UNITED STATES POLICY ON NORTH KOREA.

SEC. 529. UNITED STATES POLICY ON NORTH KOREA. It is the sense of the Congress that: (1) It is in the United States national security interest to curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. (2) The North Korea nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing national security challenges the United States currently faces. (3) North Korea’s development of other weapons of mass destruction and of ballistic missiles further threatens United States national security interests and regional security. 108 STAT. 478 (4) United States policy should ensure that North Korea does not possess a nuclear bomb or the capability to build one. (5) United States forces in Korea must remain vigilant and maintain a robust defense posture. (6) While diplomacy is the preferable method of dealing with the North Korean nuclear challenge, all options, including the appropriate use of force, remain available. (7) In fashioning an appropriate policy for dealing with the challenge presented by North Korea’s nuclear program, the Administration should consult closely with United States treaty allies, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as with China, Russia, and other members of the United Nations Security Council. (8) United States policy should support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as the international community’s designated body for verifying compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to perform inspections of North Korea’s nuclear program. (9) The United States should encourage strong and expeditious action by the United Nations Security Council inasmuch as North Korea has proved unwilling to comply fully with the following: (A) North Korea’s December 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea pledging not to possess, manufacture, or use nuclear weapons, not to possess plutonium reprocessing facilities, and to negotiate the establishment of a nuclear inspection system. (B) The nuclear safeguards agreement North Korea signed with the IAEA on January 30, 1992. (C) The agreement on IAEA inspections North Korea accepted on February 15, 1994. (10) Unless North Korea unequivocally adheres to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and abides by all provisions of that treaty, the President should seek international consensus to isolate North Korea, including the imposition of sanctions, in an effort to persuade Pyongyang to halt its nuclear weapons program and permit IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities. (11) Recognizing that within the international community China has significant influence over Pyongyang, the nature and extent of Chinese cooperation with the rest of the international community on the North Korean nuclear issue, including Chinese support for international sanctions should such sanctions be proposed and/or adopted, will inevitably be a significant factor in United States-China relations. (12) If unable to achieve an international consensus to isolate North Korea, the President should employ all unilateral means of leverage over North Korea, including, but not limited to, the prohibition of any transaction involving the commercial sale of any good or technology to North Korea. (13) The President should consult with United States allies in the region regarding the military posture of North Korea and the ability of the United States and its allies to deter a North Korean attack, or to defeat such an attack should it occur. 108 STAT. 479 (14) Toward these ends, the United States and South Korea should take all steps necessary to ensure that United States and South Korean forces stationed on the Korean peninsula can defend themselves, including the holding of Team Spirit or other joint military exercises, the deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea, and other appropriate measures. (15) The problem posed by North Korea’s nuclear program is not a bilateral problem between the United States and North Korea, but a problem in which virtually the entire global community is united against North Korea. (16) The international community must insist upon full compliance by North Korea with all its nonproliferation commitments including acceptance of regular and ad hoc inspections of its declared nuclear facilities on a continuing basis, as well as special inspections of all suspected nuclear sites as the IAEA deems appropriate. (17) International concerns about North Korea’s nuclear intentions and capabilities will not be adequately addressed until North Korea cooperates fully with the IAEA, all North Korea nuclear facilities and materials are placed under full scope safeguards, and North Korea adheres unequivocally to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as well as to its 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea. (18) The Administration should work to encourage a productive dialogue between North and South Korea that adequately addresses all security concerns on the Korean peninsula.