SENSE OF THE SENATE CONCERNING MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS.

SEC. 202. SENSE OF THE SENATE CONCERNING MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS. (a) Findings.—The Senate finds that— (1) the United States and its allies have agreed that as of March 31, 1994, the Coordinating Committee (hereafter referred to as “COCOM”), the multilateral body that controlled108 STAT. 2369 strategic exports to the former Soviet Union and other Communist States, ceased to exist; (2) no successor has yet been established to replace the COCOM; (3) threats to United States security are posed by rogue regimes that support terrorism as a matter of national policy; (4) a critical element of the United States proposal for a successor to COCOM is that supplier nations agree on a list of militarily critical products and technologies that would be denied to a handful of rogue regimes; (5) some allies of the United States oppose this principle and instead propose that such controls be left to national discretion”, effectively replacing multilateral export controls with a loose collection of unilateral export control policies which would be adverse for United States security and economic interests; (6) multilateral controls are needed to thwart efforts of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and other rogue regimes, to acquire arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies that could contribute to their efforts to build weapons of mass destruction; and (7) the United States would be forced to make the difficult choice of choosing between unilateral export controls under the Export Administration Act of 1979, which would put American companies at a competitive disadvantage worldwide, or allowing exports that could seriously harm the national security interests of the United States. (b) Sense of the Senate.—It is the sense of the Senate that— (1) the President should work to achieve a clearly defined and enforceable agreement with allies of the United States which establishes a multilateral export control system for the proliferation of products and technologies to rogue regimes that would jeopardize the national security of the United States; and (2) the President should persuade allies of the United States to promote mutual security interests by preventing rogue regimes from obtaining militarily critical products and technologies.