1906-1908 Ind. Op. Att'y Gen. p. 243
The language "legal voter" means each poll taxable person twenty-one years of age, as defined by section 8409 and section 2 of the act of 1905; it does not create a new class, and therefore, the male inhabitants fifty years and over, and enlisted men of the active militia, are exempt from the paymen
243
to engage in such a business; hence, unless it is implied, it does
not exist.
In an opinion rendered to Hon. W. -. Hart, Auditor of State,
by my predecessor, Hon. W. L. Taylor, the view was expressed and
reinforced by authorities, that building and loan associations have
no power to borrow money for the purpose of re-loaning the same.
(See Biennial Report of Attorney-General Taylor, for 1900-1902).
In addition to the cases therein cited, holding that no implied
power of borrowing exists, see Marion Trust Co. v. Cresent Loan
Co., 27 Ind. App. 451, 455, 456; Columbus Bldg. Assn. v. Kriete,
192 Ill. 128, 61 N. E. 510, 513; Towle v. Building Co., 78 Fed. 688;
Forwood v. Ewbank, 106 Ky. 291, 295.
Upon full examination of the question, I concur with the view
of Attorney-General Taylor.
However, these institutions have the implied power possessed
by all business corporations, to borrow money in aid of the gen-
eral purposes of the association (4 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, p.
1023; Cook v. Equitable Assoc., 104 Ga. §814, 829; Powell's Ap-
peal, 93 Mo. App. 296).
According to the view above indicated, the general loaning of
money is not one of the statutory purposes of building and loan
companies.
I am therefore of the opinion that while no section of the
banking law is violated by this practice, it is ultra vires.
What has been said supra virtually answers your second
question. While, under certain circumstances, these associations
might borrow money as a temporary expedient, or strictly in aid
of their corporate purposes (4 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, p. 1022),
they can not make it a part of their regular business to receive
moneys from investors other than from purchasers of their stock.
TAX-MEMBERS OF INDIANA NATIONAL GUARD AND
MALE INHABITANTS OVER AGE OF FIFTY YEARS,
EXEMPT FROM POLL TAX.
July 15, 1907.
Hon. John C. Billheimer, Auditor of State:
Dear Sir--In answer to your inquiry as to -whether, under
Chapter 249, page 505 of the acts of the general assembly of the
state of Indiana, session of 1907, members of the Indiana National
Guard and male inhabitants over the age of fifty years, are ex-
exempt from poll tax, I beg leave to advise that section 1 of said
act reads as follows:
"See. 1.
That there shall be in the year 1907, and an-
nually thereafter, assessed and collected as state and coun-
ty revenues are collected, thirteen cents and six mills on
each one hundred dollars worth of taxable property, real
and personal, in this state, and in addition thereto a poll tax
of fifty (50c.) cents upon each legal voter in the state," etc.
That portion of section 8409 Burns' Annotated Indiana Stat-
utes 1901, which relates generally t o poll tax, reads as follows:
"A poll tax shall be assessed upon every male inhabi-
tant of this state between the ages of twenty-one and fifty
years, and every person shall be listed for his poll tax in
the township, town or city of his residence."
So much of section 2. of the act of 1905 relating to the exemp-
tion of officers and enlisted men of the active militia, from pay-
ment of poll tax, reads as follows:
"Every officer and enlisted man of the active militia
shall be exempt from
*
a
payment of any poll and
road tax."
It will be observed that section 1 of the act of 1907 first above
quoted, with reference to the taxation of polls, contains this
language: "And, in addition thereto, a poll tax of 50 cents upon
each legal voter in the state," etc.
