DEPRESSED-TRAJECTORY BALLISTIC MISSILES

SEC. 219. DEPRESSED-TRAJECTORY BALLISTIC MISSILES (a) Establishment of Definition.—Not later than April 1, 1989, the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe a definition of what constitutes a depressed trajectory for a strategic ballistic missile. The definition shall be prescribed in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence. The Secretary shall prescribe such definition in specific quantitative terms so as to clearly distinguish ballistic missile trajectories which are depressed from other ballistic missile trajectories, including minimum-energy ballistic missile trajectories, so that if the United States and the Soviet Union mutually observe a policy of non-flight testing of depressed-trajectory strategic ballistic missiles, the observance of that policy— (1) would, to the maximum possible degree, reduce the potential for a short-time-of-flight attack on strategic aircraft or other strategic assets the survivability or effectiveness of which depends on timely receipt of adequate warning of attack, but (2) would not significantly affect present or planned practices of the United States for the testing of ballistic missiles that are not intended for development of a depressed-trajectory capability. (b) Report.—Not later than April 1, 1989, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on depressed-trajectory strategic ballistic missiles (as defined under subsection (a)), which shall be prepared in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence. The report shall set forth the definition prescribed under subsection (a) and shall include each of the following: (1) An evaluation of the ability of the United States to monitor flight tests by the Soviet Union of depressed-trajectory strategic ballistic missiles (as defined under subsection (a)) on dedicated or nondedicated test ranges. (2) A description of any past flight test of a ballistic missile by the United States or by the Soviet Union that would qualify as a test of a depressed-trajectory strategic ballistic missile as defined under subsection (a). (3) An evaluation of the possibility that the Soviet Union could deploy depressed-trajectory ballistic missiles (as defined under subsection (a)) with sufficient confidence in the reliability of those missiles for use in an attack on the United States without further flight testing.