Number 13. October 18, 1968

Number 13. October 18, 1968 HONORABLE ROBERT Q. CRANE Treasurer and Receiver General Chairman, State Board of Retirement State House Boston, Massachusetts 02133 Dear Mr. Crane: As Chairman of the Board of Retirement, you have requested my opinion as to the effect of St. 1968, c. 700 on the amount of the pensions payable to widows of certain classes of veterans who were employed in public service during their lifetimes. Section 1 of the 1968 statute amended G.L. c. 32, § 58 to read as follows: "A veteran who has been in the service of the commonwealth, or of any county, city, town or district or any housing authority, for a total period of thirty years in the aggregate, shall, at his own request, with the approval of the retiring authority, be retired from active service at seventy-two percent of the highest annual rate of compensation, including any bonuses paid in lieu of additional salary or as a temporary wage increase in addition to his regular compensation and including any maintenance allowance, payable to him while he was holding the grade held by him at his retirement, and payable from the same source." (Emphasis supplied.) The effect of the amendment was to increase the percentage of annual compensation used in computing the retirement allowance from 65% to 72%. Section 2 of St. 1968, c. 700 provides that "any veteran who, prior to the P.D. 12 53 effective date of this act, was retired under [G.L. c. 32, § 58] shall have his annual pension adjusted, so as to comply with the provisions of said [§ 58] , as amended by section one of this act." (Emphasis supplied.) The 1968 statute was approved July 19 and its effective date is October 17, 1968. The problem arises under G.L. c. 32, § 58B, which was not amended by St. 1968, c. 700. Section 58B allows a veteran qualifying for a pension under § 58 to accept a lesser sum in order that an allowance may be payable to his widow after death. You are concerned about the effect of the 1968 amendment to § 58 upon the rights of widows of veterans who have died prior to October 17, 1968, the effective date of the amendment. You ask specifically about the rights of a widow in the following situations: 1. Where the veteran had elected to accept the option under § 58B and had retired before his death. 2. Where the veteran was entitled to retire but died before applying for retirement and before accepting the option under § 58B. I am of the opinion that the widows of both classes of veterans are entitled to an adjustment in the allowances payable to them under G.L. c. 32, § 58B. This conclusion is based on the inter-relationship which appears to have been intended between §§58 and 58B, and the effect on that interrelationship of St. 1968, c. 700, § 2. The first paragraph of G.L. c. 32, § 58B provides: "A veteran who is entitled to be retired under the provisions of section fifty-eight may, on or before the date of his written application for retirement, elect to receive a lesser yearly amount of pension payable to such veteran during his lifetime, with the provision that upon his death leaving as a survivor his spouse at the time of his retirement two thirds of the yearly amount of such lesser pension shall be continued during the lifetime of and paid to such spouse; provided, however, that the surviving spouse shall receive not less than one half of the pension such employee is receiving at the time of his death . . ." The yearly amount of such lesser pension shall be determined so that the value, on the date of retirement, of the prospective payments to such veteran and to such spouse shall be the actuarial equivalent of the value on such date of the full pension that such veteran would be entitled to under the provisions of said section fifty-eight." It is clear that any veteran who retired under G.L. c. 32, § 58 before October 17, 1968, // still living on that date, would be entitled to the benefits of the 1968 amendment whether or not he had elected to accept the lesser sum under § 58B. The source of the right to retire and to receive a pension lies exclusively in § 58 itself. Section 58B does not affect the existence of those rights, but deals only with the manner in which the pension is to be paid. The "lesser pension" payable to a veteran who has accepted the § 58B option is determined by a formula which is applied to "the full pension that such veteran would be entitled to under the provisions of [§ 58]." Since the amount of the "full pension" payable to a living veteran must be recomputed at the 72% rate because of the 1968 amendment to § 58, the same adjustment must be made in the "lesser pension" payable to a living veteran who made the election under § 58B. 54 P.D. 12 Upon the death of a veteran who has accepted the "lesser pension" under § 58B, his widow receives an allowance equal to "two thirds of the yearly amount of such lesser pension . . . ." If