REVIEW OF THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW AND THE FUTURE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FUNDING REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES.

SEC. 1069. REVIEW OF THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW AND THE FUTURE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FUNDING REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES. (a) Findings.— Congress finds as follows: (1) United States defense policy is to maintain the capability to fight and win two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously. (2) The Secretary of Defense conducted the Bottom Up Review during 1993 to structure the Armed Forces for the Post-Cold War period. (3) The United States military force structure has shrunk dramatically since the 1991 Persian Gulf War and some critical force enhancements will not be deployed for several years. (4) The Secretary of Defense (in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on February 2, 1994) stated that under current inflation assumptions the Department of Defense’s Future Years Defense Program includes approximately $20,000,000,000 more in program funding requests for fiscal years 1996 through 1999 than the defense funding levels projected for the President’s budget for those years. (5) The Secretary of the Navy (in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on March 8, 1994) stated that by 1999 the Department of the Navy will operate only 330 ships, rather than the 346 ships projected in the report on the Bottom Up Review. (6) The Secretary of Defense, in his January 1994 Annual Report to the President and Congress, reported that the Air Force will field approximately 100 heavy bombers, rather than the “up to 184” assumed in the report on the Bottom Up Review. (7) The plans of the Department of Defense for a major regional contingency in the Far East call for up to 5 Army divisions and the plans for a major regional contingency in Southwest Asia call for up to 7 Army divisions, while the report on the Bottom Up Review plans for an Army of 10 active divisions and at least 15 enhanced-readiness Army National Guard brigades. 108 STAT. 2854 (8) The President’s budget for fiscal year 1995 assumes the Department of Defense will save at least $6,000,000,000 from procurement reform. (9) The first and second rounds of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission have not yet achieved the level of savings initially estimated, and the 1995 base closure round may cost significantly more than is assumed in the President’s budget. (10) United States forces are presently involved in humanitarian relief efforts in or around Rwanda, in a number of air and maritime operations relating to the United Nations operations in Bosnia, and in a variety of operations relating to Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, and Macedonia. (11) United States forces may be called upon in the future to conduct additional humanitarian and relief missions. (12) United States forces may be called upon to conduct even more significant operations to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership. (13) Many of the forces that are participating in these other-than-war or nontraditional operations would be required early on in the event of one or more major regional contingencies. (14) There are inevitable tradeoffs among spending on force structure, readiness, modernization, personnel, pay, and quality of life. (b) Sense of Congress.— In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that— (1) within 30 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense should initiate a review of the assumptions and conclusions of the President’s budget, the report on the Bottom Up Review, and the Future Years Defense Program, such review to include consideration of the various other-than-war or nontraditional operations in which the United States forces are or may be participating; (2) not more than 180 days after the review is initiated, the Secretary should submit to the President and Congress a report which— (A) describes in detail the force structure required to fight and win two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously in light of other ongoing or potential operations; (B) may also address possible changes in national security planning or programs, including revised alliance arrangements, increased reliance on reserve component forces, or adjustments to the national military strategy; and (C) includes an evaluation of an Army configured as 12 active duty divisions, a number of which would be rounded out with National Guard combat units; (3) not more than 60 days after receipt of the report from the Secretary of Defense, the President should submit to Congress a report detailing the steps the President intends to take to meet the force structure described in the Secretary’s report; 108 STAT. 2855 (4) future-years defense budgets submitted to Congress by the President should reflect the funding level necessary to support the force structure described in the report; (5) funding for national defense for fiscal years 1995 through 1997 should be established at a level sufficient to support a force structure adequate to meet a two-war strategy and to ensure that the United States does not have a hollow force; (6) the force structure to meet the requirements of a two-war strategy represents the minimum level which should be maintained unless the strategy is modified; (7) whenever possible and consistent with the safety of United States personnel, in deploying military forces in support of operations other than war or other nontraditional operations, the President should seek to use forces other than those identified for early deployment in the event of one or more major regional contingencies; and (8) the President should be willing to increase defense spending if required to meet new or existing threats.