SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION MEASURES

SEC. 1441. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION MEASURES (a) Findings.— Congress makes the following findings: 104 STAT. 1690 (1) On June 1, 1990, the President of the United States and the President of the Soviet Union signed a document entitled “Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability”. (2) In that document, the two nations pledged to pursue additional confidence-building and predictability measures “that would reduce the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war as a result of accident, miscalculation, terrorism, or unexpected technological breakthrough, and would prevent possible incidents between them”. (3) As a result of the recent increase in ethnic, national, economic, and political tensions within the Soviet Union, concern has heightened regarding the possible unauthorized or accidental use of Soviet nuclear weapons. (4) It has been four years since the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive review of its nuclear control procedures and failsafe mechanisms. (5) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in its 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment, concluded that with the recent changes in the global security environment “the risk of nuclear deterrence failing is assessed to be low and at this moment to be decreasing”. (6) While Congress is concerned about continued strategic offensive and defensive modernization by the Soviet Union and the unpredictable status of the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, at this stage the lessened prospects that nuclear weapons of the United States might have to be employed may afford an opportunity to reconsider past reluctance to use certain positive control measures, such as the installation of permissive action links (PALs) on nuclear weapons deployed at sea by the United States and the installation of post-launch destruct mechanisms on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) deployed by the United States, as long as appropriate security measures can be developed to protect the integrity of such destruct mechanisms. (7) On September 15, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in Washington and Moscow. (8) The NRRCs have made a useful contribution to lowering the risks of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war and are capable of taking on expanded roles. (b) Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress— (1) that the President of the United States and the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are to be commended for their June 1, 1990, joint statement to pursue additional nuclear confidence-building measures; and (2) that, in keeping with that joint statement, the President— (A) should invite the Soviet Union to join with the United States in conducting separate but parallel, comprehensive reviews of each nations own nuclear control procedures and failsafe mechanisms; and (B) should propose to the Soviet Union that representatives of the two nations engage in discussions with the objective of agreeing on additional roles and functions that could be assigned to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to further lessen the risks of the outbreak of nuclear war as the result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident. 104 STAT. 1691 (c) Report on Additional Measures.— Not later than March 1, 1991, the President shall submit to Congress a report (in both classified and unclassified form) assessing additional nuclear risk reduction measures which could be implemented pursuant to the joint statement of June 1, 1990, referred to in subsection (b), including the following: (1) Assigning to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) such expanded roles as the following: (A) Serving as a forum for discussions between the two nations on responding to possible nuclear terrorism. (B) Transmitting notifications that may be required under future arms control treaties. (C) Transmitting non-urgent notifications and information requests required under Article 5 of the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (D) Providing a forum for discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on restricting nuclear, chemical, and missile proliferation. (E) Serving as a meeting place for high-level military discussions on nuclear doctrines, forces and activities, and regional security concerns. (2) Installation of post-launch destruct mechanisms on all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) deployed by the United States. (3) Installation by the United States of permissive action links (PALs) on all nuclear weapons at sea.