October 26, 1992 Number 2

October 26, 1992 Number 2. The Honorable John E. Fenton, Jr. ChiefAdministrative fustice Trial Court of the Commonwealth Two Center Plaza, Room 540 Boston, MA 02108 Dear Judge Fenton: 1 have been asked for my opinion whether the transfer of the Suffolk County courthouse facilities from the City of Boston the Trial Court of the Commonwealth, pursuant to St. 1988, c. 203, § 15, carried with it the duty to pay workers' compensation to certain courthouse employees who were injured and who began receiving such compensation prior to the date of the transfer. The City has asked the Trial Court to make such payments as of the date of the transfer, and the question has arisen whether chapter 203 obligates the Trial Court to do so. Although only the Supreme Judicial Court may make binding determination on this issue,' for the following reasons 1 conclude that the responsibility for these payments remains with the City. /. On October 1, 1988, pursuant to chapter 203, all right, title and interest in the Suffolk County courthouses was transferred from the City to the Commonwealth. St. 1988, c. 203, § 15. As part of the transfer, persons who were employed "primarily for the operation and maintenance" of the court- houses were transferred from the City's employ to that of the Trial Court. Id. § 21.1 am informed that as of October 1, 1988, twenty-four persons whom the City represented as having been employed primarily for the operation and maintenance of the courthouses were receiving workers' compensation pay- ments from the City based on injuries sustained prior to October 1, 1988. Both the City and the Commonwealth are subject to the workers' compensa- tion act and are self-insurers. //. Section 20 of chapter 203 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: [1] Expenses, liabilities and income relating to the operation prior to acquisition by the commonwealth of buildings and land trans- ferred pursuant to section fifteen ... of this act and annual debt obligations with respect to such buildings and land which are due prior to such acquisition shall be borne and receivable by the [City] whether or not billed, incurred or received by [it] prior to such acquisition. [2] Expenses, liabilities and income relating to the Under St. 1988, c. 203, § 20, the Supreme Judicial Court has the power to determine "|a|ll questions regarding the identification of . . . expenses, liabilities, income, contracts, obligations and monies" to be transferred from the City to the Trial Court. I render this advisory opinion in the hope that the Trial Court .nd the City will find it unnecessary to request that the Supreme Judicial Court resolve the matter. P.D. 12 143 operation of said buildings and land after such acquisition and annual debt obligations with respect to such buildings and land which are due after such acquisition shall be borne and receivable by the Commonwealth. [3] All duly existing contracts and obliga- tions of the [City] relating to the operation of said buildings and land which are in effect immediately prior to such acquisition shall be transferred to the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court to be performed in accordance with law. St. 1988, c. 203, § 20 (bracketed numbers added). Section 20 thus identifies three categories of rights and duties. First, the City must pay all "expenses" and "liabilities," and must receive all income, relating to the pre-acquisition operation of the courthouses, regardless of when such "expenses" and "liabilities" are due or are billed.- Second, the Commonwealth must pay all "expenses" and "liabilities," and must receive all income, relating to the post-acquisition operation of the courthouses. Third, the Chief Administrative Justice must assume all "contracts and obligations" that relate to the operation of the courthouses and that were in effect just prior to the acquisition. Here, the employees in question were injured during the pre-acquisition operation of the courthouses, so that the second category is clearly inapplica- ble. The question thus reduces to whether workers' compensation payments to these employees fall within the first category, i.e., "expenses" and "liabili- ties" which must be borne by the City regardless of when due or billed, or instead within the third category, i.e., "contracts and obligations," which were transferred to and must be performed by you as Chief Administrative Justice. In approaching this question it is critical to note that the statute uses very different language depending on the nature of the right or duty in question. One group of rights and duties — "[ejxpenses, liabilities and income" and annual debt obligations" — is spoken of as "borne and receivable" by either the City or the Commonwealth. Another group of rights and duties — "duly existing contracts and obligations is spoken of as "transferred to the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court