82-029
Payment of Necessary Costs of Election and Confidentiality of Names on Petitions Filed Thereunder
Cite as Ill. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-029
5
TAL OF STATE
TYRONE C. FAHNER
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD
September 9, 1982
FILE NO. 82-029
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS:
Payment of Necessary Costs of
Election and Confidentiality of
Names on Petitions Filed Thereunder
Honorable J. William Roberts
State's Attorney, Sangamon County
Room 404 County Building
Springfield, Illinois 62701
Dear Mr. Roberts:
I have your letter wherein you raise the following
questions with reference to the duties of a regional superintendent pursuant to section 3-14.24 of The School Code (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1981, ch 122, par. 3-14.24):
"I.
Who is responsible for bearing the notice,
printing, personnel, and other necessary costs of such
an ection?
&
Should the names appearing on petitions
seeking recognition be kept confidential by the
Regional Superintendent?"
Honorable J. William Roberts - 2.
For the reasons hereinafter stated, it is my opinion that the
costs of an election conducted pursuant to section 3-14.24 of
The School Code are to be borne by the regional superintendent
who is charged with conducting the election. Further, it is my
opinion that the names appearing on such petitions may be kept
confidential by the regional superintendent.
As you are aware, section 3-14.24 provides a statutory
mechanism whereby an exclusive bargaining representative may be
recognized by a public school employer. When a question of
representation is found to exist, the regional superintendent
is charged with the responsibility of administering the petition and election procedures. Section 3-14.24 provides in
pertinent part that:
"
* * *
* * * Petitions requesting an election may be
filed with the regional superintendent:
* * *
The regional superintendent shall investigate the
petition and if he has reasonable cause to suspect
that a question of representation exists, he shall
give notice and conduct a hearing. If he finds upon
the record of the hearing that a question of representation exists, he shall direct an election. * * *
* * *
Elections shall be by secret ballot. The
regional superintendent may establish rules and
regulations for the conduct of elections. * * *
*** The regional superintendent shall certify
the results of the election within 5 working days
Honorable J. William Roberts - 3.
after the final tally of votes unless a charge is
filed by a party that improper conduct occurred which
affected the outcome of the election. *** If he
determines, after hearing, that the outcome of the
election was affected by improper conduct, he shall
order a new election. If he determines upon investi-
gation or after hearing that the alleged improper
conduct did not take place or that it did not affect
the results of the election, he shall immediately
certify the election results.
*
"
According to information received from your office:
"
* * *
The Illinois State Board of Education, although
apparently not claiming to have jurisdiction to
promulgate enforceable rules and regulations, has
issued a set of guidelines relative to P.A. 82-107
[section 3-14.24] which is entitled 'General Rules'.
These documents have been, or will be, sent to the
various regional superintendents with the expectation
that each superintendent will 'adopt' the substantive
provisions. * * *
***
=
Rules 14 and 15 of those proposed General Rules provide that:
"13. The Petitioner (s) must bear the costs of notice
and election including the printing of ballots,
however, the content of ballots and other
material prepared by the Petitioner (s) must be
approved by the regional superintendent prior to
distribution or use.
14. The regional superintendent may determine that he
cannot conduct the election without the use of
agents. If the regional superintendent makes
such a determination, the costs of agents shall
be paid by Petitioner (s). Agents shall be
impartial third parties named by the regional
superintendent.
"
As indicated above, section 3-14.24 specifically
provides that "The regional superintendent may establish rules
Honorable J. William Roberts - 4.
and regulations for the conduct of elections". Therefore, the
regional superintendent is clearly authorized to promulgate
certain rules and regulations "for the conduct of elections"
(emphasis added). Section 3-14.24, however, does not provide
that the costs of the election are to be assessed against the
petitioners, and the question arises as to whether a rule
requiring payment of costs by petitioners would be one made
pursuant to the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
for the actual conduct of the election itself. Because a
statute may not be altered, extended or added to by the
exercise of a power to promulgate rules and regulations thereunder (Northern Ill. Auto Workers V. Dixon (1979), 75 Ill. 2d
53, 60; Saxon-Western Corp. V. Mahin (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d
125, 129), it is my opinion that the regional superintendent
may not establish, by rule or regulation, a requirement that
petitioners bear the costs of an election. Additionally, discussion in the Senate debates on House Bill 701 (which added
section 3-14.24) concerning whether or not The State Mandates
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 85, par. 2201 et seq.) is
applicable, indicates that the expenditure of public funds was
anticipated. (June 24, 1981, Senate Debate on House Bill No.
