83-005
Abolition of Home Rule Status
Cite as Ill. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-005
NEIL F. HARTIGAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD
March 11, 1983
FILE NO. 83-005
MUNICIPALITIES:
Abolition of Home Rule
Status
-
Honorable Daniel D. Doyle
State's Attorney, Winnebago County
Courthouse Building
Rockford, Illinois 61101
Dear Mr. Doyle:
I have your letter wherein you state that a referendum
is to be held, pursuant to subsection 6(b) of article VII of
the 1970 Illinois Constitution, on the question of whether the
city of Rockford shall cease to be a home rule unit. You
inquire regarding the effect which the passage of this referendum would have on the powers of the city of Rockford, and in
particular, its power to tax and to raise revenue.
Honorable Daniel D. Doyle - 2.
Subsection 6(a) of article VII of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution grants home rule powers to certain units of local
government:
"(a) A County which has a chief executive
officer elected by the electors of the county and any
municipality which has a population of more than
25,000 are home rule units. Other municipalities may
elect by referendum to become home rule units. Except
as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining
to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection
of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to
license; to tax; and to incur debt.' (Emphasis added.)
The city of Rockford is a home rule unit by virtue of its
population and has been such since the adoption of the 1970
Illinois Constitution.
As a home rule municipality, the city of Rockford is
empowered to tax and to raise revenue, subject to the restric-
tions contained in section 6 of article VII, without specific
statutory authorization. (See City of Rockford V. Gill (1979),
75 Ill. 2d 334.) You advise that the city of Rockford has
adopted, pursuant to its home rule powers, certain tax levies
and other revenue measures which either exceed the limitations
provided by law, or which are not specifically provided for by
statute. Clearly, this power is granted to home rule units.
However, the issue here is what effect the abolition of home
rule powers will have on actions which are authorized by the
Constitution for home rule units, but which are not authorized
for non-home-rule units.
Honorable Daniel D. Doyle - 3.
Although the delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention provided a method for home rule units to
abolish home rule status (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(b)),
neither the Report of the Local Government Committee (7 Record
of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1637)
nor the debate with respect thereto addresses the effect of the
abolition of home rule status on the powers of a former home
rule unit. It appears clear, however, that the drafters of the
Constitution contemplated that there would be two types of
local governmental units, home rule and non-home-rule. Logic
dictates that the result of the abolition of home rule is a
return to non-home-rule status.
In this sense, the abolition of home rule is analogous
to the repeal of a statute without a savings clause. In such a
circumstance, a statute must be treated, except as to proceedings passed and closed, as if it had never existed. (People V.
Carpenter (1916), 274 Ill. 103, 105; Holcomb V. Boynton (1894),
151 Ill. 294, 297.) Thus, the repeal of a statute takes away
all right to proceed under the statute (Illinois and Michigan
Canal V. City of Chicago (1853), 14 Ill. 334, 335-36), or to
exercise powers granted by the statute. Therefore, by analogy,
the abandonment of the grant of home rule power takes away all
right to proceed under that grant of power, leaving the
municipality with the status of a non-home-rule municipality.
Honorable Daniel D. Doyle - 4.
Section 7 of article VII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 7) sets forth the powers
of counties and municipalities which are not home rule units:
"Counties and municipalities which are not home
rule units shall have only powers granted to them by
law and the powers (1) to make local improvements by
special assessment and to exercise this power jointly
with other counties and municipalities, and other
classes of units of local government having that power
on the effective date of this Constitution unless that
power is subsequently denied by law to any such other
units of local government; (2) by referendum, to
adopt, alter or repeal their forms of government
provided by law; (3) in the case of municipalities, to
provide by referendum for their officers, manner of
selection and terms of office; (4) in the case of
counties, to provide for their officers, manner of
selection and terms of office as provided in Section 4
of this Article; (5) to incur debt except as limited
by law and except that debt payable from ad valorem
property tax receipt shall mature within 40 years from
the time it is incurred; and (6) to levy or impose
additional taxes upon areas within their boundaries in
the manner provided by law for the provision of
special services to those areas and for the payment of
debt incurred in order to provide those special
- services.
Non-home-rule municipalities, therefore, possess only those
powers granted to them by the Constitution or by statute, or
those necessarily implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. (Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 82-032, issued September
15, 1982, at 4.) As embodied in section 7 of article VII of
the Constitution, "Dillon's Rule" is still applicable to
non-home-rule municipalities in Illinois.
