ASSESSMENT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES ON EFFORTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE RISKS POSED TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE DEPARTMENT BY THE USE OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

SEC. 321. ASSESSMENT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES ON EFFORTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE RISKS POSED TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE DEPARTMENT BY THE USE OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. (a) Assessment Required.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall assess the efforts of the intelligence community and the Department of Defense to identify and mitigate the risks posed to the intelligence community and the Department by the use of direct-to-consumer genetic testing by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. (b) Report Required.— (1) Definition of united states direct-to-consumer genetic testing company.—In this subsection, the term “United States direct-to-consumer genetic testing company” means a private entity that— (A) carries out direct-to-consumer genetic testing; and (B) is organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States. (2) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress, including the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, a report on the assessment required by subsection (a). (3) Elements.—The report required by paragraph (2) shall include the following: (A) A description of key national security risks and vulnerabilities associated with direct-to-consumer genetic testing, including— (i) how the Government of the People’s Republic of China may be using data provided by personnel of the intelligence community and the Department through direct-to-consumer genetic tests; and (ii) how ubiquitous technical surveillance may amplify those risks. (B) An assessment of the extent to which the intelligence community and the Department have identified risks and vulnerabilities posed by direct-to-consumer genetic testing and have sought to mitigate such risks and vulnerabilities, or have plans for such mitigation, including the extent to which the intelligence community has determined— (i) in which United States direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies the Government of the People’s Republic of China or entities owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China have an ownership interest; and (ii) which United States direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies may have sold data to the Government of the People’s Republic of China or entities owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. (C) Such recommendations as the Comptroller General may have for action by the intelligence community and the Department to improve the identification and mitigation of risks and vulnerabilities posed by the use of direct-to-consumer genetic testing by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. (4) Form.—The report required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Cooperation.—The heads of relevant elements of the intelligence community and components of the Department shall— (1) fully cooperate with the Comptroller General in conducting the assessment required by subsection (a); and (2) provide any information and data required by the Comptroller General to conduct the assessment, consistent with Intelligence Community Directive 114 or successor directive.