No. 7 (1983)

February 3, 1983 Number 7

Year: 1983Length: 1,685 wordsOfficial source

Cite as Mass. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 (1983)

February 3, 1983 Number 7. John W. Lawson, Commissioner Department of Education 1385 Hancock Street Quincy, Massachusetts 02169 Dear Commissioner Lawson: You have requested my opinion concerning the scope of a school committee's responsibility for transportation of non-public school students.' Specifically, you ask whether General Laws chapter 76, section 1 , requires a school committee to provide cash reimbursement to parents of students attending out-of-district pri- vate regular day schools for that part of the bus trip that takes place within the dis- trict, where the school committee transports no public school students out of district to comparable programs. If so, you ask whether the amount of reimbursement must be in an amount equal to the per pupil transportation cost the school committee expends for district public school transportation. For the reasons set forth below, it is my conclusion that school committees are not required to provide cash reimbursements to parents of private school students attending out-of-district schools. The Department of Education therefore has no corresponding responsibility to reimburse a school committee which chooses to reimburse parents of private school students for those transportation costs. Since As an additional note, ihc general insuranec laws piaee strict lirnilaluins upon group lite insurance policies underwritten b\ eoinniereial insurance companies, as well as by SBLI departments- For example. G.L. c. I7.'>. SI3.^C, limits group lite insurance to debtors of a bank on maximum bank loans of $U),(XX), payable over ten years or less. The proposed Agreement would contravene this statutory provision, since the prospective policy holders would be mortgagors holding home mortgage debts well in excess of $10,000 and payable over more than ten years. Your request derives from your responsibilities to advise school committees concerning their legal duties and to ensure that the laws pertaining to education are enforced. See. e.g., G.L. c. 15, SIG. In addition, the Department of tiducation has the statutory responsibility to reimburse schixil committees for the costs of transportation which they are required by law to furnish students. See. G.L. c. 71, §7A. P.D. 12 97 I have answered your first question in the negative, I find no need to address your second question concerning the amount of reimbursement that must be provided to the parents of private school students. At the outset it should be observed that your question is a narrow one; it focuses on the responsibility of the school committee to reimburse parents of private school students for transportation to those schools. It does not involve a determination of the issue of the extent of the school committee's responsibility to provide trans- portation to private school students. This is not a distinction without difference. The Supreme Judicial Court has had occasion to address the issue of the responsibility of school committees to pro- vide transportation to private school students several times since the enactment of G.L. c. 76, §1 . See, Attorney General v. School Committee ofEssex, 387 Mass. 326 (1982); Murphy v. School Committee ofBrimfield, 378 Mass. 31 (1979); Quinn V. School Committee of Plymouth, 332 Mass. 410 (1955). The decision in those cases would appear to be totally dispositive of your ques- tions. In Murphy v. School Committee ofBrimfield, for instance, the Supreme Judi- cial Court held that district lines are the primary consideration in determining a school committee's private school transportation responsibility under G.L. c. 76, §1 : "private school students are entitled to receive transportation to schools located outside their district of residence only if, and to the extent that, public school stu- dents enrolled in comparable programs receive transportation to schools located outside their district of residence," 378 Mass. at 37. In its most recent decision, the Supreme Judicial Court held that where a school committee provides out-of- district transportation to public school students. General Laws chapter 76, sec- tion 1 , requires that it provide transportation to private school students under the age of sixteen who attend schools that are the same distance from home or closer than the public school the student is entitled to attend. Attorney General v. School Committee of Essex, 387 Mass. at 337. You inform me that the school committee in question here transports no public school students out of district, but under G.L. c. 76, §1, a school committee is required to provide out-of-district private school transportation only if it transports public school students in comparable programs out of the district. Murphy v. School Committee ofBrimfield, 378 Mass at 38 n.8 (1979). Because the case law clearly states that there is no requirement to provide reimbursement to the parents of pri- vate school students for out-of-district transportation, the inquiry would appear to be at an end. Because you have indicated that this remains an important ques- tion, however, I go beyond the dispositive opinions of the Supreme Judicial Court and analyze further the specific statutory provision to determine if there exist any new arguments, not considered by the Court, requiring cash reimbursement. In answering the question afresh, I begin with the provision of the statute itself and measure it by the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation succinctly stated by Chief Justice Rugg in Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444 (1934): (T)he general and familiar rule is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, consi- dered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated. Id. at 447. 