he should be entitled to an adjustment under St. 1968, c. 700, § 2 in that "lesser pension" before his death, it follows that his widow's allowance payable thereafter would also have to be adjusted to conform to the increased pension rate. In this way the increase in the pension rate brought about by the 1968 amendment would ultimately inure to the benefit of the widow of a previously retired veteran who happens to be alive on the effective date of October 17, 1968. The foregoing case differs from the one described in part 1 of your question only in that the veteran in the latter case has died prior to October 17. But once it is conceded (as I believe it must be) that the widow of the previously retired veteran who died after October 17 will benefit from the increased pension rate, I can see no basis for supposing that the Legislature intended to deny similar benefits to widows of veterans who died before that date. The Supreme Judicial Court, in upholding the application of another statute increasing pensions payable to a broad class of veterans, stated that "[t] he benefits thereby afforded should not be denied to the plaintiff . . . unless there exists a substantial reason to believe he was not intended to be among those retired veterans receiving the increase." Johnson v. Milton, 349 Mass. 736, 740. I think that the same reasoning is applicable to the pension rights of retired veterans' widows in the present case. In my opinion the widow under § 58B must be treated as standing in the place of her deceased husband regardless of whether his death preceded or followed the effective date of the 1968 amendment. Under § 58B the lives of two persons — the veteran and his widow — are substituted for the life of the veteran alone in determining the period of the retirement benefits conferred by § 58. For purposes of § 58B, therefore, I think that the reference to "veteran" in the retroactive adjustment clause of the 1968 statute should be construed as including the veteran's widow. Her rights are derivative and her survival to the effective date of October 17, 1968 was, in my opinion, intended to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for the increased pension rate to the same extent that her husband's survival to that date would have done so. Putting it a different way, I think that § 58B should be read as, in effect, including within the scope of the word "veteran" the widow in whose favor he has made the election provided in that section. Mathematically, this was certainly the intention of the Legislature, since § 58B provides that "[t]he yearly amount of such lesser pension shall be determined so that the value, on the date of retirement, of the prospective payments to such veteran and to such spouse shall be the actuarial equivalent of the value on such date of the full pension that such veteran would be entitled to under the provisions off § 58] . " (Emphasis supplied.) I am persuaded that a similar legislative purpose governs in determining the effect of the 1968 amendment to § 58. To be sure, a literal reading of some of the language of § 58B - such as the proviso that the widow receive "not less than one half of the pension such employee is receiving at the time of his death " (emphasis supplied) - might argue for a narrower interpretation. But the terms of an isolated provision must be subordinated to the overriding legislative intent. In any event I do not think that this is sufficient evidence to establish the proposition that the Legislature intended to discriminate between veterans' widows in otherwise identical circumstances merely on the basis of the date of their husbands' deaths. P.D. 12 55 To summarize, I am of the opinion that the widow's allowance depends on the amount which would have been payable to her husband on the date of his retirement if he had lived to October 17, 1968. Under St. 1968, c. 700, § 2, the amount which would have been so payable must be adjusted to comply with the newly established pension rate of 72%. Accordingly, an adjustment must be made in the amount payable to the widow. The class of cases described in part 2 of your question involves additional complications. Here the veteran, though entitled to retire, died before actually doing so and before electing to provide an allowance for his widow under G.L. c. 32, § 58B. The third paragraph of that section is relevant to cases of this kind: "If a veteran entitled to be retired under the provisions of section fifty-eight dies before making written application for such retirement, or, having exercised the option provided by this section, dies before the effective date of his retirement, his widow shall receive an annual allowance consisting of two thirds of the actuarial equivalent to which said veteran would have been entitled had his retirement allowance been computed under the provisions of this section as of the date of death of said veteran, and payable from the same source; provided that said widow and the deceased veteran were living together at the time of his death, or that the retiring authority finds that they had been living apart from justifiable cause other than desertion or moral turpitude on the part of the widow." (Emphasis supplied.) For purposes of your question, I read the foregoing provision as saying, in effect, that the widow of a veteran eligible for retirement who dies before applying therefor and before exercising the option under § 58B shall be treated as if her husband had lived long enough to exercise the option and to retire. As previously indicated, the widow would be entitled to an adjustment in her allowance, pursuant to St. 1968, c. 700, § 2, if her husband's retirement and his exercise of the option had preceded his death — even if she was widowed before the effective date of the 1968 statute. Thus, the widow described in part 2 of your question, like the widow described in part 1, is entitled to the adjustment. Very truly yours, ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON Attorney General Number 1 4. October 2 1 , 1 968 DR. FRANCIS X. GUINDON, Director Division of State Colleges 50 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 021 10 Dear Doctor Guindon: You have requested my opinion on whether the Board of Trustees of State Colleges (the "Trustees") may authorize the expenditure of $10,000 for a program of educational stipends for a group of students at Boston State College from certain funds appropriated to the Trustees. Your letter indicates that the proposed expenditure "arises from the need to provide additional subsidy to some ten to fifteen disadvantaged students who on the basis of a ten-week workshop held this summer had been admitted as 56 P.D. 12 full-time regular students to Boston State College." As I understand it, this program is an experiment designed to assist students who, because of the extreme cultural and economic handicaps of the urban ghetto environment in which they have been living, would not otherwise have any opportunity for a college education. The program as a whole involves forty-seven such students who were selected from a larger group by a faculty team from Boston State College on the basis of college potential. The summer workshop referred to was the first stage of this program, and was financed by a self-replenishing fund available for the purpose. See St. 1968, c. 380, § 2, Item 7107-0001. Since this phase of the program was conducted on a part-time basis, the participating students were able to continue working at their jobs and thereby support themselves without interfering with their studies. This is no longer the case. Having become full-time freshmen at Boston State College, these students must now devote much more time to their studies and cannot hold full-time outside jobs without defeating the purpose of the program. You report that through scholarships and existing student-aid programs, most of these students can afford to continue at the College. You state, however, that the remaining ten or fifteen of them, some of whom have dependents, cannot do so without an additional subsidy to defray living expenses. Accordingly, the Trustees have voted to authorize a $10,000 stipend to assist the latter group of students with their living expenses for the fall semester, with the expectation of authorizing a similar expenditure for the spring semester. These funds would be disbursed to the students by the President of Boston State College in varying amounts on the basis of individual need, using much the same criteria as those prescribed by certain educational aid programs sponsored by the Federal Government. You indicate that the Trustees adopted this course of action only after exploring all other possible solutions to the problem and satisfying themselves that there was no presently available alternative. In submitting their request for this expenditure to the Comptroller, the Trustees directed that it be charged against the general operations account of Boston State College, to which over four million dollars had been appropriated in the Budget for the 1969 Fiscal Year (St. 1968, c. 380, § 2, Item 7108-0000). The Comptroller, however, has refused to certify the expenditure, stating that it is not a proper charge against this account. You have asked me to determine the correctness of the Comptroller's ruling. I regret to advise you that in my opinion the Legislature did not intend that this account be charged for the proposed expenditure. In so advising you I do not deprecate in any way the social desirability of the proposed stipends. Rather, I have assumed, for purposes of this opinion, that the Trustees are correct in treating this expenditure as necessary to meet a social and educational need of the highest priority. Nor do I believe there is any