MILITARY PLANNING FOR THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF A FORCE REQUIRED FOR A MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

SEC. 1323. MILITARY PLANNING FOR THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF A FORCE REQUIRED FOR A MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. (a) Findings.— Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Secretary of Defense conducted the Bottom-Up Review during 1993 to establish the size and structure for the Armed Forces for the Post-Cold-War era. (2) The report on the Bottom-Up Review cites the need for the Armed Forces to be large enough to prevail in two major regional conflicts “nearly simultaneously”. (3) The report on the Bottom-Up Review gives special consideration to a scenario that hypothesizes that the two “nearly simultaneous” conflicts would occur in Korea and the Persian Gulf. (4) The United States sent 7 Army divisions, the equivalent of 10 Air Force tactical fighter wings, 70 heavy bombers, 6 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups, and 5 Marine Corps brigades to the Persian Gulf to fight the war against Iraq. (5) The report on the Bottom-Up Review asserts that the forces needed to fight two conflicts similar to that with Iraq can be drawn from a total military force of between 15 and 16 Army divisions, 20 Air Force tactical fighter wings, up to 184 heavy bombers, 11 active Navy aircraft carriers (along with one reserve/training carrier), and the equivalent of 12 Marine Corps brigades. (6) The report on the Bottom-Up Review recognizes that approximately 100,000 members of the Armed Forces will be stationed in Europe. (7) The report on the Bottom-Up Review recognizes that sizeable numbers of United States forces could be involved in peace enforcement and intervention operations at any one time. (8) The report on the Bottom-Up Review makes no specific recommendation as to the number of forces to be held in reserve to provide a rotation base either to relieve troops in the event 108 STAT. 2905one or both hypothetical conflicts result in lengthy deployments or to replace combat losses. (9) Military planners calculate that 430,000 or more United States military personnel may be needed to win a war with North Korea begun by an invasion of South Korea by North Korea. (10) In a worst case scenario, the size of the force military planners may request to help defend South Korea could exceed the levels that are consistent with the recommendations of the report on the Bottom-Up Review if the existing and future force requirements for a presence in Europe, possible peace enforcement operations, and an adequate rotation base, as well as a second regional conflict, must be fulfilled simultaneously. (11) The Bottom-Up Review was conducted for the purpose of force-sizing and was not meant to constrain operational planning. (b) Sense of Congress Concerning BUR.— It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the force structure identified in the report on the Bottom-Up Review should not be used to limit the size or structure of the force that United States military commanders may request in preparation for a major regional contingency on the Korean peninsula; and (2) the conclusions of the Bottom-Up Review should be continuously examined in light of the lessons learned from preparation for a major regional contingency on the Korean peninsula and from other military operations. (c) Sense of Congress Concerning Situation on Korean Peninsula.— It is the sense of Congress that the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Committees on Armed Services and chairmen and ranking minority members of the Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense of the Senate and House of Representatives should receive regular briefings from the Secretary of Defense on the situation on the Korean peninsula.