FINDINGS, SENSE OF CONGRESS, AND REPORT REQUIREMENT CONCERNING NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

SEC. 1411. FINDINGS, SENSE OF CONGRESS, AND REPORT REQUIREMENT CONCERNING NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. (a) Findings.—The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has successfully met the challenge of helping to maintain the peace, security, and freedom of the United States and its NATO allies for more than 40 years. (2) The national security interests of the United States have been well served by the process of consultation, coordination, and military cooperation in the NATO framework. (3) Recent history has witnessed radical changes in the international security environment, including the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. (4) The military threats which NATO was established to deter have greatly diminished with the end of the Cold War. (5) The post-Cold War security situation continues to present a wide array of challenges to United States national interests, many of which interests the United States shares with its allies in Europe and Canada. (6) The international community may prove capable of deterring many threats to the common peace if it can respond decisively to aggression. 107 STAT. 1827 (7) The United States must share the responsibilities and the burdens of pursuing international security and stability with other nations. (8) Several of the newly democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have expressed interest in seeking membership in NATO. (9) Many of the security challenges facing the post-Cold War world would be best handled through coherent multilateral responses. (10) The United States should never send its military forces into combat unless they are provided with the best opportunity to accomplish their objectives with as little risk as possible. (11) Military interventions against antagonistic armed forces cannot be conducted safely or effectively on a multilateral basis unless such operations are jointly planned in advance and are executed by units which have trained together and are familiar with each others’ operational procedures. (12) NATO is currently the only organization with the experience, trained staff, and infrastructure necessary to support military cooperation with the major military allies of the United States. (13) The NATO allies already have volunteered to consider requests from the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe for assistance in maintaining the peace. (14) Justification of the relevance of NATO in the post-Cold War world will depend largely upon the alliance’s ability to adapt its mission, area of responsibility, and procedures to the new security environment. (15) Justification of future United States support for the alliance and for a United States military presence in Europe will depend upon NATO’s ability to address those security interests which the United States shares with its allies in Europe and Canada. (16) The meeting of the NATO heads of state scheduled for January 1994, presents an excellent opportunity for the President to articulate a new, broader security mission for the alliance in the post-Cold War world, one which will enable it to address a wider array of threats to its members’ interests and which will help to snare more effectively the burden of international security requirements. (b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of the Congress that— (1) old threats to the security of the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization having greatly diminished, and new, more diverse challenges having arisen (including ethno-religious conflict in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in regions proximate to alliance territory), NATO’s mission must be redefined so that it may respond to such challenges to its members’ security even when those challenges emanate from beyond the geographic boundaries of its members’ territories; (2) NATO should review its consultative mechanisms in order to maximize its ability to marshal political, diplomatic, social, and economic solidarity, buttressed by credible military capability, and to bring the full weight and scope of its cooperative efforts to bear in addressing the new challenges; and 107 STAT. 1828 (3) future United States military involvement in, and contributions to, NATO should be determined in relation to the alliance’s success or failure in adapting itself to confronting the challenges of the post-Cold War world. (c) Report.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit a report to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. The report shall contain recommendations on the following: (1) The manner in which NATO can formulate and implement a strategy to address the new, more disparate threats to the security of its members. (2) The manner in which NATO should continue to adapt its consultative process, including efforts to extend that process to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, so as to enhance its political, diplomatic, social, economic, and military efforts to project stability eastward and maximize its capabilities in crisis prevention and crisis management. (3) The feasibility of having NATO conduct security operations beyond the geographic boundaries of the alliance. (4) The manner in which NATO should restructure its forces, training and equipment for the new security environment, including with regard to multinational peacekeeping activities. (5) The desirability of expanding the alliance to include traditionally neutral nations or the new democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that wish to join NATO. (6) The proper size and composition of United States forces to be deployed in Europe to assist in the implementation of NATO’s new mandate and possible reduction in United States military deployments in Europe in the event of the alliance’s failure to adopt a new mandate. (7) The structure and organization of NATO headquarters, with particular attention to the need to reinvigorate the NATO Military Committee. (8) The extent to which NATO liaison teams should be assigned to the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe so as to facilitate better coordination among these organizations, especially in regard to crisis prevention and crisis management. (9) The desirability of having additional NATO forces train in North America in a manner supportive of NATO’s proposed new strategy. (10) The structure of NATO’s military command, with particular attention to the need to make NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force a credible deterrent to regional aggression. (11) The levels of United States, European, and Canadian defense budgets and their ability to finance forces consistent with the implementation of NATO’s new mandate.