SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA

SEC. 1234. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA (a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings: (1) On December 21, 1988, 270 people, including 189 United States citizens, were killed in a terrorist bombing on Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. (2) The United Kingdom and the United States indicted two Libyan intelligence agents, Abd al-Baset Ali al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifah Fhimah, in 1991 and sought their extradition from Libya to the United States or the United Kingdom to stand trial for this heinous terrorist act. (3) The United Nations Security Council called for the extradition of those suspects in Security Council Resolution 731 and imposed sanctions on Libya in Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 because Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi refused to transfer the suspects to either the United States or the United Kingdom to stand trial. (4) United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 demand that Libya cease all support for terrorism, turn over the two suspects, cooperate with the investigation and the trial, and address the issue of appropriate compensation. (5) The sanctions in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 include— (A) a worldwide ban on Libya’s national airline; (B) a ban on flights into and out of Libya by other nations’ airlines; and (C) a prohibition on supplying arms, airplane parts, and certain oil equipment to Libya, and a blocking of Libyan Government funds in other countries. (6) Colonel Muammar Qadhafi for many years refused to extradite the suspects to either the United States or the United Kingdom and had insisted that he would only transfer the suspects to a third and neutral country to stand trial. (7) On August 24, 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to the proposal that Colonel Qadhafi transfer the suspects to The Netherlands, where they would stand trial under a Scottish court, under Scottish law, and with a panel of Scottish judges.113 STAT. 790 (8) The United Nations Security Council endorsed the United States-United Kingdom proposal on August 27, 1998 in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1192. (9) The United States, consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions, called on Libya to ensure the production of evidence, including the presence of witnesses before the court, and to comply fully with all the requirements of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. (10) After years of intensive diplomacy, Colonel Qadhafi finally transferred the two Libyan suspects to The Netherlands on April 5, 1999, and the United Nations Security Council, in turn, suspended its sanctions against Libya that same day. (11) Libya has only fulfilled one of four conditions (the transfer of the two suspects accused in the Lockerbie bombing) set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 that would justify the lifting of United Nations Security Council sanctions against Libya. (12) Libya has not fulfilled the other three conditions (cooperation with the Lockerbie investigation and trial, renunciation of and ending support for terrorism, and payment of appropriate compensation) necessary to lift the United Nations Security Council sanctions. (13) The United Nations Secretary General issued a report to the Security Council on June 30, 1999, on the issue of Libya’s compliance with the remaining conditions. (14) Any member of the United Nations Security Council has the right to introduce a resolution to lift the sanctions against Libya now that the United Nations Secretary General’s report has been issued. (15) The United States Government considers Libya a state sponsor of terrorism and the State Department Report, “Patterns of Global Terrorism; 1998”, stated that Colonel Qadhafi “continued publicly and privately to support Palestinian terrorist groups, including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC”. (16) United States Government sanctions (other than sanctions on food or medicine) should be maintained on Libya, and in accordance with United States law, the Secretary of State should keep Libya on the list of countries the governments of which have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 in light of Libya’s ongoing support for terrorist groups. (b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should use all diplomatic means necessary, including the use of the United States veto at the United Nations Security Council, to prevent the Security Council from lifting sanctions against Libya until Libya fulfills all of the conditions set forth in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and 883.