LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

SEC. 1302. LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS. (a) Funding Limitation.—Funds available to the Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1998 for retiring or dismantling, or for preparing to retire or dismantle, any of the following strategic nuclear delivery systems below the specified levels: (1) 71 B–52H bomber aircraft. (2) 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines. (3) 50C Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles. (4) 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles. (b) Waiver Authority.—If the START II Treaty enters into force during fiscal year 1998, the Secretary of Defense may waive the application of the limitation under subsection (a) to the extent that the Secretary determines necessary in order to implement the treaty. (c) Funding Limitation on Early Deactivation.—(1) If the limitation under subsection (a) ceases to apply by reason of a waiver under subsection (b), funds available to the Department of Defense may nevertheless not be obligated or expended during 111 STAT. 1949fiscal year 1998 to implement any agreement or understanding to undertake substantial early deactivation of a strategic nuclear delivery system specified in subsection (a) until 30 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress a report concerning such actions. (2) For purposes of this subsection and subsection (d), a substantial early deactivation is an action during fiscal year 1998 to deactivate a substantial number of strategic nuclear delivery systems specified in subsection (a) by— (A) removing nuclear warheads from those systems; or (B) taking other steps to remove those systems from combat status. (3) A report under this subsection shall include the following: (A) The text of any understanding or agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation concerning substantial early deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery systems under the START II Treaty. (B) The plan of the Department of Defense for implementing the agreement. (C) An assessment of the Secretary of Defense of the adequacy of the provisions contained in the agreement for monitoring and verifying compliance of Russia with the terms of the agreement and, based upon that assessment, the determination of the President specifically as to whether the procedures for monitoring and verification of compliance by Russia with the terms of the agreement are adequate or inadequate. (D) A determination by the President as to whether the deactivations to occur under the agreement will be carried out in a symmetrical, reciprocal, or equivalent manner and whether the agreement will require early deactivations of strategic forces by the United States to be carried out substantially more rapidly than deactivations of strategic forces by Russia. (E) An assessment by the President of the effect of the proposed early deactivation on the stability of the strategic balance and relative strategic nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Russian Federation at various stages during deactivation and upon completion, including a determination by the President specifically as to whether the proposed early deactivations will adversely affect strategic stability. (d) Further Limitation on Strategic Force Reductions.— (1) Amounts available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1998 to implement an agreement that results in a substantial early deactivation during fiscal year 1998 of strategic forces may not be obligated for that purpose if in the report under subsection (c)(3) the President determines any of the following: (A) That procedures for monitoring and verification of compliance by Russia with the terms of the agreement are inadequate. (B) That the agreement will require early deactivations of strategic forces by the United States to be carried out substantially more rapidly than deactivations of strategic forces by Russia. (C) That the proposed early deactivations will adversely affect strategic stability. (2) The limitation in paragraph (1), if effective by reason of a determination by the President described in paragraph (1)(B), 111 STAT. 1950shall cease to apply 30 days after the date on which the President notifies Congress that the early deactivations under the agreement are in the national interest of the United States. (e) Contingency Plan for Sustainment of Systems.—(1) Not later then February 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a plan for the sustainment beyond October 1, 1999, of United States strategic nuclear delivery systems and alternative Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty force structures in the event that a strategic arms reduction agreement subsequent to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty does not enter into force before 2004. (2) The plan shall include a discussion of the following matters: (A) The actions that are necessary to sustain the United States strategic nuclear delivery systems, distinguishing between the actions that are planned for and funded in the future-years defense program and the actions that are not planned for and funded in the future-years defense program. (B) The funding necessary to implement the plan, indicating the extent to which the necessary funding is provided for in the future-years defense program and the extent to which the necessary funding is not provided for in the futureyears defense program. (f) START Treaties Defined.—In this section: (1) The term “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty” means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991, including related annexes on agreed statements and definitions, protocols, and memorandum of understanding. (2) The term “START II Treaty” means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993, including the following protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the “START II Treaty” (contained in Treaty Document 103–1): (A) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the “Elimination and Conversion Protocol”). (B) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the “Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol”). (C) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the “Memorandum on Attribution”).111 STAT. 1951