701, at 40.) Senator Bruce, who sponsored House Bill 701 in
the Senate, indicated, during committee testimony, that the
requirements of section 3-14.24 were to be carried out at the
Honorable J. William Roberts - 5.
local level by existing staff at no appreciable net cost
increase. Consequently, it is apparent that the costs of the
election were expected to be absorbed on the local level by
the offices of the regional superintendents. I have not, however, considered the application of The State Mandates Act to
the situation at hand.
Secondly, you have inquired whether the names appearing on signature sheets which accompany petitions filed with
the regional superintendent in accordance with section 3-14.24
should be kept confidential by the regional superintendent.
Section 3-14.24 is silent as to whether the petitions are
considered to be public records open to inspection or may be
kept confidential by the regional superintendent.
To obtain information that is neither specifically
made accessible nor specifically made inaccessible by statute,
the public must look to the common law right to inspect public
records. (People ex rel. Gibson V. Peller (1962), 34 Ill.
App. 2d 372, 1976 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. 356.) In People ex rel.
Gibson V. Peller (1962), 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 374-75, the
court stated:
"
* * *
Good public policy requires liberality in
the right to examine public records. In 76 CJS,
Records, P 133, the author states: 'The right of
access to, and inspection of, public records is not
entirely a matter of statute. The right exists at
common law, and in the absence of a controlling
Honorable J. William Roberts - 6.
statute, such right is still governed by the common
law
all authorities are agreed that at common
law a person may inspect public records
...
or make
copies or memoranda thereof. * *
In discussing the common law right to inspect records,
my predecessor, in opinion No. S-1191, issued December 3, 1976,
stated:
"Although it is to be liberally construed
(Weinstein V. Rosenbloom, 59 Ill. 2d 475, 482), the
right to inspect public records is not without
qualification. There may be interests that justify
withholding public records from public inspection.
The court in People ex rel. Better Broadcasting
Council, Inc. V. Keane, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1090,
explained that interests such as confidentiality,
privacy and the need to protect sources of information
may qualify the public's right to know. The court
stated at pages 1092-93:
I
*
The people's right to know, however, must be
balanced by the practical necessities of govern-
ing. Public officials must be able to gather a
maximum of information and discharge their of-
ficial duties without infringing on rights of
privacy. Certain information possessed by
government is often supplied by individuals and
enterprises that have no strict legal obligation
to report but do so on a voluntary basis, with
the understanding the information will be treated
as confidential. Therefore, it is important to
consider whether disclosure would constitute an
invasion of privacy; whether there could be
prejudice to private rights or given an unfair
competitive advantage; whether it would prevent
responsible business people from serving the
public; whether it would discourage frankness;
and whether it could cut off sources of information upon which a government relies.
* * *
Public records may be withheld from public
inspection for other reasons. There is no right to
Honorable J. William Roberts - 7.
inspect a public record when inspection is sought for
an unlawful purpose or when inspection can serve no
useful purpose. (State ex rel. Charleston Mail Assoc.
V. Kelly, 143 S.E.2d 136 (West Virginia, 1965).) It
may also be proper to withhold information when public
disclosure would jeopardize pending litigation. In
any event, the right to inspect public records is
subject to reasonable regulation which protects the
functioning of government; reasonable rules regarding
the time and manner of examination may be established. Chicago Title & Trust Co. V. Danforth, 236 Ill.
554.
"
Consequently, in order to overcome the common law presumption
in favor of public disclosure, there must be countervailing
reasons for maintaining the confidentiality of the petitions
with accompanying signature sheets.
As an initial matter, it must be recognized that
section 3-14.24 is concerned solely with the area of collective
bargaining. As pointed out in information provided by your
office, the petition and signature sheets have certain similar-
ities to the authorization cards utilized in the administration
of the National Labor Relations Act. In Committee on Masonic
Homes, Etc. V. NLRB (1977), 556 F.2d 214, 217-18, the court
described authorization cards as follows:
Union authorizatioa cards are cards
signed by employees, authorizing a certain union to
represent them, 'for all purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to wages, hours and other
conditions of employment'. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
During an organizational campaign, employees are asked
to sign a card. The union collects them, and when
thirty percent of the employees have signed, it may
send those cards, together with a petition for a
Honorable J. William Roberts - 8.
representation election, to the regional director of
the NLRB. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
The director then reviews the petition, and, if
satisfied by the showing of support, orders a
hearing. At that hearing the employer can challenge
such items as the appropriateness of the bargaining
unit. The employer cannot, however, challenge the
sufficiency of the employee showing of interest; that
is an issue to be determined by the NLRB. Linden
Lumber V. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309, 95 S.Ct. 429, 42
L.Ed.2d 465 (1974).
If an election is then ordered, employees vote
for or against the union by secret ballot. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1). Thus, the employer is prevented from
finding out, at any time, which employees have
supported the union. Indeed, attempts to determine
particular employee's union sentiments have often
produced charges of unfair labor practices. E.g.,
NLRB V. Historic Smithville Inn, 414 F.2d 1358, 1362
(3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 908, 90 S.Ct.
904, 25 L.Ed.2d 88 (1970). For this reason, an
employer ordinarily cannot see the cards signed by its
employees indicating their preference for the union.
NLRB V. New Era Die Co., 118 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1941).
* *
"
(See also Pacific Molasses Co. V. NLRB, Etc. (1978),
577 F.2d 1172, 1177-78.)
Section 3-14.24 provides in pertinent part that:
"
*
* * * Petitions requesting an election may be
filed with the regional superintendent:
A. by an employee or group of employees or any
labor organization acting on their behalf alleging and
presenting evidence that 30% or more of the employees
in a bargaining unit wish to be represented for
collective bargaining or that the labor organization
which has been acting as the exclusive bargaining
representative is no longer representative of a
majority of the employees in the unit; or
*
Honorable J. William Roberts - 9.
The regional superintendent shall investigate the
petition and if he has reasonable cause to suspect
that a question of representation exists, he shall
give notice and conduct a hearing. If he finds upon
the record of the hearing that a question of representation exists, he shall direct an election. Nothing
prohibits the waiving of hearings by the parties and
the conduct of consent elections.
* * *
Elections shall be by secret ballot. The
regional superintendent may establish rules and
regulations for the conduct of elections. * * *
* *
"
It is apparent that, in the context of collective
bargaining, employee petitions with accompanying signature
sheets are analagous to and are used for a purpose similar to
employee authorization cards under the National Labor Relations
Act, as discussed above. In Committee on Masonic Homes, Etc.
V. NLRB (1977), 556 F.2d 214, 218, the court determined that,
under the subsection 5 (b) (6) exemption to the Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6), union authorization
cards in possession of the NLRB, which had been submitted as
the 30 percent showing in support of a petition for a representation election, are exempt from disclosure. Subsection
5 (b) (6) provides an exemption for "personnel and medical files
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clear unwarranted invasion of personal privacy". (Emphasis
added.) Although Illinois has no legislation similar to the
Honorable J. William Roberts - 10.
Federal Freedom of Information Act, nor are we dealing specifically with authorization cards under the National Labor
Relations Act, the court's discussion of what consitutes an
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" is relevant to the
discussion of what records may be withheld from public
inspection in accordance with the established common law
principles discussed above.
According to the Masonic court at pages 219-221:
"
* * * The 1965 Senate Report describes 'a policy
that will involve a balancing of interests between the
protection of an individual's private affairs from
unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of
the public's right to governmental information.' 1965
Senate Report, supra at 9. The House Report also
refers to a balancing policy: 'The limitation of a
"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"
provides a proper balance between the protection of an
individual's right of privacy and the preservation of
the public's right to Government information by
excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of which
might harm the individual. H. Rep. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
*
We begin here, then, by first considering whether
disclosure of the cards would be an invasion of
privacy. The answer is a simple yes. An employee who
signed a card was entitled to a private choice, given
the policies of the NLRA.
Next we ask what the public benefit would be from
disclosure. Masonic Homes has asserted its benefit --
it wants to challenge the signatures and avoid an
election. We are not interested in the employer's
benefit, though. Rather we must consider the public
benefit that would result from the disclosure, to an
employer or to anyone, of union authorization cards
submitted to support an election petition.
Honorable J. William Roberts - 11.
At oral argument, Masonic Homes suggested the
public would benefit as taxpayers by saving the
expense of conducting an election. If this is a
benefit, we fear it would be easily off-set by the
inevitable card challenge hearings and concommitant
appeals.
If the basic thrust of the Act is to inform the
electorate of the ways in which government agencies
operate, the cards will disclose nothing. We will
stop short of saying there is no public interest to be
balanced here, though, because the presumption is in
favor of disclosure.
* * * What the employer wants is the signatures,
the exact elements that are clearly private.
So, all that remains is to weigh the seriousness
of the invasion and the benefit of disclosure. The
invasion is serious. Despite the district court's
conclusion--' I see no reason why a person should be
embarrassed or harmed should it come to the employer's
or anyone else's attention that such person executed a
union authorization card.' App. at 14--we do see such
harm.
For instance, it is entirely plausible that
employees would be 'chilled' when asked to sign a
union card if they knew the employer could see who
signed. If so, this is a harm that could not easily
be corrected. To order disclosure here would effectively do away with union cards as they are used
now. We need only consider whether employees would be
as likely to sign a prominently displayed notice at
work, 'Sign up for the union here. Organize for
better working conditions and higher wages. Solici-
tation of authorization cards plays a vital role in
organizational campaigns, and we cannot envision a
workable substitute.
