Number 14 February 12. 1981

Number 14 February 12. 1981 Michael J. Connolly Secretary of the Commonwealth State House, Room 337 Boston, MA 02133 Dear Secretary Connolly: You have requested my opinion concerning the appropriate standards to be used by your office in administering G.L. c. 3, §§39, et seq., pertaining to legislative agents/ You inquire, first, whether those individuals who appear before legislative committees for compensation and offer brief testimony or written comments (the so-called expert witnesses) are exempt from the registration and disclosure requirements that are generally applicable to lobbyists. You next ask what employment relationships should be considered in determining whether the particular lobbying activity under consideration is "incidental" to an individual's regular employment, thereby exempting him from the registration and disclosure requirements. The answer to both your questions requires a close analysis of General Laws chapter 3, section 39, which defines legislative agent as: . . . any person who for compensation or reward does any act to promote, oppose, or influence legislation, or to promote, oppose, or influence the governor's approval or veto thereof or to influence the decision of any member of the Executive branch where such decision concerns legislation or the adoption, defeat, or postpone- ment of a standard, rate, rule or regulation pursuant thereto. The term shall include persons who, as any part of their regular and usual employment and not simply incidental thereto, attempt to promote, oppose or influence legislation or the governor's approval or veto thereof, whether or not any compensation in addition to the salary for such employment is received for such services. In construing this statute, I first examine its plain words, Sachs v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 300 Mass. 426, 428 (1938); Moynihan v. To^^'n of Arlington, Mass. App. Adv. Sh. (1978) 1255. construed so as to tultill the legislative intent. Industrial Finance Corp. v. State Tax Commission. 367 Mass 360 (1975) The intent of the legislature should be determmed by an examination of the language used, in connection with its legislative history^ and the system of law of which it is part. Commonwealth v. Welosky. ^Ib Mass. 398,401 (1931). ^. -^ , , , The plain words of this statute are clear and unambiguous. The statute essemially defines legislative agent as anyone who does anything to influence legislation^ and receives compensation for his efforts. There is no specific . fr,^„ r. I r 1 S40 and file penodic suicmenls of iheir compeiu*uoo and •All legislauve agents mus, register wth >""[?,"" q^l^, % ^j/j^TTim employers must l.kew.se rtg.sw. gL c 3. MO. expenditures in relation to their lobbying activities. O.L. =•-'•»'•' '™" ^ ' and disclose their expenditures for lobbying acuviues. G.L. c. i. 94/. ^THe statute also specifically includes attempting to -""--^'^'^.^^^r^'Li^'^irn^t" T °nIler;e^:.l"F^1X«" innuence any member of the Executive branch concern ng the adoption ol^>^^ ^ of simpl.cation, I refer to all of these activiues in thi.s opinion by the gcncnc term u. 136 P.D. 12 exemption provided by G.L. c. 3, §39, for expert witnesses who appear before legislative committees and bodies of the Executive branch, and the manifest legislative intent of the statute appears to be to broadly regulate those who seek to influence the legislative process for compensation. An examination of the legislative history of this statute strongly indicates that the legislature did not intend to exclude expert witnesses from the broad requirements of registering and disclosing their employers. When the Massachusetts legislature first provided for the registration of lobbyists, a distinction was made between "legislative counsel" and "legis- lative agents". St. 1890, c. 456, §2. The law provided for the keeping of two separate dockets, in the following terms: In the docket of legislative counsel shall be entered the names of counsel employed to appear at a public hearing before a committee of the general court for the purpose of making an argument or examining witnesses ... in the docket of legislative agents shall be entered the names of all agents employed in connection with any legislation included within the terms of section one of this act, and all persons employed for other purposes who render any services as such agents. This distinction was maintained by St. 1911, c. 728, §1, which for the first time specifically defined the term "legislative counsel" as: . . . any person who for compensation appears at any public hearing before committees of the general court in regard to proposed legislation, and who does no other acts in regard to the same except such things as are necessarily incident to such appearance before such committees. It futher defined "legislative agent" as: . . . any person, firm, association or corporation that for hire or reward does any act to promote or oppose proposed legislation except to appear at public hearings before committees of the general court as legislative counsel. While the definition of legislative counsel had previously included what is commonly referred to as "expert witnesses," the legislature in 1973 eliminated the distinction between legislative counsel and legislative agent. St. 1973, c. 981. This statute simply defined legislative agent to include anyone who did anything, for compensation, to influence legislation. The intent of the Legislature to include