constitutional obstacle to the use of public funds for this purpose. This opinion is therefore addressed exclusively to the narrow question of whether the Legislature has in fact authorized the Trustees to use funds from the particular appropriation in question (Item 7108-0000 of the 1969 Budget) for the proposed program of educational stipends. It is fundamental that the Trustees may exercise only such powers as the Legislature has conferred upon them. It is equally fundamental that the exercise of any power involving the expenditure of funds from the State Treasury is P.D. 12 57 conditional upon the existence of an appropriation for that purpose at the time the expenditure is to be made. See G.L. c. 29, §§ 26, 27. These two basic propositions supply the framework for my answer to the question at hand. 1. AUTHORITY TO GRANT STIPENDS APART FROM THE BUDGET FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR The Board of Trustees of State Colleges is established as an agency within the Department of Education by G.L. c. 15, § 20A, and is given broad powers over the state colleges by G.L. c. 73. There clearly is no provision in c. 73 or elsewhere in the General Laws, however, whereby the Trustees are given express authority to grant the proposed stipends. In my opinion, it is equally evident that there are no general statutory provisions from which such authority may justifiably be inferred. You point out in your letter that "the granting of such stipends is a customary prerogative of boards of trustees of institutions of higher education." The state colleges (including Boston State College) are, of course, institutions of higher education which "provide a major emphasis on the preparation of teachers and other professional educational personnel." G.L. c. 73, § 1. But, while G.L. c. 73, § 1, prior to 1965, gave the Trustees "all the authority, responsibility, rights, privileges, powers and duties customarily and traditionally exercised by governing boards of institutions of higher learning," this provision was stricken from § 1 by St. 1965, c. 572, § 18. The 1965 statute also created the Board of Higher Education and gave it ultimate control over certain areas of educational policy. Thus, under G.L. c. 15, § ID, inserted by St. 1965, c. 572, § 2, the stated purpose of the Board of Higher Education is "to support, facilitate, and delineate functions and programs for public institutions or of higher education in the commonwealth segments of such institutions, to allocate to them the responsibility and autonomy to discharge such functions and programs, and to plan and develop efficient and effective coordination among them . . . ." There follows in the same statute a long list of powers conferred upon the Board of Higher Education, the first of which is to "promote the best interests of all public higher education throughout the commonweatlh." In this manner, the Trustees, though continuing to perform a vital function in the structure of Massachusetts higher education, have in some respects been subordinated to the Board of Higher Education, thereby somewhat narrowing the scope of the independent powers of the Trustees which might otherwise be inferable from the broad language of G.L. c. 73. Evidence of such a legislative intent to restrict the scope of the Trustees' implied powers in the area of student aid programs lies in the fact that the Board of Higher Education, not the Trustees, has been specifically charged with the administration of many programs for providing financial aid to needy students. Under G.L. c. 15, § ID, the Board administers three different scholarship programs: one for students "enrolled in and pursuing a program of higher education," another for those pursuing "a course of study in medicine, dentistry or nursing" and still another for awarding a limited number of "merit scholarships." In addition, the Board of Higher Education is authorized by G.L. c. 69, § 7D to award "special education scholarships ... to graduates of high schools within the commonwealth who qualify for entrance to a public or private college or university in courses in the field of education . . . ." The latter 58 P.D. 12 provision is particularly significant in that it extends the authority of the Board of Higher Education even to scholarships for students in the state colleges. 1 Thus, although the Trustees are largely autonomous in their administration of the state colleges, the Legislature has seen fit to vest most of the authority over scholarships in the Board of Higher Education and to assign the Trustees a relatively minor role in this particular area. The specificity of these grants of power, moreover, discloses a legislative pattern of providing for student-aid programs only by express statutory enactment. 2 Therefore, apart from the 1969 Budget, I find no express or implied power in the Trustees to authorize the expenditure of $10,000 for the program of educational stipends here in question. 2. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR STIPENDS FROM ITEM 7108-0000 Turning, then, to the 1969 Budget, by which the Legislature could, if it so wished, have authorized as well as funded the proposed student stipend program, I find no indication that it intended to do either. The appropriation in question is Item 7108-0000 of the Budget for the 1969 Fiscal Year (St. 1968, c. 380), one of many appropriations made to the Trustees "[f] or the administration, maintenance of and for certain improvements at state colleges and the boarding halls attached thereto . . . with the approval of the board of trustees." Subject to these limitations, Item 7108-0000 appropriates $4,323,680 for "State College at Boston, including not more than three hundred and seventy-nine permanent positions." This appropriation, like any appropriation, is a legislative enactment entitled to statutory force and effect, and the funds therein may be used only for purposes falling within the scope of the appropriation. The precise question, then, is whether the "administration" and "maintenance" of Boston State College include the granting of stipends to its students. It has already been noted that so far as the General Laws are concerned, the Legislature has followed a practice of establishing programs for student aid by express statutory language. The same is true of appropriations to educational agencies. For example, the Legislature, under Item 7108-9704 of the 1969 Budget, appropriated $75,000 for use by the Trustees at Boston State College "[f]or the commonwealth's contribution toward the national defense education act loan program and the office of economic opportunity student work program." A similar appropriation relative to these federally-sponsored student- aid programs was made for each of the other state colleges (see St. 1968, c. 380, § 2, Items, 7109-9704, 7110-9704, 7111-9704, 7112-9704, 7113-9704, 'There is an exception under G.L. c. 69. § 71) for scholarships to Fitchburg State College. Scholarships to that College are specially covered by G.L. c. 69, § 7C, which provides that they shall be recommended by its president and approved by the Board of Educa- tion (as distinguished from the board of Higher Education). Yet § 7C makes no reference to the Trustees of State Colleges, whose sole responsibility in this regard appears to be to act as a conduit of funds appropriated for such scholarships. See St. 1968, c. 380, § 2, Item 71 10-9704. 2 VVhile I have found no express provision in the General Laws which authorizes a program of educational stipends in the $10,000 amount proposed, G.L. c. 73, § 5 appears to authorize (subject to appropriation) such a program in a lesser amount: •The trustees may annually expend, in semiannual payments, not more than four thousand dollars in aiding students in state colleges." (Emphasis supplied.) P.D. 12 59 71 14-9704, 71 15-9704, 71 16-9704, 71 17-9704) - despite the fact that a general operations appropriation was made for each state college in terms similar to Item 7108-0000 (see St. 1968, c. 380, § 2, Items 7109-0000, 71 10-0000, 71 1 1-0000, 7112-0000, 7113-0000, 7114-0000, 7115-0000, 7116-0000, 7117-0000). In the case of Fitchburg State College, which is authorized to award "special education scholarships" by G.L. c. 69, § 7C, a specific appropriation is made to the Trustees "for not more than one hundred scholarships, as authorized by [G.L. c. 69, § 7C] ." St. 1968, c. 380, § 2, Item 71 10-9407. Until 1967, moreover, the Legislature had made a practice of including in its annual budgets specific appropriations of $4,000 to the Trustees " [f] or aid to certain pupils in state colleges, under the direction of the board of trustees." See, for example, St. 1966, c. 411, § 2, Item 1329-03. 3 Yet this appropriation (which is conspicuous by its absence from the 1968 and 1969 Budgets) customarily appeared side by side with a general operations appropriation for each of the state colleges identical in all material respects to Item 7108-0000 of the 1969 Budget. See, for example, St. 1966, c. 411, § 2, Items 1330-01, 1331-01, 1332-01, 1333-01, 1334-01, 1335-01, 1336-01, 1337-01, 1338-01. The same degree of particularity is demonstrated in the appropriations made to the Board of Higher Education under St. 1968, c. 380 for the scholarship programs administered by that agency. Here the Legislature has not only specified that the appropriated funds are to be used for such scholarships, but has made separate appropriations for each individual scholarship program. Thus, $250,000 has been appropriated to the Board "[f] or medical, dental and nursing scholarships, as authorized by [G.L. c. 15, § ID]" (Item 7070-0005); $2,000,000 has been appropriated "[f]or general scholarships, as authorized by [G.L. c. 15, § ID] " (Item 7070-0006); $15,000 