Furthermore, union elections must be conducted by
secret ballot. Whatever reasons and policies lie
behind that would be directly undercut by forcing
employees to acknowledge in public their support of
the union, in order to be given the right to vote in
secret for the union.
Honorable J. William Roberts - 12.
Having found a serious violation of privacy and
no significant public interest in disclosure, we
conclude that the union authorization cards are exempt
from disclosure, under section 552 (b) (6) of the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
* * *
:
In Pacific Molasses Co. V. NLRB, Etc. (1978), 577 F.2d
1172, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, upheld
the ruling of the court in Masonic Homes on the issue of
whether authorization cards submitted to the NLRB for the
purpose of establishing the requisite 30 percent showing of
interest in order to petition for an election under 29 U.S.C. §
159, and which were signed by employees designating their
choice of a collective bargaining representative, were subject
to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. In making
this determination that disclosure would be a clear,
unwarranted invasion of privacy, the court stated at pages
1181-1183 that:
"*** [I]t is necessary to balance those
interests of an individual in having his private
affairs protected from public scrutiny with the desire
to preserve as best as possible the public's right to
governmental information. See Rep. No. 813, p.9;
Dept. of Air Force V. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96
S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). * * * We agree
with the Third Circuit, and feel that the Freedom of
Information Act does not compel disclosure of these
cards. In so holding, we are recognizing that
employees have a strong privacy interest in their
personal sentiments regarding union representation,
and that this right to privacy is a right necessary to
full and free exercise of the organizational rights
guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act.
Honorable J. William Roberts - 13.
In this case, it is impossible to minimize the
seriousness of the threatened invasion. We would be
naive to disregard the abuse which could potentially
occur if employers and other employees were armed with
this information. The inevitable result of the avail-
ability of this information would be to chill the
right of employees to express their favorable union
sentiments. Such a chilling effect would undermine
the rights guaranteed by the N.L.R.A., and, for all
intents and purposes, would make meaningless those
provisions of the N.L.R.A. which guarantee secrecy in
union elections.
While it is clear that the disclosure of the
authorization cards would be a serious invasion of the
privacy of the card signers, it is equally apparent
that the public benefit from disclosure would be
minimal. The only public interest advanced by the
plaintiffs is the need for public oversight of the
Board's showing of interest determination. The thrust
of this argument is that:
[T]he public would have an opportunity to verify
the signatures on the cards. This would assure
the public of the necessity as well as the like-
lihood of a fairly conducted election.
Disclosure would also lead to an actual saving of
tax monies, because in many instances the expense
of conducting an election would be avoided.
Brief of Appellee at 24.
We cannot accept the plaintiff's argument, and we
feel that there is little if any public benefit to be
gained from disclosure. The N.L.R.B. has already set
up procedures that can deal with any suspected fraud
which might occur in the obtaining of the signature
cards, and certainly the secret ballot election
ultimately protects the employer from any threat of
having to recognize a union that is not supported by
50% of the affected employees. We are also unable to
see the possibility of any potential tax savings which
would be so great as to justify the serious infringe-
ments on the employees' right to privacy. We hold,
therefore, that disclosure of these cards would result
in a serious invasion of the personal privacy of the
affected employees with no counterbalancing benefit to
be obtained for the public. As a result, these cards
Honorable J. William Roberts - 14.
are exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (6).
*
"
Because the use of signed authorization cards for the
purpose of indicating sufficient interest to support a petition
for a certification or decertification election for a collective bargaining representative is analogous to a signature
sheet accompanying a petition for an election to select an
exclusive collective bargaining representative, and because
section 3-14.24, as is apparent from the above discussion, is
similar in substance to certain provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act, the reasoning of the above courts is
highly persuasive on the question of whether signature sheets
should, in order to protect individual privacy, be held confidential by the regional superintendent under section
3-14.24. Public disclosure of the signature sheets could, in
fact, "chill" the right of employees to express union sentiments, and could effectively eliminate the privacy which is
secured by the secret ballot. In accordance with section
3-14.24, the regional superintendent is charged with the
statutory duty to investigate petitions requesting an election
and to conduct a hearing if he believes that a question of
representation exists. Therefore, an asserted interest in
disclosing the signature sheet in order to ascertain whether
Honorable J. William Roberts - 15.
such petition and signature sheet are in proper order and form
does not appear to justify the resulting invasion of privacy.
Consequently, absent any compelling public interest in opening
the petitions and signature sheets to public inspection, it is
my opinion that the regional superintendent may consider the
signature sheets confidential and withhold them from public
inspection.
Very truly yours,
JustJan GENERAL