81-032
Merit Commission - Authority of a State's Attorney to Initiate Disciplinary and Discharge Proceedings
Cite as Ill. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-032
5
DIRECTOR
4811
TYRONE C. FAHNER
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD
October 27, 1981
FILE NO. 81-032
COUNTIES:
Merit Commission - Authority of a
State's Attorney to Initiate
Disciplinary and Discharge
Proceedings
-
Honorable Fred L. Foreman
State's Attorney, Lake County
County Building
Waukegan, Illinois 60085
Dear Mr. Foreman:
I have your letter wherein you inquire regarding
the statutory authority of a State's Attorney to initiate
disciplinary or discharge proceedings against certified
sheriff's personnel in counties adopting the provisions of
the Sheriff's Merit System Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1980 Supp.,
ch. 125, par. 151 et seq.). For the reasons hereinafter
stated, I concur in your opinion that a State's Attorney is
not authorized to initiate such proceedings before a Sheriff's
Office Merit Commission.
Public Act 81-1475, effective January 1, 1981,
repealed section 58.1 of "AN ACT to revise the law in relation
Honorable Fred L. Foreman - 2.
to counties" (Laws 1965, p. 1031) and The County Police Depart-
ment Act (Laws 1967, P. 2685), and created the Sheriff's Merit
System Act to supersede merit system provisions contained in
the repealed statutes. Counties which established merit systems
pursuant to the repealed statutes are required either to adopt
and implement the provisions of the Sheriff's Merit System Act,
or to abolish their merit systems in the same manner in which
such systems were established. In counties adopting the provisions of the Sheriff's Merit System Act, a Sheriff's Office
Merit Commission is required to be appointed to administer the
merit system, with duties including the certification of
personnel for employment and promotion, and the discipline
and discharge of sheriff's personnel under its jurisdiction.
Section 7 of the Sheriff's Merit System Act (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1980 Supp., ch. 125, par. 157), which describes the
duties of the Merit Commission, provides in pertinent part:
"Duties and jurisdiction. The Merit
Commission shall have the duties, pursuant to
recognized merit principles of public employment, of certification for employment and
promotion, and, upon complaint of the sheriff
or states attorney as limited in this Act, to
discipline or discharge as the circumstances
may warrant. * * * (Emphasis added.)
Interpreted alone, section 7 of the Sheriff's Merit System Act
would appear to authorize either the sheriff or the State's
Attorney of a county to bring complaints to discipline or
discharge certified sheriff's personnel before the Merit
Commission.
Honorable Fred L. Foreman - 3.
However, it is a recognized canon of statutory
construction that a statute must be construed as a whole,
and the legislative intent in enacting its provisions gathered
from the entire statute. (Illinois Bell Telephone Co. V. Ames
(1936), 364 Ill. 362, 365-66.) Section 7 of the Sheriff's Merit
System Act must be construed together with section 14 of the
same Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1980 Supp., ch. 125, par. 164), which
provides in part:
"Removal, demotion or suspension. Except as
is otherwise provided in this Act, no certified
person shall be removed, demoted or suspended
except for cause, upon written charges filed with
the Merit Commission by the sheriff.
* * *
* *
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(Emphasis added.)
Applying the aforementioned canon of statutory construction to the pertinent provisions of the Sheriff's Merit
System Ast, the intent of the General Assembly is clear: a
Merit Commission is empowered to discipline or discharge
certified sheriff's personnel only upon the filing of written
charges by the sheriff. The apparent authority of a State's
Attorney to initiate complaints before the Merit Commission
is specifically subject by the language of section 7 of the
Sheriff's Merit Commission Act to limitations contained in the
provisions of the Act. The clear and unambiguous language of
section 14 of the Sheriff's Merit Commission Act confers upon
the Merit Commission the authority to remove, demote, or
suspend certified sheriff's personnel only upon the filing of
written charges by the sheriff. Therefore, by construing
Honorable Fred L. Foreman - 4.
sections 7 and 14 of the Sheriff's Merit System Act together
to give effect to each. section 14 must be construed as a
limitation on the authority of a Merit Commission to hear, and
a State's Attorney to initiate, disciplinary and discharge
proceedings against certified sheriff's personnel. To construe
the provisions otherwise would render the clause "as limited
by this Act" contained in section 7 meaningless.
This interpretation is supported by application of
the canon of statutory construction "expressio unius est
exclusius alterius". If a statute requires that an act be
done by specified persons or in a specific manner, implied in
the requirement is a prohibition against the act being done
by other persons or in another manner. (Wood V. Stewart (1905).
120 Ill. App. 34, 36.) Section 7 of the Sheriff's Merit System
Act conditions the jurisdiction of a Merit Commission to enter-
tain suspension, discharge, and demotion proceedings upon the
filing of written charges by the sheriff. If a statute specifically prescribes the means whereby jurisdiction is to be
obtained, the means prescribed must be strictly followed.
(Hoehamer V. Village of Elmwood Park (1935), 361 Ill. 422, 426.)
A Merit Commission therefore is without jurisdiction to discipline
or discharge certified personnel in the absence of written
charges being filed, or if written charges are filed by one
other than the sheriff.
Honorable Fred L. Foreman - 5.
You have noted in your letter that the clause
"[e]xcept as is otherwise provided in this Act" contained in
section 14, if construed as relating to the provisions of
section 7, can be interpreted as conferring authority upon a
Merit Commission to hear disciplinary or discharge proceedings
initiated upon complaint of a State's Attorney. Exceptions in
a statute must be read and applied so as to accomplish the
purpose of the law. (Winner V. Kadow (1940), 373 111. 192, 195.)
In my opinion, the exception in section 14 of the Act is intended
to relate to the authority of 3 sheriff to discipline or demote
certified sheriff's personnel, not to the authority of the
State's Attorney or sheriff to present complaints to the Merit
Commission. The exception should be construed with specific
reference to sections 11 and 13 of the Sheriff's Merit System
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1980 Supp., ch. 125, par. 161, 163), which
pertain to promotions and disciplinary measures.
Section 11 of the Sheriff's Merit System Act provides
in part:
"
* * *
Persons appointed to a higher rank shall be
on probation in such higher rank for a period of
12 months. Such appointees may be demoted by the
sheriff to their former rank at any time during
the period of probation, if, in the opinion of the
sheriff, they have failed to demonstrate the
ability and the qualifications necessary to furnish
satisfactory service." (Emphasis added.)
Section 13 of the Sheriff's Merit System Act provides:
Honorable Fred L. Foreman - 6.
"Disciplinary measures. Disciplinary measures
for actions violating either the rules and regula-
tions of the Commission or the internal procedures
of the sheriff's office may be taken by the sheriff.
Such disciplinary measures may include suspension
of any certified person for reasonable periods,
not exceeding a cumulative 30 days in any 12-month
period." (Emphasis added.)
These provisions, which are exceptions to the general requirement that no certified person be suspended or demoted except
for cause and after an opportunity for a hearing before the
Merit Commission, are properly considered the subject of the
exception clause contained in section 14 of the Act.
Therefore, it is my opinion that pursuant to the
provisions of the Sheriff's Merit System Act, a State's
Attorney is not authorized to initiate disciplinary or discharge proceedings against certified sheriff's personnel
before a Sheriff's Office Merit Commission.
Very truly yours,
FORE ATTORNEY Jch GENERAL