has been appropriated "[f]or special educational scholarships, authorized by [G.L. c. 69, § 7D] " (Item 7070-0007) and $32,000 has been appropriated "[f]or merit scholarships, as authorized by [G.L. c. 15, § ID] " (Item 7070-0014). It is even more significant, in my opinion, that the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts received an appropriation in the 1969 Supplementary Budget of $150,000 "[f]or a program of assistance for students from various racial backgrounds in disadvantaged environments, including but not limited to negro students; provided, that expenditures may be made for, but not limited to, scholarships, loans, matching federal and private grants, tutorial assistance and programs of cultural enrichment." St. 1968, c. 771, Item 7411-2000. The powers of the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts, under G.L. c. 75, are at least as broad as (if indeed, not broader than) those of the Trustees of State Colleges, many of them being conferred by identical statutory language. And the University received a general maintenance appropriation similar to those received by the state colleges. St. 1968, c. 380, § 2, Item 7410-0000. Yet the Legislature made a specific appropriation to the University for what appears to be a program closely similar to the one contemplated by the Board of Trustees of State Colleges. 73, § 5, whereby the Trustees are authorized, subject to appropriation, to spend up to $4,000 annually "in aiding students in state colleges." The omission of any comparable appropriation in the current Budget suggests that the Legislature did not intend to make funds available to the Trustees for student aid under G.L. c. 73, § 5. Furthermore, even if the Legislature had intended to incorporate an appropriation for use under G.L. c. 73, § 5 within some larger account, it seems unlikely that it would have selected for this purpose an account (such as Item 7108-0000) whereby funds are appropriated for use at a single state college rather than the state colleges generally. 60 P.D. 12 We discern here a clear and consistent pattern whereby the Legislature has provided funds for each student-aid program on an individual basis, in some instances prescribing the uses of those funds in considerable detail. In doing so, the Legislature has, I think, manifested an intention to reserve to itself all major decisions on the nature and extent of scholarship and other student-aid programs. It has, in effect, carved out an exception to the largely autonomous status which it has conferred upon bodies like the Trustees of State Colleges. In the light of this legislative pattern, my conclusion that Item 7108-0000 was not intended to include funds for the proposed stipend program is strenghtened by the fact (reported by you and by the Fiscal Affairs Division) that the Trustees did not request funds for this or any similar program in the budgetary estimates they submitted for the current Fiscal Year. The Legislature therefore had no proposal for such a program before it when it included Item 7108-0000 in the 1969 Budget. This being the case, it is highly unlikely, in the light of the legislative pattern heretofore described, that the Legislature intended to appropriate funds from this account for this purpose. In summary, then, all the available evidence, considered together, points to the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend Item 7108-0000 to include expenditures for a student stipend program of this nature. 3. THE EFFECT OF THE EXPENDITURE CODE MANUAL AND OF FISCAL AUTONOMY The foregoing conclusion is not altered by the two further factors relied upon in your letter as possible sources of the Trustees' authority to expend funds from Item 7108-0000 for educational stipends. The first of these is the fact that such stipends are recognized as possible objects of expenditure in the Expenditure Code Manual published at the direction of the Joint Committee on Ways and Means in accordance with G.L. c. 29, § 27. The second is the considerable measure of fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Trustees under G.L. c. 73, § 12. As to the first of these, you have called my attention to the schedule of "subsidiary accounts" relating to appropriation Item 7108-0000 which is on file with the Joint Committee on Ways and Means pursuant to G.L. c. 29, § 27, and to the allocation therein of $150,000 to Subsidiary Account 13. Subsidiary Account 13 is captioned on page 10 of the Expenditure Code Manual as "Special Supplies and Expenses." There follows a long and varied list of object codes - i.e., possible purposes for which funds in this account may be spent, if otherwise authorized, with a code number identifying each. Object Code 655, appearing on page 1 1 of the Manual, provides: "Tuition, Educational Stipend and Supplies: "Includes expenditures for tuition, educational stipend and