This identification of a class to be taxed has never before oc-
curred in our laws of. taxation, but has hitherto been applicable
alone to the identification and description of voters in our election
laws. If this language is to be construed literally, the class of
persons to be taxed would be only such persons as come within
the statutory difinition of a voter. The qualifications of an elector
in Indiana, required by art. 2, section 2 of the constitution, are as
follows:
Citizenship-
"Every male citizen of the United States, of the age
of twenty-one years and upwards, -
" " and every male
of foreign birth, of the age of twenty-one years and up-
wards, who shall have resided in the United States one
year, *
* * and have declared his intention to become
a citizen of the United States, conformably to the laws of
the United States on the subject of naturalization."
245.
Residence-(as to each of above classes)-
"Who shall have resided in the state during the six
months, and in the township sixty days, and in the ward
precinct thirty days, immediately preceding"
any elec-
tion.
By other sections of the law governing taxation in this state,
the first day of March in each year is fixed arbitrarily as the
day of taxability.
There is no provision of law by which any election is held in
the state of Indiana on the first day of March of any year. If
the language referred to then, is construed to be applicable to
the date of the last preceding general election, the list of voters
who would be taxable on the first day of March first succeeding
the general election in November, -would be a list made up four
months prior to the date of taxation for the first year succeeding
the general election, and the list for the first of March, occurring
the second year after the general election, in point of date. would
be sixteen months removed from the date of taxation, and, of
necessity, thousands of men in the state would become twenty-
one years of age in the time intervening between the date when
the list of voters became fixed and the date of taxability: and
in addition to this. every alien in the state of Indiana would be
exempted from this poll tax.
By section 8463 Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes, Supple-
ment 1905. the general assembly of the state of Indiana has pro-
vided a blank form of assessment sheet, on which all the anestions
which are to be asked a voter for the purpose of securing data
for taxation purposes are included, and there nowhere appears
to be any provision in this statute for inquiries to be made of
the person being assessed that would secure the information nec-
essary to prepare a. list of the legal voters upon either the election
day or npon the first d v of March. the date of tnxabilitv.
In the first part of said section 1 of the act of 1907. this lan-
guage appears, that "there shall be in the year 1907, and annually
thereafter, assessed and collected as county revenues are col-
lected." etc.. which signifies an intention and purpose to have the
taxes provided for in said section collected the same as other
taxes are collected, and it is plain that whatever meaning was
assigned by the general assembly to the term "legal voter." as
used in this section, related to the first day of March of each year.
the date of taxability.
It is also my opinion that there was no purpose on. the part
of the general assembly to exempt aliens or other male "inhabi-
tants who did not have the qualification of a voter at an election
as if held on March 1st. It is a common expression to say that
a man is a-voter when he is twenty-one years of age, and it is
undoubtedly in this sense that this language was used in this
statute.
By the language quoted from the first part of said section,
and the further fact that no provision was made in the act for
securing the data necessary to make a list of persons to be taxed,
other than those already made for poll tax purposes, it is plain
that it was the purpose of the general assembly to have this act
construed in connection with the other general taxing laws of
the state. Since the class of persons to be taxed is described by
the localigm above referred to, and if such description was in-
terpreted literally, it would destroy the uniformity of the taxing
laws of the state, it is also plain that the section and language
referred to is subject to construction.
In the State Board of Tax Commissioners, et al., v. Holliday,
et al.. 150 Ind., at p. 216 (see pages 220, 233, 234 and 235 for rea-
soning), in which the question of taxing insurance policies was
up for consideration, the supreme court of the state of Indiana,
said:
"The statute must not only provide what property
shall be taxed, but it must provide methods for the valua-
tion of such property and clothe some person, officer or
tribunal with power and authority to assess such valuation,
and if the statute contains no such provision, it will be
insufficient to subject such property to taxation."
Again:
"In order to ascertain the intention of the legislature
the court should look to the letter of the statute, to it as
a whole, to the circumstances under which it was enacted,
to the old law, if any, to the mischief to be remedied-, to
other statutes, to the rules of the common law, and to the
condition of affairs when the statute was enacted."
