NORTH KOREA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SEC. 1613. NORTH KOREA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (a) Findings.—The Congress finds the following: (1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 156 states are party, is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. (2) Any nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is obligated to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all source or special fissionable material that is within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. (3) The International Atomic Energy Agency is permitted to conduct inspections in a nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the Treaty at any site, whether or not declared by that state, to ensure that all source or special fissionable material in that state is under safeguards. (4) North Korea acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nonnuclear weapons state in December 1985. (5) North Korea, after acceding to that Treaty, refused until 1992 to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as required under the Treaty. (6) Inspections of North Korea’s nuclear materials by the International Atomic Energy Agency suggested discrepancies in North Korea’s declarations regarding special nuclear materials. (7) North Korea has not given a scientifically satisfactory explanation for those discrepancies. (8) North Korea refused to provide International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors with full access to two sites for the purposes of verifying its compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (9) When called upon by the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide such full access as required by the Treaty, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, effective after the required three months notice. (10) After intensive negotiations with the United States, North Korea agreed to suspend its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and begin consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency on providing access to its suspect sites. (11) In an attempt to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, the United States has offered to discuss with North Korea specific incentives that could be provided for North Korea once (A) outstanding inspection issues between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy 107 STAT. 1852Agency are resolved, and (B) progress is made in bilateral talks between North Korea and South Korea. (b) Congressional Statements.—The Congress— (1) notes that the continued refusal of North Korea nearly eight years after ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fully accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards raises serious questions regarding a possible North Korean nuclear weapons program; (2) notes that possession by North Korea of nuclear weapons (A) would threaten peace and stability in Asia, (B) would jeopardize the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and (C) would undermine the goal of the United States to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 1995 review conference; (3) urges continued pressure from the President, United States allies, and the United Nations Security Council on North Korea to adhere to the Treaty and provide full access to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the shortest time possible; (4) urges the President, United States allies, and the United Nations Security Council to press for continued talks between North Korea and South Korea on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; (5) urges that no trade, financial, or other economic benefits be provided to North Korea by the United States or United States allies until North Korea has (A) provided full access to the International Atomic Energy Agency, (B) satisfactorily explained any discrepancies in its declarations of bomb-grade material, and (C) fully demonstrated that it does not have or seek a nuclear weapons capability; and (6) calls on the President and the international community to take steps to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.