Pub. L. 105-261, div. A, tit. XV, subtit. D, sec. 1532
SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTS IN SOUTH ASIA
SEC. 1532. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTS IN SOUTH ASIA The Congress— (1) strongly condemns the decisions by the Governments of India and Pakistan to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998; (2) calls for the Governments of India and Pakistan to commit not to conduct any additional nuclear tests; (3) urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to take immediate steps to reduce tensions between the two countries; 112 STAT. 2181 (4) urges India and Pakistan to engage in high-level dialogue aimed at reducing the likelihood of armed conflict, enacting confidence and security building measures, and resolving areas of dispute; (5) commends all nations to take steps which will reduce tensions in South Asia, including appropriate measures to prevent the transfer of technology that could further exacerbate the arms race in South Asia, and thus avoid further deterioration of security there; (6) calls upon the President, leaders of all nations, and the United Nations to encourage a diplomatic, negotiated solution between the Governments of India and Pakistan to promote peace and stability in South Asia and resolve the current impasse; (7) encourages United States diplomatic leadership in assisting the Governments of India and Pakistan to seek a negotiated resolution of their 50-year conflict over the disputed territory in Kashmir; (8) urges India and Pakistan to take immediate, binding, and verifiable steps to roll back their nuclear programs and come into compliance with internationally accepted norms regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and (9) urges the United States to reevaluate its bilateral relationship with India and Pakistan, in light of the new regional security realities in South Asia, with the goal of preventing further nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, diffusing long-standing regional rivalries between India and Pakistan, and securing commitments from India and Pakistan which, if carried out, could result in a calibrated lifting of United States sanctions imposed under the Arms Export Control Act and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.