitations on future defense budgets make it essential that the Nation’s defense priorities be carefully analyzed so as to properly fund the Armed Forces, including the various elements of the Nation’s strategic forces. (b) Sense of Congress.—In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that— (1) it is not prudent or possible at this time to commit to a production rate for the B—2 aircraft higher than the rate under the low-rate initial production plan; (2) the contingent authorization of funds in this Act for the low-rate initial production of two additional B–2 aircraft does not constitute a commitment to support the procurement of large numbers of B–2 aircraft, to provide funding in subsequent years for rate production of B–2 aircraft, or to approve a multiyear procurement of B–2 aircraft; and (3) before a commitment is made to proceed with initial full-rate production of the B–2 aircraft, the President and Congress should carefully consider (based upon the assumption of a START regime that uses the Reykjavik counting rule for bombers, upon the assumption of a START regime that uses alternative rules for counting bombers, and upon the assumption of no START treaty) the desirability and feasibility of— (A) structuring the strategic bomber force of the United States in such a manner that primary reliance would be placed upon bombers carrying cruise missiles rather than bombers having strictly a penetrating role; and (B) pursuing options for the procurement of significantly fewer than 132 B–2 aircraft so that, if a decision is made in the future to procure an operational force of B–2 aircraft, the total acquisition and life-cycle cost of the B–2 aircraft program would be reduced.