to be performed in accordance with law." In other words, purely financial duties must be "borne" by and court- house-related income is "receivable" by, either the City or the Commonwealth, depending on whether they relate to pre- or post-acquisition operations. Other sorts of "contracts and obligations," in contrast, must be "performed" by the Chief Administrative Justice, as distinct from the Commonwealth. This suggests that the sorts of "contracts and obligations" that are "trans- ferred" to be "performed" by the Chief Administrative Justice were not intended to include purely financial rights and duties — such as the duty to pay workers' compensation, which would involve a payment of money out of " I do not interpret section 20 as providing that the City must pay only those expenses and liatjilities "which are due prior to sucli acqui- sition." The just-quoted phrase appears immediately following the phrase "annual debt obligations with respect to such buildings and land," and thus is presumed to modify only that latter phrase. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Board, .^88 Mass. 427, 432 (1983) (noting "'the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation'") (citations omitted). Moreover, the phrase "whether or not billed |orl incurred |by the City] prior to such acquisition" confirms that the critical question is whether an expense or liability relates to pre-acquisition operations, rather than when the expenses or liability must be paid. 144 P.D. 12 the City or State Treasury rather than any "perform[ance]" by the Chief Administrative Justice.* The Chief Administrative Justice is made responsible only for those duties, whether imposed by contract, constitution, statute, or regulation, that require some other sort of action to be "performed." The next section of chapter 203, section 21, buttresses this interpretation. Section 21 provides that where City employees at the courthouses are "trans- ferred to and . . . become employees of the Trial Court," their pension and retirement allowances "shall be paid by the Commonwealth . . . "Thus, as in section 20, where the Legislature chose to shift purely financial duties, the Legislature shifted such duties to the Commonwealth, not to the Chief Administrative Justice. This is additional evidence that the "contracts and obligations" to be transferred to and performed by the Chief Administrative Justice were not intended to include purely financial rights and duties.^ Cf. St. 1988, c. 203, § 4 (adding G.L. c. 211B, § 17, authorizing Chief Administrative Justice to charge occupancy fees for use of courthouse facilities, with fee to be paid into general fund of Commonwealth). It seems clear that a statutory duty to pay workers' compensation benefits could properly be termed a "liability." The Supreme Judicial Court has inter- preted the term broadly and appears to view it as broad enough to encompass responsibilities under the workers' compensation act. Gurry v. Cuniberlaud Farms, Inc., 406 Mass. 615, 619, 621 (1990). The term may include a contin- gent duty to pay money,' Xtra. Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 380 Mass. 277, 280 (1980), and a duty to pay money because of a judgment. Boston Elevated Railway Co. v. Metropolitan Transit Authority, 323 Mass. 562, 568 (1949)." The term may include taxes, id., which, like workers' compensation payments, are a creature of statute. It might be suggested that, notwithstanding the above analysis, the plain meaning of the term "obligations" is broad enough to encompass every sort of legal duty, including the duty to pay workers' compensation. Under this inter- pretation, the duty to make such payments, as an "obligation," must be "per- formed" by the Chief Administrative Justice. No doubt the term "obligations," if it stood alone in section 20, could encompass the duty to pay workers' compensation. But the term "obligations" I do not mean to suggest hat the Chief Administrative Justice acting in his official capacity should be distinguished from the Commonwealth or other purposes, e.^., of immunity from or responsibility to comply with certain forms of judicially ordered relief such as a money judgment. 1 note the distinction only because the Legislature has used it in chapter 203; the Legislature has identified the Commonwealth as the entity that succeeds to certain hnancial rights and duties, and the Chief Administrative Justice as the official who succeeds to certain other, non-financial rights and duties. Also, I have not been asked for and do not reach any conclusion regard- ing what rights and duties other than the payment of workers' compensation might fall within the category of "duly existing contracts and obligations" under chapter 203. 4 Indeed, if there were any requirement that either the Commonwealth or the Chief Administrative Justice assume responsibility or pay- ing workers' compensation for pre-acquisition injuries, one might expect to find it in section 21, which deals at length with the full range of rights of transferred employees, rather than in section 20, which does not mention employees at all. Moreover, the silence of section 21 on the issue of payment of workers' compensation, especially in light of the express provision that the Commonwealth pay pension and retirement allowances, is another indication that the Legislature did not intend to shift the duty to pay compensation for pre-acquisition injuries. See Harborview Residents' Committee, Inc. v. Qiiincy Housing Aiithorit); 368 Mass. 425, 432 (1975) (noting principle of statutory construction that "a statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute"). 5 Section 20 of chapter 203 itself expressly provides that the City must bear expenses and liabilities relating to pre-acquisition operation of the courthouses, "whether or not billed |or] incurred |by the City] prior to such acquisition." Thus, although at the time of acquisi- tion the exact extent and duration of the City's ongoing duty to pay workers compensation benefits were contingent upon future events and could not be precisely determined, these contingencies do not prevent that duty rom constituting a "liability" that remained with the City after acquisition 6 1 have not been provided with details regarding whether any of the employees at issue here participated in any administrative or judi- cial proceedings in establishing their claims to compensation. The existence of an administrative or judicial decision requiring pay- ments would support, but is not necessary to, my conclusion that the duty to make such payments is a "liability" within the meaning of section 20. P.D. 12 145 cannot be read without regard for the terms "[ejxpenses" and "habilities" appearing twice in this same section 20/ If the term "obligations" were read to encompass every duty to pay expenses or to satisfy monetary liabilities, and to place such duties on the Chief Administrative Justice, then the separate and very different provisions under which some "[e]xpenses" and "liabilities" must be borne by the City and others must be borne by the Commonwealth would be rendered entirely superfluous and ineffective. 1 reject this interpretation as violative of one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction/ Instead, I interpret the term "obligations" as not encompassing the duty to pay expenses or to satisfy, monetary liabilities. It remains to consider whether workers' compensation payments could be considered part of a "contract" to be performed by you as Chief Administrative Justice. The answer to this question lies not in chapter 203 but in the case law governing the nature of workers' compensation payments themselves. The cases indicate that the rights and remedies of employees with respect to workers' compensation payments arise out of G.L. c. 152 and are statutory rather than contractual in nature. See Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 184 (1932) ("The act thus creates rights and remedies and procedure all its own, not previously known to the common or statutory law.") Devine's Case, 236 Mass. 588, 593 (1921) ("The rights of the employee under the act rest nei- ther in negligence nor in contract. They rise wholly out of the workmen's compensation act."); Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 562, 568-69 (1941)" Although the employee may be, in some cases, a beneficiary of a contract of insurance between the employer and the insurer, [t]here is no contract between the employee and the insurer. Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. at 183. Here, of course, there is not even a contract between the employer and the insurer, because both the City and the Commonwealth are self-insurers. Accordingly, the duty to pay workers' compensation benefits does not arise out of one of the "duly existing contracts" which section 20 requires you to perform. In sum, the words of section 20 of chapter 203, together with the caselaw governing the nature of workers' compensation, lead me to conclude that the duty to pay workers' compensation to courthouse employees for re-acquisition Every word or phrase of a statute must be read in context. Attorney General v. School Committee of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 337 (1982), and without overemphasizing its effect on the remainder of the statute. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186, 190-91 (1976). "An intention to enact a barren and ineffective provision is not lightly to be imputed to the Legislature." Mitchell v. Secretary of Administration, 413 Mass. 330, 336 (1992) (citations omitted). "'Construing a statute in a way that nullifies one of its provisions is inap- propriate if there is a reasonable alternative.'" Ul. (quoting Hen Elfman Sons v. Home Indem. Co., 41 1 Mass. 13, 18 (1991). See also B)nes v. School Committee of Boston. 411 Mass. 264, 268 (1991) ("It is an( | elementary rule of statutory construction that a statute should not be read in such a way as to render its terms meaningless or superfluous."). In Beausoleil's Case, 321 Mass. 344 (1947), which arose at a time when coverage under the workers' compensation act was optional, the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that if both employer and employee elected coverage, then the act was read into the employment contract and benefits under the act were contractual in nature. Id. at 348. This analysis is inapplicable here; although an employee has an election of remedies, see G.L. c. 152, § 24 (Supp. 1991), an employer is now statutorily required to provide workers' compensation coverage. Beausoleil's Case, 321 Mass. at 348 n.l; see G.L. c. 152, § 25A (Supp. 1991). This requirement extends to the Commonwealth, G.L. c. 152, § 69 (Supp. 1991), and to those public employers, such as the City, that have previously committed themselves to the pro- vision of coverage In accordance with section 69. 146 P.D. 12 injuries is one of the "[e]xpenses [and] liabilities" to be "borne" by the City, rather than one of the "duly existing contracts and obligations" to be "per- formed" by you as Chief Administrative Justice. Sincerely, Scott Harshbarger Attorney General January 15, 1993 DO. TO . P«.NT^«'- """^ ' "! i . rOOT^OTT ON . coanRS AS WELL Ai» *» •^ -'" P„,H^D ^ P-T or ™c ^ _^ ^^^„ „„„ LIBRARIAN OR BY CALU 7 27-2200. Number 3. The Honorable John E. Fenton, Jr. ChiefAdministrative Justice Trial Court of the Commonwealth Two Center Plaza, Room 540 Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Dear Judge Fenton: 1 have been asked for my opinion on the proper interpretation of a provi- sion of G.L. c. 32, § 65D(b) (1990 ed.), which governs the rate at which judges contribute to the Judges Retirement Fund. The question arises because of the need to determine the rate applicable to a person who, until his appointment as a judge in 1990, worked continuously since 1974 for a state board whose employees were not subject to any state retirement system. The specific issue is whether such a person should contribute at the rate applicable to persons appointed judges on or after January 2, 1975, or, instead, because he did not contribute to any state retirement system until his 1990 judicial appointment, should be considered to have "entered the service of the Commonwealth on or after January 1, 1988," within the meaning of the statute, and thus con- tribute at the higher rate applicable to such persons. For the reasons stated below conclude that the appropiate contribution rate is the rate applicable to judges appointed on or after January 2, 1975. I. The relevant facts are that, prior to his appointment to the bench, the judge in question was continuously employed from 1974 to 1990 in a full-time posi- tion by a state board whose employees are not members of a retirement sys- tem. In 1990, the judge was appointed to the Trial Court, and at that time he became a contributing member of the Judges Retirement Fund pursuant to G.L. c. 32, § 65D(a) and (b).' ;/. Whereas the general provisions of the public retirement law, G.L. c. 32 §§ 1- 28, apply to most other public employees, judges retirement and pensions are ^ G L c 32 § 65D(a) provides that any judge appointed on or after January 2, 1975, shall be subject to section 65D within 90 days of appointment. Section 65D(b) sets forth the rates of contribution applicable to justices of the Trial Court, and provides that amounts so deducted shall be deposited into a Judges Retirement Fund. P.D. 12 147 governed exclusively by sections 65A-65G of chapter 32. In particular, section 65D, which applies to all Appeals Court and Trial Court judges appointed on or after January 2, 1975, sets forth the amount of retirement allowance and rates of deduction or such judges, and further provides: No other retirement provisions shall be applicable to judges first appointed on or after January second, nineteen hundred and sev- enty-five, except as provided in section sixty-five A in the case of a chief justice or an associate justice of the supreme judicial court. G. L. c. 32, 65D.