legislative counsel, and presumably expert witnesses, within the definition of legislative agent is expressed in a "[sjtatement of intent," which specifically provides that the statute was enacted to require the disclosure of "the identity, expenditures and activities of certain persons who engage in reimbursed efforts, the so-called lobbyists, to persuade members of the General Court or the executive branch to take specific legislative actions, either by direct communication to such officials, or by solicitation of others to engage in such efforts . ..." St. 1973, c. 981, §1. The intent to include expert witnesses within the definition of legislative agent is further evidenced by the fact that in 1974, the legislature provided a specific exemption from the definition of "legislative agent" for certain P.D. 12 137 expert witnesses. St. 1974, c. 382, amending G.L. c. 3, §50. That statute provides that laws pertaining to lobbyists do not apply to "any person requested to appear before any committee or commission of the general court by a majority of the members of such committee or commission; provided that such person performs no other act to influence legislation . ..." It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be read together so that no clause, sentence or word is rendered superfluous, void or insignificant. Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee in the Department of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339 (1973). Here the legislature has provided a specific exemption to a general requirement. Where the legislature has provided such an express exemption, it must be construed to be the only exemption that the legislature meant to apply to the rule. See McArthur Brothers Co. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass. 137, 139 (1908). I conclude, therefore, that expert witnesses who for compensation appear before legislative committees and offer testimony or written comments are legislative agents and must register and file the required disclosure forms with your office. The only exception to this requirement is in the limited instance provided in G.L. c. 30, §50, for those individuals whose testimony is requested by the legislative committee itself. You have posed separate questions concerning the appropriate factors to be considered in determining whether an individual should be considered a legislative agent within the meaning of G.L. c. 3, §39. The terms of the statute clearly indicate that if any compensation is received by the individual for his lobbying activities, including compensation received from his usual employer. he must be considered a legislative agent. The statute does not restrict or limit the definition according to the source of the compensation. Rather, it explicitly includes within the definition of legislative agent an individual who performs lobbying activities as any part of his regular and usual employment. If that individual's salary or compensation is in any way substantially attributable to activities enumerated in G.L. c. 3, §39 he falls within the definition of legislative agent. 1974/75 Op. Atty. Gen. No '48 Rep A G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 112 (1975). Those individuals who engage 'in lobbying simply as an incidental aspect of their regular and usual employment^ are excluded from the statutory definition. This determination must of necessity be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. In those situations where the statutory exemption applies, you should continue to examine the entire scope of the individual's regular and usual employment, including all of the functions performed by the employee to determine whether or not lobbying activity is a substantial part of that employment or merely incidental thereto. The location ol the lobbying activity is immaterial to the determination of whether or not '^^ ^^^;-^^"^;,"\P'^ '^''i,^^ the time the individual's annual salary was set, see 3 Op. Atty. Cur a 4f>9 (1912) and, therefore, part of his usual and regular employment. For this , J K„ ^ niihlir uiililv who lc\liricd before i lcgi%Ulive commillcc. on 3The exception was held lo apply to an <-'"g'"f%'^f"P'°y^f, ^LJnsa ion from the utility was n« allnbutabk to hi* ippeirancc behalf of the utility, when a substam.al amount of his usuaUompcn.a.ioniro y^^ ^^ ^^ IU,197M. «e .1 Op Ati* or to other lobbying activities. 1974/75 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 48, Rep. A.U., ni Gen. at 469 (1912). 138 P.D. 12 reason, I conclude that you should continue to view all lobbying activity, both within Massachusetts as well as in other jurisdictions, to determine whether or not such activity is part of the individual's regular and usual employment or is merely incidental thereto. In closing, I note that the statutory exemption is based upon an analysis of the employment relationship between the individual who performs the lobbying activity and his regular and usual employer only. It does not apply when an individual receives compensation for the lobbying activity from a source other than his regular and usual employer. In that instance the individual is simply lobbying for compensation and, by definition, subject to the registration and disclosure requirements. Because his lobbying activity is separate from his usual employment, there is no necessity to inquire whether the statutory exemption applies. Very truly yours, FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI Attorney General