SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND UNITED STATES MODERNIZATION POLICY

SEC. 1011. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND UNITED STATES MODERNIZATION POLICY (a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States is currently engaged in a wide range of arms control negotiations in the areas of strategic nuclear forces, strategic defenses, conventional force levels, chemical weapons, and security and confidence building measures. (2) On May 30, 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a “Comprehensive Concept on Arms Control and Disarmament” which placed a special emphasis on arms control as a means of enhancing security and stability in Europe. (3) The President has stated that arms control is one of the highest priorities of the United States in the area of security and foreign policy and that the United States will pursue a dynamic, active arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. (4) The United States has already made major proposals at the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks, convened on March 6, 1989, which would result in a dramatic reduction in Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. (5) The President, on September 25, 1989, made a major new arms control proposal in the area of chemical weapons. (b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the President is to be commended for pursuing a wide array of arms control initiatives in the context of a multitude of arms control negotiations, all of which have been designed to enhance global security and result in meaningful, militarily significant reductions in military forces; (2) Congress fully supports the arms control efforts of the President and encourages the government of the Soviet Union to respond favorably to United States arms control proposals which would require the Soviet Union to reduce its massive quantitative superiority in military weaponry; (3) the President should seek arms control agreements that would not limit the United States to levels of forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; and (4) the President’s efforts to negotiate such agreements is dependent upon the maintenance of a vigorous research and development and modernization program as required for a prudent defense posture. (c) Reaffirmation of Prohibition Relating to Entering Into Certain Arms Control Agreements.—Congress hereby reaffirms 103 STAT. 1547the proviso in the first sentence of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573) that no action may be taken under that Act or any other Act that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treatymaking power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress.