RUSSIAN NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SEC. 1504. RUSSIAN NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (a) Findings.— The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The 7,000 to 12,000 or more nonstrategic (or “tactical”) nuclear weapons estimated by the United States Strategic Command to be in the Russian arsenal may present the greatest threat of sale or theft of a nuclear warhead in the world today. (2) As the number of deployed strategic warheads in the Russian and United States arsenals declines to just a few thousand under the START accords, Russia’s vast superiority in tactical nuclear warheads—many of which have yields equivalent to strategic nuclear weapons—could become strategically destabilizing. (3) While the United States has unilaterally reduced its inventory of tactical nuclear weapons by nearly 90 percent since the end of the Cold War, Russia is behind schedule in implementing the steep tactical nuclear arms reductions pledged by former Soviet President Gorbachev in 1991 and Russian President Yeltsin in 1992, perpetuating the dangers from Russia’s tactical nuclear stockpile. (b) Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that the President should call on Russia to expedite reduction of its tactical nuclear arsenal in accordance with the promises made in 1991 and 1992. (c) Report.— Not later than March 15, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the nonstrategic nuclear weapons of Russia. The report shall include— (1) estimates regarding the current numbers, types, yields, viability, and locations of those weapons; (2) an assessment of the strategic implications of Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal, including the potential use of those weapons in a strategic role or the use of their components in strategic 112 STAT. 2173nuclear systems and the potential of Russian superiority in tactical nuclear weapons to destabilize the overall nuclear balance as strategic nuclear weapons are sharply reduced under the START accords; (3) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of the warheads of those weapons, including an analysis of Russian command and control as it concerns the use of tactical nuclear weapons; (4) a summary of past, current, and planned efforts to work cooperatively with Russia to account for, secure, and reduce Russia’s stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and associated fissile material; (5) a summary of how the United States would prevent, or plans to cope militarily with, scenarios in which a deterioration in relations with Moscow causes Russia to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons or in which Russia threatens to employ, or actually employs, tactical nuclear weapons in a local or regional conflict involving the United States or allies of the United States; and (6) an assessment of the steps that could be taken by the United States to enhance military preparedness in order (A) to deter any potential attempt by Russia to possibly exploit its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons through coercive “nuclear diplomacy” or on the battlefield, or (B) to counter Russia if Russia should make such an attempt to exploit its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. (d) Views.— The Secretary of Defense shall include in the report under subsection (c) the views of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the commander of the United States Strategic Command.