REPORT ON OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM OF THE STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

SEC. 1207. REPORT ON OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM OF THE STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. (a) Findings.— Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States has identified nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a high priority in the conduct of United States national security policy. (2) The United States is seeking universal adherence to global regimes that control nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and is promoting new measures that provide increased transparency of biological weapons-related activities and facilities in an effort to help deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. (3) In early 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin indicated to former United States President George Bush that Russia still had an offensive biological weapons program. (4) A United States Government report dated January 19, 1993, on arms control noncompliance noted that Russian declarations up to that date had dramatically underestimated the size, scope, and maturity of the former Soviet biological weapons program. (5) Despite President Yeltsin’s decree of April 11, 1993, stating that activities in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention are illegal, questions continue to arise regarding 108 STAT. 2885offensive biological weapons research, development, testing, production, and storage in Russia as well as in other countries. (6) A United States Government report, dated June 23, 1994, states the following: “The United States has determined that the offensive biological warfare program that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union violated the Biological Weapons Convention through at least March 1992. The Soviet offensive biological weapons program was massive, and included production, weaponization, and stockpiling. The status of the program since that time remains unclear and the U.S. remains concerned about the Russian biological warfare program”. (7) The Joint Statement on Biological Weapons issued by officials of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia on September 14, 1992, confirmed the commitment of the three govemments to full compliance with the Biological Weapons invention and outlined steps designed to increase confidence in that commitment. (8) The Presidents of Russia and the United States are scheduled to hold a summit meeting in Washington during the month of September 1994. (b) Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the President should continue to urge all signatories to the Biological Weapons Convention to comply fully with the terms of that convention and with other international agreements relating to the control of biological weapons; (2) the President should keep the Congress fully and currently informed regarding any Russian activities related to offensive biological weapons; (3) the President should continue to insist that the Russian Government complete the steps noted and agreed to in the Joint Statement on Biological Weapons issued by officials of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia on September 14, 1992; (4) subsequent meetings of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia on biological weapons and the September 1994 summit meeting in Washington provide opportunities for the President to again emphasize the importance of resolving the issues related to compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention; (5) in assessing the President’s fiscal year 1996 budget request for foreign assistance funds for Russia, and for other programs and activities to provide assistance to Russia, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, Congress will consider United States Government assessments of Russia’s compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention; and (6) as the President encourages increased transparency of biological weapons-related activities and facilities to deter violations of, and enhance compliance with, the Biological Weapons Convention, the President should also take appropriate actions to ensure that the United States is prepared to counter the effects of use of biological weapons by others. (c) Presidential Reports.— Not later than February 1, 1995, not later than June 1, 1995, and not later than October 1, 1995, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and unclassified forms, containing an assessment of the extent of compliance of the independent states of the former Soviet Union with 108 STAT. 2886the Biological Weapons Convention and other international agreements relating to the control of biological weapons. (d) Content of Report.— The report shall include the following: (1) Matters related to compliance.— (A) An evaluation of the extent of control and oversight by the government of the Russian Federation over the former Soviet military and dual civilian-military biological warfare programs. (B) The extent, if any, of the biological warfare agent stockpile in any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union. (C) The extent and scope, if any, of continued biological warfare research, development, testing, and production by such states, including the sites and types of activity at those sites. (D) An evaluation of the effectiveness of possible delivery systems of biological weapons, including tube and rocket artillery, aircraft, and ballistic missiles. (E) An assessment of measures taken by the Russian Government to complete the steps noted and agreed to in the 1992 Joint Statement on Biological Weapons referred to in subsection (b)(3), including a determination of the extent to which Russia has— (i) agreed to permit visits to military and non-military biological sites in order to attempt to resolve ambiguities; (ii) provided information about biological weapons dismantlement accomplished to date, and further clarification of information provided in its United Nations Declarations regarding biological weapons; (iii) been cooperative in exchanging information on a confidential, reciprocal basis concerning past offensive biological weapons programs not recorded in detail in its declarations to the United Nations; (iv) cooperated in reviewing potential additional measures to monitor compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and modalities for testing such measures; (v) agreed to an examination of the physical infrastructure of its biological facilities to determine whether there is specific equipment or excess capacity inconsistent with their stated purpose; (vi) helped identify ways to promote cooperation and investment in the conversion of biological weapons facilities; and (vii) agreed to exchanges of scientists at biological facilities on a long-term basis. (2) Matters related to united states capabilities.— (A) An evaluation of United States capabilities to detect and monitor biological warfare research, development, testing, production, and storage. (B) On the basis of the assessment and evaluations referred to in other provisions of the report, recommendations by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the improvement of United States biological warfare defense and counter-measures. 108 STAT. 2887 (e) Limitation.— Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, $25,000,000 may not be obligated until the President submits to Congress the first report required under subsection (c).