FINDINGS.

SEC. 232. [10 U.S.C. 2431 note] FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The emerging threat that is posed to the national security interests of the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is significant and growing, both in terms of numbers of missiles and in terms of the technical capabilities of those missiles. (2) The deployment of ballistic missile defenses is a necessary, but not sufficient, element of a broader strategy to discourage both the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of the means of their delivery and to defend against the consequences of such proliferation. (3) The deployment of effective Theater Missile Defense systems can deter potential adversaries of the United States from escalating a conflict by threatening or attacking United States forces or the forces or territory of coalition partners or allies of the United States with ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction to offset the operational and technical advantages of the United States and its coalition partners and allies. (4) United States intelligence officials have provided intelligence estimates to congressional committees that (A) the trend in missile proliferation is toward longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles, (B) North Korea may deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska or beyond within five years, and (C) although a new, indigenously developed ballistic missile threat to the continental United States is not foreseen within the next ten years, determined countries can acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in the near future and with little warning by means other than indigenous development. (5) The development and deployment by the United States and its allies of effective defenses against ballistic missiles of all ranges will reduce the incentives for countries to acquire such missiles or to augment existing missile capabilities. (6) The concept of mutual assured destruction (based upon an offense-only form of deterrence), which is the major philosophical rationale underlying the ABM Treaty, is now questionable as a basis for stability in a multipolar world in which the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union are seeking to normalize relations and eliminate Cold War attitudes and arrangements. (7) The development and deployment of a National Missile Defense system against the threat of limited ballistic missile attacks— (A) would strengthen deterrence at the levels of forces agreed to by the United States and Russia under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START–I); and (B) would further strengthen deterrence if reductions below the levels permitted under START–I should be agreed to and implemented in the future. (8) The distinction made during the Cold War, based upon the technology of the time, between strategic ballistic missiles and nonstrategic ballistic missiles, which resulted in the distinction made in the ABM Treaty between strategic defense and nonstrategic defense, has become obsolete because of technological advancement (including the development by North Korea of long-range Taepo-Dong I and Taepo-Dong II missiles) and, therefore, that distinction in the ABM Treaty should be reviewed.