If the Andersonville Monument Commission pays a designer for services rendered in preparing designs, such payment would be a charge against the $7,500 fund rather than against the fund for general expenses.

I am of the opinion that his election is invalid. No statute prescribes the number constituting a quorum of the town board, or the proportion of the quorum which can transact business; hence the common law rule applies, which is thus ex- pressed by a recent authority: "Unless there be some special provision by charter or law to the contrary, the common law rule as to quormms and majorities of bodies of definite number obtains with reference to city councils. That is to say, a majority of the whole number must be present to constitute a legal quorum; and a majority of that quorum is necessary to do any valid act." 1 Smith on Municipal Corps., §504; also §§294, 300; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corps., §279; Rushville Gas Co. v. Rushville, 101 Ind. 206. ANDERSONVILLE MONUMENT COMMISSION-EMPLOY- MENT OF MORE THAN ONE MEMBER FOR SPECIAL SERVICE-COMPENSATION-COMPETITIVE BIDS. July 19, 1907. Hon. James P. Goodrich, Winchester, Indiana: Dear Sir-Certain questions submitted in your favor of July 16th will be answered in the order of presentation: (1) "Under section 1 of the act of 1907 (Acts 1907, p. 361) have the Andersonville Monument Commission the right to em- ploy more than one of their number to perform any service re- quired of them by the statute for which compensation may be paid ?" Section one reads: "Nothing in this act shall prevent the commission from employing one or more of .their members, when desirable, to perform services for which they may lawfully contract: Provided, however, That one of their members can only be employed by contract in writing with the consent and ap- proval of the governor indorsed thereon." My construction of this section is, that the proviso does not limit the number of those who may be employed, but the manner of their employment. The language is not "only one of their number can be employed," but, "one of their members can only be employed," etc. The word "one" means "any, " and though singular in form, may be given a plural meaning (Garrigus v. Board, 39 Ind. 66). The bill, as originally introduced in the House of Representa- tives, contained the present proviso in §1. It is unreasonable to assume the framer of the law, as well as both houses of the Gen- eral Assembly, intended to incorporate contradictory terms into the act, as would result if the word "one" were not to be inter- preted to mean "one or more," as used in the sentence preceding the proviso. As to the character of the services to be performed by the one employed, my view is that the intent of the legislature was not to empower the commission to delegate all its authority to one or more of its members, without the supervision and control of the entire commission. Ministerial acts may be thus delegated, but in all matters involving the exercise of discretion, such as the ac- ceptance of designs, location of monument, etc., the sense of the commission, as a whole, should control, and no one member be given carle blanc to decide for all. (2) "Must the contract specify definitely the amount of com- pensation to be received by the member performing the service, or can the contract be in writing, leaving the amount of com- pensation for future determination by the commission and the governor? '' The only requirements provided for by law are that the contract be in writing and be entered into with the consent and approval of the governor indorsed therein (§l). In the nature of the case, the extent of services to be rendered would be wholly uncertain until the same were performed. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the statute is complied with by entering into a writ- ten contract, approved by the governor, calling for the services contemplated, and stipulating that the compensation shall be a reasonable one, to be determined, after performance, by the gov- ernor and the members of the commission, other than the one employed. That parties to a contract may therein refer the ques- tion of compensation to a third party, has been frequently de- cided. See: Baltimore Ry. Co. v. Scholes, 14 Ind. App. 524, 528. I enclose herewith a suggested form of agreement. (3) "The commission has decided to ask for competitive de- signs of the monument and will expect to pay the successful de- signer for services rendered in preparing the designs for the plans adopted. Where should this expense be charged,-to the $2,500 fund, or to the $7,500 provided for the erection of the monu- ment ? '' The act appropriates $7,500 "for the erection," and $2,500 "for the expenses of the commission as traveling expenses, and for the expense of the governor, and of the participation of the state in the dedication of ceremonies of said monuments (monument), 0 "1 0 clerk hire, labor employ, office rent and other neces- sary expenses, and included in this is any expense for the pur- pose for which this commission is created, for services which are valuable to the commission." I am of the opinion that, if the commission pays a designer for services rendered in preparing the designs, such payment would be a charge against the $7,500 fund rather than against the fund for general expenses. The method which most readily sug- gests itself would be to advertise for competitive bids, based upon designs submitted by each competitor; these bids including not only compensation for the design itself, together with value of labor and material furnished subsequent to acceptance, but also time and material consumed in preparing the designs. The total bid would be for the erection of the figure, pedestal or monu- ment; and preparation of designs is an essential step in such erection. If the commission sees best to pay for these preliminary services separately, this would not alter the situation, so far as the statutory appropriation is concerned. INSURANCE-COMPANY WITHDRAWING FROM STATE, LEAVING POLICIES IN FORCE THEREIN, CONTINU- ING TO COLLECT PREMIUMS. July 18, 1907. Hon. John C. Billheimer, Auditor of State: Dear Sir-In your communication of July 7th, you ask the following question: "If an insurance company retires from the state of Indiana, leaving policies in force therein, and continues to collect premiums on these policies, would it be required to pay taxes on such gross premium receipts after withdrawing from the state?"