PRESIDENTIAL REPORT REGARDING WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND POLICIES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

SEC. 1306. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT REGARDING WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND POLICIES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (a) Findings.— The Congress finds that— (1) the People’s Republic of China acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter in this section referred to as the “NPT”) on March 9, 1992; (2) the People’s Republic of China is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and remains the only major nuclear supplier that continues to transfer nuclear technology, equipment, and materials to countries that have not agreed to the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter in this section referred to as the “IAEA”) over all of their nuclear materials; (3) on June 30, 1995, the United States and 29 other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group notified the Director General of the IAEA that the Government of each respective country has decided that the controls of that Group should not be defeated by the transfer of component parts; (4) a state-owned entity in the People’s Republic of China, the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, has knowingly transferred specially designed ring magnets to an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; (5) ring magnets are identified on the Trigger List of the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a component of magnetic suspension bearings which are to be exported only to countries that have safeguards of the IAEA over all of their nuclear materials; (6) these ring magnets could contribute significantly to the ability of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to produce additional unsafeguarded enriched uranium, a nuclear explosive material; (7) the Government of the People’s Republic of China has transferred nuclear equipment and technology to the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite repeated claims by the Government of the United States that the Islamic Republic of Iran is engaged in clandestine efforts to acquire a nuclear explosive device; (8) representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China have repeatedly assured the Government of the United States that the People’s Republic of China would abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (hereafter in this section referred to as the “MTCR”); (9) the Government of China has transferred M–11 missiles to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (10) the M–11 missile conforms to the definition of a nuclear-capable missile under the MTCR. (b) Sense of the Congress.— It is the sense of the Congress that— 110 STAT. 2707 (1) the assistance that the People’s Republic of China has provided to the Islamic Republic of Iran and to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan could contribute to the ability of such countries to manufacture nuclear weapons; (2) the recent transfer by the People’s Republic of China of ring magnets to an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan conflicts with China’s obligations under Articles I and III of the NPT, as well as the official nonproliferation policies and assurances by the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan with respect to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles; (3) the transfer of M–11 missiles from the People’s Republic of China to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is inconsistent with longstanding United States Government interpretations of assurances from the Government of the People’s Republic of China with respect to that country’s intent to abide by the guidelines of the MTCR; (4) violations by the People’s Republic of China of the standards and objectives of the MTCR and global nuclear non-proliferation regimes have jeopardized the credibility of the MTCR and such regimes; (5) the MTCR and global nuclear nonproliferation regimes require collective international action to impose costs against and to withhold benefits from any country, including the People’s Republic of China, that engages in activities that are contrary to the objectives of those regimes; (6) the President should explore with the governments of other countries new opportunities for collective action in response to activities of any country, including the People’s Republic of China, that aid or abet the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery; and (7) the President should communicate to the Government of the People’s Republic of China the sense of the Congress that the stability and growth of future relations between the people, the economies, and the Governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China will significantly depend upon substantive evidence of cooperation by the Government of the People’s Republic of China in efforts to halt the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. (c) Report.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified form, concerning the transfer from the People’s Republic of China to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan of technology, equipment, or materials important to the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The President shall include in the report the following: (1) The specific justification of the Secretary of State for determining that there was not a sufficient basis for imposing sanctions under section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended by section 825 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, by reason of the transfer of ring magnets and other technology, equipment, or materials from the People’s Republic of China to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 110 STAT. 2708 (2) What commitment the United States Government is seeking from the People’s Republic of China to ensure that the People’s Republic of China establishes a fully effective export control system that will prevent transfers (such as the Pakistan sale) from taking place in the future. (3) A description of the pledges, assurances, and other commitments made by representatives of the Governments of the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the Government of the United States since January 1, 1991, with respect to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable missiles, and an assessment of the record of compliance with such undertakings. (4) Whether, in light of the recent assurances provided by the People’s Republic of China, the President intends to make the certification and submit the report required by section 902(a)(6)(B) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note), and make the certification and submit the report required by Public Law 99–183, relating to the approval and implementation of the agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and, if not, why not. (5) Whether the Secretary of State considers the recent assurances and clarifications provided by the People’s Republic of China to have provided sufficient information to allow the United States to determine that the People’s Republic of China is not in violation of paragraph (2) of section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as required by Public Law 99–183. (6) If the President is unable or unwilling to make the certifications and reports referred to in paragraph (4), a description of what the President considers to be the significance of the clarifications and assurances provided by the People’s Republic of China in the course of the recent discussions regarding the transfer by the People’s Republic of China of nuclear-weapon-related equipment to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. (7) A description of the laws, regulations, and procedures currently used by the People’s Republic of China to regulate exports of nuclear technology, equipment, or materials, including dual-use goods, and an assessment of the effectiveness of such arrangements. (8) A description of the current policies and practices of other countries in response to the transfer of nuclear and missile technology by the People’s Republic of China to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.