SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MARINE CORPS.

SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MARINE CORPS. (a) Findings.—With respect to the roles and missions of the Army and Marine Corps, the Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Army and the Marine Corps both provide military capabilities that are necessary for carrying out the national military strategy of the United States. (2) Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the complementary nature of those capabilities and the substantial degree to which the Army and the Marine Corps can effectively coordinate their activities and cooperate with each other. (3) The availability of future Federal budget resources for the Army and the Marine Corps is likely to be significantly more limited than the Federal budget resources currently available for the Army and the Marine Corps. (b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Army and the Marine Corps should intensify efforts— (1) to eliminate unnecessary duplication; and (2) to improve interservice coordination and to specialize in specific functional areas. (c) Examination by CJCS.—(1) The Congress encourages the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine whether— (A) the Army should provide the Marine Corps with armor and heavy fire support needed for mid-intensity and high-intensity combat; or (B) the Marine Corps should be equipped with the armor, heavy artillery, and other weapons and sustainability needed to engage in mid-intensity and high-intensity combat independent of the other military services. (2) In conducting the examination, the Chairman should consider the following actions: (A) Designating Army artillery battalions equipped with the Multiple Launch Rocket System to support Marine amphibious forces afloat. (B) Designating Army tank battalions to support Marine amphibious forces afloat. (C) Equipping maritime prepositioning ships with Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers and Ml tanks to be manned by Army units in support of Marine forces. (D) Transferring management of all prepositioning shipping on behalf of all of the Armed Forces to the Marine Corps. 106 STAT. 2472 (E) Transferring Army shipping and lighterage to the Navy. (3) In the consideration of the actions referred to in paragraph (2), the Chairman should evaluate the logistics, training, and operational implications of each action. (4) If the Chairman recommends that the Marine Corps be equipped with the armor, heavy artillery, other weapons, and sustainability necessary for engaging in mid-intensity and high-intensity combat independent of the other services, the Chairman should determine, as part of the examination under this paragraph, the following: (A) What additional procurement requirements and costs are necessary to equip the Marine Corps to meet the demands of mid-intensity and high-intensity combat. (B) The adequacy of current prepositioning programs, mine warfare capability, naval fire support, and night fighting capability to meet the demands of mid-intensity and high-intensity combat. (d) Roles and Missions Authority of Chairman.—The Chairman should consider the findings and sense of Congress set forth in subsections (a) and (b), and the matters set forth in subsection (c), including the options for streamlining the roles and missions of the Army and the Marine Corps, in the performance of the Chairman’s responsibilities under section 153(b) of title 10, United States Code.