1906-1908 Ind. Op. Att'y Gen. p. 29
If a member of the school board of Evansville is the attorney for a railroad corporation that solicits a franchise from that city, his office is not vacated.
SCHOOL TRUSTEE NOT INELIGIBLE BECAUSE ATTORNEY
FOR, RAILROAD ASKING FRANCHISE FROM CIVIL
CITY.
December 6, 1906.
Hon. Fassett A. Cotton, Superintendent of Public Instruction:
Dear Sir-I am in receipt qf your communication of the 15th
nlt., wherein you ask whether a member of the school board of
Evansville is rendered ineligible to hold such office by the fact
that he is the attorney for a railroad corporation which is plan-
ning to enter the city, and to ask for a franchise.
You further
state that this trustee was appointed by the mayor of Evansville
under §4050 Burns' Statutes 1901.
The statute last referred to reads, in part, as follows:
"The mayor of such city shall appoint, as hereinbefore
provided, three school trustees
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4
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Said trustees
shall constitute the school board of such city, and before
entering upon the duties of their office each shall take an
oath faithfully to discharge the duties of the same."
The answer to your inquiry depends upon the proper construe-
tion to be given to §46 of the Town and City Code of 1905, found
at page 243 of the Acts of 1905, reading as follows:
"No member of the common council, nor any officer,
clerk or deputy of such officer, or other employe of any
city of this state, shall, either directly or indirectly, be a
party to or in any manner interested in any contract or
agreement, either with such city, or with any officer, board,
clerk, deputy or employe of such city, for any matter,
cause or thing by which any liability or indebtedness is in
any may or manner created or passed upon, authorized or
approved by such council or by any member thereof, or by
any officer, board, clerk, deputy or employe of such city.
No officer, employe, agent or servant of any corporation,
firm, company or person holding or operating under a fran-
chise granted by any city, or having any contract with such
city, shall be eligible to any office in such city: and any
officer of any city accepting any office in or employment by
any such corporation, firm, company or persons holding or
operating under any such franchise or having any such
contract, or seeking to acquire any such franchise or con-
tract, shall thereby vacate such city office.
Any contract
in contravention of the foregoing provisions shall be abso-
lutely void; and any person violating any of such pro-
visions shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars
and imprisoned in the state prison not less than one year
nor more than ten years.
No councilmen or other officer,
clerk, deputy or eniploye of any city shall, either directly
or indirectly, purchase any bond, order, claim or demand
whatsoever against such city, during his continuance in
office or employment, for any sum less than the amount
specified therein: and any bond, order, claim or demand
so purchased by any such officer or other person in contra-
vention of the foregoing provision, shall be forfeited to
such city, and no action shall ever be maintained thereon.
Gifts and the acquirement of equ-itable interests by any
such officers in any such bonds, orders, claims or demands
shall be deemed to be within the meaning and scope of the
foregoing provisions."
It will be noted that this section is a part of a code relating to
the civil and not to the school city, and that the city to which the
section refers is such as has a council and can grant a franchise.
Considering that this is a penal provision, aind should be construed
strictly and not extended beyond its apparent meaning, I am of
the opinion that. as far as a member of the school board of Evan.1-
ville is concerned, the above section does not render him ineligible
merely because he happens to be an attorney for a corporation
which seeks a franchise from the civil city.
The language of the statute is-"Any officer of any city, etc.,
shall
'
vacate such city office."
Who are city
officers is determined largely by section 3476 Burns' Statutes 1901.
which states
"The officers of such city shall consist of a mayor, two
councilmen from each ward, a city clerk, treasurer, civil
engineer, street commissioner, chief of the fire department,
health officer, marshal and (if the common council deem it
expedient) a city attorney and a city judge."
While the last cited statute is not exclusive in its enumeration
of "city officers,"
(See City of Ft. Wayne v. Rosenthal, 75 Ind.
156, 161), it is a significant fact that the officers of the school city
are not mentioned therein.
The civil and school cities are independent corporations, and
it can not properly be said that when the legislature enacted a
penal statute governing "officers of any city," and in so doing Cem1-
ployed language, which, in many instances, necessarily is to be
limited to officers of the civil city, it intended to include school
city officials, although they were not named or suggested.
It will also be noted that §517 of the criminal code of 1905
(Acts 1905, p. 704), which concerns the interest of officers in pub-
lie contracts, expressly mentions school trustees as within its pro-
hibitions. It would have been natural for such school officials
to be similarly referred to in §46, supra, if the purpose of the leg-
islature was to embrace them within the act.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that if a member of the school
board of Evansville is the attorney for a railroad corporation
which solicits a franchise from that city, his office as a member
of the board is not thereby vacated.
BURIAL ASSOCIATION-DIS POSITION OF MONEY PAID IN
13Y PATh ONS-COLLECTION OF FURTHER ASSESS-
T\IENTS.
December 6, 1906.
Iioi. John C. Billheimer, Auditor of State, Indianapolis, Indiana:
Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your communication of the 30th
ilt., in which you ask the following questions:
1.
"Will it be lawful for the operators of burial asso-
ciations, in closing up their organizations to voluntarily
issue receipts to their patrons for the several amounts paid
in by such patrons, and specifying in such receipts that
credit to the amount so paid shall be given on their funeral
expenses?"
2.
"Will it be lawful for such burial associations to
make collections on the death of members occurring pre-
vious to your decision for services rendered by such burial
associations in good faith'?"
Replying to these inquiries in their order:
First. I do not regard it as violative of any law of this state
for the receipts, above mentioned, to be given by those who have
heretofore operated burial associations. However, it will be op-
tional with the parties who have made payments to such oper-
ators, whether they will accept such receipts and agree to the ap-
plication of paymenlts as therein provided, or whether they will