SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT.

SEC. 1035. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT.(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:(1) The unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, in August 2007 was an extraordinary breach of the command and control and security of nuclear weapons.(2) The reviews conducted following that unauthorized transfer found that the ability of the Department of Defense to provide oversight of nuclear weapons matters had degenerated and that senior level attention to nuclear weapons management is minimal at best.(3) The lack of attention to nuclear weapons and related equipment by the Department of Defense was demonstrated again when it was discovered in March 2008 that classified equipment from Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles was inadvertently shipped to Taiwan in 2006.(4) The Department of Defense has insufficient capability and staffing in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to provide the necessary oversight of the nuclear weapons functions of the Department.(5) The key senior position responsible for nuclear weapons matters in the Department of Defense, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, a position filled by appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was vacant for more than 18 months before being filled in July 2008.(6) The inability to provide consistent senior level emphasis on nuclear weapons policy has contributed to an erosion in the level of attention paid to nuclear weapons matters across the Department of Defense.(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—(1) the United States should maintain clear and unambiguous command and control of its nuclear weapons;(2) the safety and security of nuclear weapons and related equipment should be a high priority as long as the United States maintains a stockpile of nuclear weapons;(3) these objectives will be more successfully attained if greater attention is paid to nuclear weapons matters within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;(4) the Secretary of Defense should consider establishing and filling a senior position, at the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to hold 122 STAT. 4596 primary responsibility for the strategic and nuclear weapons policy of the Department of Defense; and(5) the Secretary of Defense should clarify the lines of responsibility and accountability for nuclear weapons matters within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to place greater emphasis on strategic and nuclear weapons policy and management.