No. 13 (1972)
Number 13 December 9, 1971
Cite as Mass. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 13, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 (1972)
Number 13
December 9, 1971
Honorable John F. Kehoe
Commissioner of Public Safety
1010 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02215
Dear Commissioner Kehoe:
Your predecessor requested my opinion as to the jurisdiction of the
Department of Public Safety over the construction of a "private gas util-
ity" of an above-ground tank of more than
10,000 gallons capacity for
the storage of liquified nature gas (LNG). According to additional
in-
formation which has been provided, the "private gas
utility"
will
dis-
tribute and
sell LNG both to public utility companies and to the public
by means of pipelines and trucking facilities. The following question
is
posed:
"Does a private gas utility, intending to construct a facility
for storing and piping gas
in
liquified form, come under the
purview of Section 37 of Chapter 148 of the General Laws,
it
being understood
that
the above-ground
tanks
to be con-
structed will contain more than 10,000 gallons and be used for
the storage of gas in
its fluid or liquid form?"
I conclude that the Department of Public Safety does not have juris-
diction over the private gas
utility, and
I therefore answer the question
in the negative for the reasons hereinafter stated.
P.D.
12
73
General Laws,
c.
148, § 37 states in pertinent part:
"No person
shall construct, maintain or use any tank or
container of more than ten thousand gallons' capacity, for the
storage of any fluid other than water, unless the same
is lo-
cated underground, without securing a permit therefor from
the commissioner [of Public Safety]."
In Op. Atty. Gen., May 27,
1968,
at
195, my predecessor ruled that
the Department of Public Utilities exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
the construction by the Boston Gas Company of an above-ground tank
of more than 10,000 gallons capacity for the storage of LNG.
It was de-
termined that the Legislature, by the enactment of G. L. c.
164, § 105A,
intended to vest in the Department of Public Utilities exclusive jurisdic-
tion, at the State level, over gas companies and their operations. Id. at
197. Massachusetts General Law, c. 164, § 105A states in pertinent part:
"Authority to regulate and control the storage, transporta-
tion and
distribution of gas and the pressure under which
these operations may respectively be
carried on
is hereby
vested in the department [of Public Utilities]."
Since
I concur in the conclusion reached in the former opinion for the
reasons
stated therein, the only question for resolution
is whether the
opinion
is altered by the fact that construction of an LNG tank
is con-
templated by a "private gas utility," as described above.
The grant of jurisdiction to the Department of Public Utilities under
G. L. c.
164, § 105A quoted above is unrestricted and does not differen-
tiate between a "private gas utility" and a "public gas utility," however
defined, with respect to the storage of gas. Accordingly, the portion of
the
statute quoted above must
control
the
situation you
raise unless
other terms of the statute or the remaining statutory scheme of Chapter
164 can be viewed as imposing a limitation upon the sweep of Section
105A.
The latter part of Section 105A does refer to a "gas company," which
is defined under G. L.
c.
164, §
1
as:
"a corporation organized under the laws of the common-
wealth for the purpose of making and
selling, or distributing
and selling, gas within the commonwealth, even though sub-
sequently authorized to make or sell electricity."
Under the same section, however, this definition applies "unless the
context otherwise requires
.
.
.
'
To the extent
that the
definition of
"gas company" as formulated imposes any limitation upon the jurisdic-
tion of the Department of Public Utilities over the storage of gas by a
"private gas utility,"
I conclude that the context of Section
105 A re-
quires that said limitation not apply, for the following reasons.
General Laws
c.
164,
§
105A should be interpreted so as to be ren-
dered an effectual piece of legislation in accordance with common sense
and sound reason. Atlas Distributing Co.
v. Alcoholic Beverages Con-
74
P.D.
12
trol Commission,
354 Mass.
408,
414, and cases
cited. The
statute
should also be construed so as to effectuate
its salutary and important
purpose {Foley v. Lawrence, 336 Mass. 60, 65), namely the safeguarding
of the public from the risks inherent' in the storage of gas. Op. Atty.
Gen., May 27, 1968, at 197. Compare Repucci v. Exchange Realty Co.,
321 Mass. 571, 575 (statute for the protection of human life to be broadly
construed). Neither the vital purpose nor the effectiveness of the statute
would be advanced by attributing to the statute an overly narrow con-
struction. Moreover, since the term "fluid"
in G. L.
c.
148,
§ 37 does
not include LNG within
its meaning (Op. Atty. Gen., May 27,
1968, at
197), to rule that G. L.
c.
164,
§ 105A does not govern the factual situa-
tion you raise might well result in the construction of gas storage tanks
without the regulation and supervision of any public agency. An inten-
tion to accomplish such an absurd result cannot be imputed to the Legis-
lature. Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 355 Mass. 94, 99. On
the other hand, to rule, as
I do, that G. L.
c. 164, § 105A governs all gas
companies
falling under
its broad terms,
irrespective of whether such
companies are labelled "public" or "private," does not more than effec-
tuate a "control which strongly tends to ensure protection of the public
interest and which
is
within
the
statutory language." Boston Edison
Company v. Sudbury, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh.
1289, 1299.
Accordingly,
I conclude that the gas company you describe does not
come within the purview of G. L. c.
148, § 37 but is subject to the provi-
sions of G. L.
c.
164,
§ 105A.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT H. QUINN
Attorney General