- The provision at issue here, governing the amount to be deducted from the salary of Trial Court judges appointed on or after January 2, 1975, is subdivi- sion (b) of section 65D. Section 65D(b) establishes three categories of rates of contribution for judges, from lowest to highest, as follows. For judges "appointed" on or after January 2, 1975, the contribution rate is seven percent of such judges' salaries. For judges who "entered the service of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof" between January 1, 1979 and January 1, 1988, seven percent shall be deducted from the first $30,000 of salary earned and an additional two percent, or a total nine percent, shall be deducted from salary in excess $30,000. Finally, for judges who "entered the service of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof" on or after January 1, 1988, eight percent shall be deducted from the first $30,000 salary earned, nine percent shall be deducted from salary, between $30,000 and $45,000, and ten percent shall be deducated from salary in excess of $45,000.' Section 22(1) [h^/z) in turn provides for an additional two percent to be deducted from the salaries of any member of any retirement sys- tem who entered the service of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof on or after January 1, 1979, from the amount of such salary over $30,000. The effect of section 22(1) (b^/z), as incorporated into section 65D(b), is that judges who entered the service of the Commonwealth between, January 1, 1979, and January 1, 1988, are subject to a seven percent deduction from the first $30,000 earned and a nine percent deduction from that por- tion of salary in excess $30,000 . For the sake of convenience, the three categories of rates of deduc- tion are referred to herein as low or lowest (for judges appointed after January 2, 1975) medium (for judges who entered the service - Section 65A similarly sets forth the amount at retirement allowance and rates of deduction applicable to Appeals Court and Trial Cotirt judges appointed prior to January 2,1975, and to the chief justice and associate justices of the Supreme Judicial Court (regardless of the date of their appointment) •^ Subdivision (b) provides: _, . . u ^ ^ , i .,.,„,. There shall be deducted and withheld from the salary each judge appointed on or after January second, nineteen hundred and seven v- five a sum equal to seven percent of the salary of such judge. There shall be deducted and withheld from the salary of eachjudge who entered the service of the commonwealth or political subdivision thereof on or after January first, nineteen hundred and eighty-eight, a sum equal to eight percent of the first thirty thousand dollars salary of each judge, nine percent of such salary between thirty thousand dollars and for^-five thousand dollars and ten percent of such salary in excess of forty-five thousand dollars: provided, however, that any judge who entered the serv-ice of the commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof between January hrst, nineteen hundred anil seventy-nine and January first, nineteen hundred and eighty-eight shall be subject to the additional deduction provided or in para- graph (b'-4) of subdivision (1) of section twenty-two. 148 P.D. 12 of the Commonwealth between January 1, 1979 and January 1, 1988), and high or highest (for judges who entered the service of the Commonwealth on or after Jauary 1, 1988) The amounts so deducted fom judges' salaries are deposited into a Judges Retirement Fund, pursuant to section 65D(b). The amount of retirement allowance to which a judge subject to section 65D is entitled is set forth in subdivisions (c) and (d) of the section and is based on a percentage of the salary earned by the judge at the time of retirement. G.L. c. 32, §§ 65D(c) and (d). Retirement allowances are paid from the Judges Retirement Fund, supple- mented if necessary by funds rom the same source from which judges salaries are paid G.L. c. 32, § 65D(h). Judges appointed to the bench before January 2, 1975, are non-contributing members of the judges' retirement system; that is, they do not contribute to the Judges Retirement Fund at all, but they are enti- tled to receive a retirement allowance, pursuant to section 65A.^ The question here relates to the proper rate of deduction under section 65D(b) for a judge who was continuously employed by the Commonwealth in a full-time position (but not as a judge) from 1974 to 1990, and who was appointed as a judge of the Trial Court in 1990. In particular, the question is whether, under section 65D(b), the determinative date for purposes of calcu- lating the amount to be deducted from the judge's salary is the date of his appointment as a judge in 1990 or the date he first was employed by the Commonwealth in 1974. This issue arises because the language in section 65D(b) refers to both the date a judge is appointed (for judges appointed on or after January 2, 1975) and the date a judge "entered the service of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof" (for judges who entered such service between January 1, 1979, and January 1, 1988, or on or after January 1, 1988). For the reasons set forth below, conclude that a judge (appointed to the bench in 1990, and who first entered the service of the Commonwealth in 1974, is subject to the lowest rate of deduction set forth in section 65D(b). The "meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the lan- guage in which the act is framed ..." Boston Neighborhood Taxi Association v. Department of Public Utihties, 410 Mass. 686, 690 (1991) (citation omitted). The plain language of