Pub. L. 102-25, tit. V, sec. 501

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT

EnactedYear: 1991Length: 947 wordsOfficial source
SEC. 501. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT (a) Report Required.— Not later than January 15, 1992, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the conduct of the hostilities in the Persian Gulf theater of operations. The Secretary shall submit to such committees a preliminary report on the conduct of those hostilities not later than July 1, 1991. The report (including the preliminary report) shall be prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command. (b) Discussion of Accomplishments and Shortcomings.— The report (and the preliminary report, to the extent feasible) shall contain a discussion, with a particular emphasis on accomplishments and shortcomings, of the following matters: (1) The military objectives of the multinational coalition. (2) The military strategy of the multinational coalition to achieve those military objectives and how the military strategy contributed to the achievement of those objectives. (3) The deployment of United States forces and the transportation of supplies to the theater of operations, including an 105 STAT. 104assessment of airlift, sealift, afloat prepositioning ships, and Maritime Prepositioning Squadron ships. (4) The conduct of military operations. (5) The use of special operations forces, including operational and intelligence uses classified under special access procedures. (6) The employment and performance of United States military equipment, weapon systems, and munitions (including items classified under special access procedures) and an analysis of— (A) any equipment or capabilities that were in research and development and if available could have been used in the theater of operations; and (B) any equipment or capabilities that were available and could have been used but were not introduced into the theater of operations. (7) The scope of logistics support, including support from other nations, with particular emphasis on medical support provided in the theater of operations. (8) The acquisition policy actions taken to support the forces in the theater of operations. (9) The personnel management actions taken to support the forces in the theater of operations. (10) The role of women in the theater of operations. (11) The effectiveness of reserve component forces, including a discussion of each of the following matters: (A) The readiness and activation of such forces. (B) The decisionmaking process regarding both activation of reserve component forces and deployment of those forces to the theater of operations. (C) The post-activation training received by such forces. (D) The integration of forces and equipment of reserve component forces into the active component forces. (E) The use and performance of the reserve component forces in operations in the theater of operations. (F) The use and performance of such forces at duty stations outside the theater of operations. (12) The role of the law of armed conflict in the planning and execution of military operations by United States forces and the other coalition forces and the effects on operations of Iraqi compliance or noncompliance with the law of armed conflict, including a discussion regarding each of the following matters: (A) Taking of hostages. (B) Treatment of civilians in occupied territory. (C) Collateral damage and civilian casualties. (D) Treatment of prisoners of war. (E) Repatriation of prisoners of war. (F) Use of ruses and acts of perfidy. (G) War crimes. (H) Environmental terrorism. (I) Conduct of neutral nations. (13) The actions taken by the coalition forces in anticipation of, and in response to, Iraqi acts of environmental terrorism. (14) The contributions of United States and coalition intelligence and counterintelligence systems and personnel, including contributions regarding bomb damage assessments and particularly including United States tactical intelligence and related activities (TIARA) programs. 105 STAT. 105 (15) Command, control, communications, and operational security of the coalition forces as a whole, and command, control, communications, and operational security of the United States forces. (16) The rules of engagement for the coalition forces. (17) The actions taken to reduce the casualties among coalition forces caused by the fire of such forces. (18) The role of supporting combatant commands and Defense Agencies of the Department of Defense. (19) The policies and procedures relating to the media, including the use of media pools. (20) The assignment of roles and missions to the United States forces and other coalition forces and the performance of those forces in carrying out their assigned roles and missions. (21) The preparedness, including doctrine and training, of the United States forces. (22) The acquisition of foreign military technology from Iraq, and any compromise of military technology of the United States or other countries in the multinational coalition. (23) The problems posed by Iraqi possession and use of equipment produced in the United States and other coalition nations. (24) The use of deception by Iraqi forces and by coalition forces. (25) The military criteria used to determine when to progress from one phase of military operations to another phase of military operations, including transition from air superiority operations to operations focused on degrading Iraqi forces, transition to large-scale ground offensive operations, and transition to cessation of hostilities. (26) The effects on the conduct of United States military operations resulting from the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. (c) Casualty Statistics.— The report (and the preliminary report, to the extent feasible) shall also contain (1) the number of military and civilian casualties sustained by coalition nations, and (2) estimates of such casualties sustained by Iraq and by nations not directly participating in the hostilities in the Persian Gulf area during the Persian Gulf Conflict. (d) Classification of Reports.— The Secretary of Defense shall submit both the report and the preliminary report in a classified form and an unclassified form.
Pub. L. 102-25, tit. V, sec. 501: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT | Justis AI