Honorable Daniel D. Doyle - 5.
The principle of law commonly referred to as "Dillon's
Rule" (see 1 J. Dillon, Municipal Corporations 448-50 (5th ed.
1911)) was followed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Consumers
Co. V. City of Chicago (1924), 313 Ill. 408, 411-12, in which
the court stated as follows:
"
* * *
A municipal corporation possesses and can
exercise the following powers, and no others: First,
those granted in express words; second, those necessarily implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; and third, those essential to the accomplish-
ment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation, --not simply convenient but indispen-
sable. (Huesing V. City of Rock Island, 128 Ill. 465;
I Dillon on Mun. Corp. 5th ed. -sec. 237.) Any fair
or reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the
power must be resolved against the municipality and
the power denied. (19 R. C. L. 769; City of Chicago
V. M. & M. Hotel Co. 248 Ill. 264; City of Chicago V.
Pettibone, 267 id. 573.)
*
*
11
Illinois statutes contain numerous provisions author-
izing municipalities to levy taxes and to incur indebtedness,
and setting statutory limits on the amounts of taxes which may
be raised or the amount of indebtedness which may be incurred.
(See L. Ancel and S. Diamond, Illinois Municipal Handbook
102-107 (1980) ) In the absence of specific limitations on the
power of home rule municipalities in these areas, home rule
municipalities may levy taxes in excess of statutory limitations (City of Rockford V. Gill (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 334, 339),
Honorable Daniel D. Doyle - 6.
or for purposes not specifically authorized by statute. Non-
home-rule municipalities, on the other hand, can levy taxes
only for purposes provided by statute, at rates not greater
than the maximum established by statute or referendum. (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 643.) A municipality which
ceases to be a home rule unit will be subject thereafter to all
pertinent statutory limitations on the exercise of taxing power.
As an example, section 11-80-23 of the Illinois
Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24, par. 11-80-23)
authorizes municipalities having a population of less than
500,000 to levy a special tax not to exceed .02% of the
assessed valuation of all taxable property in the municipality
to pay the compensation of school crossing guards. A home rule
municipality could levy a tax for this purpose without regard
to the statutory limitation. If that municipality ceases to be
a home rule unit, however, it will be governed by the statutory
limitation of .02% of assessed valuation provided in section
11-80-23 of the Illinois Municipal Code. The fact that the
municipality had previously levied a tax in a greater amount,
pursuant to its home rule powers, does not thereafter permit
that municipality to continue to levy taxes in excess of the
statutory limitation after it ceases to be a home rule unit.
The only exception to this conclusion concerns debt
service levies made for the purpose of paying principal and
Honorable Daniel D. Doyle - 7.
interest on bonds, notes and other obligations secured by ad
valorem property taxes. In such cases, the levying of a tax
occurs only once, even though taxes may be extended and
collected over a number of years. (1981 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op.
72, 74.) Consequently, the act of levying and extending a tax
under home rule powers for debt service purposes will not be
affected by a subsequent return to non-home-rule status, because the levy will be complete before the municipality ceases
to be a home rule unit.
Having addressed the general effect of the passage of
a referendum abolishing home rule in a municipality, I will
respond to the following specific questions which you have
raised:
1. If the referendum as to home rule status passes, will
the city of Rockford thereafter be limited in its
power to levy taxes to those purposes and limitations
specified by statute?
2. Will Rockford be subject to the legal principle
commonly known as "Dillon's Rule"?
3. What effect would the passage of the referendum have
on the extension of debt service levies imposed by the
city under the grant of home rule powers?
In response to your first question, it is my opinion
that if the referendum passes, the city of Rockford will be
subject to all statutory limitations on the power of taxation
generally applicable to non-home-rule municipalities. Because
the city will retain no residual home rule powers, any levy or
Honorable Daniel D. Doyle - 8.
imposition of tax in excess of statutory limits, or in the
absence of statutory authority, will be void.
In response to your second question, it is my opinion
that the city of Rockford, should it elect to become a
non-home-rule municipality, will be subject to the legal
principle commonly referred to as "Dillon's Rule", as embodied
in article VII, section 7, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
In response to your third question, it is my opinion
that the city of Rockford will be precluded from imposing any
taxes not statutorily authorized to be imposed by a non-home-
rule unit, except for the extension of taxes under a debt
service levy completed prior to the abandonment of home rule
status.
Very truly yours,
A T TORNEY GENERAL