98 P.D. 12 Thus, the language of the G.L. c. 76. §1. itself must be the starting point for determining its meaning, as well as the principal source of insight into the legisla- tive purpose for its enactment. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846 (1980); Hojfincm v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977). The language of G.L. c. 76, §1, providing for transportation to private school students is plain and unambiguous. It states, in relevent part that: Pupils who . . . attend private schools of elementary and high school grades . . . shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges as to trans- portation to and from school as are provided by law for pupils of public schools (emphasis supplied). The express language of this portion of G.L. c. 76, §1, deals with transportation. It does not authorize cash reimbursement. Thus, to answer your question one need go no further than the statutory language itself. Moreover, no support for cash reimbursement can be discerned from the stat- ute's legislative history or purpose. The purpose of school transportation, articu- lated in the statute itself, is "to protect children from the hazards of traffic and promote their safety," and it therefore provides that "cities and towns may appropriate money for conveying pupils to and from any schools approved under this section." G.L. c. 76, §1. See also, Attorney General v. School Committee ofEssex, at 333-334. Indeed, cash reimbursement for school transportation might well be contrary to the public safety purpose of this provision. For example, par- ents providing their own transportation would necessarily increase traffic on the roads and highways and thereby create more hazards to the safety of children. School buses, on the other hand, operate to decrease extra traffic, making the road travel less hazardous. Furthermore, the operation of school buses is governed by specific statutory safety standards and motor vehicles laws require other vehicles to observe certain rules for the safety of those traveling in school buses. See gener- ally, G.L. c. 90, §§7B, 7C, 7D, 7D-1/2. Mere payment of a cash reimbursement to parents would not necessarily further the stated purpose of G.L. c. 76. §1. The fact that a town or regional school district may transport some public school students to out-of-district Chapter 766 programs, vocational -educational programs and cosmetology and health care programs does not create an obligation to pro- vide transportation for private school pupils attending regular or private school programs outside the districts. The Supreme Judicial Court has noted that a school committee's transportation of pupils in special needs, vocational and cosmetol- ogy programs does not trigger the regular private school transportation obliga- tion under G.L. c. 76, §1 , as these school programs are not comparable. Murphy V. School Comittee ofBrimfield, 378 Mass. at 33-34 n.3; Quinn v. School Com- mittee ofPlymouth, 332 Mass. at 414. Under G.L. c. 76, §1, school committees are only required to transport private school students to educational programs that are comparable to the programs to which it transports public school students. For all these reasons, it is my opinion that G.L. c. 76. §1 . requires that a school committee provide transportation to private school students only to the same extent ^ As the Supreme Judicial Court has previously observed, this conclusion may operate to impose a disadvantage to those students attending private schools in those school districts where no private school exists and the school committee transports no public school students outside the district. This seeming inequality was raised by the Whitman-Hanson Regional School Committee in Murphy v. School Commillec ofBrimfield. 378 Mass. at 38 n.8. There, the Supreme Judicial Court expressly rejected the claim that this result was problematic under equal protection standards, /d. ; see also, Alloniey General y. School Commillee of Essex. 387 Mass. at 338 n.5 (1982). P.D. 12 99 provided to public school students. Where, as in this case, no public school stu- dents are transported outside the district and where there is no private school located within the district, there is no requirement that transportation be provided to the private school students. A fortiori, there is no corresponding or independent requirements to provide reimbursement to the parents of these private school students. While a school committee may decide to provide such transportation or to reimburse parents of private school students, G.L. c. 76, §1, imposes no requirement on the Department of Education to reimburse school committees for these costs. Very truly yours, FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI Attorney General
No. 7 (1983): February 3, 1983 Number 7 | Justis AI