ASSESSMENT OF CYCLICAL READINESS POSTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES.

SEC. 330. ASSESSMENT OF CYCLICAL READINESS POSTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES. (a) Requirement.—(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the readiness posture of the Armed Forces described in subsection (b). (2) The Secretary shall prepare the report required under paragraph (1) with the assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In providing such assistance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall consult with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. (b) Readiness Posture.—(1) The readiness posture to be covered by the report under subsection (a) is a readiness posture for units of the Armed Forces, or for designated units of the Armed Forces, that provides for a rotation of such units between a state of high readiness and a state of low readiness. (2) As part of the evaluation of the readiness posture described in paragraph (1), the report shall address in particular a readiness posture that— (A) establishes within the Armed Forces two equivalent forces each structured so as to be capable of fighting and winning a major theater war; and (B) provides for an alternating rotation of such forces between a state of high readiness and a state of low readiness. (3) The evaluation of the readiness posture described in paragraph (2) shall be based upon assumptions permitting comparison with the existing force structure as follows: (A) That there are assembled from among the units of the Armed Forces two equivalent forces each structured so as to be capable of fighting and winning a major theater war. (B) That each force referred to in subparagraph (A) includes— (i) four active Army divisions, including one mechanized division, one armored division, one light infantry division, and one division combining airborne units and air assault units, and appropriate support and service support units for such divisions; (ii) six divisions (or division equivalents) of the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve that are essentially equivalent in structure, and appropriate support and service support units for such divisions; (iii) six aircraft carrier battle groups; (iv) six active Air Force fighter wings (or fighter wing equivalents); (v) four Air Force reserve fighter wings (or fighter wing equivalents); and (vi) one active Marine Corps expeditionary force. (C) That each force may be supplemented by critical units or units in short supply, including heavy bomber units, strategic lift units, and aerial reconnaissance units, that are not subject to the readiness rotation otherwise assumed for purposes of the evaluation or are subject to the rotation on a modified basis. (D) That units of the Armed Forces not assigned to a force are available for operations other than those essential to fight and win a major theater war, including peace operations.111 STAT. 1683 (E) That the state of readiness of each force alternates between a state of high readiness and a state of low readiness on a frequency determined by the Secretary (but not more often than once every six months) and with only one force at a given state of readiness at any one time. (F) That, during the period of state of high readiness of a force, any operations or activities (including leave and education and training of personnel) that detract from the near-term wartime readiness of the force are temporary and their effects on such state of readiness minimized. (G) That units are assigned overseas during the period of state of high readiness of the force to which the units are assigned primarily on a temporary duty basis. (H) That, during the period of high readiness of a force, the operational war plans for the force incorporate the divisions (or division equivalents) of the Army Reserve or Army National Guard assigned to the force in a manner such that one such division (or division equivalent) is, on a rotating basis for such divisions (or division equivalents) during the period, maintained in a high state of readiness and dedicated as the first reserve combat division to be transferred overseas in the event of a major theater war. (c) Report Elements.—The report under this section shall include the following elements for the readiness posture described in subsection (b)(2): (1) An estimate of the range of cost savings achievable over the long term as a result of implementing the readiness posture, including— (A) the savings achievable from reduced training levels and readiness levels during periods in which a force referred to in subsection (b)(3)(A) is in a state of low readiness; and (B) the savings achievable from reductions in costs of infrastructure overseas as a result of reduced permanent change of station rotations. (2) An assessment of the potential risks associated with a lower readiness status for units assigned to a force in a state of low readiness under the readiness posture, including the risks associated with the delayed availability of such units overseas in the event of two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. (3) An assessment of the potential risks associated with requiring the forces under the readiness posture to fight a major war in any theater worldwide. (4) An assessment of the modifications of the current force structure of the Armed Forces that are necessary to achieve the range of cost savings estimated under paragraph (1), including the extent of the diminishment, if any, of the military capabilities of the Armed Forces as a result of the modifications. (5) An assessment whether or not the risks of diminished military capability associated with implementation of the readiness posture exceed the risks of diminished military capability associated with the modifications of the current force structure necessary to achieve cost savings equivalent to the best case for cost savings resulting from the implementation of the readiness posture.111 STAT. 1684 (d) Form of Report.—The report under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. (e) Definitions.—In this section: (1) The term “state of high readiness”, in the case of a military force, means the capability to mobilize first-to-arrive units of the force within 18 hours and last-to-arrive units within 120 days of a particular event. (2) The term “state of low readiness”, in the case of a military force, means the capability to mobilize first-to-arrive units within 90 days and last-to-arrive units within 180 days of a particular event.