NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL POLICY.

SEC. 1322. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL POLICY. (a) Findings.— Congress makes the following findings: (1) Export controls remain an important element of the national security policy of the United States. (2) It is in the national security interest that United States export control policy be effective in preventing the transfer, to potential adversaries or combatants of the United States, of technology that threatens the national security or defense of the United States. (3) It is in the national security interest that the United States monitor aggressively the export of militarily critical technology in order to prevent its diversion to potential adversaries or combatants of the United States. (4) The Department of Defense relies increasingly on commercial and dual-use technologies, products, and processes to support United States military capabilities and economic strength. (5) The maintenance of the military advantage of the United States depends on effective export controls on dual-use items and technologies that are critical to the military capabilities of the Armed Forces. (b) Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Secretary of Defense should evaluate license applications for the export of militarily critical commodities the export of which is controlled for national security reasons if those commodities are to be exported to certain countries of concern; (2) the Secretary of Defense should identify the dual-use items and technologies that are critical to the military capabilities of the Armed Forces, including the military use made of such items and technologies; (3) upon identification by the Secretary of Defense of the dual-use items and technologies referred to in paragraph (2), the President should ensure effective export controls or use unilateral export controls on dual-use items and technologies that are critical to the military capabilities of the Armed Forces (regardless of the availability of such items or technologies overseas) with respect to the countries that— (A) pose a threat to the national security interests of the United States; and (B) are not members in good standing of bilateral or multilateral agreements to which the United States is a party on the use of such items and technologies; and (4) the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, should ensure effective controls on the re-export by other countries of dual-use items and technologies that are critical to the military capabilities of the Armed Forces. (c) Annual Report.— (1) Not later than December 1 of each year through 1999, the President shall submit to the committees specified in paragraph (4) a report on the effect of the export control policy of the United States on the national security interests of the United States. (2) The report shall include the following: (A) A list setting forth each country determined by the Secretary of Defense, the intelligence community, and other appropriate agencies to be a rogue nation or potential adversary or combatant of the United States. 110 STAT. 479 (B) For each country so listed, a list of— (i) the categories of items that the United States currently prohibits for export to the country; (ii) the categories of items that may be exported from the United States with an individual license, and in such cases, any licensing conditions normally required and the policy pounds used for approvals and denials; and (iii) the categories of items that may be exported under a general license designated “G-DEST”. (C) For each category of items listed under subparagraph (B)— (i) a statement whether a prohibition, control, or licensing requirement on a category of items is imposed pursuant to an international multilateral agreement or is unilateral; (ii) a statement whether a prohibition, control, or licensing requirement on a category of items is imposed by the other members of an international agreement or is unilateral; (iii) when the answer under either clause (i) or clause (ii) is unilateral, a statement concerning the efforts being made to ensure that the prohibition, control, or licensing requirement is made multilateral; and (iv) a statement on what impact, if any, a unilateral prohibition is having, or would have, on preventing the rogue nation or potential adversary from attaining the items in question for military purposes. (D) A description of United States policy on sharing satellite imagery that has military significance and a discussion of the criteria for determining the imagery that has that significance. (E) A description of the relationship between United States policy on the export of space launch vehicle technology and the Missile Technology Control Regime. (F) An assessment of United States efforts to support the inclusion of additional countries in the Missile Technology Control Regime. (G) An assessment of the ongoing efforts made by potential participant countries in the Missile Technology Control Regime to meet the guidelines established by the Missile Technology Control Regime. (H) A discussion of the history of the space launch vehicle programs of other countries, including a discussion of the military origins and purposes of such programs and the current level of military involvement in such programs. (3) The President shall submit the report in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (4) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the following: (A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (B) The Committee on National Security and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives. (5) For purposes of this subsection, the term “Missile Technology Control Regime” means the policy statement announced on April 16, 1987, between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan to restrict sensitive missile-relevant transfers based on the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, and any amendment thereto.