supplies, textbooks and periodicals for teachers and pupils and all supplies for educational purposes." (Emphasis supplied.) But this does not mean that all appropriated funds allocated to Subsidiary Account 13 are available for the purposes described in Object Code 655, or that funds allocated to Object Code 655 can necessarily be expended for all the purposes set forth therein. On the contrary, these educationally oriented types of expenditures are grouped under Object Code 655, and Object Code 655 is included under Subsidiary Account 13, merely for administrative convenience in the classification and control of expenditures. That is, if and when authorized by P.D. 12 61 the Legislature, expenditures for educational stipends would be assigned to Subsidiary Account 13 and Object Code 655 for accounting purposes. 4 Whether a given object code is pertinent to a particular appropriation always depends in the final analysis on the scope of the appropriation itself. For the reasons already stated, I do not think that the Legislature intended the funds in Item 7108-0000 to be available for the payment of the educational stipends here in question. For similar reasons, I do not believe that the degree of fiscal autonomy which the Legislature has conferred upon the Trustees can be successfully relied upon here. General Laws c. 73, § 12 authorizes the Trustees, among other things, to transfer appropriated funds "within and among subsidiary accounts" without obtaining the approval of the Budget Director which G.L. c. 29, § 29 requires of most state agencies. 5 But funds so transferred may still be used only for purposes falling within the scope of the general appropriation within which the transfer is made -in this case, Item 7108-0000. As previously indicated, the payment of the proposed educational stipends is not among the purposes for which funds from Item 7108-0000 may be spent. It should be noted in this connection that the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts are also granted fiscal autonomy by a statute almost identical to G.L. c. 73, § 12. 6 Yet the Legislature apparently deemed it necessary to give the University the specific appropriation previously referred to " f fj or a program of assistance for students ... in disadvantaged circumstances . . . ." St. 1968, c. 771, Item 741 1-2000. In short, neither the terms of Object Code 655 in the Expenditure Code Manual nor the degree of fiscal autonomy given by G.L. c. 73, § 12 can alter the fact that the proposed expenditure of $10,000 for this program of educational stipends is outside the intended scope of Item 7108-0000 of the 1969 Budget. It is therefore my opinion that the Trustees may not authorize the proposed payment of such stipends to students at Boston State College from this account. Very truly yours, ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON A ttornev General Subsidiary Account 1 3 also embraces such expenditures as those "for all fish and game propagation supplies for stocking streams and forests" (Object Code 636, at page 1 1 of the Manual), and "for military and police supplies such as revolvers, holsters, rifles, ammunition, gas, bombs, cartridges, handcuffs, etc." (Object Code 637, at page 11 of the Manual). It could hardly be contended that the Trustees may apply funds appropriated under Item 7108-000 to these purposes. 'The full text of G.L. c. 73, § is as follows: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the general court shall annually appropriate such sums as it deems necessary for the maintenance, operation and support of each state college; and such appropriations shall be made available to each state college by the appropriate state officials for expenditure through allotment, transfer within and among subsidiary accounts, advances from the state treasury in accordance with the provisions of sections twenty-four, twenty-five and twenty-six of chapter twenty-nine, or for disbursement on certification to the state comptroller in accordance with the provisions of section eighteen of said chapter twenty-nine as may from time to time be directed by the trustees or an officer of the division designated by the trustees." 3General Laws c. 75, § 8 provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the general court shall annually appropriate such sums as it deems necessary for the maintenance, operation and support of the university; and such appropriations shall be made available by the appropriate state officials for expenditure through allotment, transfer within and among subsidiary accounts, advances from the state treasury in accordance with the provisions of sections twenty-four, twenty-five and twenty-six of chapter twenty-nine, or for disbursement on certification to the state comptroller in accordance with the provisions of section eighteen of said chapter twenty-nine, as may from time to time be directed by 62 P.D. 12