NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION.

SEC. 1811. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. (a) Findings.—The Congress finds the following: (1) The United States has been seeking to contain the spread of nuclear weapons technology and materials. (2) With the end of the Cola War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a leading military threat to the national security of the United States and its allies. (3) The United Nations Security Council declared on January 31, 1992, that “proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security” and committed to taking appropriate action to prevent proliferation from occurring. (4) Aside from the five declared nuclear weapon states, a number of other nations have or are pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. (5) The IAEA is a valuable international institution to counter proliferation, but the effectiveness of its system to safeguard nuclear materials may be adversely affected by financial constraints. (6) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty codifies world consensus against further nuclear proliferation and is scheduled for review and extension in 1995. (7) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 declared that the United States is committed to continued strong support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to a strengthened and more effective IAEA, and established that it is United States policy to establish more effective controls over the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology. (b) Comprehensive Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy.—In order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it should be the policy of the United States to pursue a comprehensive policy to end the further spread of nuclear weapons capability, roll back nuclear proliferation where it has occurred, and prevent the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, with the following additional objectives: (1) Successful conclusion of all pending nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements with all the republics of the former Soviet Union and their secure implementation. (2) Full participation by all the republics of the former Soviet Union in all multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts and acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. 107 STAT. 1849 (3) Strengthening of United States and international support to the IAEA so that the IAEA has the technical, financial, and political resources to verify that countries are complying with their nonproliferation commitments. (4) Strengthening of nuclear export controls in the United States and other nuclear supplier nations, impose sanctions on individuals, companies, and countries which contribute to nuclear proliferation, and provide increased public information on nuclear export licenses approved in the United States. (5) Reduction in incentives for countries to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional tensions and to strengthen regional security agreements, and encourage the United Nations Security Council to increase its role in enforcing international nuclear nonproliferation agreements. (6) Support for the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference to review and extend that treaty and seek to ensure that all countries sign the treaty or participate in a comparable international regime for monitoring and safeguarding nuclear facilities and materials. (7) Reaching agreement with the Russian Federation to end the production of new types of nuclear warheads. (8) Pursuing, once the START I treaty and the START II treaty are ratified by all parties, a multilateral agreement to significantly reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation to below the levels of the START II treaty, with lower levels for the United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China. (9) Reaching immediate agreement with the Russian Federation to halt permanently the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and working to achieve worldwide agreements to— (A) end in the shortest possible time the production of weapons-usable fissile material; (B) place existing stockpiles of such materials under bilateral or international controls; and (C) require countries to place all of their nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards. (10) Strengthening IAEA safeguards to more effectively verify that countries are complying with their nonproliferation commitments and provide the IAEA with the political, technical, and financial support necessary to implement the necessary safeguard reforms. (11) Conclusion of a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. (c) Requirements for Implementation of Policy.—(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Congress a report, in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary, on the actions the United States has taken and the actions the United States plans to take during the succeeding 12-month period to implement each of the policy objectives set forth in this section. (2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Congress a report in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary, which— 107 STAT. 1850 (A) addresses the implications of the adoption by the United States of a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons; (B) addresses the implications of an agreement with the other nuclear weapons states to adopt such a policy; and (C) addresses the implications of a verifiable bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation under which both countries withdraw from their arsenals and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, and seek to extend to all nuclear weapons states this zero option for tactical nuclear weapons. (d) Definitions.—For purposes of this section: (1) The term “IAEA” means the International Atomic Energy Agency. (2) The term “IAEA safeguards” means the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. (3) The term “non-nuclear weapon state” means any country that is not a nuclear weapon state. (4) The term “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968. (5) The term “nuclear weapon state” means any country that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968. (6) The term “weapons-usable fissile materials” means highly enriched uranium and separated or reprocessed plutonium. (7) The term “policy of no first use of nuclear weapons” means a commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. (8) The term “START II treaty” means the Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on January 3, 1993.