Pub. L. 104-201, div. C, tit. XXXI, subtit. D, sec. 3163

SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RELIABILITY AND SAFETY OF REMAINING NUCLEAR FORCES.

EnactedYear: 1996Length: 482 wordsOfficial source
SEC. 3163. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RELIABILITY AND SAFETY OF REMAINING NUCLEAR FORCES. (a) Findings.— Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States is committed to proceeding with a robust, science-based stockpile stewardship program with respect to production of nuclear weapons, and to maintaining nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that are adequate— (A) to ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear arsenal; and (B) to meet such changing national security requirements as may result from international developments or technical problems with nuclear warheads. (2) The United States is committed to reestablishing and maintaining production facilities for nuclear weapons components at levels that are sufficient— (A) to satisfy requirements for the safety, reliability, and performance of United States nuclear weapons; and (B) to demonstrate and sustain production capabilities and capacities. (3) The United States is committed to maintaining the nuclear weapons laboratories and protecting core nuclear weapons competencies. (4) The United States is committed to ensuring rapid access to a new production source of tritium within the next decade, as it currently has no meaningful capability to produce tritium, a component that is essential to the performance of modern nuclear weapons. (5) The United States reserves the right, consistent with United States law, to resume underground nuclear testing to maintain confidence in the United States stockpile of nuclear weapons if warhead design flaws or aging of nuclear weapons 110 STAT. 2846result in problems that a robust stockpile stewardship program cannot solve. (6) The United States is committed to funding the Nevada Test Site at a level that maintains the ability of the United States to resume underground nuclear testing within one year after a national decision to do so is made. (7) The United States reserves the right to invoke the supreme national interest of the United States and withdraw from any future arms control agreement to limit underground nuclear testing. (b) Sense of Congress Regarding Presidential Consultation With Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that the President should consult closely with Congress regarding United States policy and practices to ensure confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of the nuclear stockpile of the United States. (c) Sense of Congress Regarding Notification and Consultation.— It is the sense of Congress that, upon a determination by the President that a problem with the safety, reliability, or performance of the nuclear stockpile has occurred and that the problem cannot be corrected within the stockpile stewardship program, the President shall— (1) immediately notify Congress of the problem; and (2) submit to Congress in a timely manner a plan for corrective action with respect to the problem, including— (A) a technical description of the activities required under the plan; and (B) if underground testing of nuclear weapons would assist in such corrective action, an assessment of the advisability of withdrawing from any treaty that prohibits underground testing of nuclear weapons.