In Allison. president of the Bank of Gosport, v. Hubbell, 17
Ind. 559, p. 563, in discussing the construction of statutes, the
supreme court of this state said:
"Although it is the province and duty of the court to
construe a statute, and interpret the language employed by
the law makers, yet the object to be arrived at is a question
of fact, namely, the intention of such law makers.
That
is to be derived, if possible, from the act itself; or from
that, when considered in connection with other statutes
upon the same subject, or from these things, together with
contemporaneous construction of, or usage under, said
statute. ''
In Humphreys v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274 (see page 284 for reason-
ing), in discussing the rules for construction of statutes, the su-
preme court of this state said:
''It is proper to look to other statutes, to the rules of
the common law," the source from which the statute was
derived, to the general principles of equity, to the object
of the statute and to the condition of affairs existing when
the statute was adopted (citing authorities)."
Then the court proceeds by saying:
"As it was said in Aurora, etc., R.. R. Co. v. City of
Lawrenceburg, supra, 'Construction has ever been a po-
tent agency in harmonizing the operation of statutes with
equity and justice. Statutes are to be construed as to
make the law one uniform system, not a collection of di-
verse and disjointed fragments.' "
In Taylor v. Board of Commissioners Washington County, 67
Ind. 383 (see p. 384 for reas9ning), the supreme court of this
state in considering the question of construction of statutes said:
"It is a settled principle that in construing a statute
the intention of the legislature must govern.
To ascertain
this intention, we must look to the letter of the statute, to
other statutes upon the same subject, to the construction
of similar statutes by the courts, to their spirit and pur-
pose, and harmonize what may appear to be conflicting so
as to bring them into concord with a general and uniform
system."
(Citing Buskirk's Practice, 353.)
To construe the language "legal voter" contained in said sec-
tion to mean every male inhabitant twenty-one years of age,
would require-as to this particular tax-every male inhabitant
twenty-one years of age to pay 50 cents poll tax, and, under said
section 8409 above referred to, those male inhabitants twenty-one
years of age and under fifty years of age, would pay this 50 cents
poll tax and in addition thereto all other poll tax assessed against
them; while the male inhabitant over fifty years of age would
only pay 50 cents poll tax.
Such a construction would not be in conflict with said section
relating to poll tax, but it would not be in harmony with said sec-
tion.
This construction, however, would be in conflict with sec-
tion 2 of the act of 1905 above referred to, since the provision of
that section is that every officer and enlisted man of the active
militia shall be exempt, and such a construction would have the
effect of repealing by implication this provision of said last named
section as to the 50 cents poll tax specified in said act of 1907;
otherwise we would have the anomalous condition of the male in-
habitants of the state over fifty years of age paying this 50 cents
poll tax and the officers and enlisted men in the active militia
exempted.
It is my opinion that the language "legal voter" in this sec-
tion means each poll taxable person twenty-one years of age, as
defined by section 8409 and section 2 of the act of 1905 above re-
ferred to, and that it does not create a new class, or in any sense
repeal section 2 of the act of 1905, and that therefore the male in-
habitants of this state fifty years of age and over, and the officers
and enlisted mci of the active militia of this state, are exempt
from the payment of the poll tax provided for in said section 1 of
the act of 1907. "
FOODS AND DRUGS-PROPRIEOR OF STORE RESPONSI-
BLE FOR SALE OF ADULTERATED OR MISBRANDED
FOODS, ETC.
July 16, 1907.
Prof. H. E. Barnard, State Food and Drug Commissioner, State
House, City:
Dear Sir-Replying to your recent request for authorities upon
the general proposition that where adulterated or misbranded
foods are sold at the store of a proprietor in the natural course
of business, be himself is liable under the statute, although the
actual sale was made by a clerk who, at the time of the trans-
action, was regularly employed by the proprietor to sell goods
contained in such store, I submit the following:
In Meyer v. State, 54 Oh. St. 242, it was held that the man-
ager of a corporation who sent a traveling salesman into a par-
ticular county to sell the company's goods, viz: catsup, was