DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AND ASSOCIATED RELIEF OPERATIONS.

SEC. 1211. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AND ASSOCIATED RELIEF OPERATIONS. (a) Report Required.—(1) Not later than January 31, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the conduct of military operations conducted as part of Operation Allied Force and relief operations associated with that operation. The Secretary shall submit to those committees a preliminary report on the conduct of those operations not later than October 15, 1999. The report (including the preliminary report) shall be prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander in Chief, United States European Command. (2) In this section, the term “Operation Allied Force” means operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during the period beginning on March 24, 1999, and ending with the suspension of bombing operations on June 10, 1999, to resolve the conflict with respect to Kosovo. (b) Discussion of Accomplishments and Shortcomings.—The report (and the preliminary report, to the extent feasible) shall contain a discussion, with a particular emphasis on accomplishments and shortcomings, of the following matters: (1) The national security interests of the United States that were threatened by the deteriorating political and military situation in the Province of Kosovo, Republic of Serbia, in the country of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). (2) The factors leading to the decision by the United States and NATO to issue an ultimatum in October 1998 that force would be used against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 113 STAT. 783unless certain conditions were met, and the planning of a military operation to execute that ultimatum. (3) The political and military objectives of the United States and NATO in the conflict with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (4) The military strategy of the United States and NATO to achieve those political and military objectives. (5) An analysis of the decisionmaking process of NATO and the effect of that decisionmaking process on the conduct of military operations. (6) An analysis of the decision not to include a ground component in Operation Allied Force (to include a detailed explanation of the political and military factors involved in that decision) and the effect of that decision on the conduct of military operations. (7) The deployment of United States forces and the transportation of supplies to the theater of operations, including an assessment of airlift and sealift, with a specific assessment of the deployment of Task Force Hawk. (8) The conduct of military operations, including a specific assessment of each of the following: (A) The effects of the graduated, incremental pace of the military operations. (B) The process for identifying, nominating, selecting and verifying targets to be attacked during Operation Allied Force, including an analysis of the factors leading to the bombing of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Belgrade. (C) The loss of aircraft and the accuracy of bombing operations. (D) The decoy and deception operations and counterintelligence techniques used by the Yugoslav military. (E) The use of high-demand, low-density assets in Operation Allied Force in terms of inventory, capabilities, deficiencies, and ability to provide logistical support. (F) A comparison of the military capabilities of the United States and of the allied participants in Operation Allied Force. (G) Communications and operational security of NATO forces. (H) The effect of adverse weather on the performance of weapons and supporting systems. (I) The decision not to use in the air campaign the Apache attack helicopters deployed as part of Task Force Hawk. (9) The conduct of relief operations by United States and allied military forces and the effect of those relief operations on military operations. (10) The ability of the United States during Operation Allied Force to conduct other operations required by the national defense strategy, including an analysis of the transfer of operational assets from other United States unified commands to the European Command for participation in Operation Allied Force and the effect of those transfers on the readiness, warfighting capability, and deterrence posture of those commands.113 STAT. 784 (11) The use of special operations forces, including operational and intelligence activities classified under special access procedures. (12) The effectiveness of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to operational forces, including an assessment of battle damage assessment of fixed and mobile targets prosecuted during the air campaign, estimates of Yugoslav forces and equipment in Kosovo, and information related to Kosovar refugees and internally displaced persons. (13) The use and performance of United States and NATO military equipment, weapon systems, and munitions (including items classified under special access procedures) and an analysis of— (A) any equipment or capabilities that were in research and development and if available could have been used in the theater of operations; (B) any equipment or capabilities that were available and could have been used but were not introduced into the theater of operations; and (C) the compatibility of command, control, and communications equipment and the ability of United States aircraft to operate with aircraft of other nations without degradation of capabilities or protection of United States forces. (14) The scope of logistics support, including support from other nations, with particular emphasis on the availability and adequacy of foreign air bases. (15) The role of contractors to provide support and maintenance in the theater of operations. (16) The acquisition policy actions taken to support the forces in the theater of operations. (17) The personnel management actions taken to support the forces in the theater of operations. (18) The effectiveness of reserve component forces, including their use and performance in the theater of operations. (19) A legal analysis, including (A) the legal basis for the decision by NATO to use force, and (B) the role of the law of armed conflict in the planning and execution of military operations by the United States and the other NATO member nations. (20) The cost to the Department of Defense of Operation Allied Force and associated relief operations, together with the Secretary’s plan to refurbish or replace ordnance and other military equipment expended or destroyed during the operations. (21) A description of the most critical lessons learned that could lead to long-term doctrinal, organizational, and technological changes. (c) Classification of Report.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit both the report and the preliminary report in a classified form and an unclassified form.