the statute indicates that a judge who was continuously employed by the Commonwealth from 1974 to 1990 and appointed as a judge in 1990 (and thus "appointed on or after" January 2, 1975) is subject to the lowest rate of deduction set forth in section 65D(b). The first sentence of sec- tion 65D(b) uses the word "appointment" in setting forth the lowest rate of 4 The judges retirement system differs in several significant respects from the retirement systems applicable to other public employees. First, as noted above, to the extent that the amount needed to pay judges retirement allowances exceeds the amount of funds in the Judges Retirement Fund, the retirement allowance is paid with funds from the same source as that from which judges salaries are paid, see G.L. c. 32, § 6SD(h), in contrast to other public employees, whose retirement allowances are funded separately from sources other than the source for payment of their salaries. See G.L. c. 2, 22(3)(b). Second, whereas certain judges (those appointed before January 2, 1975) are non-contributing members of the judges' retirement system, see G .L. c. 32, § 65A, other public employees who are members of a retirement system must have contributed in order to receive retirement allowance. See G .L. c. 32, §§ 3 (2), 32. Finally, the statute does not expressly authorize judges, upon their appointment to the bench, to transfer into the Judges Retirement Fund contributions they previously made into another retirement system, whereas other public employees may transfer their contributions from one retire- ment system to another upon changing jobs from one governmental unit to another unit that has a retirement system. See G.L. c. 32, § 3(8) (a). P.D.12 149 deduction for judges "appointed on or after" January 2, 1975. The use of the word "appointed" in the first sentence clearly refers to date of appointment as a judge. A person appointed as a judge on or after January 2, 1975, thus quali- fies for the lowest rate of deduction, unless that person also falls within one of the other two categories, that is, unless that person "entered the service of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof" either between January 1, 1979. and January 1, 1988, or on or after January 1, 1988. The judge involved here, by virtue of his employment for the Commonwealth beginning in 1974. "entered the service of the Commonwealth" before either of those two dates, and thus does not fall into either the second or third categories. The only cat- egory into which this judge falls is the lowest rate of contribution set forth in the first category, applicable to judges appointed on or after January 2, 1975. I note that, had the Legislature intended to base the medium and high cate- gories solely on the date of appointment as a judge (rather than the date the person first entered the service of the Commonwealth in any capacity), the Legislature could have done so, simply by repeating the word "appointment" in defining the medium and high categories. The act that the Legislature did not do so is indicative of its intent. Boston Neighborhood Taxi Association, 410 Mass. at 689 (where Legislature has employed specific language in one para- graph of statute, but not in another, the language should not be implied where it is not present) (citations omitted).' It might be suggested that the phrase "entered the service of the Commonwealth," as used in section 65D(b), refers only to "membership ser- vice," i.e., service during which the employee was a contributing member of a retirement system. Under that interpretation, the particular judge at issue would not have entered the "service" of the Commonwealth until 1990, the date of his appointment as a judge, because his earlier employment for the Commonwealth was for a state board whose employees are not members of any retirement system. Thus, under that interpretation, the judge would be subject to the highest, rather than the lowest, rate of contribution. I reject that interpretation, however, because section 65D(b), in contrast to certain other provisions in chapter 32, does not expressly refer to "member- ship service." Section 22(1) (b), for example, uses the phrase "member in ser- vice of the system" in the course of setting forth the applicable rates of contri- bution for members of other retirement systems." Similarly, the dehnition section of the statute, section 1, defines "member- ship service" as service as an employee in a governmental unit since becoming 5 My conclusion that the Legislature, in using the phrase "entered the service of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision thereof, intended to include service or the Commonwealth in a capacity other than as a judge, is further supported by the fact that judges are employees of the Commonwealth, not of anv "political subdivision." Had the Legislature intended to make the deduction rate turn solely on the date of a person's appointment as a judge, the Legislature would not have referred to service for a political subdivision. In any event it is plain that the judge involved here, having entered the service of the Commonwealth in 1974, did not enter the service of the Commonwealth either between January 1, 1979 and January 1, 1988, or on or after January 1, 1988, and thcretore is not within the medium or high contribution categories. 6 Certain decisions by the Contributorv Retirement Appeal Board have been called to my attention that based the rate of contribution for other public employees under section 22(1 )(b) on the date membership service and contribution began. Those decisions, however, were based on the different provisions of section 22 (l)(b), and involved persons whose previous work for the Commonwealth was part-time and/or temporary, thus making it unclear in the first instance whether their previous employment made them "employees in "service" as those terms are defined in c. 32, § 1 and used in section 22(l)(b) 7 Accordingly, my opinion here should not be construed as expressing any view as to the appropriate rates of contribution applicable to other retirement systems, which are governed by the different statutory language set forth in (i, l„ c. 32, § 22(1 )fb), and which systems differ in several important respects from the judges' retirement system. Sir supra n.4. 150 P.D. 12 a member of a system, whereas "service" is defined solely by reference to ser- vice as an employee in any governmental unit or which regular compensation is paid. G.L. c. 32, § 1. Insofar as section 65D(b) does not contain that lan- guage, 1 decline to interpret it as if the Legislature had intended to equate "entry of service" with "membership service." My conclusion in this regard is based on the established principle that where specific language appears in one portion of a statute but not another, the absent language should not be read into the provision from which it is missing. Boston Neighborhood Taxi Association, 410 Mass. at 689; Beeler v. Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 616 (1982).' This interpretation does not lead to an unreasonable result. See School Committee of Greenfield v. Greenfield Education Association, 385 Mass. 70, 79-80 (1982) (statute should be given a reasonable construction). The Legislature could reasonably have determined that it was desirable to reward judges for service for the Commonwealth prior to January 1, 1979, by affording such judges the lowest rate of contribution, even if the service prior to 1979 was not membership service as a contributing member of a retirement system, and even if such service was in a capacity other than as a judge. Such a determina- tion is consistent with the Legislature's decision to exempt judges appointed to the bench prior to January 2, 1975 from any contribution to the Judges Retirement Fund. In these two ways, the Legislature has decided to treat judges more favorably, based on prior public service, than employees subject to other retirement systems. Such favorable treatment may have been intended to compensate for the fact that, unlike other public employees, judges who have prior membership service are not able to transfer contribu- tions from another retirement system into the judges' retirement system. See supra n.4. In sum, the language of section 65D(b) leads me to conclude that a judge who was appointed to the bench in 1990, and who entered the service of the Commonwealth in 1974 as an employee of a state board whose employees were not subject to any state retirement system, is subject to the lowest rate of contribution, applicable to judges "appointed on or after January second, nineteen hundred and seventy-five." " Sincerely, Scott Harshbarger Attorney General I have also been asked my opinion regarding the applicability of a deduction from the judges salary for Medicare, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3101(b). Insofar as the applicability of the deduction for Medicare depends on an interpretation of federal law, however, I express no view as to whether such deduction properly applies to the judge in question. See 1985/1986 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 9, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 40, 43 n.2 (1986) (noting that Attorney General ordinarily does not issue opinion as to interpretation of federal law); 1984/1985 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 6, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 at 89, 93 (1985) (declining to render formal opinion as to whether propose state regulations would violate federal antitrust laws); 1979/1980 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 10, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 14, at 116, 1 19 1980) (declining to interpret federal law governing receipt of federal funds from Department of Health, Education and Welfare). P.D. 12 151 ^