ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES FOR THE UNITED STATES UNDER A POTENTIAL START TREATY

SEC. 908. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES FOR THE UNITED STATES UNDER A POTENTIAL START TREATY (a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in talks regarding the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. (2) Such talks could result in a treaty requiring deep reductions in the strategic forces of the United States. (3) Any such Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) cannot be ratified without the advice and consent of the Senate. (4) Any such START Treaty should result in a stable balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union which enhances the security of the United States. (5) Congress should provide funds for the forces permitted under such a treaty that are required to ensure the stability of the force balance under such a treaty. (6) Congress faces critical resource choices for fiscal year 1989 and subsequent fiscal years, and the resource choices made by Congress for those years could substantially influence the strategic force posture of the United States in the period after such a treaty goes into effect. (b) Presidential Report.—Before entering into any Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or other agreement with the Soviet Union for the reduction of strategic arms, but not later than September 15, 1988, the President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the implications such a treaty or agreement might have on the strategic force postures of the United States during the 1990s. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of alternative force postures that might be permitted for the United States under such an arms reduction agreement, including the posture recommended by the President. (2) The estimated costs, over at least a seven-year period, associated with each alternative force posture. 102 STAT. 2036 (3) The damage limitation capability, the survivability, and the retaliatory potential of such force posture, and the implications for strategic stability, assessed with regard to the likely force postures of the Soviet Union under such an agreement and the first-strike potential of such force postures. (4) The likely effect of a breakout by the Soviet Union from such an arms control agreement on the survivability and of the force posture of the United States under such an agreement recommended by the President under paragraph (1). (c) Form of Report.—The President shall submit the report under subsection